nm5168: for the tutorials we thought it would be a good idea for once for us 
all to get together and er discuss a common issue er we chose the Gulf War as 
one which seemed to provide er enough material to discuss the structure of the 
international system the different policy-making agents and the norms and for 
you to think through er the different weight that each of these elements could 
have in explaining Japan's er policy decision in respect of the Gulf War so 
we've asked you basically to spend some of your Easter vacation preparing and 
we should have er about a forty-five minute presentation from the postgraduates 
first and Ian will lead off and explain what what that group is going to do and 
then the other Ian for the undergraduates er will then er hopefully explain how 
the undergraduates are going to proceed so it's basically forty-five minutes 
what shall we do let's think probably it's best to have both presentations 
isn't it
nm5169: yeah
nm5168: so i think we'll have both presentations and then you'll have ten 
minutes of questions for each team so in other words forty-five minutes 
presentation from the postgraduates forty-five from the undergraduates ten 
minutes of questions from the undergraduates to the postgraduates ten minutes 
of questions from the postgraduates to the undergraduates ten to fifteen minute 
break and then the three of us will ask both of the teams questions okay fine 
can i then hand over er to namex
sm5171: unfortunately our introducer er had a bit of a footballing accident and 
er he lost his teeth so [laughter] so we er couldn't do the introduction which 
was the what that Japan did but i'm sure you all know what Japan did it was 
mainly the thirteen billion US dollars to the war effort er so we're gonna move 
straight on to our second presentation which is gonna be by namex and he's 
gonna talk about the levels of analysis the structure agency norms because we 
think it's important to have a er theoretical background as to why we're 
approaching it in this way er then we're gonna move on to the the three factors 
structure agency norms er first with Anthony talking about structure then er 
Roberto talking about agency and then Hannah's gonna talk about norms er in 
conclusion er Cosel is gonna come up and say where we think the emphasis should 
lie so i'll hand you over to 
sm5172: thank you i actually know it wasn't that easy to become a presenter in 
our team because it was really competitive team so thank you very much for 
giving and presenting and Ian okay i'll start i'm going to explain about er the 
level of analysis and that fact is Gulf War and Japan's involvment and first is 
diverse explanations can we can we present varied generate generali- 
generalisations about why Gulf War occurred and why Japan as well as other 
states were involved are these insights get go beyond in the detailed and 
narrow treatment of individual disputes or obvious and understanding 
generations generalizations certainly devolves explanations and hypothesis of 
the questions are numerous and contradictory here an effective point of 
departure of the analysis of the Gulf War is suggest-, suggest-, suggested by 
the scheme Kenneth Walls employs in his book Madness States and War it is a 
classic work Walls organises the theories according to whether the cause of war 
is found in the nature of man in the nature of the states or in the nature of 
the international state system walls interview Jack Redding partly asserting 
the issue of Shumon to one side organises the theories according to whether 
they stress the system level the nature of citizen society or the decision 
making process nowadays professor Glenn Hook organises those theories according 
to whether the cause of Gulf War is found in agency norm in the nature of the 
international structure i'm going to talk about er the three devolved images 
first is er first image is second vision and third images the first image's 
assumption is that the causes of Gulf War and Japan's involving are to be found 
in the nature and behaviour of individual political leaders or decision-makers 
however although first image sometimes provide useful emphasises on the 
responsibility of specific individuals for Gulf War they nonetheless tended to 
fall well short of providing comprehensive explanations of why Gulf War 
occurred they cannot for the most part explain why warfare has been endemic in 
some regions and historical periods and rather infrequent in others human 
beings pos-, possess cap-, capacities for both cooperation and conflict and 
explanations that concern themselves exclusively with individual human 
behaviour are likely to be incomplete that is our second image explanation this 
assumption is following as Gulf War and Japan's involving depend on the type of 
national government the of the society or constitution this implication here is 
that while human nature may not be changeable social and political institutions 
are Wilson's formulation that democra-, democracies are more peaceable while 
authoritarian and monarchical states are aggressive feels better but still 
falls short of providing a comprehensive explanations in addition they i-, they 
are little relevance to any particular kind of government whether authoritarian 
or liberal communist or democracy military or civilian was more prone to 
undertake armed attack than any other other kind for a while a variant o-, a 
variety of regions are however democracies with constitutions towards peace to 
become involved in wars with non-democratic states what does seem to be the 
cause is that democracies based on democratic constitutions towards peace do 
not fight wars with each other democracies historically haven't get involved in 
the numerous wars that occur in non-democracies so you should find explanations 
it's related to structure the argument cause of Gulf War and Japan's involving 
inheres in the very condition of the international system which which for once 
and others have identified as one of international anarchy that is states 
existing in international milieu that lacks effective means for peaceful 
resolution of conflicts because of the absence of any acceptable overall 
authority or sense of community finally the position of individuals within an 
ordered nation state for security and interest of countries that are not by 
enlarge even i thought established orthodox with a monopoly of means of 
violence or by a judicial system for the authoritative resolution of this 
instead states existed in an environment where it is substantially dependant on 
its own efforts for its security and failed to deal ultimate means a complete 
resolution a governmental dispute is often one of power co coercion or force 
okay that's it thank you 
sm5180: er what do i do what is it on right okay i'm going to talk about er 
structure and this is the outline of my argument first of all i'm going to 
provide er the structural context of the Gulf War Japan's position in the world 
order structure the significance of the Gulf War to Japan and this kind of 
provides a background to er providing the argument why Japan reacted in the way 
it did and these two points security considerations and political 
considerations okay so starting off er i'll provide the structural context of 
the Gulf War er from a structuralist position it can be argued that the war was 
fought over oil and the maintenance of world economic order and was therefore 
market-driven er it was perceived there'd be little chance of the fighting 
escalating into world war the East-West confrontation was over er and the 
crisis was perceived as being a challenge to the economic structure and indeed 
after the Iraqi invasion prices of oil went up briefly hitting thirty-eight 
dollars a barrel and it was felt that a crisis was looming er under this 
assumption it was felt that oil prices would drop if coalition forces fought 
Iraq and that shortages of oil and other commodities were not likely as long as 
the world's countries US especially took a tough stance and indeed no sooner 
had an airborne attack begun than oil prices began to drop er and so this is a 
very reductionist but economic argument perspective that the war averted global 
crisis in the world capitalist structure it's important to note this because 
it's within this of course that Japan is situated okay so it's number two 
[laughter] 
sm5180: er Japan's position in the world order er Japan's structural position 
is defined by its relationship with the US since forty-five it's sheltered 
under a nuclear umbrella and this has enabled it to er spend nothing on defence 
and concentrate its production on mass goods er international order prior to 
the Gulf War er sorry it's the collapse of bipolarity for the collapse of 
bipolarity this provided the natural setting in which Japan was placed it's 
since forty-five politically Japan has been peripheral and its role defined by 
US policy makers er for example Kennan in i think forty-five identified Japan 
as one of th-, one of the five regions of the world that was crucial to the 
world system the world capitalist system and must be kept out of communist 
hands so its strategic position in the world is very significant er but of 
course in many ways it could be argued that this suited Japan it hasn't had to 
overcome a legacy of distrust of other Asian states it invaded through the war 
or raise the domestic divisive issue of sending troops abroad er so Japan's 
position post-war position in the structure of the world order er defines its 
behaviour and this is why the Gulf War is perhaps so crucial er because it 
provides the challenge to Japan's perception of itself and its role in the 
world er the end of bipolarity saw the reorganisation of the international 
structure er and its from this perspective the structuralist perspective is why 
the Gulf is so controversial er the nation was propelled into an environment of 
visibility and potential influence internationally because of its economic 
influence it is after all the economic lynchpin of the capitalist block er so 
the importance of Japan in sustaining this this hegemonic block centred around 
America the Gulf War i guess made this more plain and also illustrated how it 
was constrained structurally in its actions er so so far firstly provides 
background structural background so i'll get on to its actual responses to the 
Gulf War er okay right er structural explanation of the Gulf War er the post 
war role of Japan in the world order world order the changing world order and 
significance of the Gulf all illustrates the new position of Japan okay so what 
of Japan's actual role from a structural perspective er it's clear that it was 
not directly because of self-interest or short-termism er Japan at the time 
obtained only two percent of its oil from Kuwait and two percent from Iraq so 
it could be argued that what was of primary importance was its strategic links 
with America and this links up with the economic structuralist argument 
provided in my introduction er it was pressure from America that was the 
fundamental motivation behind Japan's response to the Gulf and while perhaps an 
investigation into domestic agency provides an explanation of the manner in 
which Japan responded its crucial to understand that its pressure from America 
in the context of Japan's position in the structure in the alliance system er 
that made Japan respond as it did er Bush put pressure on Kaifu and for example 
on the day after Japan announced it was mere it was going to freeze Kuwaiti 
until us security council required further action and for example all one-
hundred senators signed a letter urging Japan to take further action and as a 
consequence the day before the security council met Japan agreed to impose 
sanctions on Iraq er quite clearly Japan was more concerned with er the 
situation in Washington than it was in Iraq er so perhaps Japan fared to 
America and the second point is political considerations and this is perhaps 
more proactive argument and this concerns the role of Japan in United Nations 
affairs in world affairs through multilateral bodies er as i said before its 
position in the world since er nineteen-forty-five as a defeated nation and as 
part of the US security system limited its structurally limited its influence 
er and its only been through multilateral bodies perhaps that Japan has been 
able to attempt to assert some influence er and perhaps the Gulf offered 
offered this opportunity for Japan to reassert itself er a multilateralism i 
guess is a means of negating the fears of other countries of a resurgent Japan 
um an increased role of Japan in world affairs and this would also consolidate 
Japanese demands to remove the former the enemy clause from the UN charter and 
also Japan's desire for a place on the security council um senior officials at 
the Japanese foreign ministry were concerned that for once previously believed 
Germany and Japan would simultaneously become members of the security council 
er because German Germany was more willing to send military personnel to the 
Gulf whilst the enactment of the peace cooperation bill of Japan was still 
rather unclear they feared that Germany Germany?s entrance would precede Japan 
so there was also not only security but political er structural and political 
reasons why the Gulf has significance to Japan so from this perspective Japan 
found an opportunity to consolidate structurally Japan's influence in the UN er 
so in conclusion from this structural perspective er the Benefits of a 
structural perspective is that it perhaps provides a deep er a deep er context 
in which Japanese actions can be measured against so far as one can find an 
adequate explanation by embedding Japanese actions in the context of the Gulf 
as a whole and Japan's political and economic position in the structure of 
world order 
sm5181: i'm going to talk about agency and the reason why agency wasn't wasn't 
very effective er first of all Japan being a country that was decimated during 
the war made it very difficult for the peace the peacetime constitution article 
nine made it very difficult for Japan to actually enter or send any military 
commitment to the war the figure of er Prime Minister Kaifu was was was vital 
he was a weak man to say the least he was he was chosen just basically out of 
well the the the Japanese political system couldn't off er somebody better 
because of the corruption that had gone on so the first play er i'm going to er 
focus is on Prime Minister Kaifu er he was a very weak man and he really 
couldn't push or and he was being pressured by George Bush in the international 
scene and by Ichiro Sawa who was who was blackmailing him into into taking the 
position to send er forces into the Gulf i want to raise the political parties 
okay here we go as we see all the major political parties have serious 
discrepancies on to as to what should be done the diet was very separated it 
didn't there wasn't a consensus Japanese society also was very divided they 
couldn't find a a consensus to sort of apply a strategy you see the liberal 
democratic party which is the strongest one wanted only to limit to 
transportation and communication to the all time members to carry light arms 
the Japanese socialist party is wouldn't hear of it the Komei party limited to 
just medical office without S-D-F status the democratic socialist party was 
willing to probate as long as members were not armed and the communist party 
just also wouldn't hear of it the Komei party was was willing to send medical 
officers or was willing to support that but the problem was that they couldn't 
really find people to go to the Gulf there was there was pressures from 
medicals staff and er unions and really nobody wanted to go there wasn't a 
really really big consensus they couldn't find volunteers to go to the to the 
Persian Gulf er another play er was probably and who would lat er reflect is er 
mr Hashimoto who er wouldn't really put the money for it he was he was really 
really against it although he did agree for a twenty-five-billion cheque and 
then he increased it to four billion but within the Japanese political system 
the minister er of of finance is usually a very independent person he usually 
never follows the lead of the Prime Minister er and he probably wasn't going to 
follow Kaifu anyway the last player or the last area of the agency is probably 
academics academics were also they couldn't agree professor Sadako Ogata of 
Sophia university or either a specialist in peace without weapons and professor 
Tatsuro Kanagiyo international Christian university believed that the proposed 
peace cooperation force should not even be sent er Yoshio Suzuki chief 
councillor at university argued that Japan's economy was unlikely to suffer and 
suggested another nine billion to be sent so at the end agency could produce no 
er no serious er diplomacy or no serious er solution to society to Japanese 
society and Japanese 
sf5182: i'm going to talk about norms and the influence on the response to the 
Gulf conflict and especially mention pacifist and sort of isolation er what was 
guiding the opposition against the sending S-D-F the self defence forces to the 
Gulf was even a non-military mission it was the strong pacifist norm in Japan 
ever since the er throughout the post-war period there has been a image 
prevailing of Japanese sort of pacifist or at least conflictable in the free 
world and several opinions surveys ever since the sixties have confirmed this 
image er an opinion poll furthermore plays a very significant part in the 
public sphere in Japan and their political decision makers are constantly aware 
of where the public stands on different issues and it has led to that er their 
seeking out policy trying to avoid controversial decisions for example revising 
the constitution or taking away the one ceiling on defence expenditure which 
they finally did in nineteen-eighty-seven er public opinion is of course 
important for decision makers in all democracies the abilities and the strength 
of the er pacifist or anti-military norms in Japan are very important and they 
have had a significant influence on the defence and security policy of Japan 
non the least in the Gulf conflict and these pacifist norms they stem from the 
result of defeat in World War Two and the US they were determined to see to it 
that there were no seeds for remilitarisation both in Japan and in Germany so 
general Macarthur the supreme command er of the allied forces in nineteen-forty-
six required incorporation of the principle of pacifist in the constitution er 
which and it's article nine then reads aspiring sincerely to an international 
peace based on justice and order the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation or the threat or use of force as a means of 
settling international disputes in order to accomplish the aim of the preceding 
paragraph land sea and air forces as well as other war potential will never be 
maintained the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised so 
this is er Japan is the only country in the world to constitutionally renounce 
war and er as you can see it also prohibits land sea and air forces as well as 
sending them abroad it doesn't say here er and at the time nineteen-forty-seven 
this was convenient for Japan Prime Minister Yoshida wanted to focus on the 
economic build up of Japan and to er maintain the emperor system as the 
national distinct distinction of Japan so Yoshida fully endorsed the 
constitution in the diet the Japanese people did the same and after some time 
the principle became engrained in the Japanese the way they see Japan in the 
world so the distinctive constitution became a cause of national pride and er 
also as a way to make amends of imperial deeds and to make certain that Japan 
would remain a non-threatening nation in the world so the principle might have 
been an American creation but it soon gained a life of its own er after a while 
the constitution er became or soon after the constititution became 
reinterpreted to allow self defence forces but not to send these abroad they 
the public nowadays they accept their existence but few of them want any build 
ups and the overwhelming opposition against revising the constitution in order 
to make their stance clear er and more legitimate also against sending them 
abroad er and generally furthermore the Japanese don't see military power as a 
very effective way to secure land security the kind of security in a poll in 
nineteen-seventy-seven forty-eight said it's not effective while they while 
there opt for international exchange diplomatic negotiations and economic 
cooperation and er during a poll during in a poll in the Gulf War in the time 
the Japanese people were asked: "what are the reasons Japan has been able to 
lead a peaceful existence after the second world war" and most people opted for 
the constitution and as you can see also economic and social stability Japanese 
diplomatic efforts of course the Japan-us security treaty er so about the 
legacy of war and how it has lead to the isolationist in political and 
international policy er the constitution and a strong attachment to it is 
origin originating from the memories of the war and the strong military culture 
that preceded and was during the war which led to an expansionist thrust to 
create the great er East Asia Co-prosperity spell and a defeat so Japan 
promised itself and the world especially its neighbour to never again use 
military force and er to they should remain harmless and focus on economic 
advancement so the American created a constitution and a commitment by the US 
to bear the brunt of a Japan's defence it was it was in this context it was 
very welcomed and er Japan could focus on economic prosperity and welfare and 
isolation from international politics and this all became the part of the new 
Japan and pacifist norm became part of the new Japan Japanese identity made up 
Japanese identity made it strong er than what the US would have wanted er but 
Japan was a poor country and they had a long way to go to reconstruct their 
society but they recovery of face was short er quick er than was first imagined 
and already in the seventies and eighties they developed into a great economic 
great power and with the economic achievements there also came pressure to re-
evaluate its international role and to shed its isolationist er so this norms 
influence on the response to the Gulf conflict well the importance of the norms 
it does they do not try in the financial commitment of Japan to the alliance 
but in the decision not to contribute with manpower or material in the non 
military missions and this is a decision that they got devastating critique for 
er and a strong anti-military norm they have led they have led have led to a 
lack of discussion since the end of World War Two in Japan about its stance on 
international as well as national security issues and it led to the Japan was 
unprepared to meet a crisis like the Gulf conflict and the pressure that was 
was combined with it and because the constitution would mean that Japan would 
break the law if they send the S-D-F abroad the efforts to go about this to 
send the S-D-F to the Gulf through the UN peace cooperation bill they came to 
nought since the opposition in the diet the-, identified them with they 
identified with pacifist norms at least they knew that the electorate did and 
er also because of the absence of discussion in the diet so to shed or revises 
of Japanese face for national security equip identity now shrink in an ad-hoc 
decision to send forces abroad for the first time since second world war it was 
just not deemed possible er it might be a good idea to mud-fight as normal when 
the constitution since the world has changed quite a lot since nineteen-forty-
seven as well as Japan but the Japanese people they first need an open 
discussion and critically analyse er the constitution and its role in the world 
and as a consensus seeking people and er the probably want to avoid the 
demonstrations that came about around nineteen six nineteen-sixty when the us-
Japan security treaty was about to be revised and er Prime Minister prime 
minister Kishi had to resign and thereafter they have tried to avoid to use 
majority as a way to get decisions through so that evidence of the influence of 
political opinion evidence of the influence of the political opinion in Japan 
er that's in April in April nineteen-ninety-one when the war had ended and 
there was maybe a shift in public opinion towards sending S-D-F as mine-
sweepers to the Gulf and first then the government also did to finally send 
mine-sweepers and er so i also think so the pacifist norm and the long 
political isolation they led to a lack of discussion in Japan: the subject of 
security and defence were almost taboo that led as i said to a no re-evaluation 
of the inflexible constitution and it can be made in the ad-hoc manner that the 
that would have suited the allied forces so er this did not only lead to a 
decision not to send manpower and material abroad it also power a non-
directionally response to Japan's so also public opinion about decision they 
pressured Japan in one direction while the international pressure present 
pressured in the opposite direction 
sm5183: ah i hope i can conclude all the things that my team mate made this 
conclusion i'd like to make four point the first point will deal with levels of 
analysis and the second will deal with agency the third structure and the 
fourth and the last norms firstly the explanatory powers of the three variables 
structure agency and norms enable us to comprehend why and how policy was made 
and what factors conditioned policy for example in the case of Japan's response 
to the Gulf War crisis we may recognise that the US and foreign and economic 
decline of the US which so adds structural variables did play Japan decision 
makers to make policy in response to the Gulf War crisis however due to the 
fact that Japanese society there has been norms of pacifism and anti-militarism 
which has been embedded as a result of the second world war this constrained 
policy makers to think carefully when dealing with the issue of dispatching the 
self defence force abroad the point here about level of analysis is that these 
three variables complement each other in other words they work interdependently 
to help us explaining the if we are to ignore one of the three variables we are 
not likely to logically and understandingly analyse the thing we want 
nevertheless it is not worthy that the work of each of these variables in 
explaining a particular case may not be equal to one another the second point 
in analysing Japan's response to the Gulf War crisis although we cannot make a 
consensus on the variables between structure agency and norms which one is the 
most important but we do agree that we should ruling out agency yeah because to 
explain why Japan behaved in the way it did in response to the crisis the 
policy making agents and other political actors seem to us to be the least 
important between the three variables this is because agency the fundamental 
factor which response to the United Nations flatter the agency the actors 
decisions seem in large part to reflect something imen-, emanating from the 
structure and norms variables in short this is not to say that the agency did 
not influen-, influence the way Japan reacted but the agency played a lowly 
formulating policy by structure and norms third part: structure according to 
one of the two factions of our group [laughter] 
sm5183: they insist that the structure of international system is the most 
important variable in analysing why Japan part in participated in the war 
because their structure is the fundamental variable which forced Japan to play 
more variety of roles in response to the war Japan decision making agents were 
faced with a dilemma: on the one side the government was pressured to play more 
roles commensurate to its position as an economic superpower on the other side 
the of policies to send the self defence forces abroad was composed by Japanese 
society the structure of the international system at that time were the in war 
the new world order of multipolarity system formed the current decline of the 
US the question of Japan's international role flow and the pressure from the US 
for Japan to play a more pro-active role it is worthwhile to say that the US 
forces source of power of the Japan government because Japan's security was 
mainly guaranteed by the US troops lastly: norms we agree to disagree over the 
roles of norms there are two positions of norms in dealing with the military 
issue the first position: norms that conditioned Japan's response were dictated 
by the structure of the world after the war after the second world war that is 
democracy and legacy and legacy of the second world war which created pacifism 
secondly norms have been wove into two directions traditional norms of anti-
militarism and pacifism and the second and the most important norm that they 
were Japanese pro-active role at international levels this norms stems from the 
fact that Japan has finally succeeded in economic scenario thus now it is a 
time to recall Japanese dignity and honour which has been ruled out since the 
end of the second world war this will as advocated by most of our group argue 
that norms were the most important factor since they evolved and become a major 
constraint on policy makers 
sm5184: i've brought this along today which is something i got from the charity 
shop [laughter] so as as the Gulf War was basically a media war i thought it 
would be nice to look at some pictures and distract you from me [laughter] so 
basically as i said the Gulf War was basically a media war as you can see er it 
presented an interesting point in history where the basic Berlin wall had 
fallen down and international communism was on the retreat and the cold war had 
basically ended and this situation gave a chance for a change in the 
international community a change in the structure of the international 
community and a chance for Japan also to revise its nature in the way it demon 
in the way it takes on its role in foreign policy and also in this situation 
gives Saddam Hussein a chance to invade Kuwait and draw the world's attention 
to the fact that although the cold war in many ways provided us with securities 
it also provided us with insecurities er the thirty years before this happened 
er president of Iraq at that time Hassam invaded well threatened to invade 
Kuwait er the British response was that only one brigade of troops and there 
was no international furore about it not compared to this with an international 
coalition of more than thirty countries so obviously there's been some change 
in the structure of the world somebody found this far more important in 
nineteen-ninety than they did in nineteen-sixty-three so the point being is 
that the international situation is always in a state of flux: it's always 
changing and this nineteen-ninety-six relation was just one more of the many 
changes which have happened in the international situation er so clearly the 
situation in the Gulf has changed: the influence of the world's oil economy had 
become so more such more significant than they had been in the sixties and this 
meant that issues of the middle-east region and the global economy were put on 
the line er so this time Japan's international basis was in a state of flux er 
during the eighties economic rivalry and trade disputes with America had meant 
that the nature of Japan's foreign policy had been shifting from what it had 
been in the nineteen-seventies which was an er very unilateral to a 
multilateral then again as as Japan witnessed the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan and increased er naval activity out of Vladivostock Japan's er 
often changed its its foreign policy to realign itself with America but this 
realignment also came at a point in time where the book book called the Japan 
that can't say no was released Prime Minister Kaifu made a statement where he 
believed in nineteen-ninety Japan was starting to take a more important role in 
world affairs he thought that er the time for Japan's coping policy where it 
just reacted to situations and basically followed the line of least resistance 
was now over he believed it was time for Japan to take on a more important 
position in the world as reflected by its current situation er so many many 
people say that Japan's previous economic and political foreign policy of 
reaction rather than proaction was problematic and realistic for other people 
on the on the other side would call it spineless and in some cases immoral uh 
so the Gulf War provided a test of Jap-, of Japan's rhetoric was it really was 
it really willing to take on the responsibility of a world power so what did 
Japan do during the Gulf War so despite the rhetoric of words instead of tax 
which Prime Minister Kaifu say; the first thing Japan did was basically sit 
down and work out what its oil supplies were going to be and basically that was 
irrelevant it was obvious that they were going to think about that but it was 
again straight away a reversion back to coping policies that we talked about 
before er sanctions were issued on the ninth of august before the UN security 
council the UN had actually sanctioned it the foreign the Japanese foreign 
minister was sent on a tour around the eastern states so Japan on the face of 
it seemed to react very very quickly to the situation but many of these many of 
these points were brought about because of American pressure you probably see 
lots of examples of president Bush on the telephone in this video i imagine 
most of it was actually occupied by Tokyo say to try to get them to do more 
even before the United Nations had sanctioned put sanctions in force America 
had been asking or jockeying and pushing Japan into trying to make er a stand 
against what they saw as international they're breaking an international 
agreement of policing etc so Japan also said that the thirty the thirty member 
council which was supposed to be involved in organising Japan's response to the 
middle eastern crisis and in many levels this international council was plugged 
in to the American foreign office American and so on er Japan made an effort to 
send shippings for food vehicles and also made offers of medical staff and 
supplies for many many times these failed to materialise quite as quickly as 
the Americans wished er food supplies were were delayed by two days because 
somebody forgot to order a ship to deliver them; four wheel drive vehicles 
failed to get delivered to the Gulf on time because Japanese shipping unions 
were afraid refused to load and then refused to take the ship to a potential 
war zone and of a one-hundred medical officers er promised only seventeen 
volunteered so Japan in many ways talked the talk but didn't walk the walk so i 
think basically Japan as the as the crisis unfolded Japan took the decision 
where it wanted to avoid isolation er so when the house of representatives vote 
in America voted for three seventy votes to fifty-three for US troops to be 
removed from the Japanese from Japan unless Japan was willing to foot the whole 
bill for their occupant for their presence there Japan came up with four 
billion US dollars to help the war effort Japan's second policy was to vote for 
the was United Nations centre where it looked to use the United Nations to try 
and allow itself to be part of the international community to try and get past 
the er constrictions of the er of the constitution but in November this was 
abandoned er and Japan took on its part as i suppose an individual neighbour 
within the international community where it provide funding goes back to the 
which cheque-book economy er cheque-book foreign policy of the nineteen-
eighties Japan set up a think tank to er decide what it could do in the future 
if such a crisis should happen in the future and i think that was the nail in 
the coffin Japan found it very difficult to react in this situation and set the 
think-tank for future reference and in January when the air raids started Japan 
promised nine well gave nine billion dollars in further economic aid so that is 
what Japan did and we have three groups to introduce individually how we go on 
to international structure agency and
nm5168: norms
sm5184: norms [laughter] sorry 
sf5173: is it between us we're all going to be looking at the international 
structure personally i'm going to introduce how the international structures 
influenced the debate on the role of the self defence forces er during the Gulf 
War new demands were set on Japan on deciding the scope of the international 
contribution they made and due to the position and power Japan acquired through 
economic means it was expected to take on a new global political role 
responsibility Japan had been prevented from dispatching self defence forces 
under the self defence force law but in this case more pressure was coming in 
from abroad mainly from the United States for Japan to contribute self defence 
force personnel and Japan was torn between these us demands and domestic 
constraints but the US wouldn't be satisfied if Japan's contribution failed to 
contain some commitment to self defence force manpower the reality of Japan's 
domestic politics ruled out any such a direct role and as if this wasn't 
problem enough Japan had to consider the political reactions of er the Asian 
countries should they agree to dispatching self defence force troops because 
these Asian nations as victims of Japan's aggression in the past would surely 
fear such military involvement and although Japan made a vast financial 
contribution it was clearly not sufficient in the eyes of others and Japan was 
taught by the lesson that you can't simply become economically involved with 
other countries and avoid political and military issues the Gulf War brought 
the issues of international cooperation into perspective Japan as a nation 
dependent on trade links with resource-rich countries to survive couldn't 
afford to be a bystander the demands on Japan included contributions of self 
defence forces and Japan's realisation of the importance of international 
cooperation for the future due to the issues that came about from the Gulf War 
has led to a mass debate on the expansion and role of the self defence forces 
though a lot of people have suggested that since Japan's a member of the UN the 
contribution to the collective security is surely a duty rather than a right 
and a new pattern was reached in the handling of the issue and the idea was to 
surpass the problem of constitutional restriction by using unarmed volunteers 
er affirming Japan's participation through UN peace-keeping activity which also 
may help with ease the worries of Japan's Asian neighbours and this issue led 
to the proposal of a a larger to allow Japan to contribute self defence forces 
and although it wasn't passed during this time in nineteen-ninety-two it 
finally was and since then the self defence forces have had some involvement in 
and debate continues even now on the possibility of reforming the constitution 
to allow Japan to be come more fully involved in a collective security 
arrangement and in reality pressure from the international community not being 
put on Japan at this time the debate surrounding the importance of the S-D-F in 
Japan's involvement in the international arena ruled Japan out
sf5175: the Gulf War belonging to the end of the cold war signalled a 
realignment of the world order it brought the question of how to deal with 
international conflicts in an age of d?tente to the fore Japan was used to 
operating within a way east-west confrontation imposed a kind of order on the 
world and served to determine military reaction er new world orders always 
begins to emerge in times of crisis and become fixed however set amongst the 
conclusion of hostilities and the Gulf was no exception during the Gulf crisis 
the major countries of the world with the US in the lead acted to a new world 
order Japan was aware of this but opinion in Japan regarding Japan's place in 
the new world order was divided and effected Japan's response to the Gulf War 
some subscribed to the pacifist view that Japan should remain pacifist and as 
if it was the Switzerland of Asia while others believed Japan should actively 
use the opportunity that the Gulf war presented to seek a more prominent place 
in the new world order previously Japan had been content as little Japan after 
World War Two Japan assumed the role of little Japan as a war devastated weak 
country Japan took as its role model Switzerland a neutral country uninvolved 
in international debates and decided to become the Asian Switzerland however 
with the Gulf crisis Japan became aware that remaining little Japan and 
uninvolved in international politics would be problematic they were no long er 
little but an economic superpower the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian 
Gulf gave rise to perhaps one of the greatest challenges to face Japan in the 
post cold war era prior to the Gulf crisis Japan had been operating on the 
hypothesis that it was possible to be a major power without being seriously 
involved in international politics this assumption was very seriously 
questioned by the Gulf crisis the Gulf crisis was a rude awakening for the 
Japanese government which had been burying its head in the sand regarding 
international politics Japan had previously escaped from becoming involved in 
international affairs the Gulf however forced the Japanese government to issues 
that had previously been ignored - Japan's role in international politics 
Japan's involvement with the UN and her international responsibilities this in 
turn opened up many debates concerning Japan's facing the world in general 
while immediate debate still ran day to day concerns Japan's international 
military role and the question of whether economic dependency alone was 
effective sorry is sufficient with this comes the question of Japan's of 
Japan's international responsibilities and to Japan's right to become part of 
the new emerging world order and Japan also had to contribute to the Gulf and 
not abstain from the conflict there were constitutional constraints that 
limited their response perhaps it was na?ve of Japan to believe that she could 
secure herself a place in the formation of the new world order by bearing 
merely a financial burden and not contributing in human terms the new world 
order also had an effect on Japan's response to the Gulf War Japan had since 
World War Two made it a priority to pursue a strong er relationship with the UN 
and took the US response to the Gulf War as its example although the UN did not 
react as skilfully or impartially as the US and other allied forces who had 
already agreed and acted upon force deployment just four days after the 
invasion it didn't feel that it did not support Iraq's actions on a thirteen to 
one vote in the security council the UN chose to censor this made it all the 
more necessary for Japan to become involved and to contribute to the allied 
efforts Japan was unable however to contribute to normative allied forces in 
the Gulf but was under pressure to contribute to peace keeping operations in a 
non-military role this was a source of contention in Japan but Japan was as 
Japan was the first to international in nineteen-ninety-two a survey conducted 
by the pacific research group found that only fifteen of the Japanese supported 
sending troops abroad and fifty-one were opposed to this directly however Japan 
in order to become a major play er in the new world order also sought a 
permanent security council seat and this should be seriously considered when 
evaluating why Japan responded to the Gulf crisis in the way that she did even 
now nearly ten years lat er there are still debates surrounding Japan's 
involvement with the peace-keeping and whether she should work towards 
maintaining strong relations with the UN and seeking a permanent security 
council seat in a recent meeting with the UN special committee on peace keeping 
operations - on the eleventh of February this year mr Yoshida Japan's 
representative mentioned that there are still concerns over sending Japanese 
personnel abroad for international peace keeping operations especially where 
the self defence forces are involved
nm5168: thank you
sf5176: okay i'm just going to touch on two dimensions the first being the er 
international political economy one er basically as er mentioned in the 
graduate presentation right after the invasion the price of oil did rise 
briefly hitting three eight dollars a barrel and other commodities as well as 
US dollar rose in price and strength er but within Japan interest rates were 
edging high er and stock prices were plunging down er and at this point the 
market was warning that a global crisis could be on the horizon and there was 
predictions that oil could hit fifty dollars a barrel now obviously as we have 
all discussed in the lecture you know Japan is extremely resource-poor oil is a 
very valuable commodity to this society and what we see here is a situation 
where an economic superpower is drawn into a problem firstly on the surface we 
see military and then we see the economic dimensions of that military political 
problem coming out so we see that this is going to be restraining obviously er 
but by November the market was sending different messages and the prevalent 
assumption was that oil prices would drop if coalition forces fought Iraq but 
they would rise sharply if a diplomatic solution were reached and obviously 
Japan would have pushed for a diplomatic solution preferring not to get 
involved in any worries about putting in military forces and this obviously in 
hand with the fact that this was the first international military incident 
since the Korean war that the US had acted so quickly towards doing something 
about they were put in a situation here er then the second dimension i'm 
touching on is the er historical one do you have the right that's on okay has 
to do with the idea of what had happened in the past when Japan had tried to 
persuade the independent diplomatic course er obviously up to this point they 
had Benefited by since World War Two they had Benefited being under the nuclear 
umbrella of the United States they had enjoyed the Benefits from the bilateral 
situation and they never felt the need to act as a custodian of the 
international order they had always completely accepted the existing order 
since the World War Two failure and there was a i mean they especially 
Benefited from the fact that never striking out on their own they had still 
been able to Benefit greatly from major elements of international economic 
order like I-M-F and G-A-T-T and these types of institutions so even though 
they had never tried to strike out and played the lead role something they may 
not have been used to not sure how to go about they had up to this point been 
getting all the Benefits so i guess to a certain extent it would just be the 
logic of why jump in now why at this point especially in terms of a crisis er 
generally from our perspective we thought that even though international 
structure did play quite a large role in determining the nature of Japan's 
response er we thought that domestic factors and crisis mismanagement was 
generally more important and they were not a result of Japan's traditional 
reluctance as a trading state to take sides in an international conflict and we 
also thought that it is important to note that within a historical perspective 
the government measures were swiftly implemented in an unprecedented in terms 
of the prominent role Japan played due to American pressure and the 
corresponding desire within the government for Japan to play a role in 
international affairs commensurate with its economic superpower size 
sf5177: we're just going to go through the main structure of what we're going 
to talk about: er impact of agency on the Gulf War reaction in Japan first 
we're going to outline the main agencies involved in foreign policy making and 
they're going through the constraints for example inter-minsterial disputes 
like the government arguments over the UN cooperation bill and the 
malfunctioning of international crisis management system Cath's then no namex's 
going to talk about the limitations due to Kaifu constitution they are and then 
Cath will go through constraints due to pressure groups public opinion and the 
media and divisions amongst political parties constraints due to the legacy of 
World War Two and then conclude with the results of such constraints on 
agencies policies with regards to Japan the main agencies involved in foreign 
policy would ref er to political and bureaucratic actors involved in decision 
making including the Prime Minister the diet the ministry of foreign affairs 
the ministry of international trade and industry defence agency and the 
transport ministry etc basically all of them for Japan's foreign policy it can 
be said quote: "that the multiplicity of agencies involved in external affairs 
is a source of confusion and inefficiency in formulation of foreign policy" 
this is true as well in regards to Japan's response to the Gulf War crisis one 
of the main constraints on agency was the malfunctioning of the international 
crisis management system er basically there was a need because of time 
constraints and political er nature of the issue there was a need for a top-
down approach to decision-making rather than er a ringisei system which is like 
a bottom-up consensus approach which is used in Japan but so that made the 
bottom-up consensus approach inefficient and also there were so many agencies 
involved there was a lot of bickering between the different agencies for 
example the UN peace cooperation bill er the ministry of foreign affairs and 
defence agency were fighting over the composition of forces that were to be 
sent and who was to be sent there were daily heated arguments in cabinet with 
regards to sanctions er the ministry of foreign affairs and the M-T were at 
loggerheads with each other with the size of economic aid the ministry of 
foreign affairs and the finance ministry weren't agreed and just as Ian 
mentioned earlier i think shipping off road vehicles to Saudi Arabia the 
ministry of foreign affairs decided that they'd go they'd promised this while 
the ministry of transportation was still negotiating for labour unions at all 
therefore they were basically unable to reach a consensus er in addition the pm 
Kaifu was very indecisive and at first he proposed that the S-D-F would take 
part in UN peace cooperation force but lat er changed his mind and said no 
maybe not so in general the decision making process can be seen to be very 
chaotic no set policies there
sf5173: er reactions of Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki in addition to the 
bureaucratic and constitutional constraints constraints contributed to his 
failure to pass the UN peace cooperation bill this bill was presented at the 
diet session on October twelfth nineteen-ninety and was designed to allow the 
dispatch of the S-D-F personnel to trouble spots such as the Persian Gulf but 
due to opposition from members of the L-D-P the socialist party Komeito the 
Japan communist party and the er Japan socialist the democratic socialist party 
er it failed to win enough votes to pass through to the U-P-P- er house this 
failure added to the growing unpopularity of Kaifu whose weakness as Prime 
Minister was already obvious a weakness was most diff most physically seen when 
Kaifu was forced to agree to the rewritten bill that had been amended in his 
absence he was away er visiting America and the middle east and it was amended 
in his absence by the deputy chief cabinet secretary Ishihara who was himself 
influenced by other leading ministers his weakness was also obvious as he 
seemed to provide aid packages and financial assistance each time in response 
to US involvement and pressure from Prime Minister er president Bush there was 
much wavering and waffling in his in um indecision in the government statements 
about the bill itself this was because the traditional methods of debate such 
as the ad ad hoc committees and the diet the diet debates were avoided and it 
was hastily passed through also the bill was a contradiction in terms it 
stipulated that the S-D-F would not employ the use of force yet were being sent 
under the US military operations in addition to this there was also confusion 
as to whether it would be classed as peace keeping or peace making the 
constitution this was further confused the issue with regards to Prime Minister 
Kaifu with the S-D-F laws this made the dispatchment of the S-D-F abroad 
illegal and article nine of the constitution was itself the embodiment of 
pacifism article however article ninety-eight of the constitution also demanded 
that Japan honour its treaties Japan had agreed to the UN treaty that demanded 
all member countries make armed forces available to the security council so 
there was constitutional confusion everywhere and as i'd like to finish with er 
a quote that was made by prime minister Kaifu just before the outbreak of the 
war he announced in the foreign policy magazine that the way forward for Japan 
was: "dialogue and cooperation which were now replacing missiles and tanks as 
the tools for achieving order" and that "Japan would rely on economic strength 
as opposed to military capability"
sf5178: as Sarah said i'm going to concentrate on constraints on Japan's 
political agent as a result of controv-, of the controversy of opinion in Japan 
firstly public opinion's an important factor the Kaifu government depended he 
depended heavily on this due to a lack of factional support within the L-D-P 
however the contradiction in public opinion which is existed in Japan and 
reflects the difficulties that Japanese political agents faced in policy 
formation for example er a majority whilst they clearly opposed dispatching 
military forces they also believed that er the cheque-book diplomacy was 
inadequate and half-hearted er the there was an Asahi poll which er shows the 
public opinion could also be a problem in the future as a constraint on er 
political agents for example sixty-seven of the Japanese favoured the use of 
non-military contributions in the future in the event of a future crisis 
nineteen percent still um nineteen favoured permitting the dispatch of forces 
whereas the rest remained unsure secondly the media er it's an interesting 
point cos it contrasts with this public opinion er there were three three out 
of four papers which i've never seen it mentioned lat er thought that Japan 
should take more military responsibility in the future these were the Sankei 
Shinbun who said well quoted in one edition "a nation must bear more risks" er 
the yomiuri sought re-examination of constitutional restrictions the Mainichi 
criticised the Japanese for their preference to send money rather than 
sacrifice their own blood and the Asahi was the only one that really supported 
the majority of public opinion which i mentioned earlier that Japan should 
maintain its non-military contributions er thirdly the division amongst 
political parties that was a a major constraint obviously there was the 
majority of the L-D-P supported the UN peace cooperation bill but the odd 
member for example the form er Prime Minister Fukuda opposed S-D-F involvement 
er the opposition party the Japan socialist party was er strictly against this 
bill apart from a few of the young er politicians on the legacy of World War 
Two as a hindrance to political agents which links back to the public opinion 
er in Japan a deep aversion to military related mat matters was embedded in the 
way of thinking also there was much suspicion amongst the Japanese of 
internationalisation: the one that was forced upon them by the US and also must 
be considered that up to this point the economics first policy and 
subordination to the US had served Japan well up until now so again there's 
aversion to change er now the results of all these constraints on agents 
policies generally any aid packages and policies that were announced were vague 
and ineffective for example er in nineteen-ninety-one er a package called 
maximum aid set was announced however no military contributions were outlined 
at all and the scale of aid and details of activities were very vague also um 
belated gestures of cooperation were evident as a result of many hypothetical 
debates during the Japanese decision decision making process generally 
everything was slowed down an example of this is er debate over to send send 
mine sweepers the hypothetical debate that was occurring was if these mine 
sweepers were to be attacked would they constitutionally be allowed to fire 
back in this case so the resultant uncertainty um the pol-, the decision to 
send mine sweepers was delayed also as Ian mentioned at the beginning there's 
er political actors were generally full of rhetoric er rhetoric such as 
globalisation and internationalisation and because of such constraints 
generally they i'm going to conclude with ways to improve the agents actions in 
the future er they need to politician Japanese bureaucracy and politicians 
needs to come up with a much more effective crisis management system er they 
also need a reinterpretation of the constitution not necessarily a complete 
reform but they need to include a more international perspective also er Japan 
just can't reform suddenly in a crisis so the political agents need to prepare 
Japan domestically er particularly public opinion er so i think in general if 
these issues and constraints are dealt with by Japan's political agents Japan 
may be ready for a future international crisis but the war in nineteen-ninety-
one was generally characterised by Japan's political agents being reactive 
rather than proactive 
sf5179: okay finally we're going to look at the norms that constrained Japan in 
relation to the Gulf War crisis er first of all i'm going to look at the 
domestic norms er then Alex will look at international norms oh sorry 
international norms and then Alex nick's going to look at international norms 
and then Alex is going to look at changes in norms that the Gulf War brought 
about what we think anyway okay first of all um the biggest domestic norm is 
post-war constitution and Japan's legacy of er a pacifist state article nine of 
the constitution states that: "the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of a nation and the threat or use of force as a means of 
settling international disputes" thus far this has been taken to mean that the 
S-D-F can only go into action if Japanese territory is attacked so ie 
exclusively defensive missions in their area er public opinion on this issue 
again er about Japan's involvement in the Gulf War consistently goes back to 
the constitution which has defined for most part the post-war Japan er and 
opinion polls from various newspapers back this up er in one particular nearly 
nearly half of those polled were unsure whether to send personnel at all to the 
Gulf never mind what for whether it was medical er back up troops or actually 
military force in another poll sixty-two wanted er a stipulation that anyone 
that was sent was for mon-, was for non-military use er the norm again showed 
itself in the proposed UN peace cooperation bill in October nineteen-ninety er 
the government was willing to set up peace-corps but only for monitoring and 
transport etc and the subsequent rejection of this bill again had links back to 
constitutional values er the role Japan wanted to assume and did assume in the 
Gulf War was that of kind of an international financier as it were it was 
willing to to pay for the war rather than get involved and er as is said for 
they paid thirteen billion US dollars towards it nine billion of those was a 
was kind of six months after the war had actually started and er much of that 
was to do with raise raising taxes within Japan to raise that nine billion 
dollars er Japan had already used this in the Iran-Iraq war in eighty-seven it 
had given economic assistance to Gulf nations in loans aid-packages and 
whatever it had seen itself as being quite successful in doing this er and this 
use of economic strength er was domestically considered considered enough for 
Japan to do and influences of economics and international politics was perhaps 
felt more strongly within Japan before the war started then the rest of the 
world felt afterwards er thirdly the anti-militarist and peace movement this is 
another area where the public and non-governmental organizations pressure the 
pressure form those came through again the legacy of the constitution and how 
the war is remembered in Japan is very important they tend to emphasise it 
being a bombed er in nineteen-forty-five rather than other atrocities that 
perhaps Japan inflicted on other nations er again this has to do emphasising 
this has to do with war guilt that Japan felt a certain responsibility for er 
the actions it took on other nations especially Asian nations er again another 
opinion poll showed that er the most popular answer to the question "what 
lessons have been learnt from the Gulf?" was that er Japan or maybe any other 
nation should establish a non-military system which shows an emphasis for the 
pacifist movement but also little understanding and or appreciation of 
international of their international position and expectations er again it can 
be said that that anti-militarists and peace movements er present in public 
opinion swayed the L-D-P to er reject the bill for sending troops and supplies 
to the Gulf forthly and finally Ja-, Japan-US relations play a part er in 
international relations Japan has for a long time followed the lead and the 
advice of the US it got stability from the US and also protection in terms of 
security and free trade but going into the Gulf War um while this was an 
acceptable norm in peace time or the cold war era it was brought into doubt by 
the strong er domestic norms ie the constitution and then and and anti-war 
sentiment and when the Gulf crisis broke out and Japan's constitution came into 
conflict with its international duties it was forced to maybe reconsider this 
norm which Alex will talk about
sm5185: er i'm going to talk about the international norms that er affected 
Japan's behaviour the first one i'm going to say is that er economic 
superpowers are sort of expect to take a role and er show responsibility in 
world affairs the obvious example of this would be the US in er cold war that 
they were particularly involved in situations of crisis around the world er 
although Japan in the end contributed thirteen billion dollars er it was not 
actually their soldiers that were at risk on that battlefield their mine-
sweeping operations in the light were not generally considered to be a fair 
share of the burden um in the west especially the fact that it was a a u a UN 
mission sort of gave it justification as a generally backed by most countries 
in the world so a just mission er in the far east on the other hand where 
relations with the UN aren't so cosy especially in terms of human rights and 
stuff er the idea of Japanese sending troops abroad would not have been quite 
so quite so um happily welcomed er force also seems more of a legitimate 
solution in dealing with national interests outside of Japan if you just take 
the example of Britain there's been the Suez crisis and the Falklands since the 
second world war which were the use of force force wasn't particularly popular 
er internationally but there was still set precedents for the Iraq crisis which 
Japan especially with Gulf War er left over from the second world war this put 
er put 'em in a bit of an awkward situation and as i said earlier our local er 
powers would not be too happy to see a rise in military power of Japan er 
Japanese-us relationships also er had an impact on this er with a US economic 
power gradually decreasing er it increasingly wants Japan to take a larger 
military military role to ease their burden article nine although it's actually 
er drawn up by the US is now seen as somewhat outdated and er count er to US 
and Japan's international interests again the local the local regional powers 
probably disagree with some of this china especially see doesn't want to a see 
a Japan rearmed and er it may be a slightly paranoid attitude but that's still 
important to er rearm and take a role military role outside their own borders
sm5186: okay i'm going to take a look at what we felt came out of the Gulf War 
for Japan the Gulf War was like a big momentous occasion for Japan it actually 
forced it to confront a lot of issues er about self defence er the first point 
was the evolution of article nine er we felt that er then Gulf War forced Japan 
to relook at article nine and also look into its interpretation of how they 
interpreted article nine and what it meant er since nineteen-forty-five 
reinterpretations occurred on a numb er of occasions er after the Gulf War they 
finally had in nineteen-ninety-two peace keeping operation bill was passed and 
as a result we've seen Japanese uh soldiers involved in peace keeping 
operations in Cambodia and in Lebanon so as a result of the Gulf War er they've 
had to reinterpret article nine er not in just the context of defending their 
national territory but maybe looking at how that affects their national 
interests and international interests in the global er in the global world the 
second point was er the bi-polar world situation er a lot of the domestic and 
international norms had been set by the conflict between the Soviet Union and 
the western world in nineteen-eighty-nine with the fall of the Berlin wall er 
we saw the collapse of the Soviet empire er so there are two sorts of 
interpretations of what this led to one is that now we have a uni-polar world 
with America dominating and er as a result focusing the different international 
norms in its interests er on the other side you could argue that there's a 
multi-polar world and that's there more chaos and uncertainty in the world as a 
result of er there's no long er the pressure to conform to the black and white 
view of the cold war period and er Japan is a nation like other nations that 
has to respond to these international norms and er meet them with their own 
domestic norms so either their own domestic norms will have to evolve and 
change or international norms will have to evolve and change to fit with Japan 
obviously it's a lot easier to change domestic norms to fit in with 
international norms er the final point i wanted to look at was er the sort of 
concept of political citizenship which has er come out of the new world order 
er within domestic view within Japan there was a lot of dissatisfaction with 
domestic politics there's a lack of faith in politicians to do anything and as 
a result er there's been a corresponding increase in the numb er of people 
actively involved in non-governmental organisations er this is not unique to 
Japan: this has occurred globally as well er and the sort of great er feeling 
of within and outside of Japan that it should take great er sort of economic 
responsibility for make for it actions both en environmental considerations and 
to great er focus on quality of life and er the Gulf conflict has sort of 
helped focus on how they're going to achieve this er and how that's going to 
how they're going to play a full role in as a citizen of the planet that's 
everything we had to say 
sm5184: mm i have to say that the conclusions we're trying to say about what 
the Japan done you know and why did it act in that way and to use a cricketing 
analogy so i think you could say that Japan's foreign policy that it's run up 
was very good but its delivery was absolutely awful [laughter] and in many ways 
this is this is the this is the real thing important here is the international 
agency at home the government political actors i think are in many ways are the 
key although all the different groups and all like the international structure 
agency and the norms all work in in association with each other but i think 
agency was very important for why Japan did act in its way essentially Japan i 
think sat on its hands a lot of the time it it tried to under pressure from 
outside to react but at the end of the day it was so constrained by what what 
what it could do basically Japan Japan's government was weak internationally 
and weak internally and in many ways used the constitution as as i won't say an 
excuse but it is it's a way out "we'll we can't do anything because the 
constitution states we can't" which is very legitimate you know but it would 
take a much a much strong er government a much strong er government i'm sure 
would have been able to manipulate the constitution any way any way which they 
see fit to do it er it's not unusual that countries do do that and i think as i 
say again like a strong country would probably be able to manipulate the UN 
situation the constitution and probably public opinion as well to be able to 
deliver the goods in such a situation i would say that i think the 
international structure is really important here obviously the Japan-American 
relationship is really significant and Japan would not have found itself in the 
situation with the self defence force if America had not demanded it to invite 
troops if American made no demands Japan would not have deliver it would not 
need to deliver it was only president Bush i was saying before being on the 
telephone twenty-four hours a day to er Prime Minister Kaifu who really put the 
pressure on Japan to make some sort of commitment to an international world 
Japan had been used to an international world in the eighties where in the 
Persian Gulf during the time of the Iran-Iraq war where tankers were under 
threat from er we say terrorist acts or attacks from nations the Japanese 
tankers were quite free to go under American protection into the Persian Gulf 
and back again and nobody said anything about it but in nineteen-ninety the 
situation had already changed America had lost a lot of its economic power i 
think America was afraid itself that it was losing its position and perhaps 
also frightened of over-committing itself in the Gulf which put Japan in the 
position well put America in the position where it had to say to Japan "look 
come on on we can't we can't do this anymore we can't just do its not going to 
be this hegemony any more where we can just er economically and military 
militarily police the world" perhaps if Japan had had a seat on the security 
council perhaps if Japan had had more input into the coalition they were 
allowed to have more input into the coalition perhaps things would have been 
slightly different so as i say i think it's a mixture of all these three groups 
but i would say definitely agency was weak and the Americans weren't very happy 
that force one agencies so that's our conclusion 
nm5168: choose from you to each other i mean i i thought they were quite 
contrastive in the in the way you presented em the undergraduate one was much 
more detailed about the agency and the conflict between the agents and how that 
affected the foreign policy process whereas the postgraduates said a lot more 
about the structure of the international system and how the structure of the 
system can constrain the way a state behaves so i think just on those two 
points there was there was quite a lot that you could ask each other but even 
on norms there were quite different ways that you emphasised the different role 
er that norms could play with some of you talking more about domestic norms and 
others saying what the contrast and contradictions may be between international 
norms and domestic norms and how that tension also constrained Japan so 
postgraduates first then and this is your chance to er sorry sorry the 
undergraduates to the postgraduates first so the Davids against the Goliaths 
with your your sling [laughter] 
nm5168: okay who'd like to start out don't be shy most of you have lots of 
points that you've anyone namexyou should er encourage your troops
sm5184: come on [laughter] i think maybe the confusion is like what type of 
questions the people are a bit confused about what sort of questions we should 
be asking
nm5168: well you're
sm5184: and
nm5168: you're trying to er weigh the different factors in explaining the Gulf 
crisis and you both came to different conclusions about why the Gulf crisis 
occurred
sm5184: umm
nm5168: which one's right are you right or are they right
sm5184: so if i ask
sf5179: we're right
sm5184: if i ask
nm5168: so in other words are there questions which which would strengthen your 
own case where you argued much more in favour of the domestic agency
sm5184: um
nm5168: in the light of the crisis policy making process within Japan
sm5184: so that's
nm5168: and that is a way to explain the way Japan reacted to the crisis 
postgraduates didn't tell us anything about that they said it was the structure 
of the international system which helps to explain the way Japan behaves which 
one of you is right
sm5184: so we ask that in in the postgraduate's conclusion they were very 
dismissi-, dismissive about the agency part of what we what we believe what we 
find important so how would you believe that how could you justify that 
conclusion is that is that good enough [laughter] 
nm5168: good start good start
sm5171: well i think you actually just got it yourselves er in your talks when 
your agency group went they said that the agents were reactive rather than 
proactive and what were they reacting to they were reacting to structure and 
norms
sf5177: that is true but the fact that they were reactive is that not quite a 
big part does that not show that agency plays quite a big part because of the 
way they acted because the way they act the way they sort of behaved in a was 
the main sort of sort really was the agency sort of what Japan actually did do 
to the Gulf War crisis the way in which they acted so does that not make them 
rather
sm5171: so if they were proactive they would have reacted in a different way
sf5177: it's not so much whether they're proactive or reactive
sm5171: yeah
sf5177: i don't know it's just the way you dismissed it as just like well 
agency just wasn't really very important
sm5184: agency must be essential to policy decision
sm5171: um
sm5184: and like Americans didn't say "this is your foreign policy you must 
follow this foreign policy" because like in the nineteen-seventies with the 
United Nations what was the sea the Japanese didn't follow American American 
lines on that at all they chose to pick and choose when they want to follow it 
it's in their interest and other things well sometimes they agreed to things 
and then don't do them you know so much rather agency well in reactions to 
domestic events and domestic opinion and things like that were really quite 
essential that to why Japan acted in this way if it had a strong er government 
it could have said no to America it could have said no we're not doing it you 
can't make us do it
sf5177: hmm so your
sm5184: you know
sf5177: conclusion was
sm5171: but they didn't
sf5177: that agency
sm5171: sorry go ahead
sf5177: but your conclusion was that agency is basically a tool influenced by 
international structure and the norms
sm5171: no we concluded that agency was reactive rather than proactive like you 
said and that is why it's more important to look at the things that made them 
react
nm5168: yeah but you treated agency as the state they cho-, they treated the 
agency as the disaggregation of the state
sf5177: cos you didn't you didn't mention say alright that in fighting between 
the different you know bureaucratic things like the different ministries and 
things like that and that played quite a big part in how Japan didn't react 
sort of or reacted late really and i don't think you really mentioned that at 
all
sm5180: i think maybe our position was that agency describes the manner in 
which a country or you know like a type of institution er responds but the 
actual reasons why a country like Japan reacts to a situation like the Gulf War 
is i mean i agree with him that we probably didn't talk about that enough in 
fighting and stuff like that is er it creates the manner
sf5177: that is but that is the reason why
sm5180: but that but why the thing is why
sm5171: why the in fighting
sm5180: why the in fighting the bigger picture is that er the Japanese 
constitution and Japan's place in the international economy and also its er 
political significance in the and strategic significance in the US security 
system surely that's the major factor in er Japan's actions
sm5187: no
sf5179: so would you say
sm5187: i think it's i think it's sorry i think its become quite obvious that 
that isn't the main factor simply because
sm5180: which wasn't sorry
sm5187: the point that you just made was that er the main factor in how Japan 
reacted to it it was its economic position or th-, the position in the world
sm5180: unh
sm5187: i think you'll find that the reason it it reacted so the reason for it 
being reactive is that's because always going internally what was going on 
internally like anti-Japan anti-military movements and i think that's basically 
what they're all pointing to is that what causes
sm5180: sure
sm5187: the problem if that didn't exist that wouldn't be a problem to start 
with
nm5168: what's that you saying there norms which shape the agents or is it the 
agents themselves there's three right
sm5187: they're part of the agents aren't they
nm5168: well is it the norms which shape the way the agents behave or is it the 
agents themselves in their disaggregated form which is the way that your 
group's presented it it was disaggregated in that you talked about the unions 
for example ministry of transport ministry of finance you were arguing that for 
a very very complex policy-making process and that complexity meant that the 
crisis decision-making functions in Japan didn't work efficiently therefore 
Japan reacted in the way it did their argument is that irrespective of the 
domestic nature of that policy-making process the structure of the 
international system will constrain any state so that the weight is 
considerably different so irrespective of
sf5177: it's not really both though
nm5168: well which one is it
sf5177: i wouldn't say its 
nm5168: so er you know
sm5171: so
sm5186: well what i was going to say is the interaction of all three and in 
different circumstances like in America the agencies were very strong they said 
"this is wrong we want this this and this" and that sort of led you know that 
fitted in with the international norms at the time which they accept and the um 
the norms the structure that was there allowed them to do that but Japan was 
very much in a different position as to how it how it reacted to the structures 
and its agencies were perhaps very different from different from many different 
countries
sm5171: and
sm5186: i think it's the emphasis within the interaction of the three that sort 
of determines it
sm5171: i'd like to take up on this idea of international norms which you were 
talking about quite a bit i mean isn't that structure [laughter] 
sf5179: if you're talking about an idea is that as an idea of structure
sm5171: an idea
sf5179: like a like a philosophy behind something
sm5171: but the international norms that you were talking about were the exact 
same things as the structure that we were talking about so if that
sf5179: so that
sm5171: so if that isn't structure
sf5179: so like a like a
sm5171: what is structure
sf5179: for example the the you could you could argue that say an int-, an 
international norm if that for want of a better word could be that you send 
troops to sort out a dispute is that would you agree with that as a kind of 
that's a kind of
sm5180: and structure there
sf5174: i think norms
sf5179: is that would you call that a structure though
nm5168: sorry do you wanna just step in
sf5179: i think norms probably create a structure because if people are used to 
doing things one way then they're gonna kind of build up a system that allows 
them to sort of carry out their actions the way they've always been doing
sm5184: but i could add to that just saying that probably international norms 
themselves are what probably was international structure from the second world 
war on to this point but what we're dealing with here is generally new 
territory and there's no norms existed for this like you had the Americans 
fighting with the Syrians together against the Iraqis you know there's no 
there's no sort of establishment idea on how on how this thing worked it was 
new territory for many of these countries especially America and it was the 
agency that was instrumental in bringing this about i don't think norms existed 
in many ways in during this during this conflict the as i say like there was 
such a big change in the world what were the norms no long er applied and it 
was difficult you know
sm5171: but
nm5168: but there were certain sorry
sm5171: if there was such a change in the world is that a change in the 
structure
sm5184: no i think well if there's a change in the world is there a change in 
the structure
sf5182: but anyway
sm5184: but it was in a state flux you know it was changing all the time and
nm5168: yeah but some things remain constant i mean the
sf5179: but i think what arguably i think what they were trying to say is 
obviously we could sit here and discuss whether or not like realists like 
politics liberals that go within Westphalian state system whether or not that's 
the structure versus whether the norms they produce where you'd be saying its 
obviously that structure was there you know maybe it was a little more fluid 
because the cold war etc had just ended but the point is is that because of 
that structure norms had developed and it wasn't just the structure it was this 
idea of it cos obviously people were operating within that structure doing 
different norms two different norms
nm5168: so the norm the norm for example that that you er er that what er 
action Iraqi took was regarded by the international community as unacceptable 
is a norm which is embedded in the structure of the international system right 
there was no discussion about that that was an accepted by the international 
community how Japan or how the US responded to that is a separate issue but 
certainly within international even in international law it was regarded as 
unacceptable behaviour wasn't it so that was embedded within the international 
system even though the cold war had ended and there'd been that transition in 
the structure of the international system we still certain norms which were 
still constant from before the end of the cold war okay it's the other way 
round postgrads did you want to ask anything of the undergrads i mean it's a 
bit messy wasn't it all this stuff about domestic agency and stuff we're going 
to move on to [laughter] 
sf5182: are we going to ask this
sm5171: mm what we could do is nit-picking
sf5182: yeah [laughter] it's just splitting hairs over the er importance of oil 
really i was just going to ask whether the fact that after the nineteen-seventy-
three oil crisis and Japan diversifying its resources for oil did that not make 
the oil less important and there was also an argument within the Japanese 
ministry that even if the price of oil did rise which they didn't think it 
would even if it did that Japan Japan's economy would be er strong enough to 
cope with it and that they'd pay any price
sf5179: so what's the question sorry
sf5182: so it's just um
sm5171: cos it just appeared to us that er 
sf5182: you seem to stress the importance
sm5171: of oil we disagree with that
sf5182: yeah
sf5179: you just think i over stressed it
sm5171: well
sf5179: and do i need to kind of defence that work can you just can you leave 
it that i overstressed it [laughter] 
sm5171: just a bit more
sm5186: it was important in the previous Gulf crisis i mean they had to cut 
back in eighty-one but it did affect their economy not a grave amount but so i 
mean if if like i don't know your name
sf5179: yeah
sm5186: but in terms of fifty US dollars that's quite a lot at sixteen US 
dollars beforehand i mean it certainly your oil sort of energy costs shot up 
that much you've got to pass it on to the consumer you know people who are sort 
of buying your products can you afford to do that or are you going to rely on 
America to do the fighting and keep down the price of oil i think that's the 
point i'm making
sf5182: hmm
sf5179: the thing there was a obviously Japan would have had enough resources 
to cope with it but it was more just the idea that it was a financial issue and 
an economic issue right whether or not they would be able to to get the 
resources that that was being they were they wouldn't have had any control over 
it right and that was a result of the fact that there was a war going on and 
they weren't sure what kind of role they were playing so obviously if they 
didn't play any sort of role in it or what kind of role they chose to play in 
the crisis situation would determine like how the resources would be effective 
afterwards it was more like enforce i think not necessarily like oh we're going 
to run out of oil therefore we should jump on the US bandwagon
sf5182: um
sm5171: we came to the conclusion that er no matt er who has control of the oil 
if it's Saddam or if it's Kuwait they will sell oil anyway to them and supply-
demand will low er the price again they had that conclusion during the conflict
nm5168: okay er let's er move on to the panel then because we're running out of 
time do you want to Philip and er Hiroko come up here
nm5169: well okay
nm5168: er perhaps perhaps we'll ask Philip first to give his impressions and 
er raise a question for the
nm5169: well what my general observation is that er among the postgraduates we 
have a group of Japan specialists um
nm5168: undergraduates
nm5169: sorry i mean undergraduates and i think their specialisation i mean i 
think as as a school of east Asian studies i think we should feel quite pleased 
with the way in which those presentations went because it certainly does reveal 
that every specialisation is something that is worthwhile and important and the 
degree of detail and analysis that was done er on on er looking at the conflict 
from from the point of view of Japan's foreign policy and particularly from the 
point of view of agency er i mean in every perspective it was an impressive 
presentation but this er i think came out particularly strongly er and on the 
other side i would say that the Benefit of this course is again i'm associating 
myself to a certain extent with the undergraduates is that we have the Benefit 
of er specialists in political science and international relations who bring a 
heavy theoretical er knowledge and and experience to the group and i think 
we've all Benefited er from the the er knowledge and experience that they've 
brought on that side and er and it does it does raise the question of with 
events i mean even events like the Gulf War that that catch the whole of the 
international community by surprise to what extent in the system that that 
we're living in today the international system do er national governments and 
and and and independent national actors how important are the roles that they 
play how important are governments in governments one kind or another in the 
context of a system in which to a certain extent er things are almost 
preordained in in the way that they would be be worked through and er so from 
that point of view i've found the er the exercise very worthwhile and 
interesting
nm5168: you were going to ask er a pointed question i know
nm5169: er oh oh well
nm5168: but Hiroko do you want to say something first
nf5170: mm well i leave evaluation with professor hook and doctor Charrier but 
i find it interesting especially er the discussion that began er regarding er 
norms and the system structure and how norms are implied from the structure and 
how correlate between the them and i would like to make a question that er um 
regarding the point um
nm5168: do you want to do it right away
nf5170: yeah okay
nm5168: okay you're first then okay
nf5170: [laugh] because it's a it's a it's quite simple question er really 
simple question er the still um the central definition of international re 
responsibility that this is a kind of basis on er er the the nation state 
America er Japan the acted and reacted to the situation so each side could you 
just er define what were the int-, er er international responsibility for 
America and how er sorry um defined [laugh] 
nm5168: for the for the U-S
nf5170: for the U-S
nm5168: ha ha
nf5170: yeah for the U-S and for Japan how can Japan er er fill fulfil the 
internation-, er international responsibility the er and what is the best way 
for Japan at the time in that situation a really simple question
nm5168: yeah but very difficult er okay let's try the postgraduates first then 
in terms of in the sense that that's the question behind the whole exercise: 
what should Japan have done i mean what is its international responsibility in 
such a situation and how can it fulfil that responsibility postgrads any anyone
sm5186: i was going to say that what struck me was sort of how quickly it 
changed in Japan and the west how to deal with the situation as being asked by 
America to participate and help out for American aims which were ultimately its 
international interests sort of aims that might have happened to fit in with 
great er sort of er international aspirations and Japan was basically asked to 
help out there and not knowing what to do you know the structure you'd lived by 
had suddenly changed was being asked to be more proactive so that that sort of 
got me mm
nm5168: but can can Japan have a different role to play
sf5179: i think er Japan's got it's recognized its economic wall and i think 
economically its its aid has been sort of befitting of its status but it's got 
responsibility now to get a more political role which is both be befitting of 
its status and equal to its economic aid so at the moment it's far too 
unbalanced so it needs to balance that out to fulfil its responsibility
nm5168: so you would say that er an inbalanced state is an inappropriate state
sf5179: well it's almost like it's it's a big state economically which 
obviously everyone's already recognised but it's trying to politically it's 
trying to remain a small state so the contradiction will well America won't let 
that work and er i know it's got a responsibility in the world today
sm5181: but but but this is America who won't let it work i mean er other east 
Asian countries are not er they're not too too happy with the concept of 
Japanese remilitarisation you could have china who's a permanent security 
member vetoing that
sf5177: i think that Japan has to weigh up like the influence of the US and the 
reactions of say the Asian countries in weigh up the importance of each one and 
develop a system what so crisis management system a set policy of how it should 
well react cos when the Gulf War happened it sort of thrown into the chaos it 
didn't even know where to look or what to do who to respond to that sort of 
thing they need to be a bit clear er maybe
sm5171: i mean this is some
sm5180: yeah
sf5177: what the important factors are that it should be reacting to
sf5179: but it needs to do that at a time of stability rather than crisis i 
mean the Gulf War s set off all these debates but it can't really do anything 
with a country let's say constitutionally restrained and idol ideology as well 
you can't just change that at a click of your fingers so you need to do they've 
got a responsibility to build it up and put more of a long term emphasis on that
sm5181: but i think it's an appropriate time to just ask Japan it's a country 
that's ageing and i think the new generation is probably doesn't have as many 
er war time well it doesn't have any wartime traumas
sm5187: but the problem is there's not enough emphasis being placed on the 
agents like in internally Japanese politics is is absolutely terrible they they 
aren't trusted and before that happens before there's a change internally in 
Japanese politics nothing will change externally and i think that's that's 
something that you can't forget i mean although you could argue that there's a 
new generation entering that same new generation that same that same sort of 
point has been made before was made in the seventies by people of who said you 
know there's a new generation coming in they certainly barely lived through the 
war unfortunately nothing changed and something that you can't forget is if you 
live in a conservative society it's conservative people who are going to re-
elect conservatives and fundamentally that's going to take a long time to 
change and until that changes you're not going to see an improve or change 
externally
nm5168: a really clear position there Ben Hannah you've been wanting to er 
sf5182: can i just what he said about international responsibility and er the 
Japanese people also thought that er roughly you know the failure of the UN 
peace cooperation bill showed that something needed discussion about Japan's 
international responsibility that's what was said and also since they're a 
member of the un and they decided to help out in international conflicts and so 
er they they can been helping their international conflicts without increasing 
their military much as shall we say and er on it was about three principles and 
they probably abide by the list to tolerance sovereignty and er not abide not 
appeasing aggression and also er peace and security which the UN er yeah which 
they signed and there's only south east Asia their neighbours would oppose so 
much any more Taiwan and Indonesia has shown an interest in Japan taking over 
taking on a bigger role in the security affairs
nm5168: mm thank you Philip you have one question i know
nm5169: i've changed my question [laughter] 
nm5168: you've changed your question
nm5169: yet again i i've just been reflecting that that really in the context 
of this crisis this Gulf War crisis for Japan that Japan emerged as somewhat of 
a political cripple unable unable to deal with with the crisis and we've seen 
that that this crippling of Japanese foreign policy probably resulted from 
several problems er spanning the whole range from structure right through to 
agency er we've seen since the Gulf War really Japan becoming an economic 
cripple er in the decade since the Gulf War almost a decade Japan has found it 
extremely difficult to get itself out of the recession it's been facing the 
question i have to ask is somewhat of an unfair one but er to what extent do 
the lessons and the er and the issues that emerged in the context of this 
discussion relating to the Gulf War er to what extent can those be applied also 
to the decade that followed and particularly the economic crisis that Japan 
found itself in and found that it had considerable dif has been finding it very 
difficult to get itself out of
sf5179: i think like a major theme this is more general a major theme that i 
pick up from this class particularly is that there seems to be a very large gap 
between the political elite in Japan and how they view the world and the 
majority of the population it just seems to me that a lot of times when we're 
discussing popular opinion in Japan it seems very na?ve and i don't mean that 
in terms of necessarily you know not smart or anything like that just in terms 
of na?ve as to how the world actually operates they have isolated themselves to 
a certain extent built themselves up and they don't seem to understand why they 
can't just crash on to the scene and why things aren't good they don't 
understand how other people perceive them
sm5171: mm
sf5179: and i think that it's just going to be a major problem for them unless 
they can get a class of political elites that will be able to bridge that gap 
know you know just so many of the comments that are like coming up all the time 
they just the majority of the well at least the voters or whoever don't seem to 
really fully grasp the implications that other people see that they have 
responsibilities whether or not they feel that they have those responsibilities 
themselves
sm5187: the problem of er responsibility in Japan is one which i find 
particularly in my own personal experiences a fundamental and you don't it 
doesn't matt er what part of Japanese life or Japanese politics you look at 
responsibility always seems to be the main key issue and people not taking 
responsibility this you can look at in Japanese education in in pretty much any 
social area there's a problem of responsibility and you could attribute the 
problem of Japan's economy to the same problem of responsibility: who is to 
take responsibility who is to take responsibility for the Japanese banks 
crashing who is to take responsibility for er who er whether or not they should 
send troops to er to er Kuwait or to Kosovo i mean it's basically Japan has a 
fundamental problem with dealing with the problem of responsibility they they 
they they have a lack of of leadership in that sense there's nobody who really 
wants to take the role on of or take the flack of responsibility
nm5169: how would you i mean how would you structure those answers in the 
context of structure agency and norms
sm5187: it would take along time to do it but i would i would i can i could 
guarantee you i would be able to do it but i mean [laughter] the simple it's 
it's difficult because it i mean to be honest it just occurred to me now this 
just seems there's almost the same problems occur again and again in Japanese 
society as they do internally and externally and i think you could almost 
devise like an experience if you like you have the same problems everywhere i 
mean absolutely everywhere i think it's fundamentally speaking it's 
responsibility 
sf5177: would that not come under er agency then probably cos we would argue 
that agency has been a major factor in how Japan [laughter] responded or didn't 
respond to the Gulf crisis and i think in the economic crisis we seen agency as 
quite a major factor as well the fact that when the bubble burst and a lot of 
problems were happening the sort of you know agencies buried its head and 
didn't really admit it for a long time and no one's really sort of dealing with 
anything proactive everyone's sort of just shifting about i don't really know 
exactly but like for unemployment they refused to admit for a long time that 
they had an unem-, unemployment problem until it was sort of really you know in 
the world's eyes and then they thought you know maybe so this was not picking 
up on things straight away and acting on them straight away which i don't know 
political anarchy 
sm5186: after Kobe as well where it took them ages to mobilise the sort of 
civil defence forces to actually respond to that situation the army wasn't even 
allowed to go in because of the constitutional issue again going back to the 
second world war and sort of internal pressure so it's er how to deal with that 
and when the Americans offered aid tents and stuff it was turned down so 
there's sort of that issue how to deal with responses to crisis situation and 
not having a structure in place to like this is what we do then when we have 
this problem which maybe other nations do have in place
nm5169: it sound from what you're saying as if with globalisation that that 
everything is speeding up decisions are having to be made more quickly systems 
are having to be more flexible and that that structures in Japan are straining 
under the under the under the in the changed circumstances and that 
particularly agency but i would think also norms er would be need to be er 
looked at quite carefully in terms of analysing the problems but i think i 
guess overall that structure would be something else that er what about on the 
what about on the postgraduate side
sf5182: no i just well Japan in the sense it's so recurring that the agency 
fails to come to quick responses: it has to be something deeper like the norms 
of consensus-seeking or conflict-avoiding and so something more than just agency
sf5177: i was about to say as well the same thing that maybe it is the norms as 
well like just within an economic context now with restructuring and everything 
that laying workers off that wouldn't be such a shock sort of in the European 
system but for the Japanese you know when they laid off loads and loads of 
workers is quite recently seems a very big move and one that's sort of quite 
overdue i think because the norms are so there that you don't do that sort of 
thing in Japan
sm5180: i think yeah
sf5177: it's sort of you know it takes them a long time to sort of change that 
mood and get going
sm5180: i think there's a sort of a dichotomy between Japan's domestic norms 
and the norms of the international structure [laughter] sorry but you know i 
think Japan's having difficulty in reconciling the two perhaps
sm5171: yeah
sm5181: just just the structure of the Japanese government compared to the 
United States you have a president that in the states who takes those decisions 
and they're obeyed and there's no there's nothing to it he's the command er in 
chief of an army he he he's the man [laughter] in Japan you don't in Japan you 
don't have a Prime Minister with all that power
nm5168: okay er and anyone else who could slowly wind up and give the last 
comments Hannah
sf5182: i just have a question for you
nm5168: oh [laughter] 
sf5182: it's still the the defence agency it's still on the Prime Minister's 
ministry 
nm5168: yeah okay very er very rewarding i think the er the balance between er 
the different elements or explanatory variables that we are examining i think 
is is the key because you seem most of you seem quite happy to explain the Gulf 
crisis within those parameters which is quite interesting i thought you'd come 
back and say well actually you can't explain it by structure agency and norms 
you need to also include X Y and Z but all of the presentations either 
amplified structure mainly amplified agency we found a lot of different 
bureaucratic actors which were involved in the policy and also the way that 
norms is er have shaped the the behaviour of of those actors so i think in 
terms of at least some of the key variables that you can use to try and explain 
how and why a state behaves the way it does in response to changes in the 
structure of the international system i think is quite useful what i'd like to 
end on is is to suggest that that er all states are reactive and we seem to 
forget that the United States was reactive towards the Gulf war as as Japan was 
reactive towards the Gulf War the difference is that the norms which shape the 
behaviour of policy-making agents in Japan tend to come up with a an answer to 
the way that Japan should respond to that international crisis er in a way 
which is different to other states where the gap between domestic and 
international norms is not as salient it's a very salient gap in terms of Japan 
because those domestic norms and international norms are so different in terms 
of article nine of the constitution the way anti-militarism and pacifism has 
tended to shape er policy-making agents and other actors within domestic 
society whereas in the case of Britain or in the case of the United States 
people say "gung ho great send out the troops" because the gap between domestic 
norms and international norms is not salient at all in a sense those norms are 
what are regarded as normal that's just at this particular historical period
sm5184: can i ask a question now i've heard that the American's have basically 
a blueprint and they've got lots of these blueprints that if such and such 
happens in such and such a place they've got a numb er of different plans now 
does that mean is that reactive to the fact that there might be a situation say 
in the Gulf or is it or is it proactive in the fact that they've thought ahead 
of themselves seems to suggest that they have that they should develop plans 
contingency plans and things like that
nm5168: it's a contingent so the idea of reactive or proactive it's simply 
going back to the article you've all read about Japan's reactive state which 
was to argue that because of the the preconception that a major power in the 
international system takes a leadership role don't forget there are nearly two 
hundred countries that are members of the United Nations and we don't expect 
all of them to react in the same way it may be simply that because Japan has 
the economic power to make it er a big power in terms of the international 
system that it's behaviour is supposed to be similar to the behaviour of say 
the United States or other of the big powers in the international system but we 
don't expect Nepal or Venezuela or er any of the other one-hundred and odd 
states to behave in that way why is it that we expect Japan to behave in a 
particular way it's because of the expectations of the way big powers behave in 
the international system which means that you're conditioned by history in the 
way you view the way a state should behave so if if you reject that idea and 
argue instead that there are different ways that even big states can behave in 
the international system such as Funabashi's idea of Japan as a civilian power 
and that Japan will play a different kind of role even though it is a major 
international power and a major economic power that there are different options 
for states in the international system they don't all have to have nuclear 
weapons they don't all have to be members of the UN security council so i mean 
that's the sort of debate that's emerging in Japan at the moment with the 
question of whether Japan will revise the constitution or not what's Japan's 
identity going to be in the twenty-first century is it going to be a state 
which uses its military power as a means to realise its interests in the same 
way that it's used its economic power and hence become a "normal state" in the 
way that Ozawa Ichiro argues where it uses its full complement of power 
resources in terms of economics politics and military and uses those as 
instruments to realise the interests it wants to achieve or is it going to be a 
different kind of state and say well we're not going to use our military forces 
we're only going to use them through the United Nations in peace keeping 
operations we're going to use oda and other economic means as the way to 
realise our interests and we're not going to send troops abroad er to fight 
wars or to protect er protect resources or gain resources whatever so i mean 
there are different ways that Japan could decide to define its identity in the 
twenty-first century and i think the Gulf War started that debate that's why in 
a sense it was a watershed and the result is not known yet but it it really 
opened up the debate as to what kind of state Japan's going to be and what kind 
of identity it will have in the twenty-first century okay er we said we would 
go to the pub if people wanted to er if we don't then it doesn't matter either 
cos we haven't booked it or anything but er it's the er Star and Garter just at 
the back of the arts tow er and sometimes staff go there or students go there 
to if anyone wants to go along and have an informal chat at least i'll go 
[laughter] investigate