nm1172: er [0.8] i'm going to talk about European politics but more 
particularly i'm going to talk about the European Union [1.2] that's the E-U [0.
2] and the changing character of the European Union [0.3] and er the reason for 
choosing this topic [0.5] the reason for namex suggesting that we might tackle 
this topic [0.5] is that we are [0.5] er on the eve of a very important change 
[0.2] in the European Union because of the [0.5] imminence [0.4] of the 
Economic and Monetary Union [0.3] EMU [0.5] E-M-U [0.5] and the creation in 
Europe of a single currency that will be coming within the next year or two and 
preparations for doing that are already well advanced [0.5] and [0.3] not only 
will that mean that [0.2] a new [0.4] unit of currency the euro will be created 
for use [0.3] throughout those members of the European Union who decide to join 
the er E-M-U [1.0] er but it will also mean a considerable increase in the 
powers [0.5] of the [0.5] central institutions of the European Union and in 
particular it will mean the creation of a central European bank [0.5] which 
will have quite important 
powers [0.3] in relation to money and taxation [0.5] er [0.3] with respect to 
all those [0.4] member states who have joined [0.4] the union [0.2] so [0.7] er 
er because of its topicality and because of its importance this seems to be a 
[0.3] topic [0.3] to which [0.6] er [0.6] i can talk and which you might be 
interested in [0.9] a a further element in the interest [0.7] of the [0.3] er 
in the European Union is more long term that is to say that [0.8] in a great 
many [0.4] areas of the country [0.3] of the world i should say [0.5] both [0.
2] in North America [0.3] and in East Asia [0.5] there is a certain amount of 
experimentation [0.4] with [0.5] er entities new regional entities [0.4] which 
[0.2] are [0.3] more or less [0.7] er er modelled on or inspired by [0.4] the 
European Union [0.5] er not that these [0.2] other [0.3] er organizations in 
other parts of the world [0.3] have copied [0.5] er strictly [0.2] the formulae 
which had been reasonably successful in a European context that obviously 
wouldn't have been appropriate [0.5] but [0.4] the [0.3] er success [0.3] in 
quotes of the European Union as a regional economic and political organization 
[0.4] has inspired countries in some 
other regions to come together [0.4] er in order to do something rather similar 
[0.3] and therefore [0.3] when we're talking about the European Union we're 
talking about something which is of [0.3] worldwide and of global interest [0.
5] and of course [1.0] finally underlining the importance of our topic [0.8] er 
an-, and thirdly [0.4] we are [0.2] living in a period in which [0.6] we are 
more and more conscious [0.3] of the [0.7] global [0.5] operation of the 
economy especially with regard to [0.4] currency stability [0.5] and [0.2] 
potential currency devaluations [0.5] and [0.2] in a world of that kind the 
European Union [0.4] will [0.2] once it has its own currency [0.4] be a major 
player [0.4] alongside the United States [0.3] er and Japan [0.6] and therefore 
any [0.2] kind of understanding of the way in which [0.4] world [0.2] politics 
and especially the economic aspects of world politics operates [0.3] requires 
us to understand what sort of an animal [0.3] the European Union is 
nm1172: i've tried to organize the lecture [1.1] around three broad questions 
[0.6] which i thought [0.8] er might be of interest [1.2] the first question [0.
4] is why was 
the European Union created in the first place [0.7] and [1.1] implicit in that 
[0.2] question is also another question [0.6] not only why was it created but 
why has it persisted why has it grown why has it prospered relatively speaking 
[0.5] in the period since its creation in nineteen-fifty-eight [1.5] er [0.5] 
it's it's a it's a forty year old institution now so clearly we need to know 
something if we're going to understand it about the forces that were at work at 
its birth [0.4] and [0.2] even more importantly since its nature has changed 
over time [0.4] those forces that have had an impact on it subsequently [0.3] 
and have allowed it to persist and to grow [1.6] the second [0.2] question [0.
3] er i want to [0.3] ask [0.8] is what kind of an entity [0.8] is this [0.5] 
union [0.2] is this European Union which exists [0.8] we are accustomed to 
think of the world as divided into [0.8] however many it is a hundred-and-fifty 
two-hundred [0.4] nation states all of which enjoy a degree [1.0] of 
independence from one another sometimes described as national sovereignty [1.1] 
er and clearly when 
regional organizations [0.3] are created and when they begin to acquire [0.5] 
at least some degree of power [0.2] over their [0.2] member states [0.5] then 
some new kind of entity which is not a national state [0.9] and perhaps is not 
a even a supranational state [0.4] i-, is being created and therefore i want to 
in my second question [0.4] reflect a little on what sort of entity [0.6] er is 
being created here [0.3] is it a new national state [0.4] on a larger scale [0.
5] or is it something rather different from that which i i think is [0.6] more 
likely to be the the answer that we're going to reach [0.5] involved also in 
that second question [0.3] of what kind of an entity is the the E-U [0.5] is [0.
4] er [0.2] an answer in terms of [0.5] er [0.5] er beneficiaries if you like 
[0.3] er i-, in politics we're always keen to know who who [0.3] who's winning 
and who's losing [0.6] and therefore it's important for us t-, [0.2] to as as 
students of politics to ask [0.6] who does the creation of the E-U benefit [0.
5] who is it likely to [0.3] to to assist and who is it likely not to assist [0.
3] or even perhaps positively [0.4] 
damage or handicap in certain ways [0.3] in other words in terms of power [0.4] 
who is going to benefit from this [0.2] i-, this initiative this innovation [0.
5] in the organization of international relations [0.2] and who is going to 
suffer [1.9] and the third question i [0.3] i want to [0.3] ask which i think 
is probably less [0.6] er [0.5] less [0.2] less crucial less fundamental in 
some ways but no no no l-, [0.5] nevertheless of interest to you i'm sure [0.4] 
is [0.3] more specifically relit-, regarding the U-K [0.9] and that is [0.8] er 
[0.2] what is the U-K's particular position vis-à-vis Europe [0.4] and has 
that position been altered [0.4] by [0.2] the election of a Labour government 
last year [0.2] led by Tony Blair [0.2] in other words [0.4] has that [0.3] 
political change in the U-K which is no doubt significant in certain respects 
[0.3] had any [0.6] er major significance for the relationship between Britain 
[0.4] and the European Union [0.3] which many of you know [0.3] has often in 
the past been a rather difficult relationship [0.6] but my conclusion on that 
third question will be [0.3] that it hasn't changed [0.4] things [0.3] very 
much 
nm1172: right [0.7] let's begin with our first question then why was the [0.2] 
er European Union created [0.5] and i want to begin by giving you two [0.3] 
wrong answers if you like because part of the way of course of answering the 
question is to is to is to [0.4] suggest [0.3] possible answers that you need 
to reject before you get to the correct answer [1.3] and a popular [0.6] well i 
think it's a popular myth anyway a popular myth that surrounds [0.4] the [0.4] 
motives underlying the creation of er the European Union [0.7] in the nineteen-
fifties [0.7] was that [0.3] it was [0.5] a reaction [0.7] to the danger of war 
and the [0.5] those member states [0.2] in particular France Germany and Italy 
who had been most directly affected [0.4] by the ravages of a second world war 
[0.3] decided to create the European Union [0.3] in order to prevent [0.4] 
future wars amongst themselves [0.6] in other words [0.2] the argument here 
which i'm going to suggest is a mistaken argument [0.4] is that the European 
Union was conceived of [0.3] as a solution to [0.2] security problems [0.3] as 
a solution to [0.5] the problems 
of war and peace [0.3] and how to secure for [1.2] er [0.2] Europeans [0.5] a 
more stable [0.2] and a more secure [0.2] future [0.6] i think that wasn't in 
fact the intention [0.6] er and it wasn't the purpose which the European Union 
[0.3] was er designed to serve [0.4] although [0.2] subsequently many 
politicians in order to win support [0.6] for the European Union [0.5] er [0.2] 
have tried to play [0.2] on people's fear of insecurity [0.4] as a way of 
justifying [0.4] the [0.5] er [0.3] er the existence of the union and and of 
and of justifying its expanded role [1.1] the reason why i reject this argument 
is that [0.7] the real threat [1.5] to security [0.7] as understood by 
Europeans in the nineteen-fifties [0.5] came [0.3] from the Soviet Union [0.5] 
and the solution which was adopted [0.6] to that threat [0.3] and [0.6] what 
was seen in the nineteen-fifties as a solution to Europe [0.2] Europe's [0.7] 
er security problems [0.2] was not the European Union but a qu-, a quite 
different sort of organization [0.4] called [0.2] NATO the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization [0.2] which was created much earlier [0.6] er and was [0.2] 
explicitly American led [0.3] as opposed to the 
European Union of course [0.2] of which America is not a member [0.3] and which 
even has some [0.4] er [0.2] c-, [0.3] some some anti-American or some some 
independent of American [0.5] er [0.2] elements in it [0.4] so [0.5] er [0.2] 
it seems to me that [0.3] NATO was the answer to security difficulties [0.4] 
the [0.5] the answer which u-, [0.2] Western European countries sought [0.4] to 
the security problem in the immediate post-war period [0.3] was [0.3] 
collective security [0.3] under American leadership [0.7] and the E-U [0.3] 
wasn't concerned with that [1.4] second wrong answer [1.5] is to suggest that 
[1.3] in some way with advancing prosperity [0.7] with more international 
travel [0.2] with easier and freer communication [0.9] er between peoples [2.0] 
the sense of [0.3] national identity [0.3] which Europeans felt [0.8] was 
tending to decline [1.0] and [0.2] a greater sense of [0.2] if you like 
cosmopolitan loyalty [0.3] or of European loyalty [0.4] or of loyalty to some 
broader entity [0.4] beyond one's own country [0.6] was growing [1.4] so 
there's a there's a kind of an optimistic myth [0.2] underlying [0.4] much talk 
about the E-U that says [0.4] well of course we live in an age [0.2] when 
people [0.5] er 
are no longer as obsessed as they once were [0.4] by their own particular 
national identities [0.2] they travel more they have more foreign friends [0.3] 
and they have freed themselves [0.2] of these [0.3] th-, national [0.4] and 
limiting [0.2] perspectives and as a consequence [0.3] forms of international 
organization and forms of regional organization [0.4] which were once 
impossible [0.7] er now become [0.3] not only possible but a-, also perhaps 
desirable [0.5] th-, that doesn't seem to me to be [0.3] er in any sense part 
of [0.2] the real story [0.3] of how the European Union was created [0.4] 
because [0.6] er the European Union has always acknowledged [0.8] and worked 
within [0.4] the constraints established [0.3] by [0.2] national loyalties [0.
2] in other words [0.2] it's not a club [0.5] which has ever set its face [0.3] 
against [0.6] er [0.4] national identity [0.6] and [0.5] it has always been a 
club [0.4] whose members are the national states themselves [0.5] not [0.4] the 
individual [0.3] European citizens and so [0.3] in a sense it has from the 
first been an organization [0.4] which [0.2] accepts and works within [0.4] the 
notion of national identities [0.3] and 
national states 
nm1172: well i've given you two wrong answers [0.4] so it's about time i gave 
you at least one [0.3] correct answer and this correct answer [0.6] comes in [0.
4] er i-, in three parts [1.3] er [0.2] broadly speaking the correct answer 
seems to me to be that [0.8] the true understanding [0.2] of [0.2] the [0.3] 
origins of the European Union arises [1.4] er [0.5] m-, [0.7] or can be best 
understood by looking at the attitudes of individual European states [0.7] in 
other words you have to ask [0.4] why did the French [0.4] want the European 
Union why did the Germans want the European Union [0.3] why did the Italians 
why did the Belgians why did the Dutch [0.3] why did the [0.6] er Luxembourgers 
now we we can't go through all of those six cases [0.3] in detail here [0.3] 
but my contention is [0.3] that [0.3] th-, it's in doing that sort of thing [0.
2] in other words in looking at it from specifically national perspectives [0.
7] that you gain a real understanding [0.2] of how this [0.6] er international 
organization this regional organization was actually created [0.3] now since we 
haven't got time to do all six [0.3] we shall do [0.6] three things we shall 
say a word about France [0.2] we shall say a word about 
Germany because those are the two most important powers [0.3] in the process of 
creation [0.2] and then we shall say a brief word about all the others lumped 
in together 
nm1172: er [0.2] the first word about France is to say [0.5] that [1.6] the 
French [1.1] in the immediate post-war period [1.7] had [1.8] international 
ambitions [0.6] above their station [0.2] if you like [0.2] they wanted to 
exert more power in the world [1.3] than [0.4] their [0.2] military and 
economic position [0.5] really permitted them to do [0.9] so they were 
ambitious in some sense [0.9] and [0.4] they saw [0.3] the creation of the 
European Union as the first step [0.6] towards their being able to do that [0.
5] because they were reasonably confident [0.7] that in the conditions of the 
nineteen-fifties when the European Union was created [0.3] they were likely to 
be [0.2] one of the leading if not the leading power within the European Union 
[0.5] so that for them to create a European [0.5] er entity [0.5] which 
involved some degree of economic and even possibly political integration [0.4] 
was [0.4] understood [0.2] as an extension of their 
own power [0.3] rather than placing limitations upon it [0.4] in other words 
they had an optimistic interpretation [0.3] of the degree of power which they 
could eventually wield within this new [0.6] regional association [0.2] and as 
a consequence [0.3] they saw [0.2] the creation of it [0.2] as an opportunity 
[0.2] rather than a threat [0.8] and we can't give [0.7] too much of the 
background to that [0.4] but [0.7] that gives you some notion [0.4] of the ways 
in which [0.2] the French saw the creation [0.4] of an organization which they 
sought to dominate [0.3] and to some degree at least [0.4] did succeed in 
dominating [0.5] as an extension of their own national power [0.4] you can see 
how this contrasts with [0.3] the rather different picture that i was painting 
in my two [0.6] false answers [0.6] now the second [0.8] the second element i 
suggested [0.6] we need to say something about Germany [0.2] and here the 
picture is more complicated because clearly [0.5] Germany had the potential to 
be as powerful if not more powerful [0.4] a member of the regional association 
[0.4] than the French did and therefore you 
would have thought that if the French expected to create an organization which 
they would dominate [0.4] then the Germans would have opposed [0.3] such a 
development and that would have prevented it from taking place [0.4] but what 
made [0.2] this development possible of course was that Germany had just been 
defeated [0.5] in [0.4] er in the Second World War [0.9] and those Germans who 
had [0.2] held political power [0.6] in in Germany in the nineteen-fifties [0.
2] felt a profound sense of responsibility and guilt [1.0] surrounding the 
circumstances that had led to the Second World War [0.6] and they sought in a 
sense therefore [0.3] somehow to pay the price [0.7] which they felt as a 
nation they ought to pay [0.5] for [0.5] the damage [0.3] and the difficulties 
[0.7] which [0.4] Hitler's Germany in the past [0.2] had caused [0.6] in a 
sense therefore they were seeking international rehabilitation [0.5] they 
wanted to be readmitted to the club of internationally respectable states [0.5] 
and in order to be readmitted [0.3] they were willing to pay a high price [0.6] 
and that was why they were willing [0.4] 
to join an association which they knew from the start [0.4] would limit their 
national independence [0.2] and would be likely to be dominated [0.3] by the 
French [2.2] third i said there were three parts to my [0.2] my story and here 
i'm [0.2] simplifying very drastically [0.4] but if you take the other [0.9] 
initial members the four other members of the [1.7] the European Union as it 
was first created by its initially six [0.3] members there are of course many 
more than six members now but the others are all [0.3] latecomers [0.9] er [1.
2] you could generalize by saying that [0.2] the citizens and the politicians 
who managed these other four European states Italy Belgium [0.5] Holland [0.5] 
and Luxembourg [0.7] felt either that their own regimes were so [0.2] 
inadequate [0.2] so corrupt or so weak [0.2] in various ways [0.6] that [0.6] 
to join a newly created European [0.2] organization [0.2] would be a healthy 
step for them [0.3] it would be a sort of [0.3] an answer to some of their 
domestic political difficulties [0.4] or [0.3] a-, as in the case of the 
smaller countries [0.3] they felt that er that they were 
handicapped as a very small very powerless [0.4] state [0.3] and could only 
benefit by join [0.5] by joining some kind of larger association that of course 
[0.3] would be an argument more applicable to the three very small countries [0.
3] so [0.6] they [0.2] in some sense were radically dissatisfied with their own 
[0.5] domestic political arrangements [0.3] or their own position in the 
international world [0.3] and could see the creation of a regional organization 
[0.3] of which they could be at least a part [0.6] as [0.3] er providing them 
with a more satisfactory [0.5] er solution to some of their domestic [0.3] 
political problems and [0.3] with regard to their international position 
nm1172: i said that the first question had an element of [1.0] of creation [0.
3] and i also said [0.2] how has the organization persisted [0.3] now [1.0] 
clearly [0.2] Germany cannot go on [0.5] paying the price for a war which is 
more and more distant and more and more remote [0.3] for [0.4] er for ever [0.
2] the French cannot expect in the same way to dominate an organization [0.2] 
which now has a great many 
more members in it [0.6] er [0.4] and as the circumstances of the nineteen-
fifties [0.2] faded away [0.3] clearly new motives new mechanisms [0.3] had to 
be [0.6] er [0.7] established in order to continue to make a regional 
association [0.3] as attractive in new circumstances [0.3] as it had been [0.4] 
er in the [0.2] circumstances of its birth in the nineteen-fifties [0.9] and 
therefore [0.4] er i turn our attention now to the nineteen-nineties and i say 
look [0.7] what we've seen in the in the nineteen-nineties [0.3] has been an 
acceleration of European integration [0.6] the European Union ticked along [0.
6] in the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties without changing in any very 
radical ways [0.5] and [0.6] the integration which had been achieved [0.4] 
remained largely in the economic sphere [1.1] and consisted [0.3] very much of 
the promotion of free trade [0.4] the free movement of capital and the free 
movement of labour [0.3] within [0.4] the [0.4] boundaries of the newly created 
European Union [0.3] but in the nineteen-nineties [0.8] the political aspects 
of [0.2] the the [0.7] er union [0.4] have become more prominent and [0.3] 
a [0.2] significant move [0.5] towards greater political integration [1.2] er 
has occurred [0.2] first of all with the Treaty of Maastricht [0.3] and 
following on that [0.4] with the [0.4] er [0.7] so far successful [0.3] 
establishment of [0.2] a single currency [0.4] area [0.6] so you might say [0.
3] okay are the same kind of mechanisms operating surely circumstances have 
changed a lot [0.7] now [0.7] er we're no longer in the nineteen-fifties we no 
longer have the shadow of a recent devastating war [0.5] er hanging over us [0.
2] and therefore if we're going to expand this organization [0.3] we're going 
to have to find new ways of doing it [0.7] er [0.5] what i would like to 
contend however is that it seems to me [0.5] that [0.2] although there are some 
new elements in the mechanisms which underlie [0.4] the persistence and 
expansion of the European Union in the nineteen-nineties [0.2] some of the old 
mechanisms [0.3] which are now [0.4] er have now been working for forty or 
fifty years [0.2] are surprisingly [0.4] lively and surprisingly relevant under 
modern conditions 
nm1172: let me [0.3] briefly relate the 
story of [0.3] the origins of the Treaty of Maastricht which which [0.2] is [0.
2] one of the most significant [0.5] further steps towards greater political 
integration which the European Union [0.4] has undergone in recent years [0.7] 
the seams of Maastricht really lie in nineteen-eighty-nine [0.8] with the 
collapse [0.5] of [0.3] communist rule in Eastern Europe [0.4] and in 
particular [0.4] the [0.2] er breaching [0.5] er of the [0.2] Berlin Wall [0.5] 
and the recognition [0.5] that [0.5] in the very near future [0.3] a unified [0.
2] Germany [0.9] er which would bring together what had been the old federal 
republic of West Germany [0.4] and the [0.5] er [0.8] pro-Soviet and communist 
ruled [0.6] East Germany [0.5] would be coming together to form a single much 
larger and much more potentially [0.4] politically and economically powerful [0.
4] German state [0.7] and er the reaction to this [0.8] development [0.5] in 
both France and Britain [0.3] members [0.4] of the European Union [0.3] was 
considerable alarm and fear [0.8] because it seemed to the British and to the 
French [0.8] to [0.6] signal [0.2] the sort of danger [0.8] er [0.3] which they 
[0.7] felt [0.7] er in periods [0.9] er in 
the nineteen-thirties when Germany was growing in power and influence [0.3] and 
in the period before nineteen-fourteen and there were [0.3] faint but 
nevertheless [0.9] definite echoes [0.4] in the reactions of many [0.7] French 
and British politicians [0.8] mostly in private but occasionally in public [0.
7] er to [0.6] er [0.2] to this [0.5] reunification [0.5] and therefore 
enlargement [0.3] of the German state [0.3] so what was the solution to be [0.
3] under those circumstances [0.7] well [0.2] the the French thought first of 
all about trying to prevent it from happening [0.6] and so did the British [0.
8] er [0.3] but [0.4] er they couldn't [0.8] and therefore they decided well 
we'll have to make the best of it [0.5] and [0.5] the best of it seemed [0.5] 
er particularly to the French to be well [0.5] if we're going to [0.6] er if 
we're going to harness [0.7] German power and German ambition in a constructive 
way and to avoid the problems of rivalry between Germany [0.3] and other 
European powers [0.2] what we need to do is to integrate Germany more tightly 
[0.4] into the European Union [0.6] and as a consequence of that the French [0.
3] 
developed a project which they put to the Germans and which eventually led to 
the Maastricht Treaty [0.3] which said okay [0.4] under these new circumstances 
[0.2] we move forward quickly [0.9] we want [0.2] national states to be more 
tightly integrated [0.3] into this regional association [0.2] now what do you 
see there you see exactly the same mechanisms [1.0] er French ambition [0.7] 
French fear of [0.2] er Germany [0.3] and a willingness on the part of the 
Germans [0.2] to make sacrifices [0.3] er [0.2] in order [0.4] to [0.5] create 
a new form [0.3] of [0.3] regional association [0.3] because they themselves [0.
3] are fearful [0.4] of the possible consequences [0.3] of German nationalism 
and they like the French [0.2] want to see Germany tied into [0.4] a stable [0.
7] er [0.2] international order 
nm1172: now [0.9] that [0.2] is not exactly the same as the nineteen-fifties [0.
2] but it's a little bit similar to the story that i told you about the 
creation [0.4] of the European Union [0.7] now [0.7] when i posed the question 
[0.2] are things the same now in the nineteen-nineties [0.3] are the mechanisms 
of persistence very much the same as the 
mechanisms of creation [1.1] i said yes i thought they surprisingly were quite 
similar [0.3] but i did concede that there are some new elements [0.4] and one 
important new element which is present in the nineteen-nineties [0.2] which 
wasn't present in the nineteen-fifties [0.4] and which has spurred the further 
integration [0.4] of the European Union [0.3] is [0.4] world [0.2] currency 
instability [0.8] now we can't [0.4] tell the whole story here some of you are 
economists [0.2] and will know more about it than me no doubt [0.3] but in 
broad terms [0.2] we had relatively [0.2] stable relationships between the 
major world currencies [0.3] in the period [0.3] between the late nineteen-
forties [0.2] and nineteen-seventy-one [0.6] and since nineteen-seventy-one [0.
3] we have had a period [0.4] er [0.2] it's varied over time [0.3] of very 
considerable instability [1.4] and [0.3] that instability is thought to cause 
economic [0.3] and also sometimes [0.2] serious political difficulties [0.3] 
and therefore in an ideal world [0.4] many political leaders especially 
European leaders [0.2] would like to dispense with this instability if they 
could find a way of doing it [0.6] well [0.3] they [0.2] they can't find a way 
of doing it for the time being [0.3] but they can find a way of doing it 
partially [0.5] of creating some degree of stability [0.3] and that's what the 
European Monetary Union is partly about [0.4] so [0.3] to some degree [0.6] the 
spur to more recent European [1.1] integration [0.2] has been the search [0.2] 
for a mechanism [0.3] which will allow Europe to enjoy greater currency 
stability [0.8] and that is new [0.3] because the currency stability problem [0.
2] was not a problem [0.4] at the outset 
nm1172: i said that my second question was what sort of an entity [0.3] is the 
European Union is it a new state some kind of a superstate with a much extended 
role [4.1] and [0.7] er again i want to begin by [0.4] er [0.9] er by [0.9] er 
[0.4] giving you some [0.3] some wrong answers if you like the first wrong [0.
4] er [0.2] well [0.9] let's let let's just say that the simple answer to this 
question is no [0.7] the European Union is a new sort of [0.6] er [0.7] 
political organization [0.3] it's a one-off organization it's not a repeat 
version [0.4] of or a replica [0.4] of 
forms of political organization which have already existed [0.3] it's an 
attempt to create something new [0.4] which is neither a confederation or a 
federation [0.4] or an extended national state or a supranational state or an 
empire [0.2] or any of the other sorts of political animals [0.4] er that we're 
familiar with [0.2] from earlier history [0.8] and what makes me say then that 
it's not [1.2] it's not a state [0.4] or even a nascent [0.4] er national state 
in any sense [0.7] the first reason for rejecting the notion of the E-U as a 
state [0.3] is that it has no [0.5] not as yet anyway [0.3] no significant [0.
5] diplomatic [0.5] or [0.4] defence [0.3] responsibilities [0.6] as far as the 
use of [0.2] force is concerned [1.0] and as far as the use of international 
diplomacy as as it were a preliminary to the use of force [1.6] the form of 
organization which remains most relevant for the modern world [0.5] is still [0.
2] the nation state [0.7] and the E-U [0.6] the European Union although it has 
acquired centrally in Brussels [1.0] powers in a range of policy areas [0.2] 
has not yet significantly [0.3] made any moves [0.4] 
to acquire [0.3] genuine authority [0.7] in matters of diplomacy [0.7] er and 
in matter of defence [0.3] and these are [0.5] extraordinarily important areas 
[0.3] not that there haven't been attempts to do so [0.8] and occasional very 
minor successes [0.3] where concerted action between European powers [0.3] has 
emerged [0.2] but on the whole it's fair [0.4] as a statement to say [0.3] that 
this organization [0.4] is irrelevant [0.5] to [0.8] defence and almost 
entirely irrelevant [0.2] to [0.2] diplomacy [1.5] the second thing that we 
need to s-, to understand in order to [0.8] be clear that the E-U is not a 
state [0.6] is to say [0.4] that [1.0] er [0.4] in most areas it still makes 
decisions [0.2] according to what we [0.3] in politics call the unanimity rule 
[1.0] in other words [0.4] it does not possess [0.5] any kind of [1.0] majority 
[0.9] or collegial [0.2] form of decision making [0.4] the the fundamental form 
of decision making that operates within the u-, E-U [0.3] in [0.2] most areas 
although not admittedly all but in most areas and certainly the most crucial 
ones [0.4] is the unanimity rule which is to say [0.3] that until everybody 
that is 
to say until all the nation state members of the E-U [0.3] are agreed [0.2] on 
a new initiative [0.5] that initiative cannot take place [0.9] this is an 
extraordinarily [0.3] cumbersome [0.5] an extraordinarily conservative 
principle on which to operate [0.5] it limits the freedom of manoeuvre of the 
European Union enormously [0.4] and of course it is intended to [1.0] er er and 
what it means is that [0.4] the dynamics of the European Union the speed with 
which it can act [0.4] the vigour with which it can act are enormously [0.4] 
below [0.4] what is possible [0.3] within national states [0.3] where this kind 
of unanimity principle [0.3] generally speaking does not apply [1.9] the third 
reason [0.9] for not treating the European Union either as a state or as some 
kind of state [0.4] in the process of becoming a state [0.5] is to point to the 
question of [0.3] individual attitudes which i touched on earlier [0.5] here [0.
7] i think we can say without much doubt that in almost all the member states 
of the European Union [0.8] individual citizens look to their own national 
governments [0.2] 
principally [0.5] for the supply of services [0.4] for the provision of 
security [0.3] for all the things that we as individuals look to our political 
leaders for [0.8] and in so far as they are aware of the the European Union 
which they are of course in most cases [0.3] they understand [0.3] that it has 
[0.2] contact with them [0.3] which is largely indirect [0.3] in other words it 
passes through [0.4] their national governments [0.3] the direct contact 
between the E-U and individual European citizens [0.2] or citizens of European 
states [0.5] is relatively unimportant [0.6] we don't pay any for example we 
don't pay any direct taxes [0.5] to the E-U and the E-U has no mechanisms of 
its own [0.2] for collecting taxation [0.4] all the taxation which the E-U 
receives [0.3] is merely passed on to it [0.4] as a consequence of agreements 
reached [0.3] with member states [0.3] and that makes an enormous difference if 
you were to say for example [0.3] to to the American federal government okay [0.
3] you d-, you have no longer any power to tax American citizens directly [0.2] 
the only revenue which you had 
is revenue which comes to you [0.3] through agreements that you can reach with 
the member states [0.4] New York Texas California whatever [0.5] you would 
radically change and radically weaken [0.9] er [0.2] American federal 
government [0.4] and that's the sort of position in which [0.5] the er [0.2] E-
U has to operate 
nm1172: now i said that this second question about what sort of an animal the E-
U is would be answered in two parts firstly by [0.9] asking is it a state [0.2] 
and i've answered that by saying no it's not a state [0.9] er and and certainly 
not a national state [0.7] and secondly i said well we want to know who 
benefits from this [0.4] in other words [0.5] in terms of power [0.5] who has 
gained and who has lost as a consequence of the [2.0] creation of a European 
Union [0.9] and there are three points that i want to make [0.9] in answering 
that question [1.7] the first is that [0.6] er [1.1] today [0.2] strangely in 
many European countries [0.9] a lot of the support for the European Union [1.5] 
comes from [0.2] those who are [0.4] in the centre of politics or even a bit to 
the left of centre [1.0] er [0.2] in 
France [0.2] the French Socialist Party led by Jospin is a strongly European 
party [0.6] in the U-K [2.0] the [0.3] er Labour Party led by Blair is clearly 
more sympathetic although [0.8] we don't know exactly how much more sympathetic 
[0.4] but it's clearly more sympathetic to the European Union and British 
involvement in it [0.4] than the Conservative Party led by [0.2] William Hague 
[1.3] and therefore in a sense there seems to be [0.6] er in facts of that sort 
a suggestion [0.4] that [0.5] er th-, there is something s-, if you like 
progressive there is something left of centre there is something socially [0.4] 
desirable [0.3] in the European Union [0.4] and the European Union itself [0.4] 
tries through a range of programmes to promote itself [0.6] in terms of [0.6] 
er human rights [0.6] it it it tries in a sense to sell itself to [0.3] er [0.
2] a left of centre public [0.4] as a socially progressive entity [0.6] and 
some people [0.8] both in Britain and in France and other European countries [0.
3] on the left [0.4] who have despaired [0.2] at the conservative character [0.
6] and the right wing domination of their 
own national politics [0.2] have looked to the European Union [0.3] where they 
think perhaps [0.2] the centre of gravity in political terms [0.3] lies a 
little bit further to the left [0.9] now [0.3] my feeling is that this is 
entirely misguided [0.8] and [0.3] that [0.4] er that [0.2] if they think that 
or pretend to think that then they are profoundly mistaken [0.8] because it 
seems to me that [0.6] er [0.2] anybody with left of centre [1.8] ambitions of 
any kind [0.5] must be concerned [0.6] with the power of the state to act 
collectively [0.3] in order to realize collectively agreed goals [0.6] if you 
have [0.2] as you have in the case of the E-U as i've just pointed out [0.4] a 
rather weak state [0.6] which doesn't have the capacity to tax [0.2] which 
doesn't have the capacity to spend [0.3] which doesn't have the capacity to 
organize new public services [0.3] directed at particular groups [0.6] then you 
don't have the instrument [0.4] for increased social justice at your disposal 
[0.5] and therefore to my mind [0.5] the first thing that we can say about who 
benefits and who loses in regard to the European 
Union is [0.2] that the European Union is not [0.3] going to be and cannot be 
in its present form [0.6] er [0.2] the tool [0.3] for the realization of 
greater social justice [0.5] it's not some kind of [0.4] substitute [0.3] for 
national states that have drifted in a right wing or a conservative direction 
[0.4] that's what people would like you [0.2] tho-, those of a pro-European 
disposition [0.3] would like you to believe it's what the commissioners [0.4] 
er and the members of the European Parliament would like us to believe [0.3] 
but it seems to me to be [0.4] er [0.2] to be to be wrong [0.3] because the 
European Union [0.2] as an administrative as a political instrument [0.3] 
doesn't possess the the authority or the power [0.4] or the competence [0.2] to 
do that sort of thing [0.5] my second point of the three that i want to make 
here [3.3] is that [0.2] the E-U [0.4] presents itself [1.9] in wishing to 
appeal to a more right of centre [0.3] public [0.7] as an entity capable [0.8] 
of enlarging the sphere of market exchange in other words it [0.2] it presents 
itself [0.5] as an entity capable [0.4] of creating more free trade [0.4] more 
free movement of 
labour more free movement of capital [0.4] and through that [0.4] creating 
increased prosperity [1.2] and this seems to me to be a valid claim [1.4] in 
other words if you believe [0.6] that [0.4] what Europe needs [0.5] are larger 
[0.4] and freer markets and that there are important advantages to be gained [0.
3] from breaking down existing barriers [0.6] to the operation [0.2] of [0.4] 
large and competitive markets [0.8] and if you believe that you or the groups 
with whom wi-, with whom you identify are going to benefit from a process of 
that kind [0.3] then the E-U is on your side [1.0] now of course [1.0] there 
are all sorts of controversies about who benefits and how much [0.5] from the 
growth [0.3] in the operation of free markets [0.7] er [0.5] and and i don't 
want to enter into those [0.3] but [0.3] what i will say is that [0.4] if you 
[0.2] are [0.2] i-, as it were generally pro-market [0.2] in your dispositions 
[0.3] then the E-U is for you [0.5] and if you fear markets and wish to see 
them regulated [0.2] and controlled [0.2] and believe that only social [0.2] 
that social justice can in certain important respects [0.4] only 
be realized [0.5] er through the use of regulatory powers of various sorts and 
in the use of taxation for redistributive purposes [0.3] then the E-U is not 
going to help [0.2] it might not necessarily stand in your way [0.3] but it's 
not actually going to help you very much [0.4] in in that particular [1.1] 
battle [0.4] the third point that i want to make about the E-U is that the E-U 
is on the whole bad news [0.2] for the Third World [1.3] er [0.3] because [0.3] 
what the E-U has done above all things [0.3] during its long period of 
operation is to subsidize [0.3] the creation of an excessive amount of food in 
Europe [0.3] for which it pays [0.7] farmers [0.3] well above market prices [0.
4] having bought this food from farmers it doesn't know what to do with it [0.
7] and what it then generally does is to dump it at way below market prices [0.
2] in the Third World [0.3] where it disrupts [0.7] the the domestic markets of 
those Third World producers [0.3] and has very bad consequences [0.3] on Third 
World food production [0.7] er [0.2] so [0.5] i-, it looks to me [0.7] like a 
relatively conservative organization [0.2] let's put it 
that way 
nm1172: the third question that i said i would i would er [2.2] i would an-, 
answer [0.2] or or ask or both both ask and answer i hope [0.9] is to say 
something about the British position and w-, [0.4] to raise the question of 
whether [1.0] er [2.1] the coming to power of a Labour government in Britain 
has really changed the position [1.3] very much er [4.2] i think that the first 
point we need to make by way of historical introduction is that Britain was a 
late joiner she wasn't one of the in-, initial members of the European Union 
and only became a full member [0.3] in i think it was nineteen-seventy-three [2.
2] and that in itself [0.8] is a significant evidence for the fact that [0.8] 
the [0.5] the relationship between Britain and the European Union [0.5] is not 
likely ever to be quite the same [0.5] as the relationship of its founding 
members to the union [1.1] it's always going to be regarded as a latecomer [0.
7] er and [0.4] the reasons that led to it being a latecomer are likely to 
continue to operate [0.4] to create a certain 
distance between E-U purposes [0.3] and [0.2] British purposes [1.3] the second 
point i want to make [0.2] is er more specifically about the Labour Party [0.3] 
and that is that for most of the history of the E-U [0.4] that is to say during 
the period between [0.8] nineteen-fifty-eight [0.3] and [0.8] i suppose about 
the mid-nineteen-eighties [0.3] the British Labour Party was quite strongly 
opposed [1.0] or many elements in it [0.2] the party was often divided but 
there were significant elements within the Labour Party [0.3] that were quite 
strongly opposed [0.4] to Britain's joining the European Union and to any 
further integration of the British [0.6] state within that [0.2] union [1.2] 
and [1.7] er for much of that time one could have quite fairly said that the 
Conservative Party was the pro-European party [0.4] and the Labour Party or l-, 
[0.2] a large part of it [0.3] was s-, was significantly anti-European [0.8] 
the position is now the opposite of that [0.3] the Labour Party pretends to be 
[0.2] pro-European [0.3] and [0.2] the Conservative Party is probably genuinely 
[0.4] er anti-European [0.5] but this 
conversion of the Labour Party is quite recent [0.4] and to a very large degree 
opportunistic [1.4] er [0.2] when i say opportunistic what i mean by that is [0.
4] that [0.6] having [0.4] suffered [0.5] a succession of very serious [0.5] 
electoral defeats within the U-K [0.4] the Labour Party felt [0.5] that [0.7] 
er [0.4] er there was advantage for the left advantage for the trade union 
movement advantage [0.4] er for left of centre causes [0.3] in trying to 
associate Britain [0.5] with an entity where [0.3] at least the centre of 
gravity politically seemed a little further to the left [0.3] than it was [0.3] 
in a Britain dominated by Mrs Thatcher and her Conservative Party [0.6] so in a 
sense [1.0] the attachment of the Labour Party to the European ideal seems to 
me to be very largely built [0.3] on this opportunistic [0.3] response [0.3] to 
their weakness and their difficulties [0.2] within a [0.2] domestic [0.5] arena 
[4.5] you might say [0.2] well okay but [0.2] you know opportunism is [0.8] not 
to be discounted [0.4] er [0.2] it's the basis for many important political 
initiatives and er if the Labour Party is European for [0.3] what are [0.3] 
perhaps opportunistic [0.4] and fairly recently discovered reasons [0.2] 
nevertheless it is a bit more [0.4] pro-European [0.4] than [0.2] er [0.5] its 
Conservative er opponents [0.5] and perhaps therefore [1.3] the coming to power 
of a party led by Mr Blair [0.3] is going to lead to closer relations [0.3] in 
the long term between the British [0.5] and [0.2] the European Union [1.4] now 
the answer that you give to to that question ar-, is there really going to be 
much of a change [1.1] er depends upon whether you think there are long-
standing [3.0] er long-standing causes of tension or potential conflicts of 
interest between the British and their European partners [0.8] er a-, and the 
answer that i would give to that is yes there are [0.5] in other words [0.3] 
whichever party is in power [0.7] in Britain be it Conservative [0.3] or be it 
Labour [0.3] there are certain fundamentals [0.2] which will continue to affect 
[0.5] the relationship between Britain and Europe [0.4] and will continue to 
create a more difficult and a more distant relationship [0.5] between us and 
the Europeans [0.2] than [0.3] between many other 
European powers and the European Union 
nm1172: to conclude [0.4] my lecture a little earlier than i had planned but 
i'm sure that won't [0.4] that won't matter because you'll have more time for 
questions [0.3] i want to make three points about what those [1.6] persisting 
[0.6] national peculiarities which explain this [0.3] more difficult 
relationship are [0.9] they're not very difficult to identify i don't think [0.
6] the first one is clearly that [0.5] er as a nation [1.4] both [0.2] at the 
popular level and at the political level [0.3] we are more closely linked with 
[0.3] and more sympathetic [0.3] to America [0.4] than many of our continental 
[0.2] partners [0.8] er [2.8] that [0.2] in a sense almost goes without saying 
[0.3] but it's it's a state of affairs [0.2] which certainly goes back [0.2] as 
far as the close relationship between Britain and America during the Second 
World War [0.4] the collaboration of those two powers [0.4] er [0.6] on the 
exchange of nu-, of sensitive [0.2] nuclear information [0.3] which the 
Americans wouldn't exchange [0.4] with [0.7] other members of the European 
Union [0.4] 
the purchase by Britain of nuclear weapons [0.2] from America [0.3] close 
personal relationships [0.2] between a whole series [0.3] of British Prime 
Ministers and American Presidents [0.3] a common language [0.3] a to some 
degree common history et cetera et cetera there are all kinds of reasons [0.4] 
for [0.4] it being very likely that the British will continue to see the world 
[0.4] in terms that are marked rather more close [0.4] to the ways in which the 
Americans see the world [0.4] er and to that degree to some degree distinct 
from the ways in which [0.4] Germans [0.2] French [0.2] Italians [0.6] tend to 
see the world [0.5] the second persisting [0.5] er peculiarity [0.6] er which 
will continue to create [1.2] the kind of distance that i've talked about [0.3] 
is that the British [0.5] er [0.5] and this is more a [0.2] political than a 
popular factor [0.4] are much less dirigiste [0.4] than many of their European 
partners that is to say [0.3] they tend [0.5] in terms of state philosophy [0.
3] to be more reluctant to use the power of the state [0.3] and especially more 
reluctant to use the power of the state [0.4] to control and to intervene in 
economic matters [0.4] we as a nation [0.6] er [0.3] both historically and even 
more in the last [0.3] fifteen 
or twenty years [0.3] have become [0.5] a nation [1.4] much more strongly 
convinced of the advantages to be obtained [0.3] from the operation of free 
markets [0.3] and most of our European [0.3] partners especially those a little 
bit to the left of centre [0.4] whilst they believe in a mixed economy [0.4] 
and see great virtues in the operation of free markets [0.3] also have certain 
reservations about [0.2] the [0.2] social consequences [0.3] of markets [0.2] 
and are therefore more willing than we are [0.3] and will remain and continue 
to be more willing than we are [0.3] to intervene in markets to control markets 
[0.3] in order to achieve certain social or environmental objectives [0.9] er 
[0.4] that will continue to create a distance between us [0.2] the [0.2] final 
[1.3] the final [0.5] peculiarity [0.4] seems to me to be that [0.5] on the 
whole [1.7] the British are relatively [1.0] certainly the English not so much 
the Scots and the Welsh but the English at least [1.0] let's let's change from 
British to English here the English are relatively [0.9] content [0.5] with 
their constitution and the mechanisms of their government [0.2] 
they might be disappointed with the performance of government [0.5] but they 
don't put down [1.2] those [0.5] er those [0.8] er weaknesses in the 
performance of government [0.3] to weaknesses in the system by which they are 
governed they believe that the system can be made to work [0.5] er properly [0.
4] and therefore they are less inclined [0.3] to seek new forms of political 
organization [0.4] in other words we as a as a country the English [0.4] are 
fundamentally [0.2] relatively satisfied [0.3] with the nation state principle 
with the principle that one nation one state [0.4] and a high degree of 
concentration of power at that level [0.3] is okay for us [0.3] we're not too 
bothered about local or regional power within England [0.2] we don't see the 
great necessity for developing that [0.3] nor are we that bothered about trying 
to limit [0.2] the [0.3] er the power of the nation state by shifting power 
upwards to some larger entity [0.4] we might be willing pragmatically [0.3] to 
do that for certain purposes [0.4] er [0.2] from time to time [0.3] but we 
don't see a general political or 
constitutional problem [0.5] which can be resolved [0.3] by [0.5] organizing 
politics [0.2] in a regional as opposed to a national manner [0.4] and i think 
that does create a difference [0.3] because many European nations and this this 
argument would apply much more strongly in some cases than others [0.5] are to 
some [0.3] very considerable degree dissatisfied [0.6] with the operation of 
their own political systems [0.3] and see the creation of a stronger European 
entity [0.3] as at least to some degree [0.3] a possible answer [0.5] to their 
domestic difficulties [0.6] and we don't have that impetus [0.2] to greater 
European integration and therefore we're bound to be slower to move [0.4] in 
the direction of Europeanization [0.4] er than many of our European partners 
are [0.9] and all of those factors it seems to me those three points [0.3] the 
American point the dirigiste point [0.4] and the [0.8] er [0.2] point about [0.
4] what you might call constitutional complacency [0.4] all of those things 
apply [0.3] pretty much as strongly under Labour auspices [0.3] as they would 
do under Conservative 
auspices [0.7] so my conclusion is [0.9] that [0.5] the coming to power of the 
Blair government [0.3] is not going to and hasn't so far made any great 
difference [0.4] in the kind of relationships which Britain [0.3] Britain 
maintains with [0.4] the [0.7] er European Union and that [0.3] th-, that 
position is i-, is is demonstrated or there is evidence for that being the case 
[0.3] in the fact that the British [0.4] er so far the British government 
certainly [0.2] don't seem to be able to make up their mind as to whether they 
want to join the E-M-U or not for the moment they have said that they won't 
join it [0.3] and they won't be joining it when it's first set up [0.3] as to 
whether they want to join or [0.3] intend to join at some later point [0.3] er 
we are left [0.6] er we are left waiting [0.5] er the the words of of Gordon 
Brown or or Tony Blair [1.3] thank you very much 
nm1172: i think the gentleman at the back is asking [0.5] whether it's possible 
[1.1] to make monetary union [0.6] work [0.7] without political union [1.2] let 
let me [0.2] let me first [0.6] d-, [0.2] explain to other members of the 
audience [0.6] why there is a problem of the sort which [0.4] the questioner 
quite rightly points to [1.1] er [1.6] when the European Monetary Union is 
created there will be a single currency called the euro [1.2] and in order that 
that currency should be of any value [1.6] it has to [1.1] to to speak in very 
simple terms [0.3] it has to maintain a certain rarity [1.2] if [1.4] if euro 
are created by all [0.2] the national banks [0.7] that are members of the [0.5] 
newly created unity in large numbers if in broa-, [0.3] crude terms [0.7] the 
member nations print euros in large numbers simply in order to be able to spend 
them [0.5] then [0.5] inflation will ensue [0.3] and the value of the euro [0.
3] will decline very rapidly [0.4] and people will think that this is that the 
creation of the new [0.3] er monetary union [0.3] has been a very bad idea [0.
6] and in order to prevent that from happening [1.0] the members of 
the eur-, European Union have set up a system [0.3] which prevents national 
governments [0.3] from doing [0.2] the sorts of things [0.2] which might be 
likely [0.7] to [0.4] cause a devaluation in the u-, [0.4] E-U [0.3] in other 
words the newly created European central bank [0.3] has been given powers [0.5] 
to prevent [0.4] states from doing certain sorts of things [0.2] that will 
undermine [0.8] the value of the newly created European currency and everyone 
recognizes [0.4] that [0.2] the this central bank has got to have that sort of 
power [0.3] in order that the new currency [0.2] should be a value currency [0.
3] and a respected currency [0.9] now [1.2] what the questioner is suggesting 
is that if [0.5] the currency is to be appropriately protected [0.9] the things 
that need to be done at the centre [0.8] in order to do that will grow [0.6] as 
time [0.6] occurs that all sorts of problems in the operation of the EMU would 
arise [0.9] which [0.3] can only be solved by [0.3] adopting more powers at the 
centre [0.3] in order to regulate at the European level [0.2] some of the 
difficulties and some of the problems [0.3] which have been 
created [0.4] by [0.3] the creation of a new currency [0.5] for example it's 
often suggested that when the new currency comes into existence [0.3] it may 
initially be of enormous benefit to some parts of Europe [0.4] but cause 
enormous problems for others [0.5] if that happens [0.5] then clearly [0.2] 
those people who have suffered [0.3] will come knocking on the door [0.3] of [0.
4] European institutions asking for some kind of corrective action to be taken 
[0.4] in order to help them out [0.4] and that corrective action can only be 
taken at a central level [0.3] it won't be easy to take it [0.4] at a national 
level and as a consequence [0.7] the powers that [0.3] are exercised at the 
centre may grow [0.3] in order to protect the value of the newly created [0.4] 
single European [0.3] currency [0.4] the euro [0.6] and what my [0.3] 
questioner is suggesting is [0.3] that those powers will have to grow to a 
point where we can speak of a political union [1.3] of some kind [0.6] er [1.1] 
and that would imply the exercise at the centre of a great deal more power than 
is being presently exercised [0.4] er [0.3] i i'm not 
dogmatic about that [0.3] my feeling is [0.2] that it's quite possible [0.5] to 
run an organization such as the E-U [0.4] with a single currency [0.8] and 
inevitably [0.5] having a single currency will require the exercise of some 
additional power at the centre [0.3] but i would have thought [0.3] that there 
are a whole range of matters [0.6] er over which it is still possible [0.3] for 
nation states to go their own way [0.3] without endangering [0.5] the [0.3] 
single market and without endangering the single currency [0.3] just to give 
one example [0.8] it's important [0.2] for [0.2] the [2.1] er for the value and 
the stability of the newly created [0.6] European currency [0.5] that [0.7] er 
[0.8] the member states [0.8] keep their public deficits within certain limits 
that's to say [0.6] they can spend a little bit more than they earn like most 
of us [0.2] but they can't spend and ought not to be allowed and will not be 
allowed to spend [0.4] too much more than [0.3] they earn [0.5] because that 
would allow [0.3] would require them to borrow heavily [0.3] and very heavy 
state borrowing [0.2] has [0.6] certain undesirable economic consequences [0.3] 
so [0.7] er [1.0] 
it's important [0.6] er [0.2] to limit [0.6] the [0.3] borrowing power [0.2] of 
[0.2] the member states [0.3] but what does that mean for example [0.3] for a 
state [1.1] which is intent on spending more [0.3] what it means is that that 
state has got to face up to the fact that if it wants to spend more [0.5] it 
has got to tax more [0.6] and i don't think [0.7] m-, speaking as a non-
economist at least [0.3] i don't think there is any reason why [0.4] there 
shouldn't remain very large [0.4] disparities [0.2] between the levels of 
taxation [0.5] in the different members of the European country [0.3] what [0.
3] must be standardized within limits is the extent to which these states [0.3] 
borrow and run important public deficits [0.3] but there's no reason why [0.2] 
some states [0.2] shouldn't be high taxing high spending states [0.8] typically 
for example [0.2] countries like er the Netherlands [0.4] or or Sweden [0.8] 
and other states should be much [0.2] er much more inclined towards lower 
levels of taxation and lower levels of spending [0.3] provided that their 
divergent policies don't threaten the value of the single currency [0.3] 
then those divergencies can persist [0.3] and it seems to me therefore that the 
basic answer is [0.3] yes it is possible to have a monetary union [0.3] without 
having a political union there seem to me to be a wide range of policies [0.3] 
that can still be pursued [0.3] distinctively at the national level [0.4] 
whilst [0.3] everyone agrees that [0.3] everything that is necessary to protect 
the value of the newly created currency [0.3] is done [3.2] 
nm1174: one more question 
nm1172: that's a difficult question 
sm1173: how do you see the future of the European Union [0.9] 
nm1172: h-, how do i see the future of the European 
sm1173: er i mean in terms of joining remaining countries after in Europe [1.3] 
nm1172: cou-, could you just repeat the la-, the last bit [0.2] i got the 
future but wha-, in terms of what did you say [0.2] 
sm1173: the remaining countries after Europe er er to get joining in the 
European Union [0.4] 
nm1172: did you get 
nm1174: expansion [0.5] 
nm1172: expansion 
nm1174: yeah 
nm1172: ah expansion expansion eastward [0.7] ah okay [0.6] er [1.3] i'm not 
sure 
that i can say anything about that that's not [0.3] more or less common 
knowledge [0.4] er [0.5] the [1.2] er th-, there seems to be a consensus [0.9] 
er [1.3] within the European Union [0.4] that [0.2] er in principle [0.8] er [0.
9] quite a large number of those states in Eastern Europe [2.0] which were 
previously governed by er [1.0] single communist parties and were closely 
associated with the with the Soviet Union [0.2] that those states should be 
admitted [0.5] to [0.7] er membership to full membership at some point in time 
[0.9] er [0.4] but that [0.2] the process of their economies adjusting [0.3] to 
the requirements [0.5] of [0.5] competition [0.8] and [0.7] the process of 
harmonizing some of their arrangements so that [0.2] the single currency and 
the single market can operate [0.2] for for them as well as for countries in 
Western Europe [0.4] is probably quite a slow process [0.8] and therefore i 
would have thought that [0.2] in the long term a great many of those countries 
[0.3] will join [0.4] the European Union [0.3] but that [0.2] before they join 
there will be very long [0.3] very protracted [0.3] and quite difficult 
negotiations [0.2] and 
some people will get through those negotiated stages more quickly [0.3] than 
others and others [0.3] w-, w-, will will find some of the conditions that are 
imposed [0.3] difficult to meet or unacceptable [0.3] and that therefore [0.4] 
er more time will be needed before [0.5] their membership [0.4] can er [0.3] c-,
can be agreed to [0.3] but [0.4] there does seem to be a very [0.7] a very [0.
4] broad consensus [0.3] that it would be desirable to enlarge and extend the 
er community towards the east [2.4] sorry not to be more specific about that 
sm1175: what do you think about the relationship between European Union and the 
[0.2] mondial organization of commerce [0.2] or this [0.2] O-M-C [0.5] the [0.
2] G-A-T-T [0.2] or [1.8] 
nm1172: and er and W-T-O and things like that [0.4] 
sm1175: yeah [laughter] and then the organization [4.0] 
nm1172: do you do you do you have a more specific version of that question er 
[0.9] i i fe-, 
sm1175: er 
nm1172: i feel myself 
sm1175: just 
nm1172: i feel myself being drawn more and more out of m-, out of my depth [0.
4] [laughter] but but but tr-, [0.2] see 
whether you can 
sm1175: just just 
nm1172: pic-, pin me down a bit more 
sm1175: can you talk about the problem with the Third World [1.0] er [0.2] with 
with the the European Union 
nm1172: yes 
sm1175: and [0.2] with er with products and [0.8] so what [0.2] so what i'd 
like to know if [0.4] the European Union [0.2] will be [0.2] will have problems 
[0.5] with this agreement [0.6] with trade agreements 
nm1172: trade agreements [0.3] 
sm1175: yeah with [0.5] 
sf1176: yeah 
sm1175: with the the [0.7] the Uruguay [0.2] rounds 
nm1172: yeah [0.8] 
sm1175: please 
nm1172: yeah [0.4] o-, [0.3] okay [0.5] you wouldn't be by any chance [0.3] 
beginning the M-A in [0.3] International Political Economy would you [0.8] 
[laughter] [0.3] because that's the sort of question which people will be 
spending er [0.4] a l-, a large amount of time discussing [0.3] er [0.4] 
[laughter] i i i i confess to being not very well informed [0.4] on [0.2] the 
mo-, on on the on the details [0.5] and they are very important matters [0.2] 
of the relationship between [0.2] the European Union [0.3] and the World Trade 
Organization [0.6] er wi-, [0.2] previously [0.4] er [0.4] the General 
Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade GATT [0.5] er [0.2] what we're talking about for for for the 
for the for the non-initiated here [0.7] are [0.4] n-, [0.2] are negotiations 
between major world players [0.3] about the terms on which trade is permitted 
between [0.2] themselves [0.6] and we're talking about negotiations [0.3] which 
affect in very fundamental ways the well-being of all sorts of people around 
the world [0.5] the danger of c-, [0.6] that economists constantly point to [0.
3] is that [0.2] politically powerful groups [0.2] will use their power [0.2] 
in order to create protective arrangements which allow them to make money [0.3] 
at the expense of others [0.2] who would be willing [0.3] to sell or would be 
willing to do work at at lower cost which would be er as it were globally 
advantageous [0.3] but which are prevented from doing so because of their lack 
of [0.2] of political power [0.7] er [1.9] er [0.6] i'm i'm i'm thinking and 
and i'm hedging a little bit [0.5] er my [0.6] my my feeling is this that on 
the whole [0.5] the differences [0.8] which exist [1.3] between [1.5] the free 
trade [1.2] er mission [0.2] of the World Trade 
Organization the the mission of that organization to promote freer trade [0.3] 
in the interests of global welfare [0.4] the conflicts between that ambition [0.
5] and the ambition of the European Union which of course is to protect [0.2] 
the interests of its national members [0.7] er [0.3] is a reconcilable [0.8] 
divide in other words [0.2] whilst there will be occasions on which the 
Europeans will take action [0.4] which is good for them but bad for the rest of 
the world [0.4] and which involves protecting certain European interests [0.3] 
and in that way damaging certain [0.3] out-, interests outside Europe [0.3] 
although that will occur [0.4] from time to time undoubtedly [0.3] and 
certainly has occurred [0.3] in a very serious way [0.2] with regard to 
agriculture [0.3] 
that in many other areas [0.5] there was there is a sufficient recognition [0.
5] on [0.4] both [0.7] the part of the W-T-O and on the part of the U-S and on 
the part of the European Union [0.4] that [0.4] er in a sense there is some 
long term general interest [0.3] to be maximized by making a progressive move 
towards freer and freer [0.4] forms of trade [0.4] and [0.9] the the pattern 
whereby that can occur [0.6] would be if you were to take an optimistic view [0.
4] that [0.3] for example freer trade can develop [0.7] er between Mexico and 
the U-S and Canada [0.3] through the North American Free Trade Agreement [0.4] 
and then [0.6] a a [0.6] a [0.2] a growing understanding between members of 
NAFTA and members that the E-U can er can occur so that the advantages of free 
trade [0.3] which have so far been realized within [0.5] limited [0.5] regional 
settings [0.4] can be expanded