nf1339: so there are two sets of handouts today so if you can in both and take 
one of each okay so about three lectures back we were talking about changing a 
na-, the changing nature and notions of conflict and security especially since 
the end of the Cold War er how they expanded from focusing solely on state and 
interstate er security issues of a predominantly military nature er to look 
much more at problems in the mo-, mili-, non-military areas and of a global 
nature as well er the international community has certainly come to recognize 
issues like gross human rights violations the treatment of ethnic minorities er 
mass violence and famine er within countries even environmental issues within 
countries as being potentially er related to international peace er and 
stability er well new types of security threats of course demand new or at 
least reformed instruments and institutions er conventional er very much state 
centred er inst-, instruments and institutions that we 
still have today based on the sanctity of state sovereignty er are not going to 
be effective most people believe or at least not sufficient they need to be 
changed er and the need for new approaches certainly include negotiation and 
conflict resolution er this is a basic point that that so many people are 
making now over and over again while working er in these fields er Jessica 
Matthews is one of them a er prominent analyst of international security and 
negotiation who argues in a recent article that by conventional approaches that 
we still are so much using today er are too competitive and static new 
approaches will have to become more flexible more crop-, cooperative and 
recognize negotiation as a continuous process of managing shared problems and 
threats er well there are large number of factors that new approaches to 
negotiation will have to address in reality and i'm going to speak only about 
three er today er the importance of the need for prenegotiation that's what 
it's 
called for second track diplomacy and then er problem solving i will look at 
what these er activities mean and what's new about them er how they differ from 
conventional approaches and i'll also give some examples of how they're being 
er used er to this day er to successfully okay so let me s-, b-, start with 
second track diplomacy er what it is why it's important and why it's so much 
spoken about er these days er you will know all what first track diplomacy is 
er this is something that traditional approaches have focused on er it's 
something that we er are well quite well er informed about because the vast 
majority of diplomatic activities and er negotiation encounters that we learn 
about er through the media are the first track nature er at least when they are 
still ongoing er first track diplomacy involves diplomatic encounters 
negotiations between official representatives of the parties to conflict er er 
formal heads of states international recognized leaders of of national 
movements and so on these are official recognized representatives of the 
parties er er to a conflict or to an international issue they are conducted in 
official recognized fora permanent fora er such as various fora of the United 
Nations very very common er the European Union er the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe these are all very frequently used international fora 
for er diplomatic er er meetings and so on they often use well established 
predetermined rules and procedures especially in large-scale multilateral 
negotiations that are so complex as a way of simplifying them er when it comes 
to voting er decision making er the use of a single negotiating text these are 
all mechanisms that that er are decided on on in advance and that are used in 
these diplomatic encounters er they are typically public or at least partly 
public er the media is a-, almost always there and lets us know what's going on 
er at least secrecy's not an important feature 
of first track diplomacy er and this kind of third party intervention will 
involve mediation that we spoke about i think it was er two three lectures ag-, 
two lectures ago er the kind that Kissinger practised and not the kind of 
informal facilitation that i'm going to spoke speak about later on in context 
with second track diplomacy and finally of course the the overall purpose of 
first track diplomacy is to come to an official formal agreement that heads of 
state sign on to that is it i-, i-, really what everyone is aiming at in the 
end now second track diplomacy is something very very different er it is much 
more diffuse and it's much more difficult to observe er not at least because 
it's er characteristically conducted u-, in unofficial in er secret settings 
away from the media and the public eye er so we don't of-, often don't us-, er 
learn about what is going on or what has been achieved until after in fact and 
sometimes we don't really learn about it at all because it's just 
sort of channelled in to first track diplomacy and it it's very hard to 
distinguish exactly what what went on er secrecy is a is a very very important 
feature er and indeed to the success of second track diplomacy er second track 
diplomacy is non-committal and explorat-, exploratory it is not meant at 
directly er meant to directly negotiate or signing a formal agreement but er 
rather we're providing the parties with a sort of favourable er setting in 
which they can explore in a very non low risk way how the other side views the 
situation what the sense of overlapping interests are what some possible 
agreements might be what might be possible er and any kind of third er party 
intervention that occurs in this setting er is so-called facilitation rather 
than mediation it's er it's about facilitating dialogue between the parties er 
it's not about making the parties make er make particular concessions or 
produce a formal agreement of a special kind that was the kind of er 
third party er activity that Kissinger engaged in it's much kind of it's er lea-
, less interventionist softer er less forceful way of bringing the parties 
together than you wi-, you find in first track diplomacy er second track 
diplomacy and this is also very important involves non-official unofficial 
representatives of the parties like prominent community leaders are very often 
involved academics er high level informal inva-, advisers to government and 
political leaders who themselves do not hold an important political office the 
idea here is to involve individuals who are er sufficiently close to the 
official leaders that they can have an actual input into the official policy 
making but at the same time who are not themselves holding a political office 
so they are constrained by holding such an office er er er not to constrain er 
to to to engage in this kind of unofficial dialogue er they should be free to 
engage in ex-, in exploration experimentation with new possibilities and new 
options b-, feel free to to speak er as they wish er and er not er be carrying 
the so-, constraints and and burden of er ho-, holding an official office that 
often means that leaders are not able to to er speak as freely or er explore 
options as freely as they otherwise would have been able to do so so why is 
second track diplomacy so much er spoken about today why di-, why is it of 
special interest to us today well it's it's widely recognized as being 
particularly important in dealing with ethnic sectarian er conflicts that 
become so prominent and so er er er er yeah and it's such a prominent feature 
really of of er so post-Cold War er scene er increasingly conflicts are as you 
know are within states and there often have they're not only ethnic sectarian 
conflicts but they have a often a very strong ethnic sectarian component aspect 
of them and these are conflicts marked by very long histories of antagonism and 
hostility with very very low levels of trust between the parties with 
very er exclusive series of notions of of conflict and about wh-, what what is 
possible er in most cases the parties don't even recognize each others' right 
to exist to be where they are even less their their claims er so second track 
er second track dialogues you will se-, er from the features of second track 
diplomacy that i just laid out you will see that that will er be much more 
promising in dealing with these sorts of er conflicts than first track 
diplomacy er is much better suited to deal with these sort of sort of 
psychological obstacles er that you deal with in in ethnic sectarian conflicts 
er of er of er er of mistrust er of er of a lack in faith in a possibility of 
coming to negotiate an agreement and so on it provides a much more low risk non-
threatening er environment to break down down these sorts of psychological er 
obstacles to peace now of course first track diplomacy is not something we can 
do away with it's it's extre-, still extremely important er er in if you take 
the 
transition to democratic government in South Africa for example various tr-, 
second track diplomatic er initiatives were very important and very supportive 
but in the end it was first track diplomacy that did the job in the end er 
there must be of course heads of states that come up with a formal agreement er 
that translate the second track diplomatic initiatives into offical policy and 
into a formal agreement so second er first track diplomacy's still necessary 
but increasingly people are arguing that we need to complement this with second 
track diplomacy that that will buy us a much more promising er setting for 
overcoming the sorts of er conflicts that we see so much of now in the after 
the end of the Cold War er probably the most illuminating e-, er er e-, recent 
example of the role and success of second track diplomacy that people point to 
and not just people working on the Middle East er is the secret meetings that 
took place in Norway in the early nineties between Israel 
and the P-L-O er sponsored by by er actually by n-, Norwegian er government 
officials but also by er Norwegian private individuals under the leadership of 
the then foreign minister er Jürgen Holst er often out in his hidden codda-, 
cottage out in the er Norwegian forests outside Oslo er er they basically 
brought er representatives of the parties together to engage in dialogue to ex-,
explore a number of options that they hadn't really dared to entertain 
previously and eventually this led er as you well know to the formal Israel P-L-
O peace treaty the so-called Oslo Accords and the famous handshake between 
Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and P-L-O leader Yasser Arafat on the lawn 
outside the er er White House in September nineteen-ninety-three er it's an 
astonishing achievement that no one had expected and it really has to be 
explained largely in terms of er the use of a second a second track er 
diplomatic track in this case 
er it's a fascinating story that one now can er read about quite er 
comprehensibly several of the individuals that took part in this initiative in 
in Norway have now written their memoirs or or have written about this 
experience and why it was s-, so successful er and it's it's very very 
interesting to read about it er of course er this is er er i think er a lot of 
the success of this case is to be explained by the fact that at the l-, at the 
late stage of of this these diplo-, er this er er these meetings in Oslo er the 
official leaders got involved Yitzhak Rabin the Prime Minister of Israel and 
Yasser Arafat the P-L-O leader er actually went to Norway at the late stage 
when it was obvious that these meetings were going to be successful in leading 
to an agreement so there was a mixing if you like a connection between the 
first and the second track er er done in a very successful way er often second 
track dip-, dip-, diplomatic efforts can be successful on their own terms but 
they don't succeed in making the jump into s-, er first-track diplomacy they 
don't er succeed in making the transition to get the official leaders involved 
and that's very very important er er the Oslo experience was also very much 
driven by the failure of the first er first track the Madrid path er the 
multilateral Middle East multilateral negotiations ini-, initiated in Madrid 
had failed and so there was an urgent need for some kind of alternative er 
initiative er and that also explains er the er success of it er some analysts 
had also begin to speak about the importance of third track diplomacy i don't 
know if you have heard of this term er that is the involvement of grass roots 
movements and organizations that may have no direct links at all to official 
policy makers but are significant ultimately for 
representing and ultimately changing individual attitudes and behaviour among 
common people er in representing civil society the common man in the street if 
you like er er i think it adds er even s-, when you look at second track 
diplomacy it involves very much elites these are not your sort of common folks 
er they're involved but it's it's community leaders as i said it's prominent 
academics it's unofficial ad-, advisers to government leaders so we're still 
talking very much about elites that not necessarily have very close connections 
er to to the people at large er ultimately of course few agreements whether 
they're coming out of second track diplomacy or first track diplomacy are going 
to be successful unless the man in the street the woman in the street er accept 
them er and often those kinds of er er or shall i say popular er views popular 
er perceptions of what is necessary what is acceptable er doesn't change alone 
they don't change alone with second and and first track 
diplomacy and hence this the the all the talk now about the importance of third 
track diplomacy but evel-, involving representatives also of civil society of 
lar-, at large of of the er the common man in the street er and about the 
importance of change in their their views er there have been a number of 
examples provided for the importance of this you will know of the the er the 
growing er er power and activity of Islamic fundamentalist groups for example 
in the Middle East that have planted er that have engaged in a number of 
terrorist incidents that derailed the Middle East peace process they are 
getting more and more support er among the Palestinian population at large 
because of the frustration with lack of progress in the peace process er and i-,
it has pointed to the need you know to convert er people on the ground their 
views as well er and the need to complement first and tr-, second track 
diplomacy with a third track diplomacy now er second track diplomacy can either 
er 
take place once formal negotiations have really gotten underway to break any 
stalemates that that occur er get away from again from the official negotiating 
table in a confidential private setting or it can take place before official 
negotiations have even be-, begun to explore the possibilities of of er 
engaging in dialogue and in this case it it comes very close to the second kind 
of approach i'm going to speak about er the functions of prenegotiation er 
which is another er activity that people now er are speaking so much of er as 
being important to to break stalemates in so many ongoing er conflicts er now 
er as as you noted earlier on and we spoke about negotiation in traditional er 
models and practices er the significant negotiations the significant talks 
really don't really begin until the parties sit down at the official 
negotiating table and they they basically end when they leave it er 
prenegotiation in some form of course has been practised as long as negotiation 
itself 
has been practised what is new now is the recognition of its importance er that 
official negotiations that we usually er er observe and and are informed about 
are really just part of a much larger er process of decision making that begin 
with an exploratory prenegotiation phase and end much much later with 
negotiations of ratification and implementation er the relatively brief span of 
er s-, seeing diplomats sitting ra-, sitting down at the official negotiating 
table it's a it's a very short one and relatively important unimportant 
compared to this larger decision making process that involves many other 
activities as well er in many negotiations today really prenegotiations and 
post-agreemenet negotiations have become er er much more important er and it 
has partly to do with the growing complexity of multilateral negotiations such 
n-, so mu-, so much more now needs to be achieved needs to be done before 
official talks get underway er if you look at for example at the well known 
er Rio Earth Summit in er back in Rio in in June nineteen-ninety-two the the 
prenegotiations lasted for several years i think it was about ten years or so 
and both with the encounters in between them very extensive consultations the 
post-agreement er the post er negotiation phase is still ongoing er very very 
important in the area of climate change biodiversity and so on but the 
negotiations themselves at Rio lasted only two weeks er er very short er and er 
to a large extent what went on there had been be-, determined pr-, er 
previously in the prenegotiation phase so increasingly some extent these the 
formal negotiations are becoming more of a show if you like er and just er a 
way of confirming what already has been decided earlier on er in 
prenegotiations er a groundbreaking er piece of work that came b-, er out in 
the nine-, er end of the nineteen-eighties er er it talks exactly about the 
importance of prenegotiation er the book Getting to the Table the Processes of 
International Prenegotiation by Janice Gross Stein er it puts forward a notion 
of prenegotiation whi-, which says prenegotiation begins when one or more 
parties consider negotiation as a policy option and communic-, communicates 
this intention to the other parties it ends when all the parties agree to 
formal negotiations or when one party abandons the consideration of negotiation 
as an option so this is very much a temporal definition of what prenegotiation 
is and it's useful but it doesn't really tells us about what the functions of 
prenegotiations are or should be so let me just say a few words er about that 
er prenegotiation is really different it's distinct from formal negotiations in 
that the that supposed to do two things that er are not as well done in formal 
negotiations one is to explore whether actually undertaking er a formal er 
dialogue is is would i-, would it be desirable er at all from a number of 
viewpoints from the viewpoint of one's own interests er and whether these are 
likely to be possible to reconcile wi-, er to be compatible with those of the 
other sides er from the likelihood of negotiation actually being likely to 
succeed in producing an agreement er and the kind of risks involved it's really 
a a kind of assessment of of the extent to which er formal negotiations are 
likely to succeed er and the barriers er to overcome here er are usually of two 
kinds psychological and strategic i'm going to get to that in a moment but then 
in secondly if the the conclusion is that negotiations are worth undertaking 
then the second task of prenegotiation is is is er is to prepare for formal 
negotiations er to to set the agenda we spoke earlier on about the wh-, what 
the what the er how important this is er how decisive agenda setting can be for 
what happens later on looki-, looking just at the Middle East er about 
arranging this so logis-, lis-, er i i'm taking the 
logistical arrangements er for the negotiations er the importance of the 
neutrality of the sites can be very important er having negotiations in a 
partisan site can er be greatly at a disadvantage of of the party in whose home 
country the negotiations are not and so on so basically two tasks of 
prenegotiation here now there are two usually two barriers to overcome in in 
terms of making the parties believe that negotiation are worth undertaking er 
psychological and strategic er now psychological barriers are are essentially 
fears and mistrust the sorts of barriers that we see so much of in er ethnic 
sectarian er conflicts er par-, particularly in ethnic conflicts pa-, the 
parties don't even recognize each others' basic needs er for identities for 
survival er er they even their basic right to exist er so each party basically 
fears that what it has what it has or what it controls may be lost in the 
negotiation process that er the other side might exploit any concessions 
that will make as a springboard for eliminating its very existence er this was 
for a very very long time this psy-, psychology of the difficulty of getting er 
negotiations underway er between Israelis and Palestinians in Northern Ireland 
in many other ethnic sectarian er conflicts 
now strategic barriers are a quite a different er nature these are sort of 
shrewd calculations er self-interest er ca-, calculations that a party wouldn't 
er doesn't ha-, really have a need for or doesn't have much to gain from 
undertaking negotiations either compared to the current situation er if that is 
viable or some other unilateral option available to it for example the use of 
force the use of coercion er what have you er they are particularly important 
er when the disputed resources are very highly valued when they are viewed as 
being almost impossible to compromise upon as with the situation of of 
Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict where it can't at the moment or 
when the 
relations between parties are there are equal so you have one supposedly more 
powerful party that it feels that it can impose its solution er impose other 
alternatives on the on the er weaker party and doesn't really need to negotiate 
to compromise with the other side in order to get a some kind of er solution 
both these kinds of barriers psychological and strategic er are very very er i-,
is a very prominent feature of the sorts of internal violent conflicts that 
we're seeing now increasingly er within countries er the strong ethnic 
sectarian er nature and they explain very much the intractability of these 
conflicts why it's so difficult er to get negotiations underway at the same 
time of course only negotiation er is going to provide a peaceful solution er 
so still er er often the parties or outside parties try to get negotiations 
underway although it is so difficult okay er now prene-, prenegotiation is not 
explicitly about trying to find or to agree on one particular 
solution it's not about a negotiating agreement that can only take place in 
formal official negotiations but it is about er exploring about identifying 
about inventing er er possible alternatives for a solution and and finding out 
how the various parties er er would feel about them how they would er come down 
on them if they could think that they could live with them so it's about er 
exploring possible solutions it's about building confidence er in the 
possibility of reaching an agreement er and in the er the er er work of 
undertaking negotiations now if the negotiation doesn't succeed if in a way th-,
er it doesn't take place negotiations formal negotiations will hardly ever 
succeed but if prenegotiation does take place and does succeed it will have a 
usually a very important impact on what happens subsequently in formal 
negotiations er ultimately the success of course of prenegotiation is measured 
not only about er by getting the parties to the table but also 
to getting them eventually to an agreement that actually will be er implemented 
er and honoured er now the second track diplomacy and prenegotiation i've 
spoken about very briefly they're very closely related to the third approach 
i'd like to speak about briefly problem solving or the integrated er approach 
er i don't think we need to remember too much about the distributive approach 
er that i illustrated in the context of the U-S and the Soviet Union during the 
Cold War and the Kissinger mediation in the Middle East er with s-, very sort 
of competitive serious er features that is not going to be very er helpful in 
in building er trust and confidence between the parties er in creating er a 
belief in the worth of undertaking negotiation in the sorts of er conflicts 
that we have so much of now since the end of the Cold War er virtually all 
analysis now of new needed ap-, practices of conflict resolution and 
negotiation conclude that er new practices new more effective practices need 
to include a much stronger problem solving or what what's called also an 
integrative component than has been er the case so far er er then they need to 
become much less competitive much less adversarial er need to engage the 
parties in a a sort of common problem solving er process where they look at 
shared problems much er more together rather than separately er er and er er 
yes er cooperation negotiations are really needed er to tackle so many 
contemporary issues at the moment and er er the parties er er are viewed as as 
having to e-, engage much more extensively in cooperative integrated problem 
solving approaches rather than in competitive er ones er an academic by the 
name of Terje Larsen from Norway was the single most important er facilitator 
in this Oslo er e-, experience that i'd mentioned just a while ago er he er a-, 
in the context of of that conflict and the breakthrough between the Israel and 
the P-L-O er when he was interviewed on a B-B-C program er a 
couple of years ago he pointed out that Netanyahu the then the Israeli prime 
minister and Arafat are travelling on a tandem bicycle they have to be partners 
this process is not a win-lose situation it cannot be a win-lose situation 
where there can be one winner and one loser either there ha-, there has to be 
two winners or two losers if m-, mest-, Minister Netanyahu goes down he will 
drag Mr Arafat with him and if Arafat goes down he will drag Netanyahu with him 
so it's a perception of conflict er a-, as with i-, parties are being in the 
same boat that they're interdependent and they need to use more cooperative 
more problem solving more creative approaches er to arrive at a satisfactory er 
stable solution of their conflict er than the distributive conventional 
approaches have suggested now the origin of the formulation of the integrative 
approach is is one very widely practised to this day although not sufficiently 
many would argue but 
the origin er of the formulation of this approach should really be attributed 
to the pioneering work of er somebody by the name of Mary Parker Follett who 
published already back in in the beginning of last century in nineteen-eighteen 
a book er well actually three books er entitled The New State Creative 
Experience and Dynamic Administration er er they were not really recognized for 
their significance until much much later in the nineteen-sixties er especially 
the works of Walton and McKersie to academics working at Harvard er who 
produced a book entitled A Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations which was 
a really a much more systematic er er scientific development of the integrative 
approach er and it hasn't really been until very much more recently in nineteen-
seventies or so that people working in this field much more widely have taken 
this approach er seriously and it's very very recent that people actually 
started consciously to practise it though 
it is still not er er practised er sufficiently many people would argue now 
Follett herself er back in in er er beginning of the last century wrote based 
of on her own experiences in a very different context er in business 
administration and business organization and she noticed that often ki-, 
conflicts in this setting were resolved in ways that were either destructive er 
or people lost out or they didn't leave there quite as well off as satisfied as 
er er as would have been possible if they had done it in a different way er 
many opportunities for for greater joint gains for greater joint benefits were 
missed er she pointed out there were basically w-, three ways that you can 
resolve a conflict whether it's at the interpersonal level or with the your 
employer internationally er domination compromise and integration er 
integration is another word for s-, for problem solving now domination we know 
what that is that's basically the successful use of coercion or force one side 
basically wins everything or most of it and the other loses out one side er 
imposes its solution on the other side er compromise we also know what that is 
it means basically that each party has to give up something has to make 
substantial concessions and compromise er on s-, in interest to reach an 
agreement it's the s-, sort of outcome that that normally results from 
traditional dis-, dis-, distributive er approaches competitive approaches to 
conflict resolution that we saw reflected in the NISP er er last week during 
the Cold War er er you will have some kind of solution but it's a compromise 
solution meaning that each party will have to give up quite a bit in order to 
to reach it integration however which of course is the way er is the the method 
that Follett er er endorses er it's the third way of resolving conflict er that 
means that basically it's put very simply that a solution is found that meets 
all the essential interests of the various parties involved each party 
gets what it's required w-, what is requires without having to give up anything 
very significant and without having to deprive the other party of what it's 
needs er this of course sounds very good er and i'm going to give some examples 
of how it er could operate er er Follett herself er favoured using very simple 
examples that need the personal context to illustrate er larger more important 
points and in fact her very simple examples are become w-, some of the most 
widely used even in the international conflicts literature that of course deals 
with situations that are endlessly and more complex er one of the most er er 
widely quoted examples that she uses is is the er situation that she found 
herself s-, wa-, once in when she was studying at Harvard University she was 
working in the main er reading room and another woman came in and er er wanted 
to er open the window where she was sitting er while er she wanted to really 
have it closed and 
as the two kept insisting on their respective positions either open the window 
or keep it er keep it closed of course they they wouldn't really encounter any 
good solution er they they could perhaps compromise and and leave the er window 
open some of the time or close it some of the time but neither would really be 
very happy but Follett er experiences in conflict resolution came up with a 
much better er er alternative here she started asking the woman why she really 
wanted to have the er er window open and found out that it was really for 
ventilation er and it wasn't so much having it open per se while she herself 
wanted to avoid a draught so they opened the window in the next room very 
ingeniously and that way both of them are are very happy with this solution and 
so she uses this to exemplify that as long as you keep insisting on your 
positions without exploring the underlying reasons you're not really ca-, going 
to come up with any good solution it's only if you start exploring the 
underlying motivations for what what why you're seeking what you're seeking 
that you're going to be able to come up with a positive some integrative er 
solution so this is a way of sort of bypassing the position sending away the 
position and looking at underlying er er reasons er er for coming up with a 
better er solution Follett's basic message here with this very simple example 
is that we tend to look at conflict se-, situations in too serious er terms we 
tend to look at them in too exclusive too negative ways and that often er we 
are not exploring underlying motivations underb-, lying concerns enough and 
that if we did we would often come up with much much better solutions that 
really address the root causes of the conflicts er she says that there are 
hardly ever any conflict that you cannot cannot be solved it depends basically 
on the parties' er willingness to engage in problem solving to en-, to 
engage with this approach er you can ha-, get a glimpse of how this approach 
could apply to much more complex international conflict in the handout where 
i've made a sort of a table of the the conflict over Jerusalem between the 
Israelis and the Palestinians er er er counted really the most intr-, er most 
intractable issue in the whole er Middle East peace process that er has already 
caused its collapse at least for the time being maybe it er will permanently co-
, collapse of this issue nonetheless it's it's the er certainly one of the most 
intractable international conflicts that we have around and er er it's going to 
remain very very difficult to to resolve and i've er made this table just to 
illustrate how the integrative approach that Follett advocates er could apply 
to this conflict now you have there er a list of the positions the interests 
and needs in in that conflict over Jerusalem between Israel and the 
Palestinians er you'll see that as you move up towards the 
positions the demands the stakes in the conflict become much more er political 
and rigid much more less flexible in terms of how they can be met this is the 
level at which the distributive conventional approaches operate it takes 
basically the positions of the parties have to give them and try to bargain and 
negotiate on basis of those er positions er it doesn't er they don't really 
question the legitimacy or or you know the positions whether they are really 
necessary or w-, how they can be changed the positions are the starting points 
er for bargaining and negotiation often of course positions are not going to 
distinguish between what are fundamental concerns and and what is just ba-, 
wishful thinking it's just like a package if you like that doesn't distinguish 
er basic er er needs from er from just aspirations so Israel Israel is saying 
as you well know er all of Jerusalem must be the exter-, ex-, er the eternal 
indivisible capital of Israel there can be no er role for a 
po-, a a a political role for the Palestinians in the city er whereas 
Palestinians are saying there are Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine now er 
obviously there's not going to be much room for agreement here it's going to be 
very very difficult if you use this kind of traditional approach based on 
positions to come to an agreement if you did have an agreement it would be 
involve a great deal of compromising on the part of both sides and neither side 
would be very very would be very happy very pleased er with the agreement er 
that's as you move down in that chart towards er er interests and needs you 
will see that the concerns of the conflict become much more psychological and 
abstract and much more flexible in terms of how they can be filled and this is 
the level at which the integrative approach operates er especially in the 
context of prenegotiation of second track diplomacy er at this level one 
doesn't take the decisions er for granted er s-, at face value 
but look beneath them a-, at the underlying motivating er concerns er as the 
two women in the Harvard library did er and in fact if you look at most of the 
Israeli interests in that chart you will see that er to for example to keep 
Jerusalem physically undivided to secure effective control over the Jewish 
areas of the city to gain recognition of Jerusalem er as the Israel's capital 
from the international community and so on and so on we'll see that they are 
not necessarily incompatible at all with most of the Palestinian ones er in 
fact many of the Israeli concerns interests are not going to be possible f-, to 
fulfil without fulfilling the Palestinian ones and most of them are not 
mutually exclusive but it's only by looking underneath the positions that we 
see this and that we can start to think of integrated mutually er er er er 
acceptable solutions er er in a new way so er er this is just really to give 
you a snapshot of er how it could be used er to to deal 
with an international er conflict so to summarize the integrative approach 
really use negotiation essentially as a joint problem solving exercise that in 
where efforts are made to create new options that can reconcile and combine the 
er the parties most essential interests in a way that avoids the need for 
painful compromises er as opposed to the distributive approach er that is a 
much more of a competitive er self-centred process where the parties work much 
more on their own er they're perceived from fixed positions and demands and try 
to strike a compromise er er basis er of them er of course there are different 
sorts of tactics negotiation tactics and indeed negotiation skills are 
associated with each approach er the distributive approach would use very much 
things like er a sort of competitive manipulative er tactics like the use of 
threats the use of deadlines er the use of coercion er as the use of warnings 
er the sorts of er tactics that er er that Kissinger used 
so much in the the Middle East that we saw whereas the integrative approach 
would use very different sorts of things er er er they would use er er i'm 
going to come to that in a moment er but basically it it er it's a piece of er 
er er techniques methods that will be based on the parties sharing a great deal 
of information in between themselves er about their general interests and needs 
priorities again this will only er be possible to take place in a non-, er non-
public confidential setting er not in formal official negotiations and that's 
why secrecy er and a lack of publicity are so important er er with the use of 
the integrative approach er there's a huge literature now and so much 
discussion about er problem solving integrative techniques that could be used 
in a number of different different settings er one for example is it's called 
resource expansion er it's really basically about how you can i-, increase the 
the amount er the usage of the resources that are 
disputed er to to provide more mutually satisfactory agreements when it comes 
to negotiations over Jerusalem now for example there's a lot of talk about how 
the municipal boundaries of the city could be er enlarged so that Israel and 
Israel and the Palestinians would each exercise sovereignty or some kind of 
control over as much territory as that they would have had have done alone 
within the old er narrow boundaries of Jerusalem so it's it's quite er er quite 
er er innovative way of sort of er making Jerusalem bigger and then dividing it 
up if you like er there are problems with it as well but i won't go into those 
details basically it's a way of facilitating conflict resolution by er making 
what is disputed er er bigger er then there are exchange or trading strategies 
er like linkage of issues er that means that er you bring in er new issues that 
a-, a-, before were not linked to the conflict and have each party concede on 
issues that it values a little or less in exchange for the 
other party doing the same so that each party ends up with what it values the 
more the exchange of concessions a little differently valued items er of course 
it assumes that there are issues that are differently valued and sometimes as 
with Jerusalem both want it equally much it cannot be traded off against 
anything else and that's a problem but often there are issues that are 
differently valued and that would help er conflict resolution in a integrative 
er way er er more some of the more recent plans for Jerusalem link for example 
the promise of a Palestinian state in the West Bank in Gaza to Palestinian 
acceptance of exclusive Israeli sovereignty over all of Jerusalem er but again 
er the assumption here is wrong that Jerusalem is differently valued the 
Palestinians have-, haven't accepted this sort of er er compromise if you like 
er and er it hasn't worked because er the city is equally valued by both 
er but nonetheless er a recent experience and i could give ma-, give many more 
examples if there was more time er seems to suggest er that er er international 
negotiation conflict resolution will result in more effective agreement are 
more likely to result in agreement in solutions if integrative problem solving 
methods are used and if also second er second track diplomatic path and 
prenegotiation er are used er it's probably linked to the fact that obviously 
in international community today we don't have supernational authority that can 
formulate and enf-, and enforce solutions so solutions if an agreement is the 
parties are going to implement and live by them and honour them in the long 
term need to be beneficial they need to see a benefit to be had 
from implementing er agreements and er by the use of the integrative er the 
integrative approach is very much focused on this on on producing er mutual 
benefits on making it gainful for the parties to implement the solutions and 
that's er why it's more er likely to succeed so er that is about these three 
approaches er to complement er what i started out talking about earlier on 
about negotiation and confli-, conflict resolution in the conventional mo-, ne-,
mode and er that's basically it for these series of lectures thank you