nm1222: maybe i said it at the very beginning er [0.2] but maybe i didn't [0.3] 
so f-, er while i talk feel free sort of to interrupt me if you have any 
questions directly as i'm going on [0.3] because as you will have noticed er [0.
5] er i and i guess namex as well we have a tendency just just just to talk to 
the very end of the lecture [0.2] so there is not really any time [0.4] to ask 
questions directly at the end only then in the seminar [0.3] but if you want to 
raise points directly related to [0.2] what we are doing [0.4] er just feel 
free to do so [0.2] then we [0.3] we can interrupt and and answer questions or 
give more detail [2.3] er otherwise [0.3] er we will with this with this 
lecture now move to er the [0.2] the whole set of lecture really the [0.2] the 
core or the middle part of this course [0.4] where the er we will talk about [0.
4] er [0.3] tendencies of change in [0.3] contemporary Western societies [0.6] 
over [0.2] well roughly [0.2] the past three decades or the post-World War Two 
period [0.6] so the main [0.4] er [0.8] time span at which we'll be looking 
will always be a comparison between [0.2] well roughly the 
nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties on the one hand [0.5] and the nineteen-
nineties on the other [0.6] and the guiding question will always be [0.3] 
whether there [0.2] is an important social transformation going on [0.4] er in 
the various fields of of social action [0.4] in society [1.0] now [0.2] er 
we'll start with really with [0.2] sort of more economic topics so the theme of 
this lecture is in [0.2] well economic sociology if you want to call it like 
that [0.5] or also some elements of [0.3] the sociology of labour and sociology 
of the welfare state [2.0] and er [0.3] you may remember from [0.2] er [0.2] a 
couple weeks ago [0.4] er that er i already gave an outline of the major areas 
we'll be looking at of the dimensions of social change [0.6] er so i will [0.2] 
er [0.2] in the first few minutes come back to that [0.4] er talk about [0.2] 
how we can discuss the major economic changes [0.4] and then go into [0.2] much 
more detail than i did in the short summary [0.5] which i did a couple weeks 
ago [2.9] now [0.2] the [0.2] question which i already posed a couple of weeks 
ago was [0.3] well why at all look at the post-war 
period [0.4] if [0.4] er one could say that i mean for [0.3] er [0.7] most 
Western countries [0.3] there wasn't really any major institutional change [0.
4] i mean most Western countries [0.2] at least from after the Second World War 
onwards from the ni-, late nineteen-forties [0.6] er were [0.2] basically [0.2] 
er [0.6] democratically organized in political terms [0.4] they were capitalist 
market societies in economic terms [0.4] they were er societies [0.2] broadly 
committed to a plural understanding of er [0.2] social lives [0.4] so nothing 
really happened in all those sort of most fundamental terms one could say [1.1] 
nevertheless [0.3] we will try to make an argument that there was a major 
change [0.4] er so that must have been then on a slightly [0.3] sort of [0.2] 
more [0.4] er more detailed levels of a more differentiated level [1.0] er and 
that is what we will try to do so we have to describe [1.0] in this lecture 
economic but then also political and social changes [0.4] in a bit more detail 
at a [0.2] at a lower level of differentiation so to say [1.9] once we do that 
[0.3] then [0.3] er we can see that indeed there were some [0.3] 
some important changes [0.6] er [0.2] and so what i will do now is i will try 
to describe [0.5] er or give an idea as to how one could describe [0.2] as 
indeed how sociology has described [0.5] er over a [0.6] a couple of decades 
within the framework of industrial society theory [0.6] has described the 
societies of the nineteen-fifties nineteen-sixties [0.8] er and then i will 
sort of [0.3] er try to show [0.4] how these descriptions have changed and how 
we should really [0.3] er see [0.3] Western societies in a slightly different 
light nowadays [1.8] in economic terms [0.3] er [0.4] i say this [0.3] briefly 
as a summary at the beginning [0.4] er [0.3] the [0.4] er [0.5] theory of 
industrial society [0.4] er was really based on the idea [0.3] that er [0.4] 
the dominant model of industrial production [0.4] is er standardized mass 
production [0.4] er [0.2] large production runs of a rather limited number of 
goods [0.4] er in large-scale factories er large-scale organizations [0.7] er 
[0.3] and those [0.2] the goods produced [0.3] the under those conditions of 
mass production [0.3] being consumed in a similarly standardized way so that's 
[0.3] 
standardized mass cos-, mass consumption as some people have said [1.6] this [0.
4] model of economic organization then went with [0.5] er [0.2] sort of say a 
model of economic policy making [0.7] er which seemed adapted and adequate to 
this model of economic organization [0.5] namely [0.3] on the one hand [0.4] 
large-scale organization of both employers and workers sort of in unions and of 
employers' associations [0.6] er direct negotiation between [0.2] the top [0.2] 
level of these large-scale organizations [0.5] with very often [0.3] the 
involvement of the state as a moderator and mediator [0.4] between sort of the 
two [0.4] conflicting organizations [1.1] the state in addition [0.4] 
intervening into the economy [0.4] er by means of [0.3] what was technically 
known as demand management [0.4] er [0.5] economic policy based on the 
Keynesian idea [0.4] that er by increasing or diminishing government spending 
[0.3] er you could indeed [0.3] keep the economy on a basically stable growth 
path [1.5] that then in consequence it's a third element [0.3] the so it's the 
the economy policy 
objective we can call it [0.4] or also a link between [0.3] economic policy and 
social policy really [0.6] namely that once you think that you can't keep the 
economy on a stable growth path [0.5] then you can also [0.2] argue that [0.4] 
full employment is [0.4] an objective of government action [0.4] which can 
indeed be achieved [0.4] there is no major problem in achieving it because on 
the basis of Keynesianism [0.5] er you know how you're going to do it [0.3] 
namely [0.4] should employment fall below a certain level [0.4] then [0.2] you 
er have to increase government spending [0.4] er [0.2] the production will 
increase and employment will increase [0.2] and accordingly sort of the move 
back to the growth path [0.4] has been achieved [1.5] so that is [0.3] 
basically er we can call that a sort of full employment convention as it has 
been called recently [0.3] and the basic agreement er [0.5] even sort of among 
the major parties sort of the more conservative Christian parties on the one 
hand [0.4] the Tories in Britain [0.4] and the the more [0.4] sort of left wing 
Social Democratic or Labour parties on the 
other hand [0.5] during the fifties and sixties [0.2] they basically agreed 
that that is the [0.3] the way to do it [0.2] er and that [0.2] one indeed 
could achieve that [1.8] so this is [0.2] i-, [0.2] in summary really something 
which i said already earlier a couple of weeks ago [0.6] is er [0.2] the idea 
that there is a typical [0.5] er sort of organization of production [0.5] 
linked to [0.6] a typical economic policy mechanism [0.3] er and economic 
policy objectives [0.5] which in sum really describe what [0.5] er the economy 
of in-, advanced industrial society is about [1.3] that's the image of the [0.
2] nineteen-sixties so to say [0.9] and now we'll i'll run through that [0.4] 
and er we'll try to discuss [0.3] if that has changed and how that has changed 
over the more recent period [0.7] let me for that purpose also [0.2] er [0.6] 
draw sort of a [0.8] a a kind of picture which you will [0.2] er be used to 
already by now [0.3] sort of this distinction between the sixties and the 
nineties [0.4] long [0.2] well always slightly schematic terms but i think 
useful terms [0.4] to er [0.3] carve out the main elements of those pictures [0.
6] so we'll [2.4] 
compare the nineteen-sixties [2.5] to the nineteen-nineties [0.6] along those 
er three dimensions which i [0.2] i outlined just now [0.5] er [0.2] the one we 
can call [0.9] something like the [0.6] organization of production [5.7] this 
is [0.6] standardized mass production [9.9] and associated with that the large-
scale organization [10.5] combined and linked to er [0.2] er [0.4] what i call 
here now the economic policy [0.6] arrangement or mechanism [12.3] this is er 
[0.4] Keynesianism [0.3] on the one hand [6.4] and very often [0.4] indeed to 
varying degrees but i will come back to that [0.5] linked to what one can call 
corporatism [0.5] corporatism in the sense namely that [0.2] both employers and 
workers [0.4] get organized also in large-scale organizations that's where 
there is some [0.2] mapping here to the form of production [0.6] er and that 
they [0.3] er [0.6] talk about er the development of the economy [0.3] often [0.
2] er together with the state governments of the economic ministry or [0.3] 
whatever the exact title is in various countries [1.8] this is indeed a term 
with which you may be less familiar [0.4] it's more 
typical really of continental European arrangements than of [0.6] English or 
British arrangements [0.2] but we come back to that [5.8] and finally we have 
an economic policy objective as i just said [9.0] and that is er the full 
employment convention [13.2] now if we look at that [0.6] you can almost 
immediately say that [0.5] er [0.2] this [0.2] is no longer [0.5] sort of 
really in the strong sense valid [0.5] er in the sense namely that [0.3] er 
this is the the one dominant or typical model [0.2] of economic organization 
and economic policy [0.8] but on the other hand you could also argue [0.4] well 
[0.3] we still have elements of all that [0.4] and certainly there is 
standardized mass production still [0.6] er there may not be exactly 
Keynesianism but er there are government interventions into the economy [0.6] 
and there are these large-scale organizations and at least in some cases also 
[0.6] er [1.0] ideas of communication coordination of [0.2] economic policy [0.
6] er [0.2] in [0.5] in wi-, er between these organizations [0.5] and there is 
at least [0.2] a lot of [0.3] talk about full employment and how one gets back 
to 
full employment [0.8] er so there is sort of [0.3] a bit a mixed picture [0.2] 
er the on the one hand [0.3] these elements are still there [0.5] on the other 
eleme-, [0.2] hand [0.5] we can also say that er many of these things have 
changed we [0.2] haven't had full employment for [0.5] er more than fifteen or 
twenty years depending on the country [0.6] now [0.4] governments may keep 
talking about it but [0.2] we may have doubts about their commitment to it 
really [0.8] er coordination between the economic policy actors [0.4] has in 
has in many instances broken down it has been difficult to re-establish it [0.
5] various countries one talks about the need to re-establish it but it doesn't 
[0.2] work [0.5] any longer as effectively as it once did [0.9] and there [0.3] 
is a lot of talk about small and medium-sized entreprise that innovation in the 
economy comes really from them and rather [0.3] not from the large-scale 
companies [0.4] so you see there [0.2] this kind of mixed picture [0.2] which 
er [0.4] really has [0.4] has these elements still but also has lots of 
complications [0.8] now er [0.5] er [1.0] i will try it from 
that basis then [0.4] try to say something about [0.4] er [1.1] rather 
analytical possibilities as we can try to describe [0.5] what the current 
situation is i mean if we try to [1.3] go beyond at least er [0.3] one or two 
steps beyond just saying [0.4] well we have it but we also have new elements [0.
4] er try to er [0.2] to analytically describe what the [0.4] the possibilities 
of sociological analysis of the economy [0.3] er are nowadays [1.5] and in that 
context i will then refer to the various [0.5] er texts which are in the course 
outline and [0.3] well [0.4] the particular one you [0.2] you read for [0.8] 
the seminar later on [1.7] now you will have seen in the reading for today [0.
4] that er some people argue [0.3] that standardized mass production is really 
[0.4] er [0.3] or went through er a major crisis of that [0.4] er there was a 
massive decline if not a collapse of the [0.4] model of standardized mass 
production [0.7] the key text for that [0.5] is er the one which we also listed 
under the additional readings [0.4] the book by [0.2] Charles Sable and Michael 
Piore [0.6] er on the second industrial divide [0.7] where they 
argue that indeed standardized mass production was a historical phenomenon [0.
5] which er slowly [0.4] which is not at all related to the industrial 
revolution [0.2] but that was really rather small-scale production [0.7] but is 
a phenomenon of the late nineteenth century [0.5] er when gradually [0.4] er 
these longer production runs [0.4] er Taylorist organization of work you know 
the [0.6] er which i briefly mentioned earlier [0.5] the m-, [0.4] the minute 
and detailed [0.4] er cutting up of the elements this i-, the the work process 
[0.4] er to control and steer [0.3] the labour power more effectively [0.5] er 
in the factory [0.5] and in the next step then the conveyor belt [0.2] er [0.3] 
and this er [0.2] model together [0.2] sort of [0.4] Taylorist [0.4] Taylorist 
scientific organization a-, [0.2] of work as [0.4] Taylor called it in the U-S 
at the beginning of this century [0.7] and [0.4] the [0.4] conveyor belt driven 
[0.6] er production of standardized good [0.4] has really become known as the 
[0.2] Fordist model of production [1.0] on the basis of [0.6] er works of some 
French economists in the [0.7] er late nineteen-sixties early 
nineteen-seventies [0.4] that has become known er this this model here as [0.3] 
as Fordism [0.5] but as a historical model of [0.4] er the organization of the 
capitalist economy [0.6] but it's not really typical for [0.2] capitalism as 
such [0.5] but rather typical for [1.1] a historical development within 
capitalism [0.6] so that means [0.2] er it may as well change and may as well 
[0.4] sort of decay and be transformed [0.6] and that then is really [0.4] the 
argument which Piore and Sable have come up with [0.4] namely that [0.2] if 
there was one industrial divide [0.5] in the nineteenth century late in the 
nineteenth century [0.5] towards [0.3] standardized mass production and towards 
Fordism [0.8] we may now be they wrote that in the early nineteen-eighties [0.
6] undergoing or going through a second industrial divide [0.7] away from 
standardized mass production [0.4] towards what they called flexible 
specialization [0.6] that's the term which you found in the in the reading [9.
9] flexible specialization means [0.2] that [0.3] due to new production 
technologies [0.4] basically related to er [0.3] electronics 
and information technology [0.7] er you can indeed [0.2] what you couldn't do 
[0.4] under Taylorism and Fordism [0.5] er change the production runs rather 
quickly [0.6] er so that you [0.2] were not dependent any longer on [1.0] mass 
production of goods and mass consumption of these [0.4] identical goods [0.5] 
but that you could [0.8] take the example of the car industry could change 
models rath-, rather quickly [0.4] or take con-, consumer electronics [0.6] er 
that you could have short production runs and then just change the computer [0.
3] er [0.2] assisted [0.2] design and production [0.4] er and produce something 
else [0.3] rather flexibly [0.2] but you can specialize [0.5] er at short 
notice and [0.2] during [0.4] over short time periods [0.5] er and that indeed 
[0.5] where [0.6] Taylorists and Fordists thought thought [0.4] that the er [0.
6] er big organization hierarchically organized centrally planned so to say 
within the govern-, within the company [0.6] that this [0.5] necessarily has to 
be the most efficient model of production [0.8] theorists of specialization 
argue instead that [0.5] at least and in [0.6] with the help 
of current technology [0.6] er you can indeed organize much more flexibly and 
that that is the [0.6] er the efficient way also of reacting to [0.3] changing 
demand [0.5] changing demand patterns [0.3] er and to [0.2] er changing market 
developments [0.3] on [0.2] that's part of this obviously [0.5] on an 
increasingly global market [1.8] and we'll just say here and point to [0.4] a 
later lecture and discussion [0.5] that [0.2] here this is also connected to er 
[0.6] a broader social change namely what we will discuss under the heading of 
lifestyles and identities [0.6] that indeed [0.3] from roughly the nineteen-
seventies onwards [0.4] er demand patterns also changed [0.4] because [0.3] er 
[0.4] partly because of affluence also [0.3] 'cause people er were less 
interested in buying sort of always the same kind of car which may have a major 
change with the season [0.3] er minor change with the season [0.4] but a rather 
[0.4] er limited diversity [0.2] er of products on offer [0.7] the same for all 
kinds of more durable products [0.7] er so that [0.2] with a differentiation of 
life lifestyles er more emphasis given to [0.5] a variety 
of id-, [0.2] identities and social life [0.4] that indeed [0.3] er there was a 
demand for a greater variety and diversity of products [0.6] so that flexible 
specialization is also a response to this kind of social change or social and 
cultural change [0.4] namely [0.4] different demand patterns towards greater [0.
2] variety and diversity [2.6] now Piore and Sable also argue that [0.2] once 
you do that [0.4] er once you er er try to develop a [0.3] production 
organization [0.3] er in direction of flexible specialization [0.5] then you 
also need a different kind of of company [0.6] that the large-scale centralized 
hierarchical company [0.2] like [0.3] General Motors or Ford or so [0.7] is no 
longer the most efficient model [0.5] and they looked indeed [0.3] at research 
done er on [0.2] er central Italy [0.5] and on south-west Germany [0.5] er 
where [0.5] sort of highly [0.2] and sort of the [0.4] highly affluent regions 
er with er world market competitive production [0.5] but rather on the basis of 
many small companies [0.4] rather than a few big ones [0.7] this has become 
known as the theory of industrial districts [0.6] but you don't have [0.8] 
if you take the ex-, Italian example [0.3] but you don't have like with er Fiat 
in Turin [0.6] er one big company which really dominates the economy of a city 
[0.7] they have a city of a million inhabitants or more [0.5] where virtually 
everything is dependent from the well-being of the Fiat company was [0.2] it is 
no longer the case [0.8] but when you look at central Italy [0.4] er then you 
have [0.6] no big company at all but a region which was not only at least as 
affluent [0.3] or maybe more affluent and more [0.2] prosperous than northern 
Italy [0.6] with the more [0.5] sort of industrial [0.7] mass production kind 
of economy [0.7] er but even an economy [0.3] which watered the crisis of the 
nineteen-seventies [0.3] the world recession [0.2] recession in seventy-four 
seventy-five [0.5] er and demand changes [0.3] er much better at [0.2] than the 
[0.4] er standardized production economy did [0.7] so Piore and Sable and other 
[0.2] economic sociologists really concluded from that [0.6] that [0.2] there 
is [0.4] a [0.5] er a more efficient a f-, more flexible model of industrial 
organization [0.3] also on the 
level of of company organization [2.3] and that is er as i said [1.1] really a 
model of industrial districts [4.0] nowadays also sometimes discussed as a sort 
of network organization [0.4] er not [0.3] one big company but [2.6] a network 
of smaller companies [0.8] about which it is also important to say that the 
idea there is [0.5] er not just [0.7] er the idea of [0.5] the innovative 
capacity of small and medium-sized entreprises as er [0.4] to here in economics 
[0.5] but also the idea that these companies are not really in full competition 
[0.8] but that they so say share common resources like [0.5] er certain kinds 
of education and training in a region er historical [0.4] er backgrounds of er 
produc-, [0.2] production specialisms [0.4] er that they also have [0.4] er [0.
3] cooperative relations rather with er [0.3] local or regional Chambers of 
Commerce [0.3] with local or regional banks to finance their arrangements [0.7] 
so indeed there's not just a question of t-, of size [0.4] it's also the idea 
[0.2] that there is not [0.5] sort of full market competition [0.3] as 
economists 
would like to tell us [0.5] but rather a kind of [0.3] social economic 
arrangement [0.3] based on [0.4] a mixture of cooperation and competition [0.5] 
er where companies also work together while they're may at the same time be 
compete in several respects [2.6] now [0.4] er [1.6] this is sort of one 
argument [0.2] and if you looked at Piore and Sable [0.6] er [0.4] The Second 
Industrial Divide you will have seen that that they make that argument sort of 
very strongly [0.5] that there is a [0.2] a big change [0.3] from this kind of 
organization [0.5] to this kind of organization [2.5] now as i said earlier [0.
3] er we may [0.7] see that something like that happens that also maybe that we 
[0.5] er sociologists and economists didn't pay enough attention [0.4] to these 
other kinds of production [0.4] er which er were [0.4] more sort of in the 
shadow so to say of [0.4] er the dominant mass production mentioned earlier 
because they existed and these industrial ic-, [0.3] districts existed in the 
fifties and sixties [0.5] they're not really new [0.5] er but not much 
attention was 
paid to them [1.2] but we may also argue [0.6] standardized mass production 
also persists [0.4] so that we cannot [0.5] that Piore and Sable really 
overdraw their argument by saying that [0.5] er [0.6] the whole economy [0.4] 
moves from one model [0.3] standardized mass production [0.5] to a different 
model flexible specialization [1.1] any empirical study will show that that is 
not really true [0.2] er that there there may be [0.9] some change into that 
direction but there may as well be just a shift in attention on the part of 
observers er also journalistic observers [1.1] now [0.5] that is where i come 
to the [0.2] diagram which is the i will not [0.2] say much in detail about 
that [0.5] because of lack of time [0.5] there have then been er been some 
economists and sociologists [0.4] er who have tried to go a step further [0.7] 
and the [0.2] main idea of this diagram is quite simple [0.3] mainly to say 
that [0.2] there is not any overall shift [0.5] just look at it myself [0.8] er 
[0.4] but we really have to [0.4] recognize that what exists [0.8] is [0.5] 
something like a plurality of worlds of production [0.3] as er Salais and 
Storper call that [0.4] this is the [0.3] text [0.5] er which is also on the 
course outline [0.5] er The Four 
Worlds of Contemporary Industry [0.7] er from the Cambridge Journal of 
Economics but you have the full details in the outline this diagram is taken 
from that text [1.6] where you see [0.2] if you just take a brief look [0.4] in 
the [0.3] the the main idea here is [0.4] that [0.4] we really have [0.3] a 
variety of different basic production models [0.7] er and they argue that sort 
of systemically speaking there are four [0.7] er and er [0.7] there could be 
more obviously one can always sort of make this argument more sophisticated [0.
4] there isn't any [0.8] any need why there should be just four [0.8] er [0.5] 
below you have in the lower right corner [0.2] what they call the industrial 
world [0.4] that is really [0.3] this model [1.2] that's the lower right corner 
of their diagram [1.3] now [0.8] what er [0.4] Piore and Sable tend to argue [0.
6] is that er [0.3] due to the changes that i have been talking about [0.5] 
there is a shift towards [0.4] what one [0.2] may want to call a network market 
world [0.3] and that's the [0.5] er top right [0.9] er corner of this diagram 
[0.7] er [0.6] this is [0.2] er roughly more or less it's not exactly 
the same [0.4] it's what Piore and Sable say [0.6] er is roughly er the idea 
that the whole economy shifts from the lower right to the upper right [0.7] not 
least because if you look at the [0.4] er [0.4] the right order of that [0.4] 
because the market conditions change from predictability to uncertainty [0.9] 
and that is why you have to be [0.4] er more flexible [0.3] that is why you 
cannot [0.5] er rely on long production runs of the same products over long 
periods [0.5] er you have to be [0.4] er you have to react flexibly [0.3] er 
sort of as a producer [0.5] er to the changing market environments [1.3] er 
Salais and Storper say that this is [0.2] not entirely wrong [0.5] but it's 
only a part of the picture [0.5] so [0.2] that one should what one should 
really do is [0.3] one should er look at [0.7] economic organization [0.4] in 
broader and more systematic terms [0.4] that market changes [0.5] the right [0.
3] axis [0.2] the axis on the right [0.5] is only one part of the change [0.3] 
or of the conditions of production having said that first of all [0.6] there is 
another element which is the technology and the production process [0.6] 
which obviously was also part of [0.5] er Piore's and Sable's argument but 
again they assume that there is [0.3] a major shift into one direction only [1.
6] and if you take [0.2] er [0.3] Salais and Storper argue if you take [0.5] 
market conditions and [0.2] technological conditions into account [0.6] then [0.
2] you er [0.3] er have this variety or diversity of [0.4] of worlds of 
production [1.3] er different kinds of economic organization [0.6] at the same 
time not really a shift over time sort of one [0.3] historical transformation 
[0.6] as [0.7] the argument for s-, [0.2] flexible specialization wanted it [0.
6] but [0.3] er you have to look really at the national or local conditions [0.
4] to see [0.5] what kinds of markets are there [0.3] what kinds of 
technologies are used to produce goods [0.5] er [0.2] in certain areas or sin-, 
[0.2] or in a national economy like [0.2] say the British [0.7] er and then you 
can say [0.3] er where [0.3] the [0.5] er a major part of such an economy falls 
into this fourfold scheme [2.5] i [0.2] er we don't really have time to 
go into much detail [0.4] but er let me just say something about the [0.4] the 
other two worlds [0.7] er the world of innovation [0.2] that is really the 
that's the lower [0.6] left [0.3] corner [0.6] that is [0.2] not this Silicon 
Valley [0.3] kind of business where you have [0.5] er [0.8] er [0.2] sort of 
high-tech [0.2] er production [0.4] of the [0.3] the cutting edge of er [0.3] 
industrial technology [0.4] er that's why [0.2] it's on a different level of [0.
5] er [0.3] on the technology scale the [0.4] axis on the bottom [1.2] but you 
may sort of like [0.3] computer chips or basic computer equipment [0.4] also do 
[0.4] er fairly gen-, generic products [0.4] er catering for a fairly stable 
and developing market [0.6] so that is why this world of innovation [0.4] er [0.
4] is [0.2] changing [0.2] rapidly in terms of the technology they use because 
they [0.4] they use [0.3] a high scientific input [0.6] but they produce er for 
fairly predictable [0.2] markets [1.2] whereas the Marshallian market world [0.
3] er [0.9] using the name of Alfred Marshall sort of the [0.3] British 
economist from the [0.2] late nineteenth century [0.7] er [0.2] is [0.4] er [0.
2] a market world which also works with er high technology but has to 
adapt to rather unpredictable [0.3] er market conditions [1.0] then you see 
what they put er [0.3] into these boxes [0.6] is er [0.5] quite different 
criteria [0.4] er as to which these economic sectors or segments [0.4] worlds 
as they call that [0.4] er how they are organized [0.3] there is really only 
the industrial world [0.4] competes by price [0.7] er where [0.4] if you 
produce more effectively [0.4] er [0.2] can offer at lower prices you will be 
the leading competitor in the field [0.9] in all other cases [0.4] there is 
there are other [0.2] criteria of competition [0.5] er it can be [0.4] sort of 
the ability to take in recent technology that's what they call learning [0.6] 
it can be quite simply the quality of products [0.6] er [0.6] you may know for 
instance that when i men-, was mentioning [0.2] south-western Germany [0.6] er 
where they produce not least er tool making [0.5] er technology sort of er 
factory equipment and things like that [0.7] er [0.7] these producers often 
sell at much higher prices than their competitors [0.6] but there is the 
general view that these products are of higher quality than [0.4] competitors 
from [0.2] er from 
other countries [0.4] so they don't really compete on the world market [0.7] by 
price [0.2] but they compete by quality [0.5] and that's a quite different kind 
of economic arrangement [0.2] than [0.2] a competition by price [0.2] i'll come 
back to that er in a minute [1.3] whereas er [0.3] then the network market 
world [0.5] er [0.2] that they say that price plays a role but quality comes in 
so that's a mixed criterion [0.7] according to their view [0.4] one can have [0.
2] and as i say i will say a bit more in a minute [0.4] can have long [0.2] 
discussions one can try what they have tried to do really [0.4] look at [0.5] 
in their case the French Italian and American economy [0.6] is say [0.6] what 
the dominant fields are where these economies specialize [0.5] er so then for 
instance you find that the American economy is rather in the two bottom [0.3] 
segments er it's still strong on in standardized mass production [0.3] but it's 
also strong in the innovative world [0.7] er [0.2] whereas [0.5] other 
economies have different specializations [1.3] so that you have a you have a 
choice really [0.4] there is not one change from [0.3] 
this model to this model [0.5] but [0.3] there is [0.3] what they call [1.7] 
worlds in plural [0.5] of production [3.9] so this is [0.5] er and this is the 
important to say the [0.4] important conceptual conclusion [0.4] from these 
observations [0.5] there is [1.6] not [0.4] a clear line to be drawn from one 
dominant model to another [0.7] but we have [0.5] it's more complicated but we 
have an alternative tool to understand these developments [0.4] by [0.6] 
looking at [0.6] this diversity or plurality [0.2] of production [1.3] not a a 
simple historical change from one model to the other [0.6] but [0.4] er [0.2] a 
more complex change [0.4] er [0.5] including er [0.2] a diversity of different 
arrangements [0.4] in the in the present [2.4] now [0.6] really [0.5] on the 
other two major points i'll be discussing [0.7] i will basically show that [0.
3] er that is essentially the same [0.3] er that again [0.3] we have er [1.1] 
among [0.2] well social scientists sociologists and certainly among journalists 
[0.4] often [0.3] a view that things have changed in one 
direction [0.4] that [0.3] this model [0.8] just didn't hold any longer [0.2] 
so that a new model had to be developed [1.0] whereas [0.2] in each case one 
can make an argument that [0.5] er [0.2] it's not as simple as that [0.4] er 
basic conditions have changed but that means [0.3] that we are in a situation 
where [0.3] as i say [0.2] new models or indeed [0.4] models based on some 
diversity of conditions [0.3] are still in need of development [1.3] if we do 
that here [0.3] for er [0.8] er the economic policy mechanism [0.9] then it is 
quite clear [0.3] that [0.5] as many people have it [0.4] er [0.2] the argument 
is that Keynesianism and corporatism [0.4] don't work any longer because of 
globalization [0.8] that indeed both rely on [0.4] a nationally organized 
economy [0.2] a nationally contained economy [0.9] Keynesanism does it [0.3] 
because you have a government role [0.4] er [0.6] the government determination 
of er [0.5] expenditure and and thus [0.3] sort of the level of economic aki-, 
activity the steering of that level [0.5] on the basis of [0.4] er [0.3] of 
government spending [1.1] where that only works is if the government can really 
control the economy [0.7] these are things which really happened [0.3] er [0.2] 
for instance in [0.4] France in the early nineteen-eighties [0.5] er when [0.2] 
the [0.7] well that was the first time that France had a socialist government 
[0.5] in the post-World War [0.3] Two period [0.6] and that government [0.2] er 
the first government under [0.2] President Mitterand [0.6] had a commitment to 
Keynesianism [0.5] and there was high unemployment [0.3] so well what they 
wanted to do [0.2] according to old Keynesian recipes [0.5] they wanted to 
increase government spending [0.2] to [0.4] push the economy [0.3] to higher 
employment levels [0.4] well they did that they spent a lot of money [0.8] and 
er the economy went upwards [0.2] to some extent [0.8] but as it happened at 
that point of time the French economy was already [0.4] er tightly linked to 
other European economies and [0.6] globally linked to [0.2] other economies 
across the world [0.7] so the fact that the French government pumped money into 
[0.3] the economy [0.5] meant that many French consumers but also producers 
companies [0.4] bought products abroad imported 
products [0.6] so that [0.3] a lot of the [0.3] pump priming as it's 
technically called a lot of the deficit spending [0.6] didn't really went into 
the French didn't really go into the French economy [0.5] but went into 
economies other European economies and abroad [0.5] so they increased their 
deficit [0.4] without much effect on the French economy [0.9] and this was 
abandoned after [0.3] er a little more than a year [0.4] they recognized that 
[0.4] Keynesianism really depends on a national economy which you can control 
[0.6] and if you cannot control it any longer [0.4] because of [0.4] global 
linkages [0.5] er you just cannot do it [0.7] you don't have the effects any 
longer which [0.2] you would like to have [2.3] the same is true [1.0] about 
corporatism [0.8] because corporatism relies on the fact [0.4] that there are 
national organizations of the employers like [0.5] C-B-I [0.2] in England the 
Confederation of [0.2] British Industry [0.6] or like a national Trade Union 
Council [0.6] and that they get together and er determine sort of [0.2] wage 
levels er employment conditions and the like [1.2] now 
again [0.4] if you come to the conviction that [0.3] er [0.6] indeed [0.2] i-, 
if you try to do that [0.3] you may just er arrive at conclusions er which the 
economy cannot sustain [0.4] er because it competes on the global level [0.8] 
then what will happen is that [0.3] er [1.0] people will defect from these 
national organizations you have that that [0.6] employers indeed say [0.4] er 
said sort of in the nineteen-seventies [0.6] well if you're going to [0.2] 
agree sort of the national organization on that level of wages [0.5] then i 
just er exit from the organization [0.4] er i cannot pay those wages so er [0.
2] er [0.3] the [0.3] er [0.7] er i will pay different wages so the the model 
of bargaining breaks down [0.7] the same actually also [0.2] not to put the 
blame one-sidedly on the employers [0.4] also for workers sort of with the [0.
6] er not least sort of s-, the so-called knowledge based upper middle classes 
[0.4] er were [0.2] er increasingly then [0.2] also employees [0.4] er hoped to 
get a better bargain by individually negotiating with their employers rather 
than agreeing to wage conventions [0.6] er then the model also 
breaks down from the [0.4] employees' or workers' [0.3] er point of view [1.0] 
this was the crisis of the [0.4] er [0.8] er of the wage bargaining the 
centralized wage bargaining model [0.4] which indeed happened from the [0.2] 
well mid-nineteen-seventies onwards [0.5] and which in many crea-, countries 
led to major changes of this [0.2] this model [0.5] not a drastic one [0.2] but 
er in in some countries but [0.5] in many [0.4] in many cases indeed [0.4] yes 
[0.7] so the the idea here is [0.8] if that were entirely true [0.5] would be 
that [0.4] this nationally organized model what's the key characteristics here 
[0.5] that it's nation based [5.4] gives way to something like a global 
neoliberalism [13.4] now this is a case like the case with flexible 
specialization [0.2] in [0.4] the [0.2] the first category [0.4] global neolib-,
liberalism that's what i said [0.9] is namely that [0.4] er [0.6] where there 
is a tendency into that direction [0.3] there was a crisis of the [0.2] 
Keynesian corporatist model of [0.5] economic policy [1.1] it is on the other 
hand not true [0.5] that [0.2] say our European economies [0.4] have just gone 
neoliberal 
have just opened to [0.4] er the world market [0.8] er we can still see on the 
one hand [0.6] that there is what [0.3] David Soskice calls varieties of 
capitalism [0.6] this is the paper which we also mention on the course outline 
[0.5] which is er unpublished er but is in the [0.3] the copy of it or several 
copies are in the [0.3] S-R-C collections [0.6] er [0.6] where he argues that 
[0.4] er [0.2] indeed [0.3] er there are [0.4] different ways of coordinating 
economies [0.5] and [0.5] and [0.2] they indeed persist er the level of 
coordination does not go away [0.6] er that may [0.2] change that may adapt to 
new conditions [0.4] er but there are sort of traditions of institutional 
arrangements [0.4] which indeed [0.2] are quite persistent of those changes [1.
0] he makes there a major distinction between what he calls [0.3] coordinated 
market economies and [0.4] uncoordinated market economies [0.8] er the 
uncoordinated ones or rather [0.4] the [0.2] British and the American one [0.8] 
er [0.3] that is why the term corporatism is less well known in this country [0.
4] because there is a much lower degree of coordination [0.5] than for instance 
in [0.5] er 
Germany or Japan [0.3] these are his counter-examples his examples for [0.4] 
coordinated economies [0.9] now this was written before the Japanese crisis [0.
4] but er [0.3] i-, it still holds [0.3] that [0.5] the the argument namely 
that [0.3] there are [0.2] sort of quite entrenched [0.3] institutional 
arrangements [0.4] which don't just disappear because of deregulation and 
neoliberalism [0.4] er but which adapt to new situations [0.9] the [0.2] point 
there is that these are indeed complex institutional arrangements [0.4] where 
[0.3] er the organization of [0.3] er training and education is involved [0.3] 
as you may know [0.5] that there is er [0.2] a much more organized [0.2] 
professional training system [0.5] er a company based one or a or a mixed 
system between [0.6] a dual system between companies and public institutions in 
Germany [0.5] where apprentices are [0.2] are trained [0.4] a much more 
formalized system than in this country [0.8] there is er a relation between 
companies and banks [0.4] which is much tighter [0.3] in both Germany and Japan 
[0.6] er where [0.2] er [0.5] there is the higher degree of coordination 
Soskice talks about [0.6] 
where banks don't just let [0.4] companies drop because they [0.2] the profits 
decline or [0.2] b-, [0.2] because they go into deficit [0.4] but they try to 
organize restructurings [0.5] er so really coordination between banks and [0.4] 
er [0.5] and companies and producers [0.9] thirdly there is in some cases [0.4] 
er coordinated [0.2] work [0.3] across [0.3] er companies in the same sector [0.
9] er [0.3] that is [0.6] er [0.3] are things which are now [0.3] sort of 
discussed under the level of sort of competition policy [0.6] where it's often 
argued that competition needs to be increased that the German or Japanese 
economy [0.4] don't really know the necessary [0.2] levels of competition [0.8] 
but it can also be taken to be an advantage of coordination [1.1] er [0.2] as 
Soskice argues [0.7] and finally there may be a kind of [0.4] company 
organization that's more the Japanese model [0.5] where you have large-scale 
con-, conglomerates [0.3] which don't [0.6] er dominate one sector [0.2] but er 
[0.6] er operate in various sectors so that they sustain themselves [0.4] er [0.
5] through [0.5] boom and bust because they never occul in all occur in all 
sectors at the 
same time [1.6] to [0.4] say that briefly [0.4] the argument here is [0.3] 
there is not just [0.5] global neoriler-, neoliberalism [0.2] but there are [0.
3] varieties of capitalism [0.2] that's indeed the title of his paper [11.5] 
and you recognize the same structure of argument [0.3] is not a change to one 
new model [0.4] but there is [0.4] a transformation towards [0.4] er a more 
complex institutional [0.2] situation overall [3.1] then er [0.5] finally [0.6] 
let's say something about [0.4] the economic policy objective [0.8] where there 
was an agreement [0.2] that [0.2] it should be sort of growth and full 
employment and full employment through growth [0.7] that is the [0.4] the 
Keynesian full employment convention as some people call it [0.7] er and the 
idea that it was reachable [0.6] er that it was indeed achievable with some 
standard tools [0.8] now as i said earlier [0.2] there is an agreement that 
these tools don't work in the same way than they used to work [0.9] but if we 
conclude from what i said earlier [0.5] there's also probably not necessarily 
[0.2] the idea that one has to abandon that entirely [1.3] now 
some people argue that and er [0.4] that's again one of those fashionable terms 
of the time [0.5] where some people say we have to [0.2] get away from any such 
commitment of full employment [0.5] what we have to do is to change the [0.3] 
supply situation on the labour market [0.3] people have to be flexible [0.5] we 
have to deregulate the labour market [0.4] we have to [0.4] allow hiring [0.2] 
hiring and firing on more easy conditions we have to allow [0.5] variety of 
work situations [0.4] er sort of temporary contracts part-time contracts [0.6] 
er [0.7] temping in general [0.5] er [0.4] no minimum wage [0.5] all that only 
[0.2] er [0.3] hampers the development of the economy and the creation of jobs 
[0.4] er what one has to have is a maximum flexibility [0.6] that's the one 
idea [7.0] now [0.3] this idea obviously goes along well with an idea of global 
neol-, neoliberalism [0.2] that you should have markets and competition 
wherever you can get them [1.2] what it does not do though [0.5] er [0.3] is it 
does not have a link between economic policy and social policy any longer [0.4] 
in the same way [0.4] in which the full 
employment convention had it [1.2] there [0.3] this [0.2] full employment 
convention really meant [0.3] that within a society within a nation [0.5] there 
was an understanding that [0.4] there is something like a common responsibility 
[0.6] to get [0.5] everybody employed [0.4] and those who temporarily could not 
be employed [0.4] er should get unemployment benefits on such a level that er 
[0.2] they could lead a decent life [1.1] er that is what i call a linkage 
between economic policy and social policy [0.8] so that there is well the 
government could even say a societal commitment and consensus along that [1.2] 
what the idea of flexibility means really is giving that idea up [0.3] it 
basically shifts responsibility from the society to the individual [0.8] er [0.
4] the overall conditions are changed in such a way that [0.5] there are really 
almost no impediments or barriers to get a job [0.8] er [0.6] no union 
involvement [0.2] no restrictions [0.3] nothing like that [0.6] but that that 
also means that [0.5] everybody should see how [0.2] he or she could [0.4] sell 
[0.5] her or his labour power [0.4] er 
under whatever conditions are possible [0.9] now the [0.4] here there is not 
really [0.2] a new [0.9] model [0.6] but it is also clear that at least in 
European societies [0.5] er [0.2] the flexibility regime is not just accepted 
[0.8] i mean there are some people who talk about [0.5] er [0.9] offensive [0.
2] flexibility or constructive flexibility [0.4] where they see a role for the 
unions n-, new role for the unions a new role for the regions [0.4] er to 
develop the regime [0.3] which er [0.3] keeps up this linkage of [0.4] as i 
will call it [0.4] of economic and social policy [1.9] i put that into [0.2] 
brackets because there isn't really yet a model [2.9] but the idea is that some 
such linkage needs to be maintained [9.0] and that there is indeed no reason to 
assume [0.5] it may have become more difficult than it was in the nineteen-
sixties [0.5] when [0.2] this could be organized around a national society [0.
6] the national government committed to that [0.5] that may no longer be 
possible [0.8] however [0.5] er this does not entail that there are no [0.3] 
means and 
resources and actors [0.4] to try to develop such a new model [0.5] there are 
unions there are [0.3] regional or [0.2] city governments who could [0.3] have 
a stronger role [0.6] again partly because historically they had a role [0.6] 
there is now not least er a stronger role of the European Union [0.5] so if 
Keynesianism doesn't work any longer on the national level [0.2] maybe it still 
works on the European level [0.6] because Europe is less overall less import 
dependent [0.3] than each individual member state of the European Union [0.8] 
so there are discussions around [0.5] how to design really this [0.4] this 
model [0.6] which are open sort of which are [0.5] open-ended there is no 
solution for it yet [0.2] but [0.5] er [0.2] there is also the view [0.2] that 
[0.3] there is no need to [0.2] embark fully on a model of flexibility [3.2] to 
conclude [0.5] er what you have seen and the way in which i [0.2] introduced 
this model at the very beginning [0.6] er [0.6] and that is one of the 
important questions here [0.2] in this model there is a linkage between [0.4] 
organization of production [0.3] economic policy mechanism [0.5] and economic 
policy objective [0.4] one follows from the other [0.7] if you have 
standardized mass production you have standardized work situations [0.4] you 
have er [0.6] a likelihood of the common workers' consciousness and [0.2] trade 
union development [0.7] er who can operate in large-scale organizations who can 
get organized and [0.4] o-, are organizable because they [0.2] are in these 
large-scale organizations [0.7] you have [0.4] er a national government [0.3] 
er [0.4] or in a national level [0.3] towards they relate [0.2] both the unions 
and the employers [0.8] and [0.3] thus you can construct [0.4] sort of a 
socially responsible community [0.3] er to arrive at [1.1] a linkage of 
economic and social policy [0.6] so this [0.4] this works the one relates to 
the other [0.2] or rather it worked [0.5] it was the model of the fifties and 
sixties [0.7] it doesn't work any longer in the same way [0.3] and one 
possibility here is [0.7] to argue [1.5] in favour of a model which combines [0.
4] flexible specialization and global neoliber-, neoliberalism and flexibility 
[0.8] which does away with all the institutions and 
boundaries which there were [0.4] and just hopes that [0.8] by flexibilizing [0.
2] this you can [0.5] create a new kind of viable [0.2] economic regime [1.3] 
now as i've tried to say briefly there are reasons [0.4] to assume that that [0.
3] while it is a coherent model [0.6] but that it just wouldn't [0.7] er be 
socially viable [0.2] that it would [0.5] er create er high inequalities [0.4] 
er [0.5] of a level in kind which one tried to abolish over much of the [0.6] 
social and economic [0.2] policy developments of the [0.4] earlier Second World 
War period [0.7] so that is why one has to search for [0.6] a model to relate 
the variety of worlds of production [0.7] in the different [0.7] sort of 
historically developed settings which have varieties of coordination between 
economies varieties 
of capitalism [0.9] to develop that into a new linkage of economic and social 
policy [0.8] but this is obviously [0.7] less clear-cut [0.2] er we can less 
take it for granted [0.4] than the old model [0.3] the old model was quite 
stable [0.4] it was [0.3] conventionalized indeed it developed over a [0.5] a 
long time sort of from the eighteen-eighties eighteen-nineties to the nineteen-
sixties [0.3] and through many struggles obviously workers' struggles not least 
[0.9] er [0.4] we don't have that now there is not such a stability [0.4] there 
are not these conventions which [0.6] hold each other [0.5] er [0.4] but there 
[0.2] that does not mean that [0.2] they couldn't be developed in principle [0.
8] and that is what many [0.2] sort of [0.5] social and economic actors are 
really working on [0.6] at this point [2.1] okay [0.3] thank you