nm1163: if for some reason you sort of get lost or want to know more about arms 
control which of course i assume that you will er Stuart Croft's Strategies of 
Arms Control is a really good introduction er and i think they have three 
copies in the library so you should be able to take turns and actually have a 
look at them er it sort of gives you a brief historical background and then 
goes into Cold War arms control negotiations and examines essentially the 
utility of arms control and the question of well is arms control a completely 
futile concept or is it not now the reason why he wrote the book partly was 
because namex wrote a book called who is a member of the department now wrote a 
book called er House of Cards in which he argues very strongly against the ut-, 
u-, the usefulness of arms control er it was out of print for quite a long time 
but i hope that because he's joined the department i mean for quite a long time 
a few years i hope that because he's joined the 
department it should actually be available at least in the departmental library 
but i haven't checked i must admit it just occurred to me that i might er that 
it might actually be available now as well so you have two completely different 
perspectives Stuart Croft arguing well there is a there is a use there is some 
use to arms controls and namex going no arms control it's all rubbish it's a 
completely futile endeavour i'm going to try to introduce you to concepts of 
arms control as they emerged now as i said last time arms control and arms 
races are not a phenomenon that's really only limited to the Cold War the 
reason why we have concentrated so much on arms control during the Cold War was 
simply because we were d-, we were dealing with nuclear weapons which you know 
loads about now after attending the lecture last week er from a historical 
perspective arms races existed well since the well since the beginning of time 
really one of the 
first er arms control measures was p-, s-, some po-, i forgot the name now 
[laugh] this is very embarrassing er outla-, outlawing the longbow simply 
because there was the idea that er that was an an immoral means of war but then 
real arms control on a political level er on a on a more concerted level you 
find before the worl-, the First World War when Russia and Britain both tried 
to push through er arms control agendas and and translate them into actual 
policy because they s-, they feared the outbreak of a war so the idea was if we 
try to cooperate on reducing levels of armament we reduce the security dilemma 
and therefore er war might actually not break out now there is a false logic to 
this argument but i get to that later now between the wars you had two broad 
categories of arms control one the Geneva Conventions which regulated the 
conduct of war the way in which military equipment was used military operations 
were conducted how prisoners were to be 
treated how which er targets were illegitimate targets how submarine warfare 
for example ought to be conducted or warfare at sea er all essentially aimed at 
regulating the the conduct of mili-, the conduct of military operations with a 
view to saving lives destroying the enemy's capabilities but saving lives and 
those whose lives have been saved and be-, and those who became prisoner were 
supposed to be treated in a reasonably decent way I-E not tortured et cetera et 
cetera now as such conventions often go they weren't adhered to in the Second 
World War er a great deal and obviously you still have violations of these 
conventions but then the question is might it not be a good idea to just have 
them for the sake of being able to refer to them the other er major system was 
the Washington Naval Treaty System in which Britain and the U-S Japan and 
Germany and France when and other countries but th-, those four countries 
particularly were meant to reduce their i mean Germany 
after the First World War had levels of armaments or top levels of armaments 
imposed on its armed forces at at any rate but they tried to come up with a 
system which would allow all of them to have some sort of armed forces or naval 
forces but which would not exceed a specific tonnage er the idea behind that 
being that if you only have a certain sort of size of ship you can only put a 
certain amount of weapons and and well weapons which which have s-, have 
limited capabilities on these ships now the Washington Treaty System also had a 
political dimension in that it was meant to force the countries that were 
members of the Washington Naval Treaties to talking to one another and to try 
to reduce to try to address each other's security concerns without always only 
bean counting but actually looking at what the political objectives were for 
each of these countries as we know er the Washington Treaty sys-, wa-, 
Washington Naval Treaty System did not do its job as intended which 
is one of the reasons why arms control or i-, which is one example where arms 
control is sometimes dismissed as completely futile now what what what are 
generally the aims of arms control i'll just look at them from the two main 
perspectives realist or neo-realist perspective and the er liberal or neo-
liberal perspective from a realist perspective arms control er is essentially 
meant to maintain the balance of military power I-E that if you assume that if 
ca-, that capabilities it's particularly military capabilities are what make a 
state powerful then if there is a balance of military power if none of the 
states tied into this balance of power is capable of of mustering the military 
capabilites which would allow it to attack another state with the assumption 
that it would win the war and that's generally assumed as one of the principal 
causes of a war that if if there are political conflicts and state A assumes 
that it could win a war against state B then it is much 
more likely to actually go and attack that state than if it has capability 
reasons to assume it won't win that war so by maintaining the balance of 
military power the assumption was that this could avoid well would be the assum-
, er that that this could be s-, that this could avoid war tied into that is 
obviously managing our old er concept the security dilemma not only with a view 
to avoiding the outbreak of war er at any given level but also because the 
security dilemma or or the spiral implied in the concept of security dilemma er 
implies defence expenditure it's an economic burden if two of or more states 
constantly respond to each other's increasing armament levels they will spend a 
lot of money on armed forces and arms control measures might be agreed upon if 
each side considers the defence expenditure far too high for its economic 
capabilities or chooses to or or would desi-, would desire to spend public 
money on things other than defence equipment so from a 
systemic perspective you could say if two two or more states seek to balance 
their cost-benefit equation in terms of military and economic security they 
might engage er in arms control the problem with that is that if you only 
reduce capabilities then that doesn't in itself prevent war because obviously 
the capabilities themselves do not cause war it's the intentions which lie 
behind the capabilities which might er lead to war so in a sense and this is 
what namex for example would argue arms control leads you into a circular 
argument because since it's not the capabilities which cause war but political 
friction and as i will explain later you need trust in order to establish arms 
control measures by the time you actually would want to go for arms control 
measures it's quite likely that the states with whom you want to control your 
weaponry are not prepared to trust you therefore they are not going to 
negotiate with you so it doesn't make any sense whatsoever and 
if there is the trust and if there is negotiations are negotiations and if 
there are there is a preparedness in principle to cooperate politically then 
you don't need to avoid war so you don't need to control arms that would be one 
of the sort of perspectives on arms control which which basically says arms 
control doesn't do anything for anyone including for the stability in regions 
or the international system now from a more liberal perspective the argument 
would be the central benefit of arms control negotiations is that they can come 
up with rules and norms of behaviour and as you will see later in the context 
of nuclear er weapons and prolifera-, er well nuclear weapons regulation that 
was a particularly prevalent argument partly er a liberal perspective of course 
is or this this idea that you can generate rules and norms of behaviour er in 
the er on the on an international level or on a regional level through arms 
control that is tied in with the idea that 
weapons will only be be used as a last resort only if everything else has 
failed or if war is about to be pressed upon a state then a liberal state would 
find it necessary to defend itself but it would not necessarily advocate the 
use of force in order for for aggressive purposes now whether that still holds 
in today's environment where the use of force and the conditions for the use of 
force are changing is a different question er a liberal perspective would 
furthermore emphasize the economic prosperity aspects of security building 
mechanisms er more than only to a limited degree but more than defence 
expenditure because there is liberals tend to see more of a trade-off between 
creating stability and security through economic means and the ability to 
preserve military or security by military means so from that perspective 
cooperation becomes more of a possibility even if this cooperation is seen 
essentially also as a means to fend off external threats which the 
international environment might throw at the state but that then leads in an 
argumentative line to the idea that economic gains through interdependence are 
preferable to using military means for the condu-, conduct of international 
politics that peaceful conflict resolution is er is essentially better than 
using force and that confidence and security building measures that's what this 
abbreviation means are a means of arms control in the sense that they control 
the will to use arms rather than on the fir-, in the first place the 
capabilities which the er weapons on each side convey 
sm1164: so what does C 
nm1163: sorry 
sm1164: C-S-B-M stand for 
nm1163: confidence and security building measures sometimes you might find this 
also as just C-B-M which is confidence building measures now how is arm-, arms 
control conducted or what are the instruments of arms control 
much arms control happens on a state to state level since the end of the Cold 
War there is quite a lot of arms control which needs to happen in in the 
context of conflict resolution or resolution of conflicts in intra-state wars 
but that's a slightly separate issue now arms can be controlled nationally 
simply by a state imposing or a government imposing export controls we'll find 
that in the nuclear er non-proliferation regime er you find i i briefly touched 
upon that er in the context of dual use goods you found that although it 
doesn't always work or very often doesn't work er with regard to nat states 
that have a strong defence industry but also at least would like to pursue a 
policy which doesn't send arms into already conflict ridden regions watched 
through government sanction that they impose export controls temporary export 
controls and they are then this is then essentially a policy of unilateral 
restraint unilateral restraint can also be imposed of course on 
the development of certain weapon systems that some states just decide not to 
go for a particular weapon system or a particular technology which of course is 
a measure of arms control once you go on to sort of an international level and 
if you want to try to enshrine arms control measures on that level you have two 
options either states agra-, agree on a bilateral basis to reduce or control 
arms or their armaments or they agree on a bilateral level to unilateral 
measures that pro-, prohibit the pro-, the proliferation of certain 
technologies or you pursue a multilateral perspective which is particularly 
favoured for non-proliferation regimes now the difference between arms the you 
could say that non-proliferation is a subsection of arms control er just sort 
of for for conceptual clarification controlling arms essentially means 
controlling the level of armaments non-proliferation means preventing the 
spread of weapon systems or weapons 
technology so there is there is a slight difference but it's a significant 
difference between the two concepts bilaterally and multinationally er you have 
again different types of options you can either go for arms limitation or arms 
reduction treaties where the two sides agree to actually cut out a whole class 
of weapons there are arms or technology transfer controls or regimes regimes 
being multinational agreements which are then nationally implemented and which 
impose on the the members of the regime a set of rules and norms as to what 
they may and may not do which in turn is meant to make it more predictable for 
each of the members to know what another member is likely to do there are of 
course pitfalls to this but this is the the positive er the the perceived 
positive aspect of regime building you can have weapons exclusion zones where 
for example nuclear weapons are not not permitted or all the states in a 
particular zone region er agree not to acquire nuclear 
weapons moratoria which well particularly linked to nuclear weapons tests or 
one state would declare a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing which of course 
puts the other members of the nuclear power community under pressure if they 
also want to gain the moral high ground that they might also er call for a 
moratorium on their weapons testing and finally notification schemes which is 
essentially well it's one core of confidence and security building measures and 
that is because there is the assumption that capabilities might be might well 
the the possession of capabilities might trigger a war and there is also from a 
conventional war perspective still the very strong assumption that surprise 
attack is always better for the aggressor than sort of giving away too much now 
the reason why exercises and well exercises became an issue of notification 
schemes for exercises became an issue was that if armies exercise armies the 
air forces navies a potentially 
hostile state in the case of NATO and Warsaw Pact if NATO exercises the Warsaw 
Pact would look at NATO's exercises and go well what are they planning to do 
might they actually be tempted to attack us now but if there is early 
notification of what sort of exercises are going to be conducted er not what 
exactly they are going to exercise but how many soldiers or troops are going to 
be moved base-, how long the exercise is going to er going to be then the other 
side has some sort of reasonable way of assessing this exercise is just a 
pretence for an aggressive act or not now this is actually quite that that this 
was actually quite important during the Cold War because er NATO in fact did 
launch a missile as part of its exercise but that missile went astray and the 
Soviet Union wasn't sure whether that was an attack or not and because they had 
good communications that meant that the that nothing worse than er just a small 
little blip happened it could have been otherwise 
if there hadn't been a way of notifying each other of this and then for the 
Soviet Union to actually assure that this was not an aggressive act now how 
effective can arms control be if you have treaties on a government to 
government level whether they are multilateral or bilateral they constitute 
then international law but that means the implementation of the treaty depends 
on each government which poses a bit of a problem because yes governments agree 
to control or limit their their military arsenals but how does government A 
know that governments B C and D are actually complying with the commitment they 
entered into in the treaty the second issue is therefore that there has to be a 
degree of transparency in the arms control process now transparency really has 
two functions when it's talked about in the context of arms control one is that 
during arms control treaty negotiations each side is tasked with putting its 
capabilities more or less accurately on 
the table they have because they know the other side has been spying on them so 
they can't be completely off the mark so in a sense during the arms control 
negotiations they will try to tease out of each other what they have the other 
aspect of transparency is when it comes to implementing the arms control treaty 
that they have just agreed on er and that is that whatever arms control 
measures have been agreed upon that should actually be verifiable and be made 
transparent by a multinational observer group or by er a small group of the 
opposite state now that doesn't always happen and there are actually a lot of 
arms control treaties which while still regarded valuable but which don't have 
either verification or transparency measures in that sense built into them 
particularly with regard to nuclear biological and chemical weapons the 
irreversibility of the arms control measures has gained very high priority in 
any sort of arms control negotiations but of 
course particularly with regard to nuclear and biological weapons where we have 
had most movement so transparency and verification are two essential components 
of arms control measures because yes you can say we have to trust each other 
but then checking whether it's worth trusting the other side is of course 
better than er just believing it and if the other side is compliant then that 
generates more trust which might in turn lead to more arms control measures if 
everything goes well and it often doesn't now you may recall that i mentioned 
on the side some time ago that the Cuban Missile Crisis was an important 
turning point in the way in which nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union 
and the U-S was conducted now why was it so essential it was essential because 
it showed the two sides that they had no quick means of talking to one another 
that if anything happened if any nuclear accident happened they couldn't they 
would have to go through each other's 
embas-, er so through yeah their embassies and or each other's embassies to 
then and send letters by diplomatic post which is quicker than if they if it 
went by normal post but still it takes a little while and when when when we're 
talking about nuclear weapons and you didn't want to take that long er so the 
the need to actually be able to pick up the phone and talk to one another 
became a hugely important aspect of the way arms control negotiations started 
and it was really the first agreement that was that was implemented in nineteen-
sixty-three meant they had a direct line between the Kremlin and the White 
House following that er we had several different measures which were meant to 
prevent or ha-, er were were were included er notification about nuclear 
accidents accidents at sea er the Limited Test Band treaty and from nineteen-
sixty-nine onwards the two sides of the U-S and the Soviet Union engaged in 
what became known as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks now i mentioned 
SALT as an issue which the Europeans saw with some trepidation because as i 
said the negotiations went on between the U-S and the Soviet Union and didn't 
include either the European Warsaw Pact members or the European er NATO members 
so the worry on the part of the Europeans was that the U-S and the Soviet Union 
might actually break out to a degree of of their alliance well pa-, 
particularly for the for the er European NATO members that was the concern and 
that therefore the U-S might find a settlement which enhanced its own security 
through nuclear arms control but also made it less likely that so-, that the U-
S would intervene or would come to the aid of NATO Europe if there was Soviet 
attack what it did do apart from the U-S then having to reiterate its point 
that it wouldn't er defect what SALT-one did was more a political achievement 
than an actual military achievement because it started a process of arms 
control negotiations which lasted through 
the entire nineteen-seventies was then interrupted for about five years because 
the Cold War became colder again and was then taken up really where SALT-two 
had left it in the start negotiations about which i will tell you briefly in a 
minute a central treaty er linked to SALT-one was the A-B-M Treaty the er Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty that was central because it enshrined the rationale 
that the well the the rationale which the U-S had favoured for a long time that 
nuclear deterrence should be b-, based on authentic capability with the A-, 
with the signing of the A-B-M Treaty which allowed the Soviet Union and the U-S 
to build anti-ballistic missile defences around first only one site each and 
then two sites er in in the respective country with the Soviet Union signing 
this treaty they basically said yes defence against nuclear weapons is not 
possible therefore or it's not affordable either therefore we are going to join 
you in building our capabilities or 
building deterrents on on offensive capabilities and this is essentially seen 
as the principal stability enhancing quality of the A-B-M Treaty now the reason 
i'm going on about this is that at the moment and f-, during the entire 
nineteen-nineties the U-S has pursued and is seriously thinking about deploying 
a national ballistic missile defence system and you have the same arguments 
over again as to what a national ballistic missile defence system will do for 
international and for European se-, security because if the sov-, if the U-S 
can can defend itself is it likely to actually come to the aid of allies 
for the allies it means are they going to spend their money on a European 
ballistic missile defence system which will also give them some degree some 
limited capability to f-, to defend themselves against missiles now no longer 
coming from well now the assumption is no longer that it that they primarily 
come from the Soviet un-, from well the successors of the Soviet Union but 
because Iraq Korea and well several mid-, Middle Eastern states and several 
asia-, er east Asian states have started building ballistic missiles which have 
now by now a medium range capability and the assumption is that well we need a 
ballistic missile defence system because these states are otherwise going to 
attack us now how serious this threat is is a hugely controversial issue they 
may have these capabilities but they may not want to attack Europe and is a 
ballistic missile defence system not an invitation for one of these states that 
is 
pursuing ballistic missile development to actually try and penetrate this 
ballistic missile defence system how secure can it be do you need a hundred per 
cent security or do you need eighty per cent security what if you feel secure 
under your ballistic missile defence system and have spent loads of money on 
the on that but you don't have any money for other defensive measures so it's 
an it's an enormously important issue which you will hear of much more if you 
read the newspaper and if er George W Bush is becoming president because he has 
already said that he will definitely deploy Clinton earlier this year er took 
back the earlier decision that the uni-, that the the U-S will definitely get a 
ballistic a national ballistic missile defence system Gore is basically 
pursuing a Clinton line but Bush has said we're going to go for it what that 
does for European defence is an issue we really need to think about hence the A-
B-M Treaty being a very important historical relic 
and Russia i should add that just just for your full information Russia is 
seriously against any deployment of ballistic missile defence systems they 
there there have been talks as to what how they might cooperate on this er or 
not but Russia clings very much to the idea that the A-B-M Treaty is really 
unviable er unvialable er going back to SALT SALT re-, limited really the 
deployment the number of deployments of medium range missiles these were 
missiles which were no longer going to be produced but they just agreed that 
they that they were essentially it was essentially outdated technology by the 
time but they agreed that they would no longer er develop them and deploy them 
it didn't have any verification measures apart from national technical means 
which is essentially spy planes or spy satellites er and there were no observer 
missions or anything built into this but the idea that they were talking about 
arms control was already seen as one mean a one one positive step forward 
SALT-two went a lot further but was never ratified because the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan and U-S Congress then refused to ratify the treaty 
following the invasion of Afghanistan obviously as you all know the Cold War 
became a lot colder so it took until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev to start 
some new approach to arms control some people argue that it was really Ronald 
Reagan's massive build up of nuclear and conventional capabilities of the U-S 
forces which escalated as you all know in the S-D-I proposal which is 
essentially the precursor to the ballistic missile defence systems we are 
talking about now so some people would argue that er Ronald Reagan out procured 
outarmed the Soviet Union others would say and i think they have a stronger 
case to make that Gorbachev's policy swing towards reasonable sufficiency in 
Soviet defence planning and Soviet defence spending was a major step forward 
which enabled nuclear arms reductions reasonable 
sufficiency was essentially a policy which went back from we have to have 
massive forces in any conceivable theatre that we might have to fight in to 
well how much do we actually need given the political situation surrounding us 
given that we are pursuing a policy that is meant to build friendly relations 
with all our neighbours and you can see that on the policy level that the 
Soviet Union went out and and started rebuilding trust between itself and its 
neighbours not least in order to have external stability for dome-, domestic 
political and economic reform er and that was these diplomatic er for-, forays 
where replicated on the military level by er a new design of the defence of 
defence policy which would use defence spending and went for smaller amount of 
forces you also have Gorbachev pro-, er suggesting in various fora conventional 
arms reductions now the West didn't take that too seriously for quite a long 
time because the arms reductions he proposed 
essentially concerned weapons systems which were outdated such as small 
submarines in the Baltic sea but START-one which the U-S and and then still the 
Soviet Union signed in nineteen-ninety and was then ratified in nineteen-ninety-
two was A an extension of the concept started in the SALT treaties I-E that 
launcher systems and platforms would be reduced not nuclear warheads that 
became an issue soon after START-one was signed but it was the first treaty 
which really significantly reduced nuclear long range or strategic er launch 
platforms in nineteen- ninety-five you also have the er well they agreed to 
reduce no nineteen-eighty-seven sorry wrong wrong date they agreed on er a 
complete reduction or a comp-, comp-, complete elimination of intermediate 
nuclear forces which er was the first time ever that a whole class of weapons 
was going to be abolished now START-one as much as it was a positive 
development soon ran into an enormous problem because what they had of course 
not contended with was that the Soviet Union would collapse now i said earlier 
if you have government to government treaties or any sort of international 
treaty then it is up t-, up to the government which has signed the treaty to 
implement the treaty now with the collapse of the Soviet Union in nineteen-
ninety-two you had all of a sudden Russia Ukraine Khazakhstan and who else 
Belarus er with nuclear weapons on their territory they then needed to be 
brought into the fold in a series of other negotiations so that they would 
actually ship back Soviet built nuclear missiles to Russia where they could 
then be where they could then be er destroyed START-two foresaw reductions down 
to three-thousand warheads on each side well two-thousand-five-hundred to three-
thousand on each side and was not ratified by Russia for a very long time they 
dragged their feet until April two-thou of this year until they finally er 
decided to to er to ratify the Duma the reasons for 
that are hugely complicated very technical and er i'm not going to go into them 
but only what a few days ago er Putin proposed a new round of arms control 
negotiations which er worked well which are to be aimed at reducing the level 
of nuclear warheads on each side down to one-thousand er which would be very 
significant START-three they've talked about two-thousand so far but if they go 
for a thousand then that would be a further step forward multinational arms 
control or international arms control the core of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime is obviously the nuclear non-proliferation treaty it is to be over well 
the I-A-E-A the International Atomic Energy Agency which is associated with the 
U-N is not a verification agency in terms of an agency which could prevent 
nuclear weapons from deve-, from being developed but it is a a verification 
agency which assesses whether the countries that are members and have 
agreements which its with its inspectors 
whether they are using nuclear material for the purposes that they have 
committed themselves to I-E not for military purposes the I-A-E-A in essence is 
an audit organization which checks the books of all in all the er installations 
for which it has er access rights but it doesn't ca-, cannot prevent nuclear 
weapons development it's been recently earlier in this er in in in the last 
decade it has been strengthened but it still has only very limited er limited 
access rights the central deal in the N-P-T was that the four five permanent 
members of the security council all of whom had nuclear weapons by the time the 
N-P-T was er agreed upon in nineteen-sixty-seven that they would give access to 
nuclear material and technology for the pa-, production of power er electricity 
and any other peaceful purposes medical use for example er or in agriculture 
they would give access to this information and to this material to all the 
members of the N-P-T which joined the N-P-T but these 
members had to commit themselves to not procuring nuclear weapons I-E the trade-
off was we abstain from nuclear weapons if you give us nuclear technology it's 
significant to remember that at the time nuclear power was seen as one of the 
major potential motors for development in lesser developed countries because 
you could produce a lot of power out of very very little material now if the 
investment in nuclear power has turned out to be enormously expensive in 
financial terms and of course there are serious risks associated with the use 
of nuclear power in turn the the P-five so-called nuclear weapons states 
committed themselves in article six to working towards early nuc-, com-, early 
and complete nuclear disarmament at the earliest possible time now their 
article six commitment has become an even more contentious issue than it was 
soon after it became apparent that the P-five had no intention to really 
seriously go towards zero during the Cold War since the end 
of the Cold War they have come under a lot more pressure from countries which 
used to belong to the non-alliant movement er trying to force them into 
actually making serious steps towards complete nuclear disarmament the N-P-T is 
not the only element of the nuclear non-proliferation regime national measures 
have also been taken by those countries that had advanced nuclear er had access 
to or developed nuclear technology and they these measures are are sort of can 
be subsumed under nuclear suppliers regulations the London Club has come up 
with a list of trigger technologies which are supposed to be subjected to 
particularly stringent export controls and for which licenses have to be er er 
well obtained before they can be exported and they have committed themselves 
not to export any weapons related er technologies to non-weapon states 
and you have regional regul-, er regulations so you have s-, er a multitier 
system in the form of EUROTOM associated with the E-U finally you have as i 
already said on the national level ex-, national export controls which are not 
tied into er a wider system and a so-called fuel takeback policy which has been 
on and off er er whatever since it was started by the nuclear weapon states 
because the idea was that if a country runs nuclear power reactors it can in 
principle obtain the material for weapons from the fuel rods that have to go 
into the pow-, the reactor but if the state that has produced the fuel takes 
these these fuel rods bage-, back back and then supplies fresh fuel rods then 
the country that runs just the nuclear power station won't get access to that 
material the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the c-, the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty the Partial Test Ban Treaty is no problem that's been signed 
and ratified the C-T-B-T has huge political problems attached to it the reason 
why the C-T-B-T is seen as a valuable arms control measure is that in order to 
build up a militarily useful nuclear arsenal it is necessary to test weapons 
and these tests in most countries still would have to be done physically which 
means er that if you restrict testing then you put a break into the development 
cycle or nuclear er technology weapons technology er however not only the so-
called rogue state or rogue states which the U-S called them tends to call 
rogue states but also the U-S haven't signed the er ratified the C-T-B-T yet 
remains to be seen whether that will be done and just one example for a nuclear 
weapons free zone was the Treaty of Tlatelolco which is always a tongue breaker 
er signed in which established a nuclear weapons free zone for Latin America in 
nineteen-sixty-eight now a lot of the problems associated with nuclear nuclear 
technology is there 
a problem 
sm1165: could you put the last one back up please 
nm1163: [laughter] you had so much time can't believe it i've been rambling on 
for ages hurry up i've got a few more got it right the problems with er nuclear 
weapons or nuclear material are essentially the same problems that you 
encounter with biological and chemical weapons now i've talked about that 
already briefly so i don't need to er go into that at great length er 
biological chemical and nuclear weapons share one characteristic which is that 
the central ingredient the central ingredient which causes the harm is dual use 
it's used for all sorts of purposes a nuclear reactor can be built in such a 
way or run in such a way that it just produces energy but it can also be run in 
such a way that it produces uranium and plutonium er it's particularly the 
uranium which you would need for building nuclear weapons now by making nuclear 
material accessible and usable you always run the risk that you cannot survey 
the use of that 
material adequately and actually check whether it's not going to be diverted in 
small amounts biological and chemical weapons you have essentially the same 
problem anyone who would want to start a lab in which biological weapons are to 
be produced essentially only needs to contact some farming supplier here and 
get the bacteria he or she wants and then start a production line for 
particular toxins for particular microbes things that that are not which are 
not very difficult to get you can you can buy cheaply and then produce in 
massive amounts chemical weapons very similar issue a lot of the er chemical or 
a lot of the elements which go into er chemical weapons are used in agriculture 
or in all sorts of other industries with civilian application now the real 
problem arises when we think about how biological chemical or even nuclear 
weapons are might be distributed and the most attractive means of doing that is 
by missiles now since the end of the 
nineteen-eighties ballistic missiles have ba-, ballistic missile technology 
which is also very largely dual use technology has been proliferating quite 
widely to a number of countries particularly er in west south and east Asia the 
three main treaties we have at the moment which are trying to sort of contain 
this are the ones listed here biological weapons convention the main problem as 
i said is that there is no there are no verification procedures although the U-
S and Russia have an agreement by which the U-S is aiding Russia to reduce its 
biological weapons arsenal and destroy them which of course has the 
verification component attached to that most notorious problem is conventional 
arms control because a lot of them well all the main weapons exporters have an 
interest for industrial employment but particularly military reasons to 
maintain a defence industry now because they can't apart from the U-S they 
can't afford to build the weapons that 
would make defence production economical only for their own armed forces they 
have to export otherwise they have to change their defence policy entirely but 
of course once you start doing that there are a lot of links in the chain and 
there are a lot of links which may not be interested in exporting weapons in 
accordance with international treaties er government regulation and such like 
plus of course nobody really wants to be too open about what sort of weapon 
systems they have in their in their arsenal because they don't want to give 
away too much so all the attempts at reducing conventional weapons which are 
not in a in a context or which were not conceived in the Cold War context 
particularly here the Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty er which was signed 
in nineteen-ninety which reduced the arsenals of both blocks brought both 
blocks down which then of course entailed a host of different problems as to 
implementing the treaty when the two blocks 
disintegrated or the Warsaw Pact disintegrated all the other agreements are 
very very vague they are conventions they are aimed at at creating norms at er 
generating rules and voluntary adherence to rules the Wassenaar Agreement is 
essentially a follow on to the COCUM Agreement which the West had impl-, had 
instated to limit exports of high technol-, high military use technology to the 
Warsaw Pact er Wassenaar is not very different from that the U-N conventional 
weapons register problem here returns to the v-, register through national 
governments are voluntary and even if er a government returns only an empty 
sheet it doesn't it it counted as a return but it doesn't really enhance 
transparency but nevertheless the conventional weapons register is meant to 
enhance transparency code of conduct we will probably hear a bit more about in 
the future again which is essentially also a means of trying to stimulate norms 
just to make the i know i'm overrunning slightly just to 
make it complete these are a few examples of confi-, confidence and security 
building measures which as i said before are aimed at initiating a dialogue and 
building trust through talking to one another how far they are they can be in 
themselves an instabil-, or a stability increasing tool without any other 
ingredients is highly doubtful there has to be at least the initial will and 
that is often tied in with incentives as to what will be the actual gain out of 
negotiations er before anything substantive happens but the other examples are 
essentially the ones that i have mentioned already in other words exchange of 
observers well exe-, exchange of e-, exchange of observers is essentially it's 
it's tied in with the notification of military exercises er idea and that is if 
if one for example at the end of the Cold War if the Warsaw Pact exercised or 
NATO exercised each side NATO would send or would be invited to send observers 
to some of the exercises in the Warsaw Pact 
and the Warsaw Pact was invited to send some observers to NATO exercises only 
selected ones but at least a beginning now where do we go from here arms 
control has become a lot more complicated in the contemporary environment 
because we don't have the blocks any more well i can over overrun another five 
minutes but i don't think that would be a very good idea er the possibly most 
promising way of approaching arms control issues is really in a multilevel er 
set up that we don't only rely on international arms control measures but also 
on regional or try to simulate regional arms control and bilateral 
understanding between states that are at risk of accelerating arms races or 
running up or well engaging in an arms race in the first place one of the 
principal advantages of doing that would be that neighbours who need to talk to 
one another 
before any confidence can be built are actually then capable of sitting down 
together and trying to sort out their differences how much the international 
community can help in this if we look at south Asia then it's not enormously 
encouraging it may be that in some areas or some regions we will just have to 
wait until arms control becomes a possibility and that there isn't an awful lot 
that can be done what within the scholarly community has become a major issue 
in researching arms control is how norms can be established and particular 
norms in the international on the on an international level and how norms can 
be preserved so that what has already been gained for example in the context of 
nuclear arms control isn't going to be reversed er in the future so much for 
today thank you very much for your attention i do apologize for the rather 
accelerated speed at the end [laughter] shan't happen on Thursday