nf1167: i told you last time because i didn't finish the lecture on Rawls and 
utilitarianism that i was going to finish it today but actually i've decided 
i'm not going to i know you'll be very disappointed but [0.4] think you've had 
enough of that [0.2] so i'm going straight into [0.3] er Nozick [0.3] and his 
criticisms of Rawls [0.5] er [0.4] so just a few years after Rawls published 
his book [0.4] er another one of the Harvard Philosophy department [0.4] er [0.
3] published [0.5] er a very sort of radical libertarian tract called Anarchy 
State and Utopia [0.6] er this was Robert Nozick it was very provocative and it 
got lots of attention [0.4] er [0.6] favourable and unfavourable [0.7] he 
started his book this way [0.3] individuals have rights and there are things no 
person or group may do to them without violating their rights [0.4] so strong 
and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what [0.3] if 
anything [0.2] the state and its officials may do [1.3] so that's where that's 
his starting point he doesn't 
even argue for that that's where he gets off [1.0] so he argued that only a 
minimal state was justified and anything more extensive than that [0.4] 
violated people's rights [0.3] all that this minimal state could do was protect 
people against force theft fraud [0.4] and forced contracts and a few things 
like that but it didn't have any welfare functions [1.8] he also had a long 
chapter criticizing Rawls [0.8] and the whole approach to distributive justice 
that he regarded Rawls as representative of [1.2] now his own approach to 
justice he calls the entitlement theory [0.5] he avoids the very term 
distributive justice he doesn't think that justice consists of distributing 
anything [0.8] at all [0.4] he d-, he doesn't like that whole approach [0.7] er 
as we'll see [0.8] now er [0.5] you'll find that Nozick writes in a very sort 
of loose style it's very readable [0.3] but a lot of it is a matter of sort of 
shooting from the hip [0.5] and he sort of scatters his shots all over the 
place [0.4] and a lot of them sort of miss a lot of them it's a lot of 
good rhetoric but a lot of his his shots really don't hit their targets [0.5] 
[0.2] so er [1.5] i'm not going to have a lot to say about his own positive 
theory today [0.4] we're going to focus mostly on his criticisms of er [0.2] 
Rawls' theory and related theories [0.8] well i'll say a l-, a little about his 
theories so you'll have some idea [0.4] of what his own view is [0.5] his own 
entitlement view of justice [0.3] begins with the proposition [0.2] that people 
have inviolable rights of self-ownership [0.7] so that means in effect that 
people have rights over themselves that are equivalent [0.3] to the rights that 
a slave owner would have over his slave [0.4] so they're entitled to use their 
own body [0.4] and their own products in a way that a slave over er slave owner 
would be entitled [0.2] to use [0.2] his slave's body and [0.2] the products of 
the slave's labour [1.4] [1.0] so as a result of that people are entitled to 
make certain 
choices [0.7] and as long as the starting point from which they make their 
choices is just [0.4] whatever follows [0.3] by just steps [0.4] is just [0.3] 
you just let the process follow [0.8] let it lead where it may it doesn't 
really matter you don't even have to keep track of the distribution [0.4] er [0.
6] that you get to [0.6] so what he cares about is the history or pedigree [0.
4] of people's holdings [0.2] he doesn't care about what the overall pattern 
that they add up to is [0.5] [sniff] so it's a historical entitlement [0.2] 
view [1.3] no general redistribution is called for [0.6] er [0.6] he says [0.4] 
now he specifies three things [0.3] that are required [0.3] for this process to 
be just [0.7] first there has to be justice in the original acquisition of 
holdings [0.4] second [0.2] there has to be justice in the transfer of holdings 
[1.0] from one person to another [0.8] and third there has to be rectification 
of any past injustices that might have occurred [0.3] [sniff] [0.8] of course 
[0.2] er the big question here is what is it for ju-, [0.2] for 
acquisitions to be just in the first place [0.7] and [0.2] an important [0.2] 
point that Nozick makes here [0.3] is what he calls [0.4] the Lockean proviso 
[0.5] er because h-, he's it's closely related to a point that John Locke made 
[0.4] this says [0.6] that there's an important constraint [0.2] on [0.2] 
acquisition [0.2] in the first place [0.4] that is [0.3] that when you 
appropriate goods you have to leave enough and as good left in common for 
others [0.6] enough and as good for others [1.1] er [0.2] well [0.7] we'll [0.
2] come back in a minute to exactly what that means [1.2] [1.9] Nozick 
contrasts his historical entitlement approach to justice [0.4] with [0.5] er [0.
2] any [0.2] principle that aims either [0.4] to achieve a certain end state [0.
5] or [0.4] to achieve a certain pattern of distribution [1.1] er [0.3] he 
rejects [0.2] all principles that end [0.2] e-, that aim at end states or 
patterns [0.6] so [0.2] there are a lot of familiar [0.2] ad-, examples of such 
principles we've already come across like [0.2] maximizing utility [0.5] or [0.
2] maximin primary goods Rawls' principle [0.6] er [0.3] [sniff] [1.4] 
now on the entitlement view things come into the world [0.3] already attached 
to people who are entitled to them [0.5] people's choices to transfer those 
entitlements [0.6] simply don't have to conform to any pattern [0.4] they can 
do what they like with them [0.5] so he thinks this whole idea of a of a [0.2] 
aiming at a pattern [0.3] is misguided [0.7] and [0.2] he [0.4] he claims that 
[0.6] the benefits of the social surplus [0.5] the the surplus [0.5] that 
people get from cooperating with each other [0.8] are not manna from heaven [1.
1] er that we can distribute freely it's not up to society to distribute this 
as if it were manna from heaven [1.3] er w-, what does he mean by that exactly 
well [0.5] let's think first about what if [0.4] what if individuals were all 
like Robinson Crusoe every person had his own island [0.4] and on that island 
he worked by himself he or she worked by themselves [0.4] creating whatever [0.
5] they were creating building their tree houses or [0.4] fishing [0.5] well in 
that case he thinks it's clear [0.4] that there would be no distribution [0.4] 
er redistribution 
warranted that each Robinson Crusoe [0.3] would be entitled [0.3] to his own 
product [0.5] [sniff] [0.2] er [1.1] well [0.3] does cooperation change that [1.
3] if these [0.2] different Robinson Crusoes [0.4] suddenly get together and 
start cooperating and producing more than the total that they were producing 
separately [1.1] is the surplus available [0.2] for redistribution [0.6] well a 
common answer is [0.3] yes it is because [0.4] once cooperation occurs we can 
no longer disentangle [0.8] er the contributions that each individual makes [0.
5] to the product [0.4] well [0.2] Nozick [0.3] rejects that answer [0.2] he 
says [0.2] yes we can [0.2] disentangle [0.2] the product [0.5] if we can 
identify the different contributions [0.5] er [0.5] sorry if w-, we c-, if we 
can identify what different individuals need to be given as incentives to 
produce [0.5] then [0.3] we know [0.3] what they are responsible for producing 
[0.4] so [0.3] the very same question the [0.3] th-, a-, let me put it this way 
[0.3] the answer to the question [0.3] of who needs to be given incentives to 
contribute in order 
to generate extra product [1.0] also answers the question of who's entitled to 
that product [0.6] the two things go together [1.8] so the surplus arrives in 
the world already attached to people [0.3] and it's not available for 
redistribution [0.7] in his view [1.7] [cough] [1.6] all right well that's all 
s-, that all sounds pretty [0.3] radically unreconstructed sort of anti-welfare 
state stuff [0.6] er how radical is it really would it actually wipe out the 
welfare state [1.8] well there are two reasons to think it might not be quite 
as radical as it sounds at first [0.9] er [0.5] first [0.2] remember [0.2] that 
[0.2] just acquisition of holdings is limited by [0.2] the Lockean proviso [0.
5] which says that [0.2] you can only take goods [0.2] to begin with [0.2] if 
you n-, leave asnough and as good for others [0.7] so acquisitions that make 
others worse off [0.2] are unjust [0.2] and they have to be rectified [1.2] 
well worse off compared to what [0.3] you may ask well that's the critical 
point what's the baseline for comparisons [1.7] er [0.3] everything depends 
here on how you fix this baseline [0.7] well he gives a few examples of what he 
has in mind [1.0] you can't appropriate the only waterhole in the desert [0.2] 
and make people pay you for y-, [0.2] getting water from it [0.5] why [0.4] 
because that would leave them [0.2] worse off than they would have been [0.4] 
if you hadn't appropriated it [0.5] er [0.9] but [0.3] contrast that with a 
different case [0.6] if you invent a new medicine [0.8] and you charge people 
[0.8] for supplying them with this medicine [1.2] then [0.7] you can [0.6] you 
can do that that's that's not unjust that's er compatible be-, [0.4] you're 
you're not leaving anyone worse off than they would have been because [0.3] if 
you hadn't invented this medicine they wouldn't have had the medicine anyway [0.
7] all right so [0.7] that's the k-, the kind of [0.2] er [0.7] way he wants 
this distinction to apply [0.6] okay so that's one reason we're limited [0.6] 
by the Lockean proviso in what we can justly acquire in the first place [0.3] 
and secondly [0.3] his third principle says you have to 
rectify past injustices [0.7] well if we think about it [0.2] think about the 
history of [0.5] er Western civilization [0.3] there have been [0.2] plenty of 
[0.3] violations of the Lockean proviso [0.3] people have been helping 
themselves to things that left other people worse off [0.4] for a very long 
time [0.2] so we've got an awful lot of accumulated past injustice [0.3] that 
strictly speaking ought to be rectified [0.4] in our societies [0.6] and [0.3] 
he admits Nozick admits that actually [0.4] maybe [0.4] er a rough rule of 
thumb which might have the effect of rectifying all this past injustice [0.6] 
might be something rather like a maximin principle [0.6] er you might assume 
that [0.4] the people who were the victims of this past injustice [0.4] er are 
now among the worst off members of society [0.4] and a rough and ready way of 
rectifying it [0.2] might be [0.4] to make them as well off as you can [1.0] so 
those are two reasons to think [0.4] maybe it's not quite as [0.3] anti-
welfarist in its [0.3] er anti-welfare state in its policy [0.2] implications 
[0.5] as [0.2] it might sound [0.9] the practical 
recommendations might not be that different [1.7] all right so [0.4] i want now 
to move on [0.3] to discuss [0.2] the objections that Nozick makes [0.3] to [0.
4] Rawlsian [0.9] justice in particular and also [0.3] more generally to the 
whole idea of a pattern of redistribution which Rawls is one example of [1.8] 
first [0.8] there's [0.2] er [0.3] the interference objection [1.1] this is an 
objection to pattern principles [0.3] er of justice just [0.2] principles that 
aim at some particular pattern of the distribution of goods [0.8] in general 
not just [0.6] to Rawls [0.6] he illustrates this objection with this famous [0.
2] example of Wilt Chamberlain [0.8] he supposes that we've got a just starting 
point [0.7] er [0.5] everybody's got a just amount of income to begin with [1.
1] and then [0.3] er from this point we suppose that there's this [0.2] 
fabulous basketball player and everybody [0.5] is very [0.3] enthusiastic about 
paying [0.4] er a pound each or a [0.2] a dollar each i guess he says [0.3] to 
[0.5] a [0.3] twenty-five cent seat i can't believe that er have twenty-five 
anyway [0.2] to see him play basketball [0.5] so [0.2] he ends up Wilt 
Chamberlain ends 
up far richer than anyone else [1.6] and this is all a voluntary [0.7] transfer 
[0.4] from a just starting point [0.7] now if we're trying to maintain a 
pattern of [0.2] justice of d-, d-, [0.2] pattern of distribution [0.9] we're 
going to have to interfere continually to maintain that pattern [0.4] when 
people make these voluntary transfers we're going to continually have to 
interfere with the liberty of people [0.7] to [0.6] buy things to transfer 
resources in the way that they choose [0.6] so maintaining any pattern of 
distribution will require a constant interference [0.2] in people's liberty [0.
3] he says [0.6] [sniff] that's the objection [2.0] well [0.2] you might [0.6] 
say [0.2] wha-, [laugh] [0.4] why wait a minute why is that an objection i mean 
that's just tax taxation i mean [0.8] we're all familiar with taxation it's [0.
3] you're just wrinkling your nose when you [0.3] when you say [0.4] taxation 
yuck i mean that's not really an objection [0.5] er [1.0] well [0.7] let's [0.
2] include a little bit more of the rhetoric here to er sort of [0.4] 
illustrate this point [0.9] er [0.6] he says [0.5] well 
look [0.2] if the starting point is just [0.3] then people s-, [0.3] in that 
starting point supposedly [0.7] should be entitled to dispose of their goods as 
they like [0.9] well why doesn't that [0.6] include [0.3] transferring [1.1] 
their money to someone else if they want [1.3] he says [0.3] no third party has 
any claim on your goods in the just starting point [0.7] well why does that [0.
2] change [0.4] if you [0.3] transfer your [0.3] good to a second party if the 
third party didn't have a claim to begin with why did they get one just because 
you transfer [0.8] some money [0.3] like you know when i transfer my [0.3] 
twenty-five cents to Wilt Chamberlain [1.7] he says [0.4] a socialist society 
would have to forbid capitalist acts between consenting adults [1.4] er [0.3] 
and [1.7] so he says [0.2] people [0.5] pattern principles let people spend 
their fair share on themselves [0.3] but not on other people [0.3] and that 
this is [0.4] a kind of [0.2] perverse individualism it's individualism with a 
vengeance he says you're only allowed to spend money on yourself but not on 
other people [1.1] er and he also complains that [0.5] er [1.4] this 
kind of a restriction [0.8] ignores the rights of donors the rights that people 
have to give gifts [1.8] all right so there's some good rhetoric there this 
this remark about forbidding capitalist acts between consenting adults is [0.3] 
reproduced in practically every introductory text [0.3] to political [0.3] 
philosophy but [0.7] let's ask is there really a good argument behind this [1.
3] er [0.2] well quite a few er different replies have been made [0.3] er just 
to consider a few of them [0.7] er first various critics have pointed out that 
really this [0.2] point just begs the question [0.8] he's simply assuming that 
an ideal starting point confers [0.3] unqualified entitlements [0.8] to 
transfer your goods [1.4] but that [0.2] assumption is [0.3] precisely what any 
pattern view is rejecting so he he hasn't really given any independent argument 
he's just [0.2] sort of begged the question with this rhetoric [2.2] a second 
reply is that [0.5] for a very important class of goods [0.4] the rights of 
donors are irrelevant [0.5] and these are goods [1.2] that are your 
natural endowments your natural abilities or disabilities your t-, natural 
talents [0.3] things like what family you're born into [0.5] er [0.5] these are 
not things that anyone gives you [0.3] unless you want to think of them as the 
gifts of God or something [0.9] but er [0.4] barring that [0.3] the r-, there's 
no donor [0.6] whose rights are relevant [0.9] er [1.2] so we'll come back to 
this point about natural endowments [0.2] shortly [1.6] a third reply though 
focuses on goods for which [0.2] there are actually donors er so it's er it's 
not pursuing the donor point [0.9] er [1.8] it says even if we consider goods 
[0.3] which are given [0.3] by human donors [0.4] this argument still doesn't 
work it actually involves a confusion [0.9] the argument [0.3] er starts from 
[0.9] er the idea [0.3] about [0.7] the correct [0.9] fr-, from an idea about 
what it is for me to spend money on myself [0.9] as opposed to spending it on 
other people [0.3] and then it says well [0.3] if i could spend it on myself 
why can't i spend it on other people that's individualism with a vengeance [0.
6] but this whole idea of spending money on myself [0.6] is [0.9] suspect [0.2] 
it doesn't hold up [0.7] er [0.7] you can't [1.1] you can you can give money to 
someone without getting anything i-, in return but that's not really spending 
it on yourself [0.4] spending money on yourself [0.3] involves [0.3] 
transferring the money to someone else in exchange for something [0.6] that you 
get from them that's what happens when you buy [0.3] something [0.3] for 
yourself [0.6] you give your money to someone else who gives you something in 
exchange [0.7] er you can't eat your money i mean there's no way of [0.3] 
consuming your money [0.3] without entering into an exchange with someone else 
[1.8] okay so transferring money to someone else is part of what it is to spend 
money on yourself [0.8] [0.2] [sniff] [0.3] so [0.8] the er underlying point 
here is that exchanges and transfers [0.8] provide the measure of income [0.9] 
er we're not income isn't just [0.4] bills you know [0.2] pound notes [0.4] or 
pound coins [0.4] income is [1.2] how many times those things get circulated in 
exchanges [0.4] so to take an example suppose i 
earn a hundred pounds [0.3] doing my job [0.6] and [0.2] i pay tax on that 
hundred pounds and i've got my leftover whatever it is sixty pounds [0.5] and 
[0.5] er [0.6] i then [0.7] come home and pay my [0.2] housekeeper [0.3] for 
cleaning my house [0.6] er [0.4] and i [0.2] so i give her twenty pounds out of 
what i have left [0.3] and she pays tax on that again [1.0] now because that's 
the same [0.6] ten er s-, ten pou-, er twenty pound note that i've already paid 
tax on doesn't she can't argue well i don't have to pay tax on that because 
you've already paid my tax [0.7] that that would be crazy [0.6] er [0.4] so [0.
4] this er objection really seems to involve a very naive view about what it is 
[0.2] what income is [2.2] [0.5] so every time people [1.3] money and goods 
change hands [0.5] in-, more income is generated [1.9] all right so i don't 
think the [0.2] Wilt Chamberlain non-interference objection [0.5] gets very far 
[1.1] let's go on now to consider [0.3] er [0.3] two more objections Nozick 
makes [0.3] these are actually focused more on Rawls in particular [2.3] and 
they concern 
especially the idea [0.2] of Rawls that you derive principles of justice from 
the original position [0.2] behind a veil of ignorance [2.1] the second and 
these are [0.3] quite closely related so i'll sort of give you a a brief idea 
of each of them and then i'll [0.2] come back and look at [0.2] them [0.2] in 
turn a little more closely [0.6] the second objection [0.6] er [0.3] Nozick 
makes is that [0.3] [0.5] the idea of deriving principles of justice from [0.7] 
er [0.4] a position of choice behind a veil of ignorance [0.7] could never [0.
3] produce [0.4] the kind of principles [0.3] that he Nozick likes they could 
never produce historical entitlement principles [0.7] er [0.2] they'd have to 
produce some kind of an end state or pattern principle [1.9] so he objects to 
this er [0.6] choosing principles in the original position behind the veil idea 
[0.3] because he thinks [0.3] it's totally biased against [0.5] the whole idea 
of an entitlement principle and a-, leads you necessarily toward [0.2] the kind 
of principle 
he rejects [1.0] the third [0.3] er objection he makes is that [0.8] if that's 
true that puts Rawls in an inconsistent [0.3] position [1.3] Nozick says look 
[0.7] Rawls' argument depends essentially on a certain procedure [0.8] er [0.4] 
whatever [0.4] principles would be agreed to [0.5] in this position [0.2] 
behind a veil of ignorance [0.6] count as just [0.8] so [0.5] the procedure 
that [0.3] people go through of choosing behind a veil of ignorance is what [1.
2] justifies these principles [0.2] as just [0.9] but he says well look [0.4] 
if a procedure is good enough to justify these principles [0.4] why aren't 
procedural principles good enough to start with [1.0] like my entitlement 
principles [0.4] er [0.4] that he thinks there's a sort of inconsistency [0.6] 
in having a procedure [0.3] that can only justify [0.2] non-procedural 
principles [1.4] all right [0.6] like pattern or end state principles which are 
not just a matter of what procedure you've historically gone through [1.0] like 
his are [1.1] all right [0.7] that's just briefly to give you an idea of these 
two objections let's go back [0.3] over them a little more 
slowly now [0.4] let's look at this second objection [0.3] [sniff] er [0.2] in 
a nutshell [0.2] this objection is [0.4] that [0.2] the original position is 
set up in a way that's biased against ever [0.7] er [0.2] yielding [0.4] 
procedural principles of justice and ty-, historical entitlement type 
principles [1.6] okay we can call that the bias objection [0.2] [sniff] [0.2] 
er [1.7] [sniff] [0.6] well [0.6] why does Nozick think [0.2] that people 
behind a veil of ignorance would never go for procedural principles would 
always go for some kind of pattern or end state principle [0.7] to explain why 
[0.4] he gives an example [0.4] he asks us to imagine a group of students [0.6] 
and these students are trying to decide [0.4] on a marking scheme [0.7] how 
they want their [0.3] er [0.8] their work [0.6] to be marked [0.5] and they're 
trying to do this from behind a veil of ignorance that is to say they don't 
know how good their work is they don't know what marks they're likely to get [1.
0] and he argues that [0.4] in that position 
students would never agree [0.4] to be marked on the merits [1.4] er to have 
their work just really fairly [0.3] at-, [0.2] assessed on the merits they 
would rather [0.5] agree to some marking scheme that gave them [0.3] as good a 
chance as possible [0.4] of [0.3] getting [0.4] a good mark or which [0.3] 
guaranteed that they wouldn't fall below a certain level [0.4] or [0.2] 
something like that some kind of pattern or end state [0.2] they would go for 
[0.5] but not just [0.8] to be marked on the merits [0.8] er according to their 
entitlements [2.8] er [0.6] well [0.8] let's think about that er [1.3] how many 
students would actually [1.2] choose to be marked on the merits if they were [0.
2] making this kind of a choice [0.6] er [0.2] in fact [0.3] er in America i 
don't i i guess it's the case here for some courses [0.5] there are a lot of [0.
2] a lot of places offer the option [0.2] of [0.5] er taking courses pass fail 
instead of getting marks in them [0.5] and it's very unpopular hardly anyone 
does it [0.2] they're per-, per-, perfectly free to do it but people don't do 
it [0.7] well you might say that's not really relevant for several reasons one 
[0.4] 
they're not behind a veil of ignorance [0.4] er [0.5] and t-, two er [0.9] you 
know the j-, the job market is such that you know that employers are going to 
wonder why you took things pass fail most students don't do it so if you do it 
it's going to look bad [0.4] right so it's not exactly [0.5] relevant but [0.4] 
maybe it's suggestive anyway because there may be more to it than this i mean 
[0.9] er [0.6] let's make a thought experiment that [0.2] makes it a little bit 
more relevant here [0.5] er [0.2] if you were starting out at university so you 
didn't really know what to expect [0.4] say you'd got into a really good 
university [0.4] much better than [0.4] er [0.2] most of the people who are in 
your secondary school did [0.3] so you were there with a lot of really high 
powered people and you really had no idea how you were going to [0.7] er come 
out in that competition [0.9] and also let's suppose er [0.5] that [0.3] this 
is the only university in your country you're in a small country it has one 
university [0.3] so [0.4] er y-, [0.4] the-, there aren't a lot of other 
universities doing 
something different [0.3] and the student body now is voting on a marking 
scheme [0.6] now we get a little bit closer to [0.5] er the situation [0.4] 
well [0.5] er [1.1] what would you what would you do let me just ask you [0.4] 
how many of you in that situation would actually vote [0.3] to be marked on the 
merits [5.8] how many of you would vote for something other than being marked 
on the merits [1.5] well all right i think that i think this is [1.8] 
sf1168: er sorry but can you explain what [0.2] on the merits means 
nf1167: on the merits it just means somebody marks you according to how good 
they think your work is [1.7] on the merits of your work [2.4] 
su1169: [laughter] 
nf1167: sorry did you not understand that do you want to tr-, do it again 
sf1170: yes 
nf1167: how many would you how how many would want to be marked according to 
how good [0.2] they think the work is [1.5] as opposed to just you know some 
kind of [0.2] pass fail scheme or something [0.5] like that if you if you pass 
the minimum amount then [0.2] okay how many people would like to 
be marked on something other than on the merits [1.9] [laughter] one brave soul 
[0.5] good [0.3] well anyway look [0.4] i think there's something [0.2] er 
revealing here i mean i don't know what your reasons are and i i'll maybe we 
can pursue this in the seminar and find out [0.4] but [0.5] at least i think 
some of you might be motivated in the following way [0.2] you might think to 
yourselves [0.5] well look it's a bit like engaging in a sport i'm going to put 
a lot of effort and a lot of time into this [0.3] and i want to achieve as much 
as i can achieve [0.3] and frankly i need the incentive i need the discipline 
to develop my own capacities to do as well [0.3] as i can do [0.3] i don't know 
what my capacities are [0.4] but whatever they are [0.4] i know that i want to 
develop them as much as i can [0.6] and the incentive and discipline that being 
marked on the merits will provide [0.3] will help me to do that [1.4] er [1.4] 
so [0.3] that suggests that people enjoy developing their abilities they enjoy 
achieving 
whatever excellence they're capable of [0.9] and i think that's actually quite 
an important and univ-, fairly universal motivation er [0.3] it also suggests a 
reply to Nozick here [0.6] er [0.6] these students may well choose to be marked 
on the merits er [0.7] even if they're behind a veil [0.2] for this kind of 
reason [1.1] er [0.5] but it's interesting that Rawls actually says you know [0.
4] behind the veil you don't know anything about yourself personally but you do 
know some general psychological facts about human beings [0.4] one of the 
things he allows [0.4] is that [0.3] what he calls the Aristotelian principle 
[0.5] the Aristotelian principle says [0.3] people enjoy exercising their 
abilities and they enjoy doing [0.2] well what they can do [1.4] so er [0.5] 
you might [0.2] wonder actually [0.3] whether people behind Rawls' veil of 
ignorance might reasonably choose principles that give them some incentives to 
develop their capacities [0.7] er might even [0.2] choose principles that 
involve penalties [0.4] along the way for failing to reach certain goals [1.7] 
now you might say well [0.2] 
wait a minute you wouldn't choose that if you didn't know whether you were 
handicapped [0.5] whether you were disabled in some way [2.1] er [0.8] well [0.
7] this is [0.5] a delicate matter i mean we have to y-, there there are lots 
of points that have to be [0.4] er made and respected about disabilities but [1.
1] we certainly don't want to be in a position of arguing that [0.5] er [0.8] 
disabled people are any different from other people in respect of enjoying 
exercising their abilities and doing what they can do well i mean from [0.3] 
you know Stephen Hawking to wheelchair sports [0.6] er [0.4] you've got lots of 
counter-examples to that so [1.3] almost everyone has [0.2] a capacity to do 
something well [0.5] er it doesn't have to be something earth shaking [0.8] er 
it can be just arranging flowers or [0.4] you know er [0.3] whatever but [0.7] 
er [0.2] people nevertheless enjoy [0.7] developing [0.4] their capacities 
whatever they are at whatever level they fall [0.6] okay [0.2] so that's in 
effect [0.2] er a reply to this [0.5] er second objection of Nozick [1.3] that 
[0.7] er the 
bias objection isn't really true [1.4] [cough] [0.2] the original position in 
the veil aren't really biased totally against entitlement princi-, principles 
[0.3] they may even [0.3] be more conducive to entitlement principles than 
Rawls himself seems to think [2.2] okay let's now go on to Nozick's third 
objection [0.6] er [1.3] for this objection we have to suppose for the sake of 
argument that the bias objection is correct [0.8] because [0.2] it [0.3] makes 
a sort of dilemma or inconsistency based on that [1.0] er [1.5] okay so we're 
supposing that the choice procedure behind the veil [0.4] cannot yield 
procedural [0.4] principles of justice [0.9] er [0.6] he says Nozick says well 
that would be it was [0.2] it's inconsistent to appeal to a procedural choice 
[0.5] er to justify principles if this procedure rules out procedural 
principles [1.6] er so he says if procedures are so great that they can justify 
the principles they lead to then Rawls' theory is defective because it can't 
lead to procedural principles [0.8] er [0.4] and if procedural principles 
aren't good enough [0.2] then Rawls' theory isn't justified anyway [0.5] er [1.
2] so if [0.6] procedures are good enough to base the choice of principles on 
they should be good enough to count as principles of justice he says [1.3] er 
[0.3] [1.0] [cough] [0.2] [1.8] excuse me [0.9] okay so how much is there in 
this er [0.2] objection [0.4] is there really any dilemma or inconsistency here 
[0.8] after all [0.4] for Rawls it's not [0.2] just the fact [0.3] that you've 
made a choice that you've gone through certain procedure [0.5] er [0.3] not any 
old procedure would do not any old choice [0.3] not any old contract that 
people might make [0.5] would have this special kind of justification attached 
to it [0.8] what's very important [0.2] for Rawls is the idea that people [0.3] 
have chosen something behind a veil of ignorance [0.6] and that's [0.4] 
essential to the justification [0.2] provided for what they choose [0.4] it's 
essential to it because [0.4] the whole idea is that there are [0.3] morally 
arbitrary factors factors for which people aren't responsible [0.6] that could 
influence [0.7] er ordinary contracts and 
ordinary procedures [0.3] so normally when people [0.2] enter into contracts 
all sorts of morally arbitrary factors are influential [1.4] er and [0.2] 
that's why [0.5] those [0.3] contracts those procedures don't yield the special 
kind of justification [0.5] that you get [0.3] when you impose [0.3] the veil 
of ignorance [0.2] which excludes the influence of these morally arbitrary 
factors [1.0] so [0.4] it isn't just any old procedure it's a very special 
procedure [1.1] er [0.2] [0.4] that Rawls appeals to [0.4] so i don't actually 
think there's any [0.3] dilemma or inconsistency here this [0.3] argument 
doesn't work either [1.8] [cough] [2.9] so let's now move on to [0.2] the 
fourth objection that Nozick [0.2] makes [0.9] er [0.6] this is [0.7] the 
forced labour objection he says taxation is equivalent [0.6] to [0.2] forced 
labour [0.5] [sniff] [0.5] taxation of earnings from labour is on a par with 
forced labour [2.2] so [0.2] seizing [0.6] er [0.7] the results of someone's 
labour is equivalent [0.2] to seizing [0.7] hours from them forcing them [0.4] 
to work [1.6] how does 
he er [0.4] develop this idea [0.2] well he compares two people [0.3] er i'm [0.
2] i'm making up some names here i've got [0.6] Amy and Zach the er [0.3] 
intended A and Z in-, intended to [0.3] suggest that this is [0.2] a spectrum 
in between these two extremes [0.7] Amy prefers overtime plus more money to 
leisure [0.8] all right she's a [0.3] a workaholic [0.9] Zach prefers leisure 
to overtime [0.9] they have the same [0.2] abilities but they have different 
preferences [1.5] so Amy likes to buy things with the extra money she work-, 
she gets by working overtime [0.6] she's a sort of workaholic consumer type [0.
5] Zach is a surfer [0.6] he works er you know the minimal working day and he 
spends the rest of his time surfing he'd rather surf than anything he could [0.
3] buy with the money he'd earn if he [0.2] wasn't surfing [1.5] so because Amy 
works overtime some of the extra money she earns goes to tax [0.5] er it h-, 
goes to help the needy [0.9] but when Zach goes surfing [0.3] he's not taxed [0.
4] no extra cash is taken from him [2.0] if his leisure spent surfing was taxed 
[0.4] he would actually h-, [0.3] have to work [0.3] 
extra [0.5] to get the cash to pay the tax on that extra [1.0] er [2.3] so he 
would be in effect forced [0.3] to work more than he wants to forced to work 
overtime in order to [0.2] pay tax [1.0] well Nozick assumes that that would be 
wrong that that would be forced [0.2] labour [0.6] that Zach [0.2] would be 
entitled not to work overtime if he chose this without being liable to tax [0.
5] on what he would have earned if he had worked overtime [1.2] he says [0.6] 
well look if [0.9] er if Zach's not required [0.3] to [0.2] pay tax to [0.2] 
he's not forced to work [0.3] in order to pay tax on his leisure [0.4] why 
should Amy be forced to work just because she prefers to work overtime [0.5] 
why should only Amy be required to help the needy and not Zach [0.8] er just 
because they have different tastes that seems unfair to workaholics [2.1] and 
he er [0.2] goes on with [0.2] a whole lot of rhetorical questions [1.2] he 
says some people's happiness depends on goods and services [0.3] and they'd 
need money to buy them [0.4] but other people's doesn't [0.3] why do we treat 
them differently [0.5] some people like to [0.2] watch films so they 
need money to buy tickets to get into the cinema [0.4] other people prefer to 
watch sunsets [0.6] why should they [0.3] why force [0.2] the movie goer to 
help the needy [0.2] and not help the sunset lover [0.2] the nature lover to 
help the needy [2.5] what justifies treating them differently [0.3] okay well 
[0.7] these are good questions actually they're serious questions in [0.5] er 
[0.2] [sniff] [0.4] the [0.5] tax tr-, about the tax treatment of leisure [0.3] 
and they raise er serious issues about tax policy [0.6] er how to value [0.4] 
er [0.4] leisure [0.6] [0.7] [sniff] [1.0] so i think in order to understand 
what's going on here we make [0.2] need to make a little bit of a digression [0.
5] er and think about what's in the background of some of these issues here [1.
1] our existing tax systems by and large [0.2] er [0.4] don't tax someone like 
Zach [0.7] who chooses to con-, [0.4] to consume his own leisure of course he'd 
be taxed on whatever he did earn [0.6] for the hours he worked [0.4] but he 
wouldn't be taxed on what he could earn if he worked more [1.1] they n-, 
existing tax 
systems don't tax leisure [1.0] er [1.2] so [0.2] someone like Zach is treated 
in effect more favourably than someone like Amy [2.2] er well why [0.2] what's 
the explanation of this is it because we have an aversion [0.4] to [0.4] er [0.
2] forced labour [0.8] or is it for some other reason [1.7] er [0.2] well let's 
[0.2] let's think a bit more about this now [0.7] er [0.4] i said Zach and Amy 
have the same abilities but different preferences [1.4] Amy er chooses to 
exercise her earning ability [0.6] t-, mo-, more fully than Zach does [1.1] 
well why doesn't Zach [0.8] want to exercise it [0.5] so [0.5] one possibility 
is Zach may genuinely prefer to surf [0.8] er [0.4] [1.5] but another 
possibility is this [0.3] he may think [0.4] well look consumption of my own 
leisure time is not subject to tax [0.5] while if i work and buy something else 
it is subject to tax [0.4] so [0.3] actually it's a better deal to consume my 
own leisure time 'cause it's tax free [1.4] er [0.2] [1.4] and since his 
leisure time is tax free [0.5] he may decide he wants to consume more 
leisure than he would [0.4] otherwise [1.1] that's a bit like buying more 
whisky than you might want [0.5] otherwise because you're in duty free [0.8] er 
[0.6] so [0.2] [0.5] if [0.2] Zach were influenced by this kind of reasoning [0.
3] he might well [0.4] er [0.4] decide [0.4] to take more leisure [0.2] spend 
more time surfing than he would otherwise [0.6] in that case the tax system 
would be distorting [0.5] his decisions about how much to work [0.2] inducing 
him to work less [0.7] and that's widely regarded [0.2] as a bad thing for a 
tax system to induce that kind of distortion in the labour supply [0.8] now how 
could that be avoided [0.3] how could a tax system avoid that [1.6] well [0.2] 
there's a way [0.2] that's widely [0.4] er known and discussed it's completely 
impractical [0.4] but it would [0.3] it would theoretically [0.2] do the trick 
[0.2] and that is [0.4] you tax people's leisure as well as their [0.2] income 
[0.5] that is to say you tax their earning ability [0.2] not what they actually 
earn [0.4] but the ability to earn [0.2] that they have [0.8] er [0.3] what 
they c-, [0.2] you tax them on what they 
could earn [0.2] if they were to exercise their earning ability [0.2] fully [1.
7] now that in effect [0.3] treats people [0.2] as if they're having to buy 
their own leisure time back [0.4] out of [0.3] their full [0.5] er earning 
ability [1.8] er [0.3] that kind of tax is called a lump sum tax you owe a 
fixed amount based on your earning ability [0.2] and you can't change it by how 
much you choose to work [1.1] you can't [0.4] reduce it by choosing to work 
less you owe it whether you work or not [1.0] and because of that [0.2] you 
actually have to work [0.3] because you can't pay it out of leisure you have to 
work enough at least [0.4] to get the money to pay the tax [1.3] so that in a 
sense does force you [0.2] to [0.3] work [2.3] [2.0] okay so this is a scheme 
that says if you have the ability to earn a certain income you owe tax on [0.4] 
that amount of income whether you choose to exercise that ability or not [0.2] 
is down to you we don't care [1.7] let's notice three things about this idea of 
lump sung [0.2] sum taxation [1.3] well first [0.5] it avoids this distortion 
[0.4] 
er people no longer have incentive to work less than they would [0.4] you can't 
reduce the amount of tax you owe [0.3] by [0.2] er [0.9] working less [1.4] er 
[1.0] second [1.1] as i said it does in a sense force people to work [0.4] in 
order to pay this inflexible tax you have to work [0.6] at least enough to get 
the money for the tax [1.4] er [0.5] so that [0.2] may be regarded as a 
distortion of their choices as well [1.6] [sniff] [0.3] er [0.8] it's not 
subsidizing leisure but it's er [0.5] doing something else maybe it's even 
worse [0.5] does it [0.2] violate their rights of self-ownership [0.7] er [0.5] 
Nozick at any rate thinks that this is such a bad idea that he doesn't really 
even take it seriously [0.7] er he thinks if he can persuade us that taxing say 
a movie goer is just as bad as taxing a sunset lover [0.4] then we won't tax 
either of them he doesn't think [0.3] er well he doesn't even take seriously 
the possibility we might tax both of them [1.4] but we should ask [0.2] well [0.
3] is it really that bad [0.3] is does it really violate s-, rights of self-
ownership to do this [0.5] er [2.4] or are d-, are 
people do r-, people really have rights of self-ownership that would [0.2] rule 
this kind of thing out [0.9] er [1.1] well [0.2] the third point [0.4] about 
lump sum taxes undercuts these [0.3] first two points really [0.3] and that's 
the point that it's just completely impractical [0.5] why [0.7] er because it 
provides an incentive to people to hide their true abilities [0.6] talented 
productive people [0.4] will have an incentive to pretend to be [0.2] less 
talented less productive to reduce their tax [0.9] er [0.5] by behaving [0.6] 
as if they were less talented and less productive because after all the 
government [0.2] doesn't know [0.3] what your true earning ability is all it 
can [0.5] observe is how you behave [0.9] so very productive people may have an 
incentive to behave as if they were less productive [1.1] and that's a bad 
distortion [0.2] on the labour supply that's probably worse than the other one 
[0.5] er [1.8] okay so [0.6] er [0.3] there's no reliable way to get the 
information you'd need [0.4] to avoid this [0.4] bad incentive effect [1.1] er 
[1.1] one way of doing it might be 
to pretend everyone had the same abilities and tax everyone [0.2] exactly the 
same regardless of their abilities [0.5] but that's really [0.2] going to be 
very hard on people who actually are disabled [1.0] who actually do have [0.9] 
very reduced abilities [0.3] so that doesn't [0.3] really work either [0.8] 
okay so it's a very impractical idea the lump sum tax idea [1.0] this is [0.3] 
a very [0.2] brief breezy summary of some very complicated and deep issues 
about tax policy [0.6] but i th-, [0.2] the point i'm trying to make here is [0.
5] look we've got another explanation of why we don't tax Zach on his leisure 
[1.0] er [0.6] in theory [0.3] if we c-, really could measure people's earning 
abilities maybe we would [0.9] maybe we wouldn't be worried about the forced 
labour idea [0.4] the reason we don't do it isn't that [0.5] it's that it's 
just completely impractical [0.4] that's why we don't do it [0.5] [1.9] all 
right [0.2] so er [2.8] i don't think that the forced labour objection [0.7] 
gets very far either [0.7] this is another one [0.6] that er [0.2] 
counts as [1.2] shooting from the hip [1.1] but now i think we're getting 
closer to the area where [0.2] the really er important [0.2] objections lie 
which i think do [0.2] actually [0.4] hit their targets [0.5] and these are the 
objections that have to do with the idea of moral arbitrariness [2.2] er [3.0] 
i think [0.3] his ideas about moral arbitrariness are central to why Rawls 
rejects anything like Nozick's [0.3] position [0.7] and [0.8] Nozick disagrees 
with him here [0.2] at the heart of his theory [0.8] er [0.3] Rawls thinks that 
[0.2] talents and abilities disabilities that people are born with [0.3] the 
family situations they're born into [0.5] the upbringings they receive [0.3] 
are morally arbitrary [0.2] but what does that mean it means they're not 
responsible for them [0.2] they don't deserve them in any sense [0.8] at times 
he even seems to think that the effort they make [0.3] the degree of effort [0.
3] they exert is morally arbitrary that that's almost like another talent they 
have [2.8] okay [0.3] so [0.6] er [1.4] these morally arbitrary factors are not 
chosen by the person they're not responsible for them [0.6] and the idea here 
is that morality and justice should not depend [0.5] on factors [0.3] that are 
arbitrary from a moral point of view [0.2] factors that are merely matters of 
luck [1.1] that expresses [0.3] a Kantian view which is at the heart of Rawls' 
[0.2] Theory of Justice [0.7] Kant thought that the demands of morality and 
justice could not depend on merely empirical factors [0.4] on merely contingent 
differences between people [1.2] between their different personalities and 
desires [1.0] they had to be the demands of justice had to be [0.6] er [0.6] an 
expression of pure reason abstracted from all the contingencies of the 
empirical world [0.7] er and an aspect of each person in Kant's view [0.3] is 
that each person has a capacity [0.5] to respond to pure reason [0.3] to form 
intentions on the basis of pure reason [0.5] this capacity is an aspect of what 
Kant [0.7] regarded as the purely rational self or the the noumenal self [0.2] 
to use his technical term [1.5] er [1.1] so [1.1] people had this 
capacity of the in their [0.3] er that resided in their noumenal aspect with 
their noumenal selves [0.5] to act on the basis of pure reason apart from all 
these morally arbitrary [0.3] factors [0.4] and in that respect [0.2] Kant 
regarded people as fundamentally free and equal [1.4] well [0.4] Rawls [0.4] 
says at one point in A Theory of Justice [0.4] that [0.3] his original position 
can be thought of [0.5] as the point of view from which noumenal selves see the 
world [1.4] so it's because differences in [0.4] your abilities your natural 
abilities your upbringing and so on [0.5] are a matter of rock are morally 
arbitrary [0.3] that Rawls wants to exclude them from influencing [0.6] what 
goes on in the original position [1.1] he does that through the veil of 
ignorance [0.7] so the veil of ignorance sort of strips people down [0.5] of 
all these [0.2] arbitrary differences [0.7] er in their own conception [0.6] 
the way they can see themselves behind the veil [0.6] er [1.3] all that's left 
is a sort of [0.7] our morally equal abstract selves [0.4] that are [0.4] 
supposed to carry out [0.2] a search for [0.2] reasons [0.7] that are prior 
to [0.2] all these different [0.8] arbitrary factors that differentiate people 
[1.4] prior to good and bad luck [1.8] now [0.2] it's those ideas i've just 
sketched a sort of cluster of Kantian ideas at the heart of Rawls' theory [0.3] 
it's those ideas [0.2] that Nozick [0.4] launches his most telling attack [0.3] 
at [1.2] er and there are at least three different strands of this attack that 
we can differentiate [0.4] first [0.5] er [0.2] he says the moral arbitrariness 
line of thought is dangerous it proves too much [0.8] er [1.0] it's supposed to 
stop us from [0.4] er giving moral significance [0.4] to [0.5] er [0.2] the 
results of certain you know free market transactions and so on [0.5] but it can 
only do that [0.6] by doing a lot more than that by attributing in effect 
everything noteworthy about a person [0.3] to morally arbitrary factors [0.6] 
'cause after all [0.2] if we go back far enough to before someone's birth [0.4] 
he's not responsible for any of the factors that lead to his own birth [0.4] or 
to his genetic make-up [0.3] the environment in which he grows up [0.5] and so 
on [0.6] so we end up [0.3] er [0.3] calling his 
responsibility for anything into question [0.4] this leads to an unexalted view 
of people [0.5] as [0.2] not responsible for anything at all [0.9] and he says 
Nozick says [0.2] well that's a very risky line to take for someone like Rawls 
[0.3] because Rawls wants to defend [0.4] the dignity and self-respect of 
autonomous human beings [0.7] er [0.3] so before we go down the route that this 
moral arbitrariness idea forces on us [0.4] we'd better stop and think whether 
we really want to end up [0.2] where it takes us [0.4] maybe Kant was actually 
wrong [2.5] second [0.2] Nozick says [1.0] look [0.3] er [0.4] the view that 
differences between people need to be justified just begs the question [0.4] it 
simply presupposes [0.3] equality is a default position [0.2] why do 
differences [0.3] particularly need to be justified [0.7] people just are 
different [0.4] that doesn't need justification [1.2] now here he actually 
flings back at Rawls [0.2] something very close to the criticism Rawls that 
makes of utilitarianism [0.8] remember [0.2] Rawls criticizes utilitarianism [0.
3] for conflating the different desires of 
different people [1.4] and treating them [0.5] as if they were all [0.3] the 
desires of one big person [0.9] he [0.3] trades the pleasures and pains of 
different people off against one another [0.9] er [0.4] Rawls says that doing 
this [0.3] fails to take seriously [0.6] the separateness of persons [1.3] well 
Nozick [0.3] says [0.5] er by assuming the differences between people need to 
be justified [0.3] Rawls is failing to take seriously the distinctions the 
differences between people [0.6] at an even deeper level [1.2] er [0.5] he says 
[0.5] all these morally arbitrary supposedly morally arbitrary features of 
people [0.3] that we're supposed to sort of [0.4] abstract from [0.4] if we [0.
7] press too hard on this distinction between people and these morally 
arbitrary factors [0.5] we're not left with any coherent conception of a person 
[0.3] there's nothing left [1.1] er [0.4] people just are these bundles of 
morally arbitrary factors [0.4] [sniff] so we deprive people of their very 
identity if we [0.3] push this line [1.3] er [1.4] [1.0] and that's quite 
similar actually to the objection that Rawls himself makes against the sort of 
[0.3] bare person idea [0.4] remember we [0.3] discussed that last time [0.9] 
er [3.2] all right [0.3] er [0.8] so [1.7] the idea then is [0.3] we [0.3] 
should be just as [0.7] unhappy about this Kantian version [0.4] of the 
noumenal self [0.9] bare person [0.3] as we were about the utilitarian version 
of the remember the bare person who had an equal chance of being anyone [0.6] 
then one's no better than the other [0.6] and [0.5] er people [0.2] aren't bare 
selves of that kind and justice doesn't need them [0.4] that's the sort of [0.
3] line [1.7] okay so that's the [0.4] the second point the third [0.3] er 
strand of this sort of attack on the Kantian [0.7] heart of Rawls' theory [0.6] 
is that actually [0.6] er [0.4] there's a kind of inconsistency here because [0.
5] Rawls' theory does allow [0.2] morally arbitrary differences to have an 
influence [0.3] on people's just shares [0.4] remember after all the maximin 
principle [0.5] allows incentive in equalities [0.4] it says [0.2] [sniff] if 
by allowing for inequalities you can 
give the more productive people [0.2] incentives [0.3] that [0.7] make them 
produce more [0.5] in a way that [0.2] makes everybody better off including the 
worst off [0.5] that's okay [0.7] but people actually don't deserve to be more 
productive [0.7] so why should they [0.4] benefit from those morally arbitrary 
factors [1.2] er [1.8] well [0.3] in fact [0.3] Jerry Cohen [0.2] coming in 
from the left [0.7] er the opposite direction from Nozick [0.7] presses that 
very question [0.4] against Rawls [0.2] he says [0.4] he doesn't he rejects 
Rawls' reasoning for this sort of maximin idea [0.5] er well h-, he rejects 
aspects of of [0.3] the reasoning [0.6] because he says [0.3] just that [0.7] 
the more productive aren't responsible for being more productive and they jolly 
well could do the extra work without getting [0.3] the extra product [0.4] so 
why should they get the extra product [0.9] okay so Rawls seems to be sort of 
[0.5] cut [0.2] er [0.3] in he seems to be caught in between [0.5] the right 
wing attack from Nozick and the left wing attack from [0.4] Cohen [0.6] he's [0.
5] he's trying to allow a little bit of incentive and 
equality [0.4] but [0.9] allowing a little bit sort of is to have neith-, 
neither one thing nor the other [0.6] er [1.6] all right i think some of these 
points here really do hit their target [0.3] the underlying point [0.8] is 
expressed by Nozick when he says [0.2] that the foundations underlying desert 
[0.3] don't themselves need to be [0.3] deserved all the way down [0.5] people 
may be entitled to what flows from their natural assets [0.4] even if their 
natural assets are morally arbitrary [1.2] well let's just [0.2] focus [0.3] er 
[0.3] on what's at issue here [0.4] [1.4] it may seem that rights of self-
ownership [0.4] are at issue [0.9] er [0.7] i don't actually think however [0.
3] that whether people have these strong rights [0.3] is the critical point [0.
7] er i don't think we have to believe in rights of self-ownership [0.3] in 
order [0.4] to [0.7] think that there's something to what Nozick is saying [0.
5] i think the real issue is [0.5] about a certain principle which i'm going to 
call the responsibility for causes principle [0.6] and this principle says [0.
2] this [0.2] it 
says that to be responsible s-, for something [0.4] you have to be responsible 
for its causes [1.6] to be responsible for something you have to be responsible 
for its causes [0.9] Rawls seems to assume that [0.4] he says [0.3] different 
earning levels are caused by different natural endowments [0.3] you don't [0.2] 
deserve your natural endowments [0.2] so you don't deserve [0.7] your earnings 
level [0.9] Nozick seems to reject that [0.3] principle [0.7] er [2.1] well [0.
4] should we actually accept this principle [0.5] notice [0.6] how if you 
accept the principle that you have to be responsible for causes [0.3] you can 
apply it again and again [0.4] not just do i have to be responsible for the 
causes [0.2] of any choice i make [0.3] but for the causes of those causes and 
the causes of those causes and so on [0.7] all the way back [1.3] er [0.3] but 
[0.6] pretty soon we're going to get back to a point [0.2] before i was even [0.
4] alive [1.4] i couldn't possibly be responsible for those causes all the way 
back [0.8] the result is [0.3] if you accept this principle it looks as if 
nobody's ever responsible for anything [1.5] er [1.3] 
responsibility seems to be impossible if we accept this principle [1.4] well [1.
5] we have to think very hard then about whether we actually do ac-, accept it 
[0.6] we don't usually think that nobody's responsible for anything [1.1] er [0.
2] so our normal [0.2] er practices of attributing responsibility people are 
inconsistent with this principle [1.3] er so we could deny that this principle 
was true [0.2] there's no incoherence in denying it [0.6] er we need to think 
very hard about [0.5] whether to accept it [0.5] one thing i want to say [0.3] 
er though is that [0.2] we shouldn't think that a reason to accept this 
principle [0.3] is that if we do it will support egalitarianism [0.9] that 
would not only be wishful thinking but it would be an illusion because [0.3] if 
no one's responsible for anything if no one ever deserves anything [0.3] it 
does not follow [0.3] that everyone does deserve [0.2] the same thing [0.8] 
that's just a fallacy [1.4] er [1.3] so making responsibility impossible does 
not provide any independent grounds [0.2] for being an egalitarian [2.1] all 
right [0.2] er [1.2] there we go then for today er [0.9] next time [0.2] 
communitarianism