nm1177: okay everybody hello nice to see you hope you had a good reading week 
[0.3] have your attention please [1.7] at the back at the sides [0.4] have you 
all got one of these [0.3] 
sm1178: yep 
sm1179: yep 
sm1180: yep 
nm1177: yeah [0.2] all right [0.3] you'll see on the front you've just got a 
very brief [0.2] overview a couple of extra references [0.7] er i'll talk about 
the conciliation procedure la-, later on and there's a web site which the er 
European Parliament has put up for its er [0.2] conciliation committee [0.5] er 
[0.3] and it's very good it's got loads of information probably too much but [0.
5] er it'll it's an up to date [1.5] database which you can use [0.2] at your 
leisure [0.5] all right so that's at the er [0.4] footnote three [0.3] that's 
the web site reference there [0.4] er on the back you've got [0.2] your lovely 
pictures of codecision and [0.5] er cooperation procedures [0.5] we're being 
filmed today [0.6] because i'm going to be a star [0.3] [exclamation] 
[laughter] 
sm1182: you are already 
nm1177: er [0.4] no i'm not actually [laughter] [laughter] oh thank you that's 
lovely [0.4] 
sm1183: 
worth ten per cent isn't it 
nm1177: [laughter] yeah no it's just for a er it's for a C-D-ROM is that right 
[0.4] 
om1184: that's right yeah we're er [1.0] er [0.3] well i'm involved in a 
project where i'm filming lectures from e-, every [0.2] different department 
and er we're making a C-D-ROM for foreign students [0.7] to help improve their 
comprehension of [0.2] er [0.3] academic lectures [0.9] [0.2] that's about it 
nm1177: right 
om1184: namex very kindly agreed to be filmed [0.2] 
nm1177: it's vanity you know [0.7] [laughter] er so i can give one to my mother 
for Christmas which is great [0.5] all right so that's the basic background 
that's why we've got cameras and stuff here [0.8] er [0.5] yeah so no rude 
comments please [1.1] er okay decision making procedures [1.4] now then have 
you all got hold of the reading okay [1.8] no same sort of result [0.5] er well 
i've got some extra ones there there's the Corbett one which is very good on [0.
6] in in the J-C-M-S on er [0.4] the cooperation procedure [0.6] and there's 
another Earnshaw and Judge one [0.2] Early Days which is on [0.4] er [0.8] on 
the 
codecision and that's in JEPP [0.5] ninety-five [0.6] er [0.2] there's other 
references as well [0.4] er [2.4] but i'll give those [0.3] to you [0.2] in the 
seminars and i'll give them to Pete directly [2.1] okay so decision making why 
is it so important who cares about this tedious [0.5] er part of the er 
European Union [0.3] er [1.0] as you'll see throughout the lecture here and as 
you've probably identified through your reading [0.3] they don't get easier 
they get more and more complicated these decision making procedures [0.5] er [0.
2] so [0.7] er er [0.3] part of the reason for er [0.2] going through them [0.
3] in this lecture is to explain why that's happened [0.5] and to er try and 
identify what the consequences are [0.3] for the European Union Union as a 
system [2.1] well what do procedures do well first of all they set up a certain 
set of rules and norms [0.3] er which [0.5] er dictate how people [0.2] 
interact [0.3] and this is important at the European level remember because [0.
3] we've talked about these theories of international inte-, of European 
integration from the international [0.3] relations perspective [0.5] and 
these approaches both emphasize the importance of rules and norms [0.6] so from 
the intergovernmentalist perspective you've got sort of [0.3] a realist [0.2] r-
, or even a regime approach [0.2] which talks about the establishment of [0.3] 
rules [0.2] and er and routines oh sorry rules and norms [0.4] er so that 
member states can cooperate and achieve [0.4] their national interests in a 
more effective fashion [0.6] from neofunctionalists [0.2] you have rules which 
then spill over [0.2] into [0.4] new [0.2] er policy areas and which promote a 
a shared sense of identity [1.0] and we'll see that [0.3] through the 
development of these rules over the over the history [0.4] er especially over 
the last twenty years [0.3] er of the European Union [0.5] er [0.7] you can see 
a development of more shared beliefs and [0.4] more [0.3] er discussion between 
[0.6] the inst-, the key institutions of the European Union [0.2] to the extent 
that their boundaries have become blurred [0.7] and that's a very important 
element in the post- [0.4] Amsterdam [0.4] er [0.2] effect of the codecision 
procedure [1.4] and for more 
information on that i'll refer you to the er [0.2] to these er [0.3] to this [0.
3] web site reference where there's a lot more information about [0.3] the 
conciliation procedure [2.0] right we can see that [0.3] decision making 
procedures have been very important in [0.2] the history of European 
integration [0.3] the Luxembourg compromise for example [0.3] was a form of 
decision making procedure [0.3] which radically affected [0.3] the evolution of 
European integration [0.2] in the nineteen-seventies [0.4] you remember then 
that the er [0.2] emphasis on reaching unanimity became an important [0.3] rule 
[1.1] in er [0.2] in in [0.2] council decision making [1.3] well what we can 
see [0.2] through the consultation cooperation codecision procedures [0.3] is a 
movement towards [0.4] er [1.3] er a common [0.3] focus on [0.7] er promoting a 
shared [0.6] er direction [0.4] er a shared [0.5] er [0.5] pursuance of a 
European orientation a com-, a set of common interests [0.4] er instead of [0.
2] the specific interest [0.2] and this has partly been compensated [1.2] by 
the er [0.4] in-, [0.2] increased role of the European Parliament [0.4] er [0.
2] but it's also [0.4] been the 
result of [0.3] changing procedures [0.3] in the Council of Ministers as well 
[2.0] okay so there's four main decision making procedures in the E-U [1.2] and 
i forgot one on your handout [0.5] er which is the assent procedure [0.9] er [0.
4] these are the consultation procedure the cooperation procedure [0.5] the 
codecision procedure and the assent procedure [2.6] okay the first one [1.1] is 
the consultation procedure [3.5] and this one er encapsulate the er the the 
exam question which you often get [0.4] or see we set a lot in past exam papers 
[0.3] er [0.7] of the commission proposes the council decides discuss [0.7] and 
this very much used to typify [0.3] the er the relationship [0.4] of decision 
making between the council [0.2] and the commission [0.3] commission will come 
up with a proposal [0.4] as its formal function requires [0.2] and the council 
will make the decision [0.2] the European Parliament only had [0.2] a very 
limited impact [0.2] on the decision making procedure [0.3] the Economic and 
Social Committee had a very limited impact [0.3] and they were effectively the 
main 
institutions that had [0.3] er some input onto the deci-, [0.2] onto the 
decision making process [1.8] so the commission proposes the council decides [0.
4] is very much [0.2] the er the descriptive of [0.2] the consultation 
procedure [0.5] er [0.2] you have the commission ini-, initiates a proposal [0.
3] the European Parliament [0.3] gives an opinion in other words it opines [1.
0] and then the Council of Ministers [0.5] takes the decision either by a 
qualified majority [0.4] or by unanimity [4.5] and that was the key decision 
making procedure [1.3] in er [1.7] for much of the period of [0.2] European 
integration [0.4] up until [1.1] er the Single European Act [3.8] an important 
[0.3] event though in the consultation procedure [0.3] was the [0.3] European 
Court of Justice's nineteen-seventy-nine [0.3] isoglucose ruling [0.5] [sniff] 
[2.6] 
sm1185: nineteen-seventy-nine [0.5] 
nm1177: hey [0.2] yeah nineteen-seventy-nine [1.3] isoglucose is the sort of 
stuff John Barnes drinks you know [0.8] gives you energy fast that sort of 
stuff [0.4] er [0.3] now isoglu-, the isoglucose [0.2] ruling was important [1.
2] er because [1.6] it [0.3] forced the Council of Ministers [0.3] to [0.3] er 
[0.2] 
wait for the European Parliament to give its opinion [2.3] now previously this 
was something which [0.4] er the Council of Ministers was went [0.2] was meant 
to do [0.2] but didn't necessarily have to [1.3] and nineteen-seventy-nine was 
important because [1.1] this was the year in which the European Parliament [0.
4] er was first [0.5] elected [0.2] through some form of direct election [0.4] 
and so the European Court of Justice was recognizing this [0.3] and requiring 
that the Council of Ministers took this on board [0.3] and incorporated the 
European Parliament [0.3] formally into its decisions [1.8] or at least 
considered [0.2] the opinion of the European Parliament [0.3] in its decisions 
[3.4] but it didn't really mean an awful lot i mean [0.3] just 'cause the 
European [0.6] Parliament's views were being considered [0.3] didn't mean that 
the Council of Ministers was actually going to er [0.4] to follow them at all 
[4.5] and this is still the sort of relationship [0.3] which you have in [0.3] 
er [1.0] in the second and third pillars of er [0.6] the Maastricht Treaty such 
as common foreign and security policy [3.4] 
and that means that the European Parliament [0.3] has the right effectively to 
be involved in the in the er [0.5] in er [0.4] er discussions [0.5] er that 
come up [0.4] that that that r-, that result in particular decisions [0.2] in 
these two pillars [0.2] but it doesn't give it a formal [0.4] er [0.3] a formal 
role [4.2] okay the second procedure [1.9] is the cooperation procedure [8.2] 
all right now if you flip over your page you'll see the cooperation procedure 
[0.3] in its full glory [3.2] er [0.3] briefly the cooperation procedure came 
about for two main reasons [0.4] first of all the Single European Market 
programme if you remember had [0.3] a list of three-hundred-odd [0.3] proposals 
which they had to get through very quickly [0.7] and this required the 
extension of qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers [0.3] in 
order to ensure that they'd [0.3] get all these er all all these decisions made 
[0.3] in time [1.6] in time to meet the ninety-two deadline [0.8] and the 
greater involvement of the European Parliament which comes through [0.2] the 
cooperation procedure [0.3] er [0.4] compensated for the 
resulting loss in democratic accountability [0.5] all right so you have a 
movement from [0.5] the [0.2] er [0.7] accountability of [0.3] the member 
states in the Council of Ministers [0.5] to the European Parliament [0.3] 
through the cooperation procedure [3.3] er the second reason [1.3] for the 
cooperation procedure was because M-E-Ps were [0.4] unrepresented [0.7] under-
represented rather in the decision making process despite their direct 
elections [0.3] so there's a lot of action [0.2] around the time of nineteen-
eighty-four [0.3] when the European Parliament came up with a draft treaty on 
European Union [0.5] er [0.4] which argued for a greater role of the European 
Parliament [0.4] in decision making [0.8] and the cooperation procedure was if 
you like the first [0.5] significant institutional development [0.3] that 
reflected [0.6] er a recognition [0.2] of [0.9] the er of of the role of the 
European Parliament [5.0] the key difference is that the cooperation procedure 
[0.6] er [0.3] introduces two readings [3.5] in the Council of Ministers to the 
consultation procedure's single readings [0.5] all right 
so the Council of Ministers has to think about it twice [2.1] and the second 
reading forces the council [0.3] to take into account the European Parliament's 
[0.3] reaction [0.3] to the council's common [0.2] position [10.3] okay have 
you got it in front of you [1.1] your cooperation procedures [1.2] er you want 
one there you go [2.4] there you go that's that's the one we're doing now [1.4] 
er [0.3] okay so the commission initiates its proposal the European Parliament 
gives an opinion [0.3] commission takes a view on the European Parliament's 
opinion so [0.3] there has to be some sort of [0.4] understanding mutual 
understanding there between the commission [0.3] and the European Parliament [1.
1] and the Council of Ministers adopts [0.2] a common position by qualified 
majority voting [1.8] all right so that's the first reading [1.4] by the 
Council of Ministers [2.0] now the European Parliament then has a fixed amount 
of time three months [0.3] to consider [0.4] the er Council of Ministers' [0.2] 
common position [1.9] can either er approve [0.3] the council position or take 
no view shoots through into [0.3] an act so that becomes legislation [2.3] or 
it can reject by an absolute majority [2.3] and this means that the council can 
only accept [0.6] er sorry can only er [0.8] er push the act through [0.3] by 
unanimity [2.6] so they're the two extremes [1.2] in the middle however [0.3] 
the European Parliament can amend the council position by an absolute majority 
[2.6] and then [0.4] the europ-, [0.3] the er [0.2] the the commission 
reconsiders it [0.8] er [1.2] and the council then has a number of different 
options [0.2] er [0.4] which basically [0.2] vary in their difficulty [0.5] and 
it's this sort of variation in in [0.3] in difficulty of achieving [0.5] er [0.
8] a decision in the council [0.2] that is the key impact here of [0.2] of a 
cooperation procedure [0.5] because [1.3] if the er [0.2] if if it's a highly 
[0.2] con-, [0.2] contested issue [1.5] which is reflected in the amendments [0.
3] of the European Parliament [2.6] er then the chances are that this 
contestability will be reflected in some way or form in the Council of 
Ministers [0.5] so [0.6] i mean it says here that [0.2] er within three months 
the council can amend the 
commission's [0.3] proposals [0.3] by unanimity [1.6] now that means that er [0.
3] everybody has to agree [0.2] so [1.5] if these amendments are in any way 
contestable [0.3] it's unlikely that they're going to push through [0.3] and 
the key thing about the cooperation procedure [0.3] was not just its sort of 
recognition [0.3] of er of the European Parliament's importance [0.5] but also 
because it [0.2] it forced the Council of Ministers [0.3] to [0.3] er [0.5] 
consult and to work with [0.3] the coun-, with the er with the European 
Parliament [0.6] and er and to take its views on board [9.4] and that's sort of 
affected the balance between [0.3] the er the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament [1.9] right now the extent of this legislation was really 
only about the ninety-t [0.3] reaching the nineteen-ninety-two deadline [0.3] 
er to achieve the Single European Market [0.8] and the Maastricht Treaty 
extended these procedures to new areas [0.5] that had [0.2] er become the 
control of the reserve of the member states [0.9] er alone [0.3] so that was 
essentially in in [0.4] pillar one of the Maastricht 
Treaty [0.4] you have the extension of er the cooperas-, [0.2] cop-, [0.2] 
cooperation procedure much more broadly [2.1] okay are there any er [0.5] 
specific questions concerning [2.1] 
sm1186: yeah i have 
nm1177: the cooperation procedure [0.8] 
sm1186: i mean if if [0.4] can [0.2] Parliament [0.2] keep on rejecting 
proposals [0.2] for [0.2] ever and a day or is there a way round that i mean 
are you got these time limits [0.3] 
nm1177: right [0.4] 
sm1186: but i mean [0.7] er [0.4] exactly what power has the E-P got over the 
Council of Ministers in terms of that sense of proposals [0.5] if they're 
adamant to say that we don't want this to go through [0.4] 
nm1177: right [0.3] 
sm1186: at the end of the day the Council of Ministers say [0.2] up yours it's 
going through and that's it [0.3] 
nm1177: yeah that's i mean effectively the Council of Ministers can do that [0.
4] i mean if you look on the right here of the diagram within three months the 
[0.2] European Parliament can reject the council's [0.3] position by absolute 
majority [0.8] 
sm1186: right 
nm1177: now that's not that's not easy to get an absolute majority anywhere in 
the European 
Parliament because [0.3] and we talked when we talked about it it's got a [0.2] 
whole range of different groupings and there's no real party whipping [0.3] and 
basically it means that [0.3] you'll have parties on the left and the right of 
the spectrum will have to get together [0.3] to get an absolute majority 
sm1186: right [0.8] 
nm1177: er [0.3] but if they do achieve that [0.2] the council can still [0.3] 
er adopt it by unanimity if they all agree [0.9] so effectively the cooperation 
procedure gives a bit more power to the European Parliament [0.3] but it 
doesn't have any real veto right [0.5] er and it can't really er [0.6] upset [0.
3] the Council of Ministers by f-, [0.3] forcing it to take a decision it 
doesn't want to take [2.6] 
sm1187: what is the er [0.5] qualified majority rule in the council [0.4] 
nm1177: er qualifi-, we talked about this when we talked about the voting 
system [0.7] all right so you have a different number of er votes which are er 
a-, attributed to the different member states [0.3] with respect to their size 
[0.6] er [0.3] and the qualified majority voting rule er [0.4] 
means that instead of just having an absolute majority [0.5] in certain areas 
which are set out in in er in treaty [0.4] procedures [0.3] the er [0.4] er you 
can go for a qualified majority [0.3] voting [0.4] a qualified majority so it 
has to be [0.3] for example more than an absolute majority [1.5] 
sm1187: a-, as in including what er majority of the population [0.5] 
nm1177: no no in terms of the votes cast [0.7] do you remember when we talked 
about the er the Council of Ministers we went through all the the distribution 
of votes [0.3] basically it's organized so that the [0.3] er [0.7] so that the 
er larger member states together [0.5] can't overrule the smaller member states 
[0.5] yeah [0.4] well that means that er [1.2] you have a a sort of whole range 
of different voting combinations that you can have there [0.4] and er the 
qualified majority voting [0.3] means that [0.3] the er [0.6] er there is [0.3] 
for example a requirement for greater [0.4] than an absolute majority [0.2] in 
the er [0.2] in the decision [0.7] for the decision to pass is that all right 
so the numbers have to add up to more than just [0.4] you know [0.4] 
more than fifty per cent [0.3] so it might be sixty per cent or [0.5] whatever 
[0.5] and it just means it's a way of [0.5] of making it harder to make the 
decision [0.3] without it becoming un-, un-, unanimous [1.0] yeah [1.5] okay 
good [0.7] right on to the er codecision procedure then [5.0] right the 
codecision procedure was set up in the treaty on European Union [0.7] and this 
this gave the greatest boost to the European Parliament's [0.4] powers [0.3] to 
date [1.7] er we'll also talk about how it fitted in with the er [0.5] with the 
er [0.4] er [0.9] Amsterdam Treaty as well which also extended the codecision 
procedure [2.6] [1.1] all right it was er established under [0.5] article one-
eight-nine-B of the Treaty of Rome [0.2] so it's very much pillar one business 
[2.4] and it took the cooperation procedure a step further [2.4] so this time 
rather than just placing the Council of Ministers under a lot of pressure [0.3] 
after European Parliament amendments [0.7] the er codecision procedure provided 
the E-P with the power [0.3] to veto decisions [2.2] so it could actually throw 
out [0.5] the er the 
decisions of er [0.3] the Council of Ministers [3.4] however [0.2] and this is 
[0.2] what makes it different to [0.3] the the er [0.4] the Amsterdam 
amendments [0.8] er [0.2] the procedure doesn't encourage the E-P to to employ 
this veto [1.5] and it really encourages the promotion of shared decision 
making [0.6] all right again there's this [0.5] attempt to try and set up 
procedures which [0.5] get everybody to agree [0.3] and to come to some sort of 
er [0.4] er mutual agreement [5.3] all right so if you have a look at your 
piccies again [1.6] you can have a try at this one [12.7] [sniff] [2.4] right 
so [0.8] for the first reading [0.5] for the European Parliament and the 
council is the same as in the cooperation procedure [0.9] all right so you've 
got the commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council of 
Ministers [0.5] the E-P opines [0.4] and then the council establishes [0.3] a 
common position by qualified majority voting [5.5] and again [0.2] you've got 
the European [0.2] Parliament [0.2] examining the council position [0.7] sorry 
the common position [0.3] and it can accept by doing nothing [0.9] and 
then it just goes straight through that's easy [1.5] rejection [0.8] by the 
European Parliament is slightly different as well [2.2] er [0.6] if the E-P 
decides to reject [0.3] by an absolute majority the council can convene a 
conciliation committee [0.8] now the conciliation committee is [0.5] er [0.5] 
well the idea is was established [0.2] er [1.2] through the budget which was 
another area where the European Parliament had [0.3] large amounts of powers [0.
6] and the conciliation committee was attempted [0.2] w-, was established to 
try and [0.3] er [0.6] ensure that they reached some sort of agreement [1.3] 
and gave it greater [0.5] er [1.1] and gave problem areas greater decisions [0.
4] er [0.2] greater consideration rather [1.6] the make-up of the com-, 
conciliation committee [0.3] is as-, is effectively [0.5] fifty-fifty council 
[0.4] and er [0.8] and er European Parliament [0.9] representatives [6.0] and 
what you see here is a formal blurring of the boundary between the European 
Parliament [0.6] and the Council of Ministers [1.0] so the idea is to take [0.
3] members of each [0.6] put them together in a room [0.3] and get them to 
think about a solution [1.4] and that's the idea is obviously here is to try 
and break down that [0.3] antagonism between [0.2] supranational and 
intergovernmental [0.4] er sort of views of the world [8.9] so after the 
council has convened a conciliation committee when after the European 
Parliament [0.3] has rejected the common position [1.5] the E-P can then 
confirm its rejection [0.5] by an absolute majority [13.4] okay so this is 
after the council has explained its position in greater detail to the European 
Parliament [3.5] now if the European Parliament proposes amendments which is 
the sort of the er the dog leg out to the right of the diagram [3.2] er the 
council can accept the amendments by a qualified majority voting [0.9] if the 
commission agrees to the ame-, [0.2] of the amendments [0.7] and by unanimity 
if the commission doesn't [2.7] but if the council [0.5] doesn't like these 
amendments at all and rejects them [0.9] then again a conciliation committee 
can be established [4.1] now at this stage the conciliation committee 
acts as a last chance for the European Parliament [0.3] and the council to d-, 
[0.3] to agree [0.8] so if it approves a joint-, [0.4] if it produces a jointly 
approved text after six weeks' deliberation [0.4] the text [0.3] must be 
approved by the council by Q-M-V [0.5] and by the [0.4] by the European 
Parliament by [0.3] absolute majority [3.5] but if the conciliation committee 
cannot agree on a joint text [0.3] then the balance back [0.2] swings back in 
favour of the Council of Ministers [2.6] all right so that [0.3] the er Council 
of Ministers [0.4] er [0.4] can then [1.5] refer back to the original common 
position [0.4] and er [0.7] and approve the legislation through qualified 
majority voting [8.9] hiya [0.2] so the Council of Ministers effectively wins 
out at the end of the day of the conciliation committee [0.4] but the European 
Parliament can make it very difficult indeed [0.4] and when it rejects [0.4] er 
a decision it makes it practically impossible for the Council of Ministers to 
pass it through [2.8] but the key thing here in the conciliation committee [0.
2] is to 
encourage [0.4] cooperation and further agreement between the different member 
states [0.9] er sorry the the different institutions of the European er [0.5] 
at the European level [0.3] 
sm1188: were they very successful these conciliations [0.6] 
nm1177: well we'll just get to that in a moment there 
sm1188: ah 
nm1177: [1.6] okay i haven't talked about the assent procedure i'll have to go 
back to that in a moment [0.2] er [0.5] 
sm1189: can i just ask a quick 
nm1177: yeah sure 
sm1189: so does the commission [0.7] its only role if if it's been to have the 
right [0.4] is to force the council to [1.3] greater un-, [0.4] unanimity [1.0] 
basically [1.0] 
nm1177: well the c-, the commission has a a fairly relat-, er has a relatively 
limited role once the whole process has got going [0.4] i mean it's made its 
proposal [0.4] and th-, the [0.2] the commission acts in the conciliation 
committee [0.3] and er [0.3] tries to promote some sort of agreement so it 
plays an im-, important mediating role [0.7] but er [0.8] it the power is out 
of its hands effectively then [1.2] er [0.6] it can only make [0.3] a slight 
amount of difference [0.7] er through its different you know 
you can see there you've got these two strands coming through [0.5] the 
positive opinion [0.4] er and the negative opinion on the E-P's [0.2] 
amendments and that affects how easy [0.2] how easily the council can then [0.
3] overrule the European Parliament's decisions [0.6] but er [0.3] its main [0.
5] part of the process is [0.3] is in [0.4] putting the proposal forward in [0.
2] er at the beginning and trying to get some [0.3] sort of agreement reached 
at the end [0.8] 
sm1189: so if the the E-P rejects something [0.3] 
nm1177: u-huh 
sm1189: something outright [0.2] 
nm1177: u-huh 
sm1189: then is it more or less going to [0.2] be very difficult to put through 
[0.3] 
nm1177: well it depends what stage it rejects it so if it rejects it after the 
first reading [0.5] then it becomes qu-, very difficult for the er for the 
council to er [0.8] to get something through they can't come to some sort of 
agreement at the conciliation committee [0.6] er [2.3] but [0.2] at the later 
stage if the European Parliament rejects the conciliation committee in other 
words after they've had a conciliation committee [0.2] on 
amendments [0.6] then er then it [0.2] reverts back to the Council of Ministers 
[0.9] it's not simple is it 
sm1189: no 
nm1177: oh no [0.6] er [0.7] all right so now i just want you to spend a few 
minutes er [0.2] thinking about the consequences of these different procedures 
because [0.5] part of the point of involving the European Parliament if you 
remember rightly [0.4] was to try [0.3] and increase the transparency [0.2] and 
democracy of the European decision making [1.2] now that's a nightmare that's 
not very democratic that whole decision making process there [0.3] it's so 
convoluted and there's so many different twists and turns [0.4] and it's so 
slow [0.2] and there's so many rules and laws to follow [0.3] that it takes a 
considerable amount of of power of brain power just to [0.2] work it out [0.4] 
er [0.4] it's harder for the M-E-Ps who are trying to operate within it [0.3] 
and it's practically impossible for people who haven't taken the time out to do 
a degree in [0.4] in er European whatever politics 
sm1186: i've [0.3] i've lost a plot in the bit in the sense that [0.5] do 
the cooperation procedures and the codecision procedures look at different 
issues or is it the same bill going through [0.4] 
nm1177: no there d-, there are different procedures for different issues 
sm1186: right [0.3] okay 
nm1177: yeah [1.3] 
sm1186: but which is which or does that [0.2] 
nm1177: well it's all it's all listed down in the treaties i mean effectively 
[0.3] er [0.4] what happened was that after the single European [0.7] er [0.8] 
s-, [0.2] after ni-, the nineteen-ninety-two deadline was reached [0.4] and the 
Maastricht Treaty came in again in sort of ninety-two ninety-three [0.4] er [0.
5] then [0.3] the [0.6] procedures which hadn't been [0.4] or or the policies 
which hadn't been reached [0.6] er for com-, [0.2] the completion of the single 
European market [0.3] then went on to codecision [0.9] and the cooperation 
procedure's become practically irrelevant now as we'll see [0.4] after the 
Amsterdam [0.6] after we talk about the Amsterdam Treaty [2.3] er [0.6] okay so 
what i want you to think about now is er have a [0.3] quick couple of minutes 
[0.3] to to discuss [0.6] how these [0.3] procedures have affected the 
balance of power between the different institutions [0.6] er in the European 
Union so think about the commission [0.4] think about [0.3] the European 
Parliament [0.3] think about the Council of Ministers and all the different 
subcommittees that we've seen there [0.3] which ones do you think cooperate 
more how do you think the structures [0.2] work together and who wins out and 
who's lost [2.0] all right [2.1] so just for er just for five minutes then 
nm1177: right so er [1.5] what did you think [0.6] who wins out is it [0.6] 
does it make the process [0.2] more democratic or less democratic [0.4] which 
institutions have [0.5] gained the most and which have lost 
sm1186: i think the E-P's gained more [0.5] 
nm1177: the E-P okay 
sm1186: yeah [2.9] 
nm1177: and does this what ef-, what's the net effect of this on the er on 
European decision making [1.0] 
sf1190: [0.5] 
sm1191: is [0.2] is it slower [0.7] 
nm1177: slower yeah absolutely it's slower [0.2] yeah [0.2] i mean the the the 
key thing is that the er [0.5] most of the er er the hold-ups have been 
in the Council of Ministers rather than [0.4] in the er [0.2] conciliation [0.
6] committee [1.2] but er [0.2] that's an important consequence of it so it 
takes even longer i mean they've had [0.3] about four or five conciliation 
committees [0.3] a year in the first year [0.3] now it [0.3] it's become 
slightly more effective they get up to about seven or eight but there's not a 
huge amount of [0.6] er [0.4] there's an [0.2] not a huge amount of turnover in 
these er conciliation committees [0.2] 
sm1192: how how democratic are they [0.8] isn't there a huge amount of room for 
like dodgy dealing [0.4] 
nm1177: dodgy dealing [laughter] yeah abso-, well i mean [0.3] to a degree yes 
there is but i mean you've got the dodgy dealings between slightly more 
democratic actors now [0.7] i mean [laughter] and this is the difference 
they're M-, M-E-Ps who are making the dodgy dealings rather than just the 
member states [0.5] and this is part of the problem because [0.4] er [0.5] if 
they were to just make the er [0.9] the er the Council of Ministers more 
transparent more open [0.4] then the decision 
making just goes back into the toilets [0.3] you know and [0.2] it doesn't 
really make it any more transparent whereas [0.3] the whole point of having 
these procedures is that it forces [0.4] the different er [0.2] the different 
er [0.4] er [0.2] er [0.5] actors from the different institutions to come 
together [0.3] so at some point they have to reveal their differences if it's 
going to be significant [0.5] 
sm1193: isn't the only real [0.2] advantage that the [1.0] the Council of 
Ministers and to a degree the commission [0.8] er [0.8] have got a moral 
imperative [0.4] to er [0.8] take a very careful look at what is the incentive 
[1.2] 
nm1177: okay what what do you mean by moral imperative [0.5] 
sm1193: well if they've got [0.4] a [2.2] a a reasonable [1.1] er as [0.3] 
qualified majority [0.2] in the [1.2] er [0.5] European Parliament saying [0.8] 
we don't agree with this 
nm1177: mm [0.3] 
sm1193: doesn't that make the [0.4] Council of Ministers think [1.7] we've got 
to be careful because of the publicity we might get [0.2] 
nm1177: right okay well that's fair enough but [0.3] how does the codecision 
procedure make that [0.5] more or less significant that moral [0.2] 
imperative [1.0] 
sm1194: try and build this [0.2] democratic [0.3] er deficit [0.3] 
nm1177: well how d-, what do you mean by the democratic deficit i mean there 
was a democratic deficit before [0.4] people were still involved in the in the 
in the cooperation procedure [0.7] 
sm1194: well 
nm1177: why does the codecision procedure mean that that that the er [0.4] the 
moral imperative which namex referred to becomes more important 
sm1194: well because [0.3] i mean you could say that the [0.2] M-E-Ps [0.4] are 
you know directly elected from European citizens [0.5] and er 
nm1177: right [1.4] but they were anyway under the cooperation procedure 
sm1194: oh right so 
nm1177: so what's the difference how does i-, 'cause this is the ad-, this is 
the key to the point i mean there was this obligation [0.3] to speak to these M-
E-Ps [0.4] you know [0.4] as soon as they were elected in seventy-nine so [0.5] 
what is it that's made it different what's made them [0.8] what's made this 
moral imperative more [0.2] significant 
sf1195: the amendments procedure [0.9] 
nm1177: the amendments procedure 
sf1195: 
yeah [0.3] 
nm1177: what [0.2] 
sf1195: more complex 
nm1177: okay [0.2] 
sf1195: gives more power to the u-, M-E-Ps 
nm1177: right okay so the M-E-Ps basically have [0.3] a greater role now 
because of the conciliation [0.2] committee all right [0.2] and that is the key 
institutional [0.2] development here which forces the Council of Ministers [0.
3] to take the whole process on board [0.4] now it's not just because of [0.4] 
the er the fact that they're sat there in a room having to talk to each other 
[0.5] because again they had to do that before [0.4] it's also because [0.4] 
they have to come up [0.4] with er [0.5] er [0.3] convergent legislative 
programmes as well [0.2] so [0.5] if you've got er [0.2] a n-, a whole number 
of decisions which are coming through codecision [1.4] er and the European 
Parliament are aware of this and so [0.2] is the Council of Ministers [0.3] 
then [0.5] the two secretariats have to get together to make sure that they've 
got time to do it [0.5] i mean otherwise you're not going to [0.5] er [0.2] 
otherwise [0.2] there's no point in having the codecision procedure at all [0.
3] and otherwise nothing gets done at all [0.4] so [0.2] it's not 
just about [0.3] ensuring that the er that the two actors get together and [0.
2] and meet [0.2] at a certain [0.4] er [1.0] er over certain issues at a 
certain stage of the policy making procedure [0.3] the whole institutional 
machinery itself [0.3] has to er has to operate more closely as well [0.9] yeah 
[0.3] 
sm1196: do [0.2] the conciliation committees do they only consider by proposal 
[0.6] er [0.8] [0.3] 
nm1177: yeah [0.2] 
sm1196: [0.2] so that [0.2] reduces the the the possibility of certain trade-
offs between [0.2] you know [0.4] the the Council of Ministers is saying oh 
we'll help you on this one and the E-P saying well we'll help you on that one 
[0.6] 
nm1177: yeah okay yeah i mean it does yeah that that's that's fair enough er [0.
8] i mean again there's not an awful lot of information about the conciliation 
committees yet so that [0.2] there's not much research on that so [0.5] er i 
couldn't say definitively but [0.3] er [0.4] in terms of [0.2] er [1.3] the 
likelihood of there being the ability to coordinate different [0.4] different M-
E-Ps for example [0.2] with different member states [0.2] that's less likely 
because [0.3] the par-, party groupings aren't [0.2] 
sufficiently hierarchical to ensure that sort of [0.5] that long term 
coordination 
sm1186: that [0.2] that also slows the procedure down like in the [0.2] U-K 
Parliament you've got different standing committees operating at the same time 
nm1177: mm 
sm1186: discussing [0.3] in different rooms 
nm1177: mm-hmm 
sm1186: whereas if you only got one committee going [0.5] at at a time 
nm1177: mm-hmm [0.2] 
sm1186: full stop [0.3] 
nm1177: mm 
sm1186: instead of having three four or five that can slows the legislation 
procedure down anyway [1.1] 
nm1177: well there's no no shortage of M-E-Ps and representatives to go and 
talk on it [0.4] er [0.3] 
sm1186: no i'm sure but if you've only got one committee in session [0.2] at a 
time 
nm1177: oh no you can have loads of different conciliation committees going on 
at the same time 
sm1186: ah right 
nm1177: i mean there are [0.2] plenty 
sm1186: i misunderstood that 
nm1177: yeah [0.2] no there's plenty it's not just one committee [0.3] the the 
actual institution itself of the conciliation committees [0.2] is the 
development of the Maastricht Treaty [0.5] but 
you can have [0.5] conciliation committees on [0.4] er you know 
sm1186: one on transport one on fishing 
nm1177: yeah absolutely 
sm1186: all going off at the same time 
nm1177: referring to yeah there's been [0.2] there's been plenty i can give you 
a number [1.3] even [2.3] did someone else have a question to ask while i'm 
yeah 
sm1197: i was just saying is there is there any more outside influences er at 
this conciliation committee and do lobbyists at all manage to get their say at 
any stage [0.3] or is that all gone by then 
nm1177: yeah no absolutely yeah i mean this is it creates another sort of level 
at which [0.3] at which er lobbyists can can influence the decision making yeah 
you're absolutely right [0.3] and another who-, you know you get this whole [0.
3] other problem about [0.2] whose influences are are c-, are coming across 
most effectively [0.3] and [1.1] you have er national level [0.2] forms of 
lobbying which [0.4] correspond to [0.5] you know the different stages of the 
codecision procedure so [0.3] companies will still try and get stuck in [0.4] 
if they er if if if they feel 
they've got a er an interest [1.8] er [0.4] breakdown of conciliations by 
presidency page twenty-two [1.1] twenty-two [1.7] okay [2.3] right with regard 
to the hundred-and-thirty codecision procedures completed [0.8] in one-hundred-
and-twenty-seven cases agreement has been reached between the two [0.3] the two 
institutions [0.3] so a hundred-and-twenty-seven out of a hundred-and-thirty [1.
2] er [0.2] seventy-eight were agreed without convening the conciliation 
committee [1.9] forty-nine [0.5] following approval of a joint text by the 
conciliation committee so [1.0] forty-nine out of a hundred-and-thirty [1.0] er 
codecision er under the codecision procedure [0.3] er have required [0.5] er a 
conciliation [0.5] committee [1.7] and there's other sort of er [0.2] 
trainspotting facts should you want them [0.6] er [0.2] again you know just get 
on that web site and have a look 'cause it's actually quite well set out [0.4] 
and you get [0.2] er a progress report [0.4] this one here is ninety-seven to 
ninety-eight [1.3] er [0.3] and you also have er a whole range of updates on 
what's going on today in the conciliation committees [0.3] er 
a little you know [0.6] fascinating publication it's amazing what can come out 
of this [0.7] so er [0.2] right [0.2] okay so just for a few the last five 
minutes er [0.6] i just want to quickly go over [0.2] the impact of the 
Amsterdam Treaty [0.6] er [0.2] mention the assent procedure 'cause i've not 
done it so far and we should do that [0.4] and then er [0.3] briefly discuss 
what the impact is [1.0] er [0.2] for theory and sort of broadly understanding 
how [0.5] the E-U operates [1.6] right the Amsterdam Treaty hasn't been 
ratified yet [0.3] but [0.6] er it's very important because it set up a certain 
[0.3] er range of er [0.4] thoughts and ideas about how [0.2] the codecision 
procedure [0.2] would operate [0.3] er [0.3] which [1.0] er which has 
influenced some some of problems [0.3] of the er [0.5] that that have come 
about in the codecision procedure [0.8] the Treaty of Amsterdam [1.2] coming to 
force in ninety-nine [0.3] probably [0.5] er has four essential changes to the 
codecision procedure first of all [0.4] the extension of the number and scope 
[0.3] of [0.2] procedures covered by codecision [3.7] so codecision now 
effectively becomes the 
default policy making procedure [0.5] er in pillar one of the European Union [4.
9] and that's very important because [0.2] it means that the possibility for 
conciliation [0.3] and for the European Parliament to [0.4] er [0.3] provide 
obstacles to further [0.5] er to to to new decisions are much greater and it 
can operate in a much more nuanced fashion [2.4] secondly [2.3] er there is the 
the Amsterdam Treaty introduces the possibility of concluding the codecision 
procedure at first reading [1.2] so it can be [0.4] if you like the fastest [0.
4] decision making procedure ever [0.8] they can just shoot straight through it 
[1.0] well when i say ever it's really like [0.3] the er [0.4] the er [0.7] er 
consultation procedure [1.1] but with the possibility of moving on [0.3] to all 
these other different other ways of er [0.6] of er making decisions [4.0] er 
thirdly [0.6] er [0.3] the Amsterdam Treaty provides for the acceleration of 
the beginning of conciliation [0.3] after the council's second reading [5.0] so 
they can start the whole process much quicker [0.8] it doesn't have 
to take this this amount of time [0.4] which is set out [0.2] er [0.2] in the 
codecision procedure [2.8] and fourthly [3.6] and this is important [0.5] er 
the codecision [1.0] the Amsterdam Treaty [0.3] er [0.4] eliminates the 
possibility of a third reading [0.8] by the council after the failure of a 
conciliation [1.0] right so the council can't now after [0.6] they've been 
through the whole conciliation procedure [0.3] on the amendments of the 
European Parliament [0.6] the council cannot now [0.3] er [0.3] forget about 
the European Parliament [0.3] if they don't agree [0.2] and just go on on a c-, 
and and [0.3] and take through the proposal [0.4] on the basis of qualified 
majority voting [0.6] right which it could under Maastricht [1.3] now that [0.
2] possibility is [0.6] gone [2.2] 
sm1186: so really they've got to come to some sort of [0.6] consensus or let it 
go 
nm1177: yeah or yeah exactly [0.2] yeah [1.8] slippery table [1.9] 
sf1195: [1.1] [0.4] 
nm1177: all right the areas which the er 
sf1195: 
nm1177: sorry d-, [0.8] 
sf1195: okay [0.3] 
nm1177: no you're all right okay 
sf1195: are we on the third reading [0.3] 
nm1177: hey 
sf1195: yeah i'm 
fine [0.7] 
nm1177: okay the third reading basically comes down here er [0.8] you've got 
the first reading [0.6] where er if you look [0.2] going to l on the codecision 
procedure you've got [0.3] this column on the left [0.3] one two three council 
establishes a common position [0.7] all right [0.7] er then you've got a second 
reading [1.0] where the council approves the E-P's amendments s-, sorry the 
where the council can reject or whatever [0.7] and then the third one after the 
conciliation committee doesn't [0.2] make some sort of agreement [0.4] er [0.3] 
where the European Parliament [0.3] where the Council of Ministers can then 
adopt whether it [0.3] whether the European Parliament likes it or not [1.1] so 
if you're going through the picture [0.8] you've got your first [1.4] er common 
position which is the third one down [3.1] er [1.4] the second one is [0.7] 
actually the second one would be the middle one [0.5] of [0.3] this er [0.4] 
cluster on the right [0.9] so that's where the council rejects the E-P's 
amendments [4.1] and then the thir-, [0.2] then the th-, the last one is this 
[0.3] one here [0.5] 
sorry so you've got one here that's number one [0.9] that's number two [0.3] 
that one there [0.6] and that's number three there [0.7] all right so that's 
the third reading [0.5] that's no more [2.4] 
sm1186: once once Amsterdam's ratified [0.5] 
nm1177: once Amsterdam's ratified yeah 
sm1186: but it won't be then [0.6] 
nm1177: yeah [1.0] all right now you can see this all on [0.2] all on the web 
site er [2.8] all right so the the point is there that the [0.3] that the 
Council of Ministers can't sort of suddenly undermine the whole point of [0.3] 
being involved in this process [1.7] right now this isn't the main [1.2] thing 
to take away with you really i mean this sort of anal detail here [0.3] er [0.
2] the key thing is to think about how this affects [0.2] the way the different 
institutions work together [0.3] and what you have here is much greater 
coordination of activities between the council [0.3] of m-, [0.2] Council of 
Ministers secretariat [0.3] and the European Parliament [0.4] and also [0.3] 
the role of the presidencies [0.2] er [0.2] in the Council of Ministers becomes 
much more important [0.3] if you've got a friendly [0.3] er [0.5] er President 
[0.3] of the Council of Ministers [0.3] then their activities b-, can become [0.
4] er [0.2] significant in promoting cooperation with the European Parliament 
[0.4] a more [0.3] er [0.6] er [0.7] er radical presidency [1.1] is likely to 
er [0.4] to undermine the process more [1.5] er [0.9] [sigh] [1.1] i've got 
lots of other things here [0.3] okay [0.3] er [0.5] so this joint planning has 
been an important development of er the introduction of codecision [3.9] er and 
that's in respect to the er to to the commission [0.6] but there's been sort of 
a normalization of [0.4] the [0.2] relations between the council [0.3] and the 
European Parliament which is another important development [0.3] part of this 
[0.3] you know requirement to go through the codecision proc-, procedure so 
often [0.3] means that when it comes about [0.2] it isn't this big issue [0.3] 
it becomes much more an everyday part of the day to day activities [0.4] and 
this is an important development as well because [0.3] er [0.5] the context in 
which conciliation committees take place [0.2] are less 
likely to be confrontational [1.9] with respect to the commission [0.3] the 
commission is much more important in [0.2] circulating information and 
mediating [0.3] between [0.2] other institutions [0.6] so that's [0.3] that [0.
6] previously distinct distinctive role of mediation [0.2] and circulating 
information [0.2] has become [0.3] less [0.3] er less separate it's become 
blurred effectively [0.8] er [0.3] and the European Parliament and the council 
[0.2] are able to discuss things [0.5] between each other without [0.2] having 
to rely on the commission as an intermediary [2.0] er [0.9] the main areas in 
which there is disagreement [0.2] in the conciliation committee [0.3] is 
generally [0.2] on traditional disputes [0.4] such as committee procedures [0.
3] and the amount of fundings to be included in in an act [1.1] and so what you 
can see here is [0.3] it's not so much that the conciliation committee [0.3] 
hasn't [0.3] worked and introduced new actors [0.2] it has and it's made the 
decision making process [0.3] more a-, more [0.2] er democratic effectively by 
involving the European Parliament [0.6] er [0.7] but the key really difficult 
[0.2] issues [0.2] 
er [0.4] such as over [0.2] certain committee procedures [0.2] haven't 
necessarily been [0.6] er [0.2] resolved [0.2] and this has meant that quite a 
large amount of [0.3] er of the negotiations between the council [0.4] and the 
European Parliament [0.3] happen on on an informal basis [1.1] right so rather 
than going through [0.3] the er the sort of these formally defined procedures 
which we've seen in the [0.3] in in in the handouts here [0.3] er [0.4] 
negotiations between for example [0.3] er expert committees in the European 
Parliament [0.3] and the relevant [0.2] er [0.7] working group under COREPER [0.
7] are much more [0.4] er [0.4] fully developed [1.2] and this means that these 
sort of the informal basis of decision is much more importing [0.3] important 
[1.2] 
sm1198: oh so the procedure and [0.5] there's another one that you said they'd 
got property of [1.2] 
nm1177: er of financial matters just [0.4] dishing out the dosh [0.3] which is 
always a bit of an issue [1.5] er [0.9] okay er i've got some figures here on 
cooperation against codecision but that's not really that interesting [0.8] er 
[0.7] all right the assent procedure is the final one which we haven't looked 
at yet [3.6] are there 
any questions there on the codecision i've had to rush that last bit a bit [2.
1] no okay well you can sort them out in the in the er [0.8] in the seminars if 
you like [0.5] er [0.2] oh right the assent procedure is the last [0.3] sort of 
major procedure [0.9] and in this one the commission proposes [0.4] the E-P 
votes to approve or reject [0.7] by an absolute majority [2.3] and then it's er 
[0.5] the E-P either rejects and the proposal fails [0.4] or the E-P approves 
[0.2] and the council [0.2] adopts through [0.4] er [0.2] unanimity [0.9] now 
the key thing here is that [0.4] here the European Parliament has a solid veto 
[0.8] but [0.3] the [0.2] areas to which this er [0.2] relates [0.4] are very 
limited it's essentially [0.5] er agreements or associations with third party 
member states [0.3] so [0.3] member states outside the European Union [0.3] or 
the accession of new member states to the E-U [0.6] 
sm1196: sorry [0.2] can you just [0.2] so the commission proposes it 
sm1196: yeah 
sm1196: and the E-P votes on it 
nm1177: yeah [0.2] 
sm1196: one way or the other 
nm1177: yeah 
sm1196: and if they reject it nothing goes to the council at all 
nm1177: well it 
just er well it it er [0.4] yeah it it fails [0.2] yeah it that's it end of 
story [0.4] yeah [0.6] so [0.4] the E-P has a solid sort of er veto here [0.4] 
er but again as i said it's it's er [1.1] it's on very limited areas [0.5] and 
that's er [0.4] that's important with respect to of [0.3] to for example 
Turkish accession where this has been the European Parliament has been [0.4] er 
[0.9] a major advocate of [0.6] of er human rights issues 
sm1186: human iss-, third party issues [laughter] [0.3] 
nm1177: they're the main ones 
sm1186: and that's it really 
nm1177: yeah that's the main ones [1.2] [sniff] [0.2] all right so how do these 
affect our understanding of er [0.5] of the th-, the relevance of the theories 
[0.3] well essentially what you can see here is that [0.2] er [1.2] with the 
movement of these decision making procedures the the e-, their evolution to a 
more [0.3] complex [0.3] and er [0.3] a more [0.3] er [1.0] well increasingly 
informal basis [0.4] the boundaries between the different institutions become 
[0.3] less [0.2] clearly defined [0.4] so these distinctions between 
supranational [0.3] and intergovernmental which we've seen [0.3] have er 
typified much of the 
international relations approaches [0.3] have become [1.0] less relevant [1.9] 
similarly when we're talking about the er [0.4] the comparative politics 
approaches [0.6] issues of accountability and transparency don't become more 
clear [0.4] they become less clear [1.0] so the decision making has moved away 
from [0.3] the European Parliament [0.3] and from the er er from the Council of 
Ministers [0.3] and from even these formal decision making procedures [0.3] are 
moved much more into informal relationships [0.3] between [0.4] er the the 
relevant subcommittees [1.5] so transparency hasn't necessarily been improved 
[0.3] and this is part of the [0.7] part of er er of the problem er [0.2] which 
Amsterdam was meant to try and [0.4] resolve and which it hasn't effectively 
done [1.1] er [1.1] so thirdly what about this constructivist approach well to 
a degree that's been quite useful [0.3] er because it [0.2] it helps us 
understand how it is [0.5] how these decision making procedures have affected 
the 
relationship between [0.6] the different actors [0.2] and how it's structured 
and restructured those [0.2] relationships [0.5] so [0.5] members of the 
European Parliament [1.1] er [0.3] cooperate more freely with the Council of 
Ministers' members [0.5] and that [0.9] to understand that you have to 
understand how [0.3] their identities and their perspectives have been altered 
[0.3] by the development of new institutional procedures [0.2] and structures 
at the European level [1.1] so there's another way of [0.4] of integrating the 
er the more constructivist approaches to understanding European [0.4] 
integration [2.8] er [0.3] okay any questions [2.0] all right [0.9] okay have a 
look at this web page before next time [0.3] er [0.2] people in my seminar 
group [0.4] we're going to do what we didn't do last time [0.2] and then we'll 
rearrange [0.2] we'll reschedule another [0.3] seminar [1.6] all right [0.2] 
thank you very much