nf1339: so there are two sets of handouts today so if you can [0.3] in both [1.
3] and take one of each [5.6] okay so about three lectures back we were talking 
about changing a na-, the changing nature and notions of conflict and security 
especially since the end of the Cold War [0.6] er how they expanded from 
focusing solely on state and interstate er [0.2] security issues of a 
predominantly military nature [0.5] er to look much more at problems in the mo-,
mili-, non-military areas and of a global nature as well [0.6] er the 
international community has certainly come to recognize issues like gross human 
rights violations [0.4] the treatment of ethnic minorities er mass violence and 
famine er within countries even environmental issues within countries [0.4] as 
being potentially er related to [0.3] international peace er and stability [0.
7] er [0.2] well new types of security threats of course demand new or at least 
reformed instruments and institutions [0.4] er conventional er very much state 
centred [0.2] er inst-, instruments and institutions that we 
still have today [0.5] based on the sanctity of state sovereignty [0.4] er are 
not going to be effective most people believe or at least not sufficient they 
need to be changed [0.6] er and the need for new approaches certainly include 
negotiation and conflict resolution [0.4] er this is a basic point that that so 
many people are making now over and over again while working er in these fields 
[0.4] er Jessica Matthews is one of them [0.2] a er [0.2] prominent analyst of 
international security and negotiation [0.5] who argues in a recent article 
that by conventional approaches that we still are so much using today [0.4] er 
are too competitive and static [0.4] new approaches will have to become more 
flexible more crop-, [0.2] cooperative [0.4] and recognize negotiation as a 
continuous process of managing shared problems and threats [1.0] er [0.2] well 
there are large number of factors that new approaches to negotiation will have 
to address in reality and i'm going to speak only about three er today [0.5] er 
the importance of the need for prenegotiation that's what it's 
called [0.3] for second track diplomacy and then er problem solving [0.6] i 
will look at what these er activities mean and what's new about them er how 
they differ from conventional approaches [0.4] and i'll also give some examples 
of how they're being er used er to this day [0.2] er to successfully [1.3] okay 
so let me s-, b-, start with second track diplomacy er what it is why it's 
important and why it's so much spoken about er these days [0.5] er you will 
know all what first track diplomacy is er this is something that traditional 
approaches have focused on [0.5] er it's something that we er are well [0.2] 
quite well er informed about because the vast majority [0.3] of diplomatic 
activities and er negotiation encounters that we learn about [0.4] er through 
the media are the first track nature [0.5] er at least when they are still 
ongoing [0.4] er first track diplomacy involves diplomatic encounters 
negotiations [0.3] between official representatives of the parties to conflict 
[0.4] er er formal heads of states international recognized leaders of of 
national 
movements and so on [0.3] these are official recognized representatives of the 
parties [0.4] er er to a conflict or to an international issue [0.7] they are 
conducted in official recognized fora permanent fora [0.5] er such as various 
fora of the United Nations very very common er [0.5] the European Union er the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe these are all [0.3] very 
frequently used international fora for er diplomatic er [0.2] er [0.3] meetings 
and so on [0.6] they often use [0.2] well established predetermined rules and 
procedures especially in large-scale multilateral negotiations that are so [0.
3] complex as a way of simplifying them [0.5] er when it comes to voting [0.2] 
er [0.3] decision making [0.4] er the use of a single negotiating text these 
are all [0.2] mechanisms that that er are decided on on in advance and that are 
used in these diplomatic encounters [0.8] er they are typically public or at 
least partly public er the media is a-, almost always there [0.5] and lets us 
know what's going on er at least secrecy's not an important feature [0.2] 
of first track diplomacy [0.9] er and this kind of third party intervention 
will involve mediation that we spoke about i think it was er two three lectures 
ag-, two lectures ago [0.4] er the kind that Kissinger practised and not the 
kind of informal facilitation that i'm going to spoke speak about later on in 
context with second track diplomacy [0.5] and finally of course the [0.3] the 
overall purpose of first track diplomacy is to come to an official formal 
agreement that heads of state sign on to [0.5] that is it i-, i-, really what 
everyone is aiming at in the end [0.9] now second track diplomacy is something 
very very different er it is much more diffuse and it's much more difficult to 
observe [0.4] er not at least because it's er characteristically conducted u-, 
in unofficial in er secret settings away from the media and the public eye [0.
6] er so we don't of-, often don't us-, er learn about [0.7] what is going on 
or what has been achieved [0.3] until after in fact and sometimes we don't 
really learn about it at all because it's just 
sort of channelled in to first track diplomacy [0.4] and it it's very hard to 
distinguish exactly what what went on [0.4] er secrecy is a is a very very 
important feature [0.2] er and indeed to the success of second track diplomacy 
[0.6] er second track diplomacy is non-committal and explorat-, [0.2] 
exploratory [0.5] it is not meant at directly er meant to directly negotiate or 
signing a formal agreement [0.5] but er rather we're providing the parties with 
a sort of favourable er setting in which they can explore [0.3] in a very non 
low risk way [0.3] how the other side views the situation what the sense of 
overlapping interests are [0.3] what some possible agreements might be [0.5] 
what might be possible [0.2] er [0.5] and any kind of third er party 
intervention that occurs in this setting er is so-called facilitation rather 
than mediation [0.4] it's er it's about facilitating dialogue between the 
parties [0.4] er it's not [0.2] about making the parties make er make 
particular concessions or produce a formal agreement of a special kind [0.4] 
that was the kind of er [0.2] 
third party er activity that Kissinger engaged in it's much kind of [0.4] it's 
er [0.2] lea-, less interventionist softer er less forceful [0.3] way of 
bringing the parties together than you wi-, you find in first track diplomacy 
[0.7] er [0.7] second track diplomacy and this is also very important involves 
non-official unofficial representatives of the parties [0.4] like prominent 
community leaders are very often involved academics er high level informal inva-
, advisers to government and political leaders [0.5] who themselves do not hold 
an important political office [0.5] the idea here is to involve individuals who 
are er sufficiently close to the official leaders that they [0.2] can have an 
actual input into the official policy making [0.3] but at the same time who are 
not themselves holding a political office so they are constrained [0.4] by 
holding such an office er [0.4] er er not to constrain er to to to engage in 
this kind of unofficial dialogue [0.5] er they should be free to engage in ex-, 
in exploration experimentation with new possibilities and new 
options [0.4] b-, feel free to to speak er as they wish [0.4] er and er not er 
be carrying the so-, constraints and and burden of er ho-, holding an official 
office that often means that [0.3] leaders are not able to [0.4] to er speak as 
freely or er explore options as freely as they otherwise would have been able 
to do [1.1] so so why is second track diplomacy so much er spoken about today 
why di-, why is it of special interest to us today [0.6] well it's it's widely 
recognized as being particularly important in dealing with ethnic sectarian er 
conflicts that become so prominent and so [0.4] er er er [0.4] er yeah and it's 
such a prominent feature really of of er so post-Cold War er scene [0.2] er [0.
4] increasingly conflicts are as you know are within states and there often 
have [0.4] they're not only ethnic sectarian conflicts but they have a often a 
very strong ethnic sectarian component aspect of them [0.5] and these are 
conflicts marked by very long histories of antagonism and hostility [0.3] with 
very very low levels of trust between the parties [0.4] with 
very er exclusive series of notions of of conflict and about wh-, what what is 
possible [0.5] er in most cases the parties don't even recognize each others' 
right to exist [0.2] to be where they are [0.4] even less their their claims er 
[0.5] so second track er second track dialogues you will se-, er from the 
features of second track diplomacy that i just laid out you will see that that 
will [0.3] er be much more promising in dealing with these sorts of er 
conflicts than first track diplomacy [0.4] er is much better suited to deal 
with these sort of sort of psychological obstacles er that you deal with in in 
ethnic sectarian conflicts [0.4] er of er of er er [0.4] of mistrust er of er 
of a lack in faith in a possibility of coming to negotiate an agreement and so 
on [0.4] it provides a much more low risk non-threatening [0.4] er environment 
to break down down these sorts of psychological er obstacles to peace [1.2] now 
of course first track diplomacy is not something we can do away with it's it's 
extre-, still extremely important [0.5] er er in if you take the 
transition to democratic government in South Africa for example [0.4] various 
tr-, second track diplomatic er initiatives were very important and very 
supportive but in the end it was first track diplomacy that did the job [0.5] 
in the end er there must be of course heads of states that come up with a 
formal agreement er [0.2] that translate the second track [0.3] diplomatic 
initiatives into offical policy [0.3] and into a formal agreement so second er 
first track diplomacy's still necessary [0.4] but increasingly people are 
arguing that we need to complement this with second track diplomacy that that 
will buy us a much more [0.3] promising er setting for [0.3] overcoming the 
sorts of er conflicts that we see so much of now in the after the end of the 
Cold War [0.7] er probably the most illuminating e-, er er e-, recent example 
of the role and success of second track diplomacy [0.3] that people point to 
and not just people working on the Middle East [0.5] er is the secret meetings 
that took place in Norway in the early nineties between Israel 
and the P-L-O [0.4] er sponsored by by er actually by n-, Norwegian er 
government officials but also by er Norwegian private individuals [0.3] under 
the leadership of the then foreign minister er Jürgen Holst er often out in 
his [0.4] hidden codda-, cottage out in the er Norwegian forests outside Oslo 
[0.4] er er they basically brought er representatives of the parties together 
to engage in dialogue to ex-, explore a number of options that they hadn't 
really dared to entertain previously [0.7] and eventually this led er as you 
well know to the formal Israel P-L-O peace treaty the so-called Oslo Accords [0.
4] and the famous handshake between Israel Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and P-L-
O leader Yasser Arafat [0.4] on the lawn outside the er er White House in 
September nineteen-ninety-three [0.5] er it's an astonishing achievement that 
no one had expected and it really has to be explained largely in terms of er 
the use of a second a second track er [0.2] diplomatic track in this case [0.5] 
er it's a fascinating story that one now can er read about quite er 
comprehensibly several [0.3] of the individuals that took part in this 
initiative in in Norway [0.3] have now written their memoirs or or have written 
about this experience and why it was s-, [0.2] so successful [0.5] er and it's 
it's very very interesting to read about it er [0.6] of course er this is er [0.
2] er i think er a lot of the success of this case is to be explained by the 
fact that [0.4] at the l-, at the late stage of of this these diplo-, er [0.5] 
this er er these meetings in Oslo [0.4] er the official leaders got involved 
Yitzhak Rabin the Prime Minister of Israel [0.3] and Yasser Arafat the P-L-O 
leader [0.3] er actually went to Norway at the late stage when it was obvious 
that these meetings were going to be successful in leading to an agreement [0.
5] so there was a mixing if you like a connection between the 
first and the second track [0.4] er er done in a very successful way [0.2] er 
[0.4] often second track dip-, [0.2] dip-, diplomatic efforts can be successful 
on their own terms [0.3] but they don't succeed in making the jump into s-, er 
first-track diplomacy they don't er succeed in making the transition [0.4] to 
get the official leaders involved and that's very very important er [0.6] er 
the Oslo experience was also very much driven by [0.3] the failure of the first 
er first track the Madrid path er [0.3] the multilateral Middle East 
multilateral negotiations ini-, initiated in Madrid had failed [0.5] and so 
there was an urgent need for some kind of alternative [0.2] er initiative [0.2] 
er and that also explains [0.4] er the [0.3] er success of it [1.6] er some 
analysts had also begin to speak about the importance of third track diplomacy 
i don't know if you have heard of this term [0.4] er that is the involvement of 
grass roots movements and organizations [0.2] that may have no direct links at 
all to official policy makers [0.5] but are significant ultimately for 
representing and ultimately changing individual attitudes and behaviour [0.2] 
among common people [0.5] er in representing civil society the common man in 
the street if you like [0.5] er [0.3] er i think it adds er even s-, when you 
look at second track diplomacy it involves very much elites these are not your 
sort of common folks [0.4] er they're involved but it's it's community leaders 
as i said it's prominent academics it's unofficial ad-, advisers to government 
leaders [0.3] so we're still talking very much about elites that not 
necessarily have very close [0.3] connections er to to the people at large [0.
7] er ultimately of course few agreements whether they're coming out of second 
track diplomacy or first track diplomacy [0.4] are going to be successful 
unless the man in the street the woman in the street er accept them [0.6] er 
and often those kinds of [0.3] er er [0.3] or shall i say popular [0.4] er [0.
6] views popular er perceptions of what is necessary what is acceptable [0.4] 
er doesn't change alone they don't change alone with second and and first track 
diplomacy [0.3] and hence this the the [0.2] all the talk now about the 
importance of third track diplomacy but evel-, involving representatives also 
[0.3] of civil society of lar-, at large of of the er the common man in the 
street [0.4] er and about the importance of change in their their views er [0.
4] there have been a number of examples provided for the importance of this you 
will know of the the er [0.4] the growing er er power and activity of Islamic 
fundamentalist groups for example in the Middle East that have planted [0.5] er 
that have engaged in a number of terrorist incidents that derailed the Middle 
East peace process [0.3] they are getting more and more support er among the 
Palestinian population at large because of the frustration with lack of 
progress in the peace process [0.5] er and i-, it has pointed to the need you 
know to convert [0.4] er people on the ground their views as well [0.2] er and 
the need to complement first and tr-, second track diplomacy with [0.2] a third 
track diplomacy [1.4] now er [0.2] second track diplomacy can either er 
take place once formal negotiations have really [0.2] gotten underway to break 
any stalemates that that occur [0.6] er get away from again from the official 
negotiating table in a confidential private setting [0.6] or it can take place 
before official negotiations have even be-, begun to explore the possibilities 
of of er engaging in dialogue [0.5] and in this case it it comes very close to 
the second kind of approach i'm going to speak about er [0.3] the functions of 
prenegotiation [0.4] er which is another er activity that people now er are 
speaking so much of er as being important to [0.5] to break stalemates in so 
many ongoing er conflicts [1.3] er [0.2] now er as as you noted earlier on and 
we spoke about negotiation in traditional er models and practices er the 
significant negotiations the significant talks really don't really begin [0.3] 
until the parties sit down at the official negotiating table [0.5] and they 
they basically end when they leave it er [0.5] prenegotiation in some form of 
course has been practised as long as negotiation itself 
has been practised [0.5] what is new now is the recognition of its importance 
er [0.4] that official negotiations that we usually er er observe and and are 
informed about are really just part of a much larger er process [0.3] of 
decision making that begin with an exploratory prenegotiation phase [0.4] and 
end much much later [0.2] with negotiations of ratification and implementation 
[0.4] er the [0.2] relatively brief span of er s-, seeing diplomats sitting ra-,
sitting down at the official negotiating table [0.3] it's a it's a very short 
one and relatively important [0.3] unimportant compared to this larger decision 
making process that involves many other activities as well [0.8] er [0.2] in 
many negotiations today really prenegotiations and post-agreemenet negotiations 
have become er er much more important [0.4] er and it has partly to do with the 
growing complexity of multilateral negotiations [0.4] such n-, so mu-, so much 
more now needs to be achieved needs to be done [0.2] before official talks get 
underway [0.5] er if you look at for example at the well known 
er Rio Earth Summit in er back in Rio in in June nineteen-ninety-two [0.4] the 
the prenegotiations lasted for several years i think it was about ten years or 
so [0.4] and both with the encounters in between them very extensive 
consultations [0.5] the post-agreement er the post [0.2] er [0.2] negotiation 
phase is still ongoing er very very important in the area of climate change 
biodiversity [0.3] and so on [0.2] but the negotiations themselves at Rio [0.2] 
lasted only two weeks [0.2] er [0.5] er very short [0.2] er and er to a large 
extent what went on there had been be-, determined pr-, er previously in the 
prenegotiation phase [0.6] so increasingly some extent these the formal 
negotiations are becoming more of a show if you like er and just er a way of 
confirming what already has been decided earlier on [0.4] er in prenegotiations 
[0.8] er [0.2] a groundbreaking er piece of work that came b-, er out in the 
nine-, er end of the nineteen-eighties er [0.2] er it talks exactly about the 
importance of prenegotiation [0.5] er the book Getting to the Table the 
Processes of 
International Prenegotiation by Janice Gross Stein [0.6] er it puts forward a 
notion of prenegotiation whi-, which says [1.1] prenegotiation begins when one 
or more parties consider negotiation as a policy option [0.3] and communic-, 
communicates this intention to the other parties [0.4] it ends when all the 
parties agree to formal negotiations [0.3] or when one party abandons the 
consideration of negotiation as an option [0.4] so this is very much a temporal 
definition of what prenegotiation is [0.4] and it's useful but it doesn't 
really tells us about what the functions of [0.2] prenegotiations are or should 
be [0.5] so let me just say a few words er about that [0.8] er [0.2] 
prenegotiation is really different it's distinct from formal negotiations in 
that the that supposed to do two things that er are not as well done in formal 
negotiations [0.4] one is to explore whether actually undertaking er a formal 
er dialogue is is would i-, [0.2] would it be desirable [0.4] er at all from a 
number of 
viewpoints from the viewpoint of one's own interests [0.4] er and whether these 
are likely to be possible to reconcile wi-, er [0.3] to be compatible with 
those of the other sides [0.4] er [0.3] from the likelihood of negotiation 
actually being likely to succeed in producing an agreement er and the kind of 
risks involved [0.3] it's really a a kind of assessment of of the extent to 
which er formal negotiations are likely to succeed [0.7] er and the barriers er 
to overcome here er are usually of two kinds psychological and strategic i'm 
going to get to that in a moment [0.4] but then in secondly if the the 
conclusion is that negotiations are worth undertaking [0.4] then the second 
task of prenegotiation is is is er is to prepare for formal negotiations [0.4] 
er to to set the agenda we spoke earlier on about the [0.2] wh-, what the what 
the er [0.2] how important this is er how [0.2] decisive agenda setting can be 
for what happens later on [0.2] looki-, looking just at the Middle East [0.5] 
er about arranging this so logis-, lis-, er i i'm taking the 
logistical arrangements er for the negotiations [0.4] er the importance of the 
neutrality of the sites can be very important er having negotiations in a 
partisan site [0.5] can er be greatly at a disadvantage of of the party in 
whose home country the negotiations are not and so on [0.4] so basically two 
tasks of prenegotiation here [0.8] now there are two usually two barriers to 
overcome in in terms of making the parties believe that negotiation [0.3] are 
worth undertaking [0.5] er psychological and strategic [0.2] er [0.6] now 
psychological barriers are are essentially fears and mistrust the sorts of 
barriers that we see so much of in er ethnic sectarian er conflicts [0.5] er 
par-, particularly in ethnic conflicts pa-, the parties don't even recognize 
each others' basic needs [0.4] er for identities for survival [0.3] er er they 
even their basic right to exist [0.2] er [0.3] so each party basically fears 
that what it has what it has or what it controls may be lost in the negotiation 
process [0.5] that er the other side might exploit any concessions 
that will make as a springboard for eliminating its very existence [0.6] er 
this was for a very very long time this psy-, psychology of the difficulty of 
getting er negotiations underway [0.3] er between Israelis and Palestinians in 
Northern Ireland in many other ethnic sectarian er conflicts [0.9] 
now strategic barriers are a quite a different er nature these are sort of 
shrewd calculations er self-interest er ca-, calculations [0.5] that a party 
wouldn't er doesn't ha-, really have a need for or doesn't have much to gain 
from undertaking negotiations [0.5] either compared to the current situation [0.
2] er if that is viable [0.3] or some other unilateral option available to it 
for example the use of force the use of coercion [0.3] er what have you [1.1] 
er they are particularly important er when the disputed resources are very 
highly valued when they are viewed as being almost impossible to compromise 
upon [0.3] as with the situation of of Jerusalem and the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict where it can't at the moment [0.7] or when the 
relations between parties are there are equal so you have one supposedly more 
powerful party [0.5] that it feels that it can impose its solution er [0.2] 
impose other alternatives on the on the er weaker party [0.4] and doesn't 
really need to negotiate to compromise with the other side in order to get a 
some kind of [0.2] er solution [0.7] both these kinds of barriers psychological 
and strategic er are very very [0.3] er i-, is a very prominent feature of the 
sorts of internal violent conflicts that we're seeing now [0.4] increasingly er 
within countries er the strong ethnic sectarian [0.4] er nature and they 
explain very much the intractability of these conflicts why it's so difficult 
[0.4] er to get negotiations underway at the same time of course [0.3] only 
negotiation er is going to provide a peaceful solution [0.5] er so still er [0.
2] er [0.2] often the parties or outside parties try to get negotiations 
underway although it is so difficult [1.6] okay [0.3] er [3.6] now prene-, 
prenegotiation is not explicitly about trying to find or to agree on one 
particular 
solution it's not about a negotiating agreement that can only take place in 
formal official negotiations [0.6] but it is about er exploring about 
identifying about inventing er [0.5] er possible alternatives for a solution 
and and finding out how the various parties er [0.4] er would feel about them 
how they would er come down on them if they could think that they could live 
with them [0.4] so it's about er exploring possible solutions it's about 
building confidence er [0.4] in the possibility of reaching an agreement [0.4] 
er and in the er the er er work of undertaking negotiations [0.6] now if the 
negotiation doesn't succeed if in a way th-, er it doesn't take place 
negotiations formal negotiations will hardly ever succeed [0.6] but if 
prenegotiation does take place and does succeed it will have a usually a very 
important impact on what happens [0.2] subsequently in formal [0.2] 
negotiations [0.5] er ultimately the success of course of prenegotiation [0.3] 
is measured not only about er by getting the parties to the table but also 
to getting them eventually to an agreement [0.3] that actually will be er 
implemented [0.4] er and honoured [2.3] er [0.2] now the second track diplomacy 
and prenegotiation i've spoken about very briefly they're very closely related 
to the third approach i'd like to [0.3] speak about briefly problem solving or 
the integrated er approach [0.6] er [0.2] i don't think we need to remember too 
much about the distributive approach er that i illustrated in the context of 
the U-S and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and the Kissinger mediation in 
the Middle East [0.5] er with s-, very sort of competitive serious er features 
[0.5] that is not going to be very er helpful in in building er trust and 
confidence between the parties [0.5] er in creating [0.3] er [0.2] a belief in 
the worth of undertaking negotiation in the sorts of er conflicts that we have 
so much of now since the end of the Cold War [0.6] er virtually all analysis 
now of new needed ap-, practices of conflict resolution [0.5] and negotiation 
[0.5] conclude that er new practices new more effective practices need 
to include a much stronger [0.3] problem solving or what what's called also an 
integrative component than has been er the case so far [0.6] er [0.2] er then 
they need to become much less competitive much less [0.2] adversarial [0.4] er 
need to engage the parties in a a sort of common problem solving er process [0.
3] where they look at shared problems much er more together rather than 
separately [0.6] er [0.4] er [0.2] and er er yes [0.2] er [0.8] cooperation 
negotiations are really needed er to tackle so many contemporary issues at the 
moment [0.5] and er er the parties er er are viewed as as having to e-, engage 
much more extensively [0.3] in cooperative integrated problem solving 
approaches rather than in competitive [0.4] er ones [0.5] er [0.3] an academic 
by the name of Terje Larsen from Norway was the single most important er 
facilitator in this [0.4] Oslo er [0.2] e-, experience that i'd mentioned just 
a while ago [0.4] er he er a-, in the context of of that conflict and the 
breakthrough between the Israel and the P-L-O [0.4] er when he was interviewed 
on a B-B-C program er a 
couple of years ago [0.3] he pointed out that Netanyahu the then the Israeli 
prime minister [0.4] and Arafat are travelling on a tandem bicycle [0.2] they 
have to be partners [0.4] this process is not a win-lose situation it cannot be 
a win-lose situation [0.3] where there can be one winner and one loser [0.5] 
either there ha-, there has to be two winners or two losers if m-, mest-, 
Minister Netanyahu goes down he will drag Mr Arafat with him [0.4] and if 
Arafat goes down he will drag Netanyahu with him [0.5] so it's a perception of 
conflict er a-, as with i-, [0.2] parties are being in the same boat that 
they're interdependent and they need to use more cooperative [0.3] more problem 
solving more creative approaches er to arrive [0.3] at a satisfactory er stable 
solution of their conflict [0.4] er than the distributive conventional 
approaches have suggested [1.6] now the origin of the formulation of the 
integrative approach is is one very widely practised to this day although not 
sufficiently many would argue but 
the origin [0.3] er of the formulation of this approach [0.4] should really be 
attributed to the pioneering work of er somebody by the name of Mary Parker [0.
2] Follett [0.6] who published already back in in the beginning of last century 
in nineteen-eighteen a book [0.4] er well actually three books er entitled The 
New State Creative Experience and Dynamic Administration [0.9] er [0.2] er they 
were not really recognized for their significance until much much later in the 
nineteen-sixties er especially the works of [0.3] Walton and McKersie to 
academics working at Harvard [0.4] er who produced a book entitled A 
Behavioural Theory of Labour Negotiations [0.4] which was a really a much more 
systematic [0.2] er er scientific development of the integrative approach [0.8] 
er and it hasn't really been until very much more recently in nineteen-
seventies or so that people working in this field much more widely have taken 
this approach er [0.2] seriously and it's very very recent that people actually 
started consciously to practise it [0.5] though 
it is still not er er practised er sufficiently many people would argue [0.7] 
now Follett herself er back in in er er beginning of the last century wrote 
based of on her own experiences in a very different context er in business 
administration and business organization [0.6] and she noticed that often ki-, 
conflicts in this setting were resolved in ways that were either destructive [0.
5] er or people lost out [0.2] or they didn't leave there quite as well off as 
satisfied [0.4] as er er as [0.2] would have been possible if they had done it 
in a different way [0.5] er many opportunities for for greater joint gains for 
greater joint benefits were missed [1.1] er she pointed out there were 
basically w-, [0.2] three ways that you can resolve a conflict whether it's at 
the interpersonal level or with the your employer internationally [0.6] er 
domination [0.2] compromise and integration [0.3] er integration is another 
word for s-, for problem solving [1.1] now domination we know what that is 
that's basically the successful use of coercion or force [0.4] one side 
basically wins everything or most of it and the other loses out one side er 
imposes its solution on the other side [0.7] er compromise we also know what 
that is it means basically that each party has to give up something has to make 
[0.3] substantial concessions and compromise er on s-, in interest to reach an 
agreement [0.5] it's the s-, sort of outcome that [0.2] that normally results 
from traditional dis-, dis-, distributive er approaches competitive approaches 
[0.4] to conflict resolution [0.4] that we saw reflected in the NISP er er last 
week [0.2] during the Cold War [0.4] er er you will have some kind of solution 
but it's a compromise solution meaning that each party will have to give up [0.
3] quite a bit in order to [0.2] to reach it [0.7] integration however which of 
course is the way er is the the method that Follett er er endorses [0.5] er 
it's the third way of resolving conflict er that means that basically it's put 
very simply that a solution is found that meets all the essential interests of 
the various parties involved [0.6] each party 
gets what it's required w-, what is requires without having to give up anything 
very significant [0.4] and without having to deprive the other party of what 
it's needs [0.7] er this of course sounds very good er and i'm going to give 
some examples of how it er could operate er [0.6] er Follett herself er 
favoured using very simple examples that need the personal context to 
illustrate er larger more important points [0.4] and in fact her very simple 
examples are become w-, some of the most widely [0.3] used even in the 
international conflicts literature that of course deals with situations that 
are [0.3] endlessly and more complex [0.5] er one of the most er er widely 
quoted examples that she uses is is the er [0.3] situation that she found 
herself s-, wa-, once in when she was studying at Harvard University she was [0.
3] working in the main er reading room [1.1] and another woman came in and er 
er wanted to er open the window where she was sitting er while er she wanted to 
really have it closed [0.7] and 
as the two kept insisting on their respective positions either open the window 
or keep it er keep it closed [0.4] of course they they wouldn't really 
encounter any good solution er [0.2] they they could perhaps compromise and and 
leave the er window open some of the time or close it some of the time [0.5] 
but neither would really be very happy [0.8] but Follett er experiences in 
conflict resolution came up with a much better er er alternative here [0.4] she 
started asking the woman why she really wanted to have the er er window open [0.
5] and found out that it was really for ventilation er and it wasn't so much 
having it open per se [0.5] while she herself wanted to avoid a draught so they 
opened the window in the next room [0.2] very ingeniously [0.6] and that way 
both of them are are very happy with this solution [0.2] and so she uses this 
to exemplify that [0.3] as long as you keep insisting on your positions without 
exploring the underlying reasons you're not really ca-, going 
to come up with any good solution [0.4] it's only if you start exploring the 
underlying motivations for what what why you're seeking what you're seeking [0.
4] that you're going to be able to come up with a positive some integrative er 
solution [0.4] so this is a way of sort of bypassing the position sending away 
the position and looking at underlying er [0.4] er reasons er er for coming up 
with a better er solution [0.6] Follett's basic message here with this very 
simple example is that we tend to look at conflict se-, [0.2] situations [0.3] 
in too serious er terms we tend to look at them in too exclusive too negative 
ways [0.5] and that often er we are not exploring underlying motivations underb-
, lying [0.2] concerns enough [0.4] and that if we did we would often come up 
with much much better solutions that really address the root causes of the 
conflicts [0.5] er she says that there are hardly ever any conflict that you 
cannot [0.2] cannot be solved [0.3] it [0.2] depends basically on the parties' 
er willingness to engage in problem solving to en-, to 
engage with this approach [0.9] er you can ha-, get a glimpse of how this 
approach could apply to much more complex international conflict in the handout 
where i've made a [0.4] sort of a table of the the conflict over Jerusalem 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians [0.6] er [0.7] er er [0.2] counted 
really the most intr-, er most intractable issue in the whole [0.4] er Middle 
East peace process that er [0.2] has already caused [0.3] its collapse at least 
for the time being maybe it er will permanently co-, collapse of this issue [0.
4] nonetheless it's it's the er certainly one of the most intractable 
international conflicts that we have around [0.6] and er er [0.9] it's going to 
remain very very difficult to to resolve and i've er made this table just to 
illustrate how the integrative approach that Follett advocates [0.4] er could 
apply to this conflict [0.5] now you have there er a list of the positions the 
interests and needs in in that conflict over Jerusalem between Israel and the 
Palestinians [0.5] er you'll see that as you move up towards the 
positions [0.4] the demands the stakes in the conflict become much more er 
political and rigid [0.4] much more less flexible in terms of how they can be 
met this is the level at which the distributive conventional approaches [0.4] 
operate [0.4] it takes basically the positions of the parties have to give them 
[0.2] and try to bargain and negotiate on basis of those er positions [0.5] er 
it doesn't er they don't really question the legitimacy or or you know the 
positions whether they are really necessary or w-, how they can be changed [0.
4] the positions are the starting points er for bargaining and negotiation [0.
6] often of course positions are not going to distinguish between what are 
fundamental concerns and and what is just ba-, wishful thinking it's just like 
a package if you like [0.3] that doesn't distinguish er [0.5] basic er er needs 
from er from [0.2] just aspirations [0.5] so Israel Israel is saying as you 
well know er all of Jerusalem must be the exter-, ex-, er the eternal 
indivisible capital of Israel there can be no [0.3] er role for a 
po-, a a a political role for the Palestinians in the city [0.6] er whereas 
Palestinians are saying there are Jerusalem is the capital of Palestine [0.6] 
now er obviously there's not going to be much room for agreement here it's 
going to be very very difficult if you use this kind of traditional approach 
based on positions to come to an agreement [0.3] if you did have an agreement 
it would be involve a great deal of compromising [0.3] on the part of both 
sides and neither side would be very very would be very happy very pleased er 
with the agreement [1.2] er that's as you move down in that chart towards er er 
interests and needs you will see that the concerns of the conflict become much 
more [0.6] psychological and abstract and much more flexible [0.3] in terms of 
how they can be filled [0.4] and this is the level at which the integrative 
approach operates er especially in the context of prenegotiation of second 
track diplomacy [0.5] er at this level one doesn't take the decisions er [0.2] 
for granted er s-, at face value 
but look beneath them [0.4] a-, at the underlying motivating er concerns er as 
the two women in the Harvard library did [0.9] er and in fact if you look at 
most of the Israeli interests in that chart you will see that er to for example 
to keep Jerusalem physically undivided [0.3] to secure effective control over 
the Jewish areas of the city [0.3] to gain recognition of Jerusalem er as the 
Israel's capital from the international community and so on and so on [0.5] 
we'll see that they are not necessarily incompatible at all with most of the 
Palestinian ones [0.4] er in fact many of the Israeli concerns interests are 
not going to be possible f-, to fulfil without fulfilling the Palestinian ones 
[0.3] and most of them are not mutually exclusive [0.4] but it's only by 
looking underneath the positions that we see this and that we can start to 
think of integrated mutually er [0.4] er er er acceptable solutions er er [0.4] 
in a new way [1.3] so er er this is just really to give you a snapshot of er 
how it could be used er to to deal 
with an international er conflict [0.6] so to summarize the integrative 
approach really use negotiation essentially as a joint problem solving exercise 
that in where efforts are made to create new options that can reconcile and 
combine [0.3] the er the parties most essential interests [0.4] in a way that 
avoids the need for painful compromises [0.6] er [0.2] as opposed to the 
distributive approach er that is a much more of a competitive [0.3] er self-
centred process where the parties work much more on their own [0.4] er they're 
perceived from fixed positions and demands and try to strike a compromise er er 
basis er of them [0.8] er of course there are different sorts of tactics 
negotiation [0.3] tactics and indeed negotiation skills are associated with 
each approach [0.5] er the distributive approach would use very much things 
like er a sort of competitive manipulative [0.3] er tactics like the use of 
threats the use of deadlines [0.4] er the use of coercion er as the use of 
warnings [0.2] er the sorts of er tactics that er [0.4] er that Kissinger used 
so much in the the Middle East that we saw [0.4] whereas the integrative 
approach would use very different sorts of things er er [0.5] er they would use 
er er [0.3] i'm going to come to that in a moment er [0.3] but basically it it 
er it's a piece of er er er [1.0] techniques methods that [0.4] will be based 
on the parties sharing a great deal of information in between themselves er 
about their general interests and needs priorities [0.6] again this will only 
er be possible to take place in a non-, er non-public confidential setting [0.
5] er not in formal official negotiations and that's why secrecy [0.3] er and a 
lack of publicity are so important er er with the use of the integrative 
approach [0.5] er there's a huge literature now and so much discussion about er 
problem solving integrative techniques that could be used [0.4] in a number of 
different different settings er [0.5] one for example is it's called resource 
expansion [0.2] er [0.4] it's really basically about how you can i-, increase 
the the amount er the usage of the resources that are 
disputed [0.5] er to to provide more mutually satisfactory agreements when it 
comes to [0.5] negotiations over Jerusalem now for example there's a lot of 
talk about how the municipal boundaries of the city [0.4] could be er enlarged 
so that Israel and Israel and the Palestinians would each [0.2] exercise 
sovereignty [0.2] or some kind of control [0.2] over as much territory as that 
they would have had [0.2] have done alone within the old er narrow boundaries 
of Jerusalem [0.5] so it's it's quite er er [0.5] quite er er innovative way of 
sort of er making Jerusalem bigger and then dividing it up if you like [0.8] er 
[0.3] there are problems with it as well but i won't go into those details 
basically it's a way of facilitating [0.3] conflict resolution by [0.3] er 
making what is disputed er er bigger [0.9] er then there are exchange or 
trading strategies er like linkage of issues er that means that er [0.2] you 
bring in er new issues that a-, a-, before were not linked to the conflict and 
have each party concede [0.4] on issues that it values a little or less in 
exchange for the 
other party doing the same so that each party [0.3] ends up with what it values 
the more the exchange of concessions a little differently valued [0.2] items [0.
7] er of course it assumes that there are issues that are differently valued 
and sometimes as with Jerusalem both want it equally much it cannot be traded 
off against anything else and that's a problem [0.5] but often there are issues 
that are differently valued and that would help [0.3] er conflict resolution in 
a integrative er way [1.2] er [0.4] er more some of the more recent plans for 
Jerusalem link for example the promise of a Palestinian state in the West Bank 
in Gaza [0.4] to Palestinian acceptance of exclusive Israeli sovereignty over 
all of Jerusalem [0.4] er but again er the assumption here is wrong that 
Jerusalem is differently valued the Palestinians have-, haven't accepted this 
[0.4] sort of er er [0.2] compromise if you like er [0.4] and er it hasn't 
worked because er the city is equally valued by both [1.4] 
er but nonetheless er a recent experience and i could give ma-, give many more 
examples if there was more time [0.4] er seems to suggest er that er [0.3] er 
international negotiation conflict resolution will [0.2] result in more 
effective agreement [0.4] are more likely to result in agreement in solutions 
[0.3] if integrative problem solving methods are used [0.4] and if also second 
er second track diplomatic path and prenegotiation er [0.4] are used er it's 
probably linked to the fact that obviously in international [0.3] community 
today we don't have supernational authority that can [0.4] formulate and enf-, 
and enforce solutions so solutions if [0.3] an agreement is the parties are 
going to implement and live by them and honour them in the long term [0.3] need 
to be beneficial they need to see a benefit to be had 
from implementing er agreements [0.5] and er by the use of the integrative er 
the integrative approach is very much focused on this on on producing er mutual 
benefits on making it gainful for the parties [0.5] to implement the solutions 
and that's er [0.4] why it's more er likely to succeed [0.7] so er [0.5] that 
is about these three approaches er [0.5] to complement er what i started out 
talking about earlier on about negotiation and confli-, conflict resolution in 
the conventional mo-, ne-, mode [0.7] and er that's basically it for these 
series of lectures thank you