nm1163: if for some reason you [0.3] sort of get lost or want to know more 
about arms control which of course i assume that you will [0.8] er [0.2] Stuart 
Croft's Strategies of Arms Control is [0.2] a really good introduction [0.9] er 
and i think they have three copies in the library so [0.2] you should be able 
to take turns and actually [0.7] have a look at them [0.6] er [0.9] it sort of 
gives you a brief historical background and then goes into [0.3] Cold War arms 
control negotiations [0.5] and examines essentially the utility of arms control 
and [0.2] the question of [0.6] well is arms control [0.2] a completely futile 
concept or is it not [0.9] now the reason why he wrote the book [0.4] partly 
was because [1.4] namex [2.5] wrote a book called [0.5] who is [0.2] a member 
of the department now [0.4] wrote a book called er [0.8] House of Cards [0.5] 
in which he argues very strongly against [0.7] the ut-, u-, the usefulness of 
arms control [0.5] er [0.2] it was out of print for quite a long time but i 
hope that because he's joined the department [0.4] i mean for quite a long time 
a few years [0.8] i hope that because he's joined the 
department it should actually be available at least in the departmental library 
[1.1] but i haven't checked i must admit it just [0.4] occurred to me that i 
might er [0.3] that it might actually be available now as well [0.8] so you 
have two completely different perspectives Stuart Croft arguing well there is a 
there is a use there is some use to arms controls [0.3] and namex going no arms 
control it's all rubbish [0.4] it's a completely futile endeavour [1.1] i'm 
going to try to introduce you [1.3] to concepts of arms control [0.7] as they 
emerged [1.2] now as i said [0.3] last time [0.2] arms control and arms races 
[0.9] are [0.5] not [0.2] a phenomenon [0.6] that's really only limited to the 
Cold War [1.6] the reason why we have concentrated so much on [0.3] arms 
control during the Cold War [0.4] was simply because [0.7] we were d-, we were 
dealing with nuclear weapons which you know loads about now after attending the 
lecture last week [1.3] er [0.6] from a historical perspective arms races [0.5] 
existed [0.9] well since the [1.5] well since the beginning of time really [0.
6] one of the 
first er [0.7] arms control measures [0.6] was [1.1] p-, s-, [0.2] some po-, i 
forgot the name now [laugh] [0.2] this is very embarrassing [0.5] er outla-, 
outlawing the longbow [1.2] simply because there was the idea that er that was 
an [0.3] an immoral means of war [1.8] but then real arms control on a 
political level [0.3] er [0.2] on a on a more concerted level [0.5] you find 
before the worl-, the First World War [0.5] when [0.2] Russia and Britain both 
[0.2] tried to push through [0.6] er arms control [0.9] agendas and and 
translate them into actual policy [0.6] because [0.2] they s-, they feared the 
outbreak of a war [0.9] so the idea was if we try to cooperate on reducing 
levels of armament [0.4] we reduce the security dilemma [1.1] and therefore [0.
4] er war might actually not break out now there is [1.3] a false logic [0.2] 
to this argument but i get to that later [1.3] now between the wars [0.2] you 
had [0.2] two [1.1] broad categories of arms control one [0.5] the Geneva 
Conventions [0.5] which regulated the conduct of war [0.3] the way in which 
military equipment was used [0.4] military operations were conducted [0.4] how 
prisoners were to be 
treated how [0.2] which [0.2] er targets were illegitimate targets [0.6] how [0.
4] submarine warfare for example ought to be conducted or warfare at sea [0.7] 
er [0.9] all essentially aimed at regulating [0.3] the the conduct of mili-, 
the conduct of military operations [0.5] with a view to saving lives [0.3] 
destroying the enemy's [0.3] capabilities [0.5] but saving lives and those 
whose lives have been saved and be-, and those who became prisoner [0.6] were 
supposed to be treated in [0.3] a reasonably decent way [0.2] I-E not tortured 
et cetera et cetera [1.3] now [0.3] as such conventions often go [0.3] they 
weren't adhered to in the Second World War [1.2] er a great deal and [0.2] 
obviously you still have violations of these conventions [2.0] but then the 
question is might it not be a good [0.2] idea to just have them for the sake of 
being able to refer to them [1.0] the other [0.6] er major system was the 
Washington Naval Treaty System [0.6] in which [0.4] Britain and the U-S Japan 
and Germany [1.3] and France [0.3] when and other countries but th-, those four 
countries particularly [0.7] were meant to reduce their [0.2] i mean Germany 
after the First World War had [0.4] levels of armaments [0.2] or top levels of 
armaments imposed on its armed forces at at any rate [0.6] but they tried to 
come up with a system which would allow [0.6] all of them to have some sort of 
[0.3] armed forces or naval forces [0.6] but which would not exceed a specific 
tonnage [0.2] er the idea behind that being that [0.5] if you only have a 
certain [0.3] sort of size of ship you can only put [0.2] a certain amount [0.
2] of [0.5] weapons and and [0.2] well [0.5] weapons which which have s-, have 
limited capabilities on these ships [1.1] now [0.6] the Washington Treaty 
System also had a political dimension in that it [0.2] was meant to force the 
countries that were members of the Washington Naval Treaties [0.6] to talking 
to one another [0.6] and to try to reduce to try to address each other's 
security concerns [1.5] without [0.2] always only bean counting [0.2] but 
actually looking at what the political objectives were for each of these 
countries [0.8] as we know [1.0] er [0.2] the Washington [0.2] Treaty sys-, wa-,
Washington Naval Treaty System [0.6] did not do its job as [0.2] intended 
which 
is one of the reasons why [0.4] arms control [0.5] or i-, which is one example 
where arms control is sometimes dismissed as completely futile [6.2] now what 
what what are generally the aims [0.6] of arms control [2.1] i'll just look at 
them from the two main [0.4] perspectives [0.4] realist or neo-realist 
perspective and [0.2] the er [0.5] liberal or [0.2] neo-liberal perspective [2.
0] from a realist perspective [0.4] arms control [0.3] er is essentially meant 
to maintain [0.4] the balance of military power [1.8] I-E that if you [0.3] 
assume that [0.2] if ca-, that capabilities [0.2] it's particularly military 
capabilities [0.6] are what make a state powerful [1.3] then [0.5] if there is 
a balance of military power [0.8] if [0.4] none of the states [1.1] tied into 
this balance of power [0.4] is capable [0.6] of of [0.2] mustering the military 
capabilites which would allow it to attack another state [0.4] with the 
assumption that it would win the war [0.4] and that's generally assumed as one 
of the [0.2] principal [0.4] causes of a war [0.3] that if if there are [0.3] 
political [1.5] conflicts [0.6] and state A assumes that it could win a war 
against state B [0.8] then it is much 
more likely to actually go [0.2] and attack that state [0.2] than if it [0.2] 
has [0.4] capability reasons [0.2] to assume it won't win that war [1.2] so by 
maintaining the balance of military power [1.1] the assumption was that this 
could avoid [1.1] well would be the assum-, er [0.2] that that this could be [0.
4] s-, that this could avoid war [1.6] tied into that is obviously [0.2] 
managing [0.8] our old er [0.8] concept the security dilemma [1.8] not only 
with a view to avoiding the outbreak of war [0.4] er at any given level [0.7] 
but also [0.3] because [0.3] the security dilemma or or [0.2] the spiral 
implied in the concept of security dilemma [0.6] er [0.9] implies [0.2] defence 
expenditure [0.3] it's an economic burden [0.4] if [0.3] two of or more states 
[0.7] constantly respond to each other's [0.2] increasing armament levels [0.7] 
they will spend a lot of money on armed forces [0.9] and arms control measures 
[0.2] might be agreed upon [0.5] if each side considers [0.2] the defence 
expenditure far too high [0.6] for [0.4] its economic capabilities [0.3] or 
chooses to or or would desi-, would desire [1.1] to [0.2] spend [0.7] public 
money on [0.2] things other [0.3] than defence equipment [1.8] so from a 
systemic perspective you could say [0.5] if two two or more states [0.2] seek 
to balance [0.5] their cost-benefit equation in terms of military and economic 
security [0.5] they might engage [0.2] er in arms control [2.0] the problem 
with that is that if you only [0.2] reduce capabilities [0.7] then that doesn't 
in itself prevent war because obviously the capabilities themselves [0.9] do 
not cause war [0.4] it's the intentions which lie behind the capabilities [0.7] 
which [0.2] might [0.6] er [0.5] lead to war [0.8] so in a sense [0.5] and this 
is what [0.5] namex for example would argue [0.3] arms control leads you into a 
circular argument [0.6] because [1.0] since it's not the capabilities which 
cause war but political friction [1.8] and [0.3] as i will [0.3] explain later 
you need trust in order to establish arms control measures [1.2] by the time 
you actually would [0.4] want to go for arms control measures [0.5] it's quite 
likely that the states with whom you want to control your weaponry [0.7] are 
not prepared to trust you [0.2] therefore they are not going to negotiate with 
you [0.3] so it doesn't make any sense whatsoever [1.4] and [0.9] 
if there is the trust and if there is negotiations are negotiations and if 
there are [0.2] there is a preparedness in principle [0.5] to cooperate [0.7] 
politically [0.9] then you don't need to avoid war [1.0] so you don't need to 
control arms [1.0] that would be [0.2] one of the [1.1] sort of perspectives on 
arms control which which [0.5] basically says arms control [0.2] doesn't do 
anything for anyone [0.4] including for [0.4] the stability in regions or the 
international system [1.8] now from a more liberal perspective [0.5] the 
argument would be [1.0] the central [2.3] benefit [0.3] of arms control 
negotiations [0.9] is that they can come up with rules [0.2] and norms of 
behaviour [1.5] and [0.2] as you will see later in the context of nuclear [0.5] 
er [0.4] weapons [0.2] and prolifera-, er well nuclear weapons regulation [1.5] 
that was a particularly [0.2] prevalent argument [2.3] partly [1.4] er a 
liberal perspective of course is or this this idea that you can generate rules 
and norms of behaviour [1.2] er [0.2] in the er on the on an international 
level or on a regional level [0.2] through arms control [0.3] that is tied in 
[0.4] with the idea that [0.4] 
weapons will only be be used as a last resort [0.5] only if everything else has 
failed or if war is about to be pressed upon a state [0.9] then [0.3] a liberal 
state [0.3] would [0.2] find it necessary to defend itself [0.6] but it would 
not necessarily advocate the use of force [0.9] in order [0.7] for for 
aggressive purposes [0.6] now whether that still holds [0.5] in today's 
environment where the use of force and the conditions for the use of force [0.
4] are changing [1.3] is a different question [2.0] er [0.7] a liberal 
perspective would furthermore [0.2] emphasize the economic [0.2] prosperity 
aspects of security building mechanisms [0.7] er more than [1.4] only to a [0.
2] limited degree but more than [0.4] defence expenditure because [0.2] there 
is [0.9] liberals tend to see more of a trade-off between creating stability 
and security [0.3] through economic means [0.5] and the ability [0.2] to [0.3] 
preserve military or security by military means [1.3] so from that perspective 
[1.5] cooperation becomes more of a possibility even if [0.5] this cooperation 
is seen [0.3] essentially also as a means to fend off [0.5] external threats [0.
2] which [0.2] the 
international environment might throw at the state [2.9] but that then leads [0.
7] in an argumentative line to [0.3] the idea that economic gains through 
interdependence are preferable [0.2] to [0.5] using military means [0.3] for 
the condu-, conduct of international politics [0.8] that peaceful conflict 
resolution is er is essentially better than using force [0.5] and that [0.4] 
confidence and security building measures that's what this [0.3] abbreviation 
means [1.0] are a means [0.3] of arms control in the sense that they control 
the will to use arms [0.5] rather than [0.3] on the fir-, in the first place [0.
2] the capabilities which the er [0.3] weapons [0.4] on each side convey [0.6] 
sm1164: so what does C 
nm1163: sorry 
sm1164: C-S-B-M stand for 
nm1163: confidence and security building measures [3.2] sometimes you might 
find this also as just C-B-M [0.3] which is confidence building measures [6.6] 
now how is arm-, arms control conducted [2.5] or what are the instruments of 
arms control [2.7] 
much arms control happens on a state to state level [1.5] since the end of the 
[1.0] Cold War [0.9] there is quite a lot of arms control [0.3] which [0.2] 
needs to happen in [0.2] in the context of [0.8] conflict resolution or 
resolution of conflicts in intra-state wars [1.3] but that's a slightly 
separate issue [1.7] now [0.5] arms can be controlled nationally [0.5] simply 
by a state imposing or a government imposing export controls [1.2] we'll find 
that in the [0.2] nuclear [0.4] er non-proliferation regime [0.8] er you find 
[0.2] i i briefly touched upon that er in the context of [0.2] dual use goods 
[0.5] you found that although it doesn't always work or very often doesn't work 
[0.5] er with regard to [0.7] nat states [0.2] that have a strong defence 
industry but also [0.6] at least would like to pursue [0.5] a policy which [0.
3] doesn't [0.5] send arms into [0.2] already conflict ridden regions [0.3] 
watched through government sanction [0.7] that they impose export controls [0.
2] temporary export controls [1.5] and they are then this is then essentially a 
policy of unilateral restraint [1.8] unilateral restraint can also be imposed 
of course on 
the development of certain weapon systems [0.9] that [0.2] some states just 
decide not to go for [0.7] a particular weapon system or a particular 
technology [1.2] which of course is [0.4] a measure of arms control [4.0] once 
you go on to [0.2] sort of an international level [1.0] and if you want to [0.
7] try to [0.3] enshrine arms control measures [0.8] on that level [0.8] you 
have two options either [0.4] states agra-, agree on a bilateral basis to [0.4] 
reduce or control [0.8] arms [0.2] or their armaments [1.0] or they agree [0.7] 
on a bilateral level to [1.7] unilateral measures [0.2] that pro-, prohibit the 
pro-, the proliferation of certain technologies [1.7] or [0.3] you pursue a 
multilateral perspective which is [0.6] particularly [0.5] favoured for [0.3] 
non-proliferation regimes [2.5] now the difference between arms the [0.6] you 
could say that non-proliferation is a subsection of arms control [1.5] er just 
sort of [0.3] for for conceptual clarification [0.7] controlling arms 
essentially means controlling the level of armaments [0.8] non-proliferation 
means preventing the spread [0.2] of weapon systems or weapons 
technology [0.8] so there is [0.2] there is a slight difference but it's a [0.
2] significant difference between the two concepts [2.0] bilaterally and 
multinationally [0.4] er you have again different types of options you can 
either go for arms limitation [0.5] or arms reduction treaties [0.7] where the 
two sides agree to actually cut out [0.5] a whole class of weapons [2.9] there 
are arms or technology transfer controls or regimes [0.2] regimes being [0.4] 
multinational agreements which are then nationally implemented [0.5] and which 
impose on the the members of the regime a set of rules and norms [0.4] as to 
what they may and may not do [0.3] which in turn is meant [0.6] to make it more 
predictable for each of the members [1.0] to [0.4] know what [0.6] another 
member is likely to do [0.7] there are of course pitfalls to this but this is 
the [0.4] the positive [0.3] er [0.7] the the [0.4] perceived positive aspect 
of regime building [1.6] you can have weapons exclusion zones [0.2] where [0.4] 
for example nuclear weapons are [0.6] not not permitted or all the states in a 
particular zone [0.5] region [0.4] er agree not to acquire nuclear 
weapons [1.5] moratoria which well particularly [0.2] linked to nuclear weapons 
tests [0.8] or one state would [1.4] declare a moratorium on nuclear weapons 
testing [0.3] which of course puts [0.5] the other members of the nuclear [0.4] 
power community under pressure [0.4] if they also want to gain the moral high 
ground [0.3] that they might also [0.4] er [0.3] call for a moratorium on their 
[0.2] [0.4] weapons testing [0.9] and finally notification schemes which is 
essentially [0.5] well it's one core of confidence and security building 
measures [0.5] and that is [0.7] because [1.8] there is the assumption that 
capabilities [0.7] might be [0.7] might [0.2] well the the possession of 
capabilities might trigger [0.3] a war [1.2] and there is also from a 
conventional war perspective [0.3] still the very strong assumption that 
surprise attack is always [0.2] better for the aggressor [0.5] than [1.1] sort 
of giving away too much [0.7] now [0.2] the reason why exercises and [0.2] well 
exercises became an issue of notification schemes for exercises became an issue 
[0.6] was that [0.2] if [0.2] armies exercise [0.2] armies the air forces 
navies [2.4] a potentially 
hostile [0.5] state [0.9] in the case of NATO and Warsaw Pact if NATO exercises 
the Warsaw Pact would look at NATO's exercises and go [0.5] well what are they 
planning to do might they actually be tempted to attack us now [0.7] but if 
there is early notification of what sort of exercises are going to be conducted 
[0.7] er [0.9] not what exactly they are going to [0.2] exercise but [0.4] how 
many soldiers or troops are going to be moved [0.2] base-, [0.4] how long the 
exercise is going to [0.5] er [0.2] going to be [0.5] then the other side has 
some sort of reasonable [0.2] way of assessing this exercise is just a pretence 
for [0.3] an aggressive act or not [0.6] now this is actually quite that that 
this was actually quite important during the Cold War because er [0.5] NATO [0.
7] in fact did launch [1.1] a missile as part of its exercise but that missile 
went astray [0.6] and the Soviet Union wasn't sure whether that was an attack 
or not [0.5] and [0.2] because they had good communications [0.6] that meant 
that the that nothing [0.3] worse than er just a small little blip happened [0.
9] it could have been [0.2] otherwise 
if there hadn't been [0.9] a way of notifying each other of this [0.7] and then 
for the Soviet Union to actually assure [0.4] that this was not an aggressive 
act [2.0] now how effective can arms control be [2.0] if you have treaties on a 
government to government level [0.7] whether they are [0.4] multilateral or 
bilateral [1.7] they constitute then international law but that means [0.4] the 
implementation [0.3] of the treaty [0.4] depends on [0.3] each [0.2] government 
[2.3] which poses a bit of a problem [0.7] because [0.3] yes governments agree 
to control or limit their [0.2] their military arsenals [0.4] but how does 
government A know [0.4] that governments B C and D [0.4] are actually complying 
with the commitment they entered into [0.3] in the treaty [4.3] the second 
issue is [0.4] therefore [0.4] that there has to be a degree of transparency [0.
5] in the arms control process [0.5] now transparency really has two functions 
[0.5] when it's talked about in the context of arms control [0.5] one is [0.5] 
that during arms control treaty negotiations [0.2] each side [0.3] is tasked 
with [0.4] putting [0.3] its capabilities [0.7] more or less accurately on 
the table [0.4] they have [0.2] because they know the other side has been 
spying on them [0.9] so they can't be completely off the mark [0.9] so in a 
sense during the arms control negotiations they will try to tease out of each 
other [0.4] what [0.4] they have [1.6] the other [0.6] aspect of transparency 
is when it comes to implementing the arms control [0.4] treaty that they have 
just agreed on [1.6] er [0.2] and that is that [1.1] whatever arms control 
measures have been agreed upon [0.5] that should actually be [0.5] verifiable 
and be made transparent [1.1] by [0.8] a multinational observer group or by [0.
3] er a small group [0.5] of the opposite state [1.3] now that doesn't always 
happen [0.4] and there are actually a lot of arms control treaties which [0.6] 
while still regarded valuable [0.6] but which don't have either verification or 
transparency measures [0.6] in that sense built into them [2.1] particularly 
with regard to nuclear biological and chemical weapons the irreversibility [0.
7] of the arms control measures [0.2] has gained [1.0] very high priority in [0.
2] any [0.2] sort of arms control negotiations but of 
course [0.4] particularly with regard to [0.4] nuclear and biological weapons 
where we have had most movement [2.1] so transparency and verification are two 
essential components of arms control measures [0.8] because [0.2] yes [0.5] you 
can say we have to trust each other [1.2] but then [0.6] checking [0.2] whether 
it's worth trusting the other side is of course better [0.5] than [0.6] er [0.
7] just believing it [0.7] and if the other side is compliant [0.6] then that 
generates more trust which might in turn [0.3] lead to more [0.6] arms control 
measures [0.4] if everything goes well [1.0] and it often doesn't [6.3] now [1.
3] you may recall that i mentioned on the side [1.9] some time ago [0.9] that 
the Cuban Missile Crisis was [1.6] an important turning point in the way in 
which [0.4] nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the U-S was 
conducted [1.0] now why was it so essential [0.4] it was essential because it 
showed [0.6] the two sides that they had no quick means of talking to one 
another [0.9] that if anything happened if any nuclear accident happened [0.8] 
they couldn't they would have to go through each other's 
embas-, er so through [0.3] yeah their embassies [0.7] and or each other's 
embassies [0.4] to then [0.2] and send [1.0] letters by diplomatic post [0.3] 
which is quicker than if they if it went by normal post but still [0.4] it 
takes a little while [0.5] and when when when we're talking about nuclear 
weapons and you didn't want to take that long [0.7] er [1.0] so [0.3] the the 
need to actually be able to pick up the phone [0.2] and [0.3] talk to one 
another became [0.4] a hugely important aspect [0.2] of [0.4] the way arms 
control negotiations started [0.8] and it was really the first agreement that 
was that was implemented in nineteen- [0.8] sixty-three [0.5] meant they had a 
direct line between [0.3] the Kremlin and the White House [1.1] following [0.9] 
that [0.6] er we had several different measures which were meant to prevent [0.
4] or [0.2] ha-, [0.2] er [0.3] were were were included [0.4] er notification 
about nuclear accidents [0.4] accidents at sea [0.8] er [1.1] the Limited Test 
Band treaty [0.6] and [0.5] from [0.2] nineteen-sixty-nine onwards [0.2] the 
two sides of the U-S and the Soviet Union [0.5] engaged in what became known as 
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [1.4] now [1.3] i mentioned 
SALT as [0.2] an issue which the Europeans saw [0.2] with some trepidation [0.
9] because as i said the negotiations went on between the U-S and the Soviet 
Union [0.4] and didn't include either the European Warsaw Pact members or the 
European [0.5] er NATO members [1.0] so the worry on the part of the Europeans 
was [0.4] that the U-S and the Soviet Union might actually break out to a 
degree [0.7] of of [0.8] their alliance well pa-, [0.3] particularly for the 
for the [0.2] er European NATO members that was the concern [1.1] and that 
therefore the U-S might find a settlement which enhanced its own security [0.6] 
through [0.2] nuclear arms control [1.4] but also made it less likely that so-, 
that the U-S would intervene [0.2] or would come to the aid of NATO Europe [0.
4] if there was Soviet attack [2.9] what it did do [0.6] apart from the U-S 
then having to reiterate its point that it [0.5] wouldn't [0.2] er [0.9] defect 
[1.8] what SALT-one did [0.7] was [0.3] more a political achievement than an 
actual military achievement because it started [0.3] a process of arms control 
negotiations which lasted through 
the entire nineteen-seventies [0.6] was then interrupted for about [0.2] five 
years [0.6] because the Cold War [0.2] became colder again [0.8] and [0.6] was 
then taken up [0.5] really where SALT-two had left it [0.5] in the start 
negotiations about which i will tell you [0.2] briefly [0.2] in a minute [1.8] 
a central treaty [0.2] er [0.7] linked to SALT-one was the A-B-M Treaty the er 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [1.1] that was central [1.3] because it enshrined 
[2.0] the rationale that the [0.2] well [0.2] the the rationale which the U-S 
had favoured for [1.1] a long time [0.9] that nuclear deterrence should be b-, 
based on authentic capability [1.1] with the A-, with the signing of the A-B-M 
Treaty which allowed [0.4] the Soviet Union and the U-S to build [0.3] anti-
ballistic missile defences [0.4] around [0.3] first only [0.2] one site each 
and then two sites [0.3] er [0.8] in in the respective country [1.3] with the 
Soviet Union signing this treaty they basically said yes [0.3] defence against 
nuclear weapons is not possible [0.7] therefore or it's not affordable either 
[0.4] therefore we are going to join you in building our capabilities [0.4] or 
building deterrents on [1.1] on offensive capabilities [1.0] and [0.5] this is 
[0.2] essentially seen as the principal [0.3] stability enhancing quality of 
the A-B-M Treaty [0.4] now the reason i'm going on about this [0.6] is that [0.
2] at the moment and f-, [0.2] during the entire nineteen-nineties [0.6] the U-
S [0.4] has [0.8] pursued [0.3] and is [0.2] seriously thinking [0.3] about [0.
4] deploying [0.3] a national ballistic missile defence system [1.0] and you 
have the same arguments [0.2] over again [0.5] as to what a national ballistic 
missile defence system will do [0.5] for international and for European se-, 
security [0.9] because if the sov-, if the U-S can can [0.5] defend itself [0.
7] is it likely to actually [0.4] come to the aid of allies [1.2] 
for the allies it means [0.2] are they going to spend their money on [0.3] a 
European ballistic missile defence system [0.4] which will also give them some 
degree [0.3] some limited capability to f-, to defend themselves against [0.6] 
missiles now no longer coming from well [0.4] now the assumption is no longer 
that it that they primarily come from the Soviet un-, from [0.2] well the 
successors of the Soviet Union [1.1] but [0.7] because Iraq Korea [0.2] and 
well [0.2] several mid-, Middle Eastern states and several [0.9] asia-, er east 
Asian states [0.5] have started [0.7] building ballistic missiles which have 
now by now a medium range capability [0.6] and the assumption is that well we 
need a ballistic missile defence system because [0.5] these states are 
otherwise going to attack us [0.6] now how serious this threat is [0.4] is [0.
2] a hugely controversial issue [1.1] they may have these capabilities but they 
may not want to attack [0.3] Europe [0.7] and [0.4] is a ballistic missile 
defence system not an invitation [0.6] for [0.3] one of these states that is 
pursuing [0.2] ballistic missile development [1.0] to actually try and 
penetrate [0.2] this ballistic missile defence system [0.7] how secure can it 
be [0.2] do you need a hundred per cent security or do you need [0.2] eighty 
per cent security [0.7] what if you feel secure [0.2] under your ballistic 
missile defence system [0.7] and have spent loads of money [0.2] on the [0.2] 
on that but you don't have any money for other defensive measures [0.8] so it's 
an it's an enormously [0.4] important issue [0.6] which you will hear of [0.4] 
much more [0.4] if you read the newspaper [0.3] and if er George W Bush is 
becoming president because he has already said that he will definitely deploy 
[0.5] Clinton earlier this year [0.4] er [0.9] took back the earlier decision 
that [0.3] the uni-, that the the U-S will definitely get a ballistic a 
national ballistic missile defence system [0.8] Gore [0.2] is basically 
pursuing a Clinton line [0.5] but Bush has said we're going to go for it [0.4] 
what that does for European defence [0.6] is an issue we really need to think 
about [2.8] hence [0.2] the A-B-M Treaty [0.2] being a very important [1.6] 
historical relic [0.5] 
and Russia i should [0.2] add that just just for [0.3] your full information [0.
5] Russia is seriously against [0.5] any deployment of ballistic missile 
defence systems they [0.6] there there have been talks as to what how they 
might cooperate on this er or not but Russia clings very much to [0.5] the idea 
that the A-B-M Treaty is really unviable [0.9] er unvialable [1.1] er [0.6] 
going back to SALT SALT re-, [0.2] limited really [0.2] the deployment [0.2] 
the number of deployments [0.4] of medium range missiles [0.5] these were 
missiles which were no longer going to be produced but they just agreed that 
they [0.3] that they were essentially it was essentially outdated technology by 
the time [0.6] but they agreed that they would no longer [0.3] er develop them 
and deploy them [0.7] it didn't have any verification measures apart from [1.1] 
national technical means which is essentially [0.2] spy planes or spy 
satellites [1.0] er [1.4] and there were no observer missions or anything built 
into this but the idea that they [0.2] were talking about arms control [0.3] 
was already seen as [0.6] one mean a one one positive step forward [0.6] 
SALT-two went a lot further [0.3] but was never ratified [0.2] because the 
Soviet Union [0.3] invaded Afghanistan [0.5] and U-S Congress then [0.3] 
refused to ratify the treaty [1.2] following the invasion of Afghanistan 
obviously [0.3] as you all know the Cold War became a lot colder [1.7] so it 
took until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev [0.7] to start [1.2] some new 
approach to arms control [3.6] some people [0.4] argue that it was really 
Ronald Reagan's massive build up of nuclear and [0.3] conventional capabilities 
[0.8] of the U-S forces [0.8] which escalated as you all know in [0.3] the S-D-
I [0.6] proposal [0.5] which is essentially the precursor [0.4] to the 
ballistic missile defence systems we are talking about now [2.4] so some people 
would argue that er [1.4] Ronald Reagan out [0.7] procured [0.5] outarmed [0.7] 
the Soviet Union [0.8] others [0.2] would say and [1.2] i think they have a 
stronger case to make [1.2] that [0.2] Gorbachev's [0.2] policy swing towards 
reasonable sufficiency in [0.5] Soviet defence [0.8] planning and Soviet 
defence spending [1.1] was a major step forward which enabled [0.3] nuclear [0.
5] arms reductions [1.2] reasonable 
sufficiency was essentially a policy which went back [0.2] from [0.4] we have 
to have massive forces [0.8] in [0.2] any conceivable theatre that we might 
have to fight in [0.8] to well how much do we actually need [0.4] given the 
political situation surrounding us [0.7] given that we are pursuing a policy [0.
5] that is meant to build friendly relations with all our neighbours [0.3] and 
you can see that on the policy level that the Soviet Union went out and [0.5] 
and [0.4] started [0.8] rebuilding trust between [0.2] itself and its 
neighbours [1.1] not least in order to [0.9] have external stability [0.3] for 
[0.2] dome-, domestic political and economic reform [1.4] er [0.2] and that was 
[0.3] these [0.3] diplomatic [1.5] er [0.8] for-, forays [0.8] where [1.0] 
replicated on the military level [0.7] by [0.3] er [0.9] a new design of the 
defence of defence policy which would use defence spending [0.5] and went for 
[0.3] smaller amount of forces [2.5] you also have Gorbachev [0.2] pro-, er [0.
3] suggesting in various fora [1.0] conventional arms reductions [0.7] now the 
West didn't take that too seriously for quite a long time [0.4] because the 
arms reductions he proposed [0.4] 
essentially concerned [0.7] weapons systems which were outdated [1.1] such as 
[0.2] small submarines in the Baltic sea [2.7] but START-one [0.4] which the U-
S and and then still the Soviet Union [0.3] signed in nineteen-ninety and was 
then ratified in nineteen-ninety-two [0.7] was [0.5] A an extension of the 
concept started in [0.2] the SALT treaties [0.5] I-E that launcher systems and 
platforms would be reduced [0.3] not nuclear warheads [0.7] that became an 
issue soon after START-one was signed [1.5] but it was the first treaty which 
really significantly reduced [0.7] nuclear [1.1] long range or strategic [0.3] 
er launch platforms [0.9] in nineteen- [1.6] ninety-five you also have the er 
well they agreed [0.3] to reduce [1.0] no nineteen-eighty-seven sorry [0.5] 
wrong wrong date [0.4] they agreed on er [0.3] a complete reduction [0.2] or a 
comp-, comp-, complete elimination [0.4] of intermediate nuclear forces [0.5] 
which er was the first time ever that a whole class of weapons [0.2] was going 
to be abolished [1.8] now [0.4] START-one [0.2] as much as it was a positive 
development soon ran into an enormous problem because what [0.2] they had of 
course 
not [0.5] contended with was that the Soviet Union would collapse [1.0] now i 
said earlier if you have government to government treaties [0.5] or any sort of 
international treaty then it is up t-, up to [0.5] the government [0.4] which 
[0.2] has signed the treaty to implement the treaty [1.3] now with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union in nineteen-ninety-two [0.4] you had all of a sudden [0.2] 
Russia [0.3] Ukraine [0.2] Khazakhstan [0.4] and [1.4] who else [0.5] Belarus 
[0.6] er with nuclear weapons on their territory [1.1] they then needed to be 
brought into the fold [0.4] in a series of other negotiations [0.9] so that 
they would actually ship back [0.6] Soviet built nuclear missiles [0.3] to 
Russia [0.3] where they could then be [0.7] where they could then be er 
destroyed [1.0] START-two [0.2] foresaw reductions down to three-thousand 
warheads on each side well two-thousand-five-hundred to three-thousand [0.5] on 
each side [0.3] and was not ratified by Russia for a very long time [0.3] they 
dragged their feet until [0.7] April two-thou of this year [0.5] until they 
finally er decided to [0.4] to er [0.9] to ratify the Duma [1.8] the reasons 
for 
that are hugely complicated very technical and er i'm not going to go into them 
[0.4] but [0.8] only [0.8] what a few days ago [0.7] er [0.2] Putin [0.3] 
proposed a new round of arms control negotiations [0.4] which [0.3] er worked 
[0.2] well which are to be aimed at reducing [0.3] the level of nuclear 
warheads on each side down to [0.4] one-thousand [0.3] er which would be very 
significant [0.4] START-three they've talked about two-thousand [1.1] so far 
but [0.2] if they go for a thousand then that would be a further step forward 
[2.7] multinational arms control or international arms control [5.5] the core 
[0.2] of the nuclear non-proliferation regime is obviously the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty [2.0] it is to be [1.7] over well [0.7] the I-A-E-A the 
International Atomic Energy Agency which is [0.2] associated with the U-N [1.4] 
is not a verification agency [0.3] in terms of [0.4] an agency which could [0.
5] prevent [0.6] nuclear weapons from deve-, from being developed [0.6] but it 
is a a verification agency which assesses whether [0.6] the countries that are 
members and have agreements which its with its inspectors [1.0] 
whether they are using nuclear material [0.3] for the purposes that they have 
committed themselves to [0.3] I-E [0.2] not for military purposes [0.7] the I-A-
E-A in essence is an audit organization [0.5] which checks the books [1.0] of 
all in all the [0.2] er installations for which it has er [0.3] access rights 
[0.8] but it doesn't ca-, cannot prevent [1.0] nuclear weapons development [0.
5] it's been [0.2] recently earlier in [0.2] this [0.3] er in in in the last 
decade [1.1] it has been strengthened [1.2] but it still has only very limited 
[0.6] er [1.2] limited access rights [1.1] the central deal in the N-P-T [0.6] 
was that the four [1.4] five [0.9] permanent members of the security council [0.
4] all of whom had nuclear weapons by the time [0.4] the N-P-T [0.4] was er 
agreed upon in nineteen-sixty-seven [1.8] that they would [0.4] give access [0.
7] to nuclear [0.2] material and technology for the pa-, production of power [0.
8] er electricity [0.8] and any other peaceful purposes medical use for example 
[0.4] er [0.2] or in agriculture [0.5] they would give access to this 
information and to this material to all the members [0.4] of the N-P-T which 
joined the N-P-T [0.9] but these 
members had to commit themselves to not [0.5] procuring nuclear weapons [1.3] I-
E the trade-off was we abstain from nuclear weapons [0.5] if you give us 
nuclear technology [0.6] it's significant to remember that at the time nuclear 
[0.2] power was seen as [0.4] one of the major potential motors [0.4] for [0.3] 
development [0.4] in [0.2] lesser developed countries [0.8] because [1.2] you 
could produce a lot of power out of very very [0.3] little material [0.4] now 
if the investment [0.4] in nuclear power has turned out to be [0.3] enormously 
expensive [0.4] in financial terms [0.4] and of course there are [0.2] serious 
risks associated with the use of nuclear power [1.5] in turn [1.1] the [0.3] 
the P-five [0.9] so-called nuclear weapons states [0.7] committed themselves in 
article six [0.2] to working towards [0.6] early nuc-, com-, early and complete 
nuclear disarmament at the [0.9] earliest possible time [0.7] now their article 
six commitment [0.4] has become [0.5] an even more contentious issue than it 
was [0.4] soon after it became apparent that [0.3] the P-five had no intention 
to really seriously go towards zero [0.9] during the Cold War [0.6] since the 
end 
of the Cold War [0.9] they have come under a lot more pressure [0.4] from 
countries [0.4] which used to belong to the non-alliant movement [0.9] er [0.3] 
trying to force them into [0.4] actually [1.1] making serious steps towards [0.
5] complete nuclear disarmament [1.5] the N-P-T is not the only element of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime [0.6] national measures have also been taken 
by those countries that had advanced nuclear [0.5] er [0.2] had access to or 
developed nuclear technology [0.6] and they [1.2] these measures are are sort 
of can be subsumed under nuclear suppliers regulations [0.6] the London Club 
has come up with a list of trigger technologies [0.4] which are supposed to be 
subjected to particularly stringent export controls [0.6] and for which 
licenses have to be er [0.4] er [0.4] well obtained before they can be exported 
[0.3] and they have committed themselves not to export any [0.3] weapons 
related [0.2] er technologies to non-weapon states [0.9] 
and you have regional regul-, er regulations so you have s-, er a multitier 
system [0.5] in the form of EUROTOM associated with [0.3] the E-U [5.5] finally 
[0.9] you have [0.4] as i already said on the national level ex-, [0.2] 
national export controls which are not tied into [0.5] er a wider system [0.4] 
and a so-called fuel takeback policy which has been on and off [0.4] er [0.2] 
er [0.2] whatever since it [0.3] was started [0.5] by the nuclear weapon states 
[0.9] because the idea was that [0.5] if [2.7] a country runs [0.2] nuclear 
power reactors it can in principle [0.3] obtain the material for weapons [0.5] 
from the fuel rods that have to go into the pow-, the reactor [0.6] but if the 
state that has produced the fuel [0.4] takes these these fuel rods bage-, [0.2] 
back back [0.4] and then supplies [0.3] fresh fuel rods [0.4] then [0.2] the 
country that runs just the nuclear power station won't get access to that 
material [2.9] the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the c-, the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty the Partial Test Ban Treaty is no problem that's been signed 
and ratified [0.5] the C-T-B-T [1.1] has [0.3] huge [1.4] political [0.2] 
problems attached to it [0.7] the reason why the C-T-B-T is seen as a valuable 
[0.9] arms control measure [0.3] is that in order to build up a militarily 
useful nuclear arsenal [0.7] it is necessary to test [0.2] weapons [0.8] and [1.
4] these tests in most countries still would have to be done physically [0.4] 
which means [0.8] er [0.7] that if you restrict [0.2] testing [0.9] then [0.6] 
you put a break [0.3] into the development cycle [0.2] or [0.2] nuclear [0.4] 
er technology [0.5] weapons technology [0.9] er however not only the so-called 
rogue state or [0.7] rogue states which the U-S called them tends to call rogue 
states [0.5] but also the U-S haven't signed [0.3] the er ratified the C-T-B-T 
yet [0.6] remains to be seen whether that will be done [1.3] and just one 
example for a nuclear weapons free zone was the Treaty of Tlatelolco [1.1] 
which is always a tongue breaker [0.8] er signed in [0.3] which established a 
nuclear weapons free zone for Latin America [0.4] in nineteen-sixty-eight [6.9] 
now a lot of the problems [0.9] associated with nuclear [0.6] nuclear 
technology [4.1] is there 
a problem [0.2] 
sm1165: could you put the last one back up please [1.1] 
nm1163: [laughter] you had so much time [1.0] can't believe it i've been 
rambling on for ages [12.9] hurry up i've got a few more [7.5] got it [2.1] 
right [0.7] the problems with er [2.2] nuclear weapons [0.2] or nuclear 
material [0.3] are essentially the same problems that you encounter with 
biological and chemical weapons [0.3] now i've talked about that already [0.2] 
briefly so i don't need to [0.5] er go into that [0.7] at great length er [1.2] 
biological chemical and nuclear [0.4] weapons [0.7] share one characteristic 
which is [0.4] that the central [1.2] ingredient the central ingredient which 
causes the harm [1.0] is dual use [1.7] it's used for [0.7] all sorts of 
purposes [0.2] a nuclear reactor can be built in such a way or run in such a 
way [0.3] that it just produces energy [0.6] but it can also be run [0.3] in 
such a way that it produces [0.3] uranium and plutonium [0.5] er it's 
particularly the uranium which [0.4] you would [0.2] need for building nuclear 
weapons [1.4] now [0.4] by [0.7] making nuclear material accessible [0.5] and 
usable [0.6] you always run the risk that [0.4] you cannot survey [0.2] the use 
of that 
material [0.8] adequately and actually check whether it's not going to be 
diverted in small amounts [3.2] biological and chemical weapons you have 
essentially the same problem [0.7] anyone who [0.8] would want to start a lab 
[0.8] in which [1.4] biological weapons are to be produced [1.1] essentially 
only needs to contact some farming supplier here [1.0] and get [1.4] the 
bacteria [0.5] he or she wants [0.7] and then start a production line [0.2] for 
particular toxins [0.5] for particular [0.6] microbes [1.7] things that that 
are not [2.5] which are not very difficult to get [0.6] you can [0.4] you can 
buy cheaply and then produce [0.5] in massive amounts [1.2] chemical weapons 
very similar issue a lot of the er [0.2] chemical or a lot of the elements 
which go into [1.1] er chemical weapons [0.4] are used [0.4] in agriculture or 
in all sorts of other industries [0.2] with civilian application [1.0] now the 
real problem arises when [0.9] we think about how biological chemical or even 
nuclear weapons are [0.6] might be distributed [0.8] and the most attractive 
means of doing that is [0.3] by missiles [0.7] now since the end of the 
nineteen-eighties [0.4] ballistic missiles [0.2] have [0.9] ba-, ballistic 
missile technology which is also very largely dual use technology [0.7] has 
been proliferating [1.1] quite widely [0.7] to a number of countries [0.5] 
particularly [0.2] er in west south [0.4] and east Asia [1.7] the three main [0.
2] treaties we have at the moment which are trying to sort of contain this [0.
7] are the ones listed here [1.6] biological weapons convention the main 
problem as i said is [0.2] that there is no [0.2] there are no verification 
procedures [0.8] although the U-S and [0.3] Russia have an agreement [0.4] by 
which the U-S [0.4] is aiding Russia to reduce its [0.2] biological weapons 
arsenal [0.4] and destroy them which of course has the verification component 
attached to that [2.8] most notorious problem is conventional arms control [3.
1] because a lot of them well [0.2] all the main [0.6] weapons exporters [0.8] 
have an interest [0.9] for industrial employment but particularly [0.5] 
military reasons to maintain a defence industry [1.3] now because they can't [0.
2] apart from the U-S [0.7] they can't afford to build [1.1] the weapons that 
would make defence production economical [1.0] only for their own armed forces 
[0.5] they have to export [1.2] otherwise they have to change their defence 
policy entirely [2.5] but of course once you start doing that [0.7] there are a 
lot of links in the chain [1.3] and there are a lot of links [0.6] which may [0.
2] not be interested in [0.4] exporting weapons in accordance with 
international treaties [0.6] er government regulation and such like [1.1] plus 
of course nobody really wants to be too open about what sort of [0.4] weapon 
systems they have in their [0.5] in their arsenal [0.7] because they don't want 
to give away too much [1.9] so [1.0] all the attempts at reducing [0.4] 
conventional weapons [0.9] which are not in a [0.7] in a context [0.2] or which 
were not conceived in the Cold War context [1.0] particularly here the 
Conventional Forces of Europe Treaty er which was signed in nineteen-ninety [1.
1] which reduced [0.9] the arsenals of [0.2] both blocks [0.4] brought both 
blocks down [0.5] which then of course entailed a host of different problems [0.
6] as to implementing the treaty when the two blocks 
disintegrated or the Warsaw Pact disintegrated [1.8] all the other agreements 
[0.2] are very very vague [0.7] they are [0.3] conventions they are aimed at at 
creating norms [0.6] at [1.0] er generating rules and voluntary adherence to 
rules [0.7] the Wassenaar Agreement [0.7] is essentially a follow on to the 
COCUM Agreement which the West had impl-, had instated [0.5] to limit exports 
of high technol-, high military [0.2] use technology [0.5] to the Warsaw Pact 
[1.0] er Wassenaar is [0.3] not very different from that [0.9] the U-N 
conventional weapons register [0.4] problem here [0.7] returns to the v-, 
register through national governments are voluntary [0.7] and even if [0.2] er 
a government returns only an empty sheet [0.6] it doesn't [0.7] it it counted 
as a return [0.3] but it doesn't really enhance transparency [0.5] but [0.2] 
nevertheless the conventional weapons register is meant to enhance transparency 
[1.1] code of conduct we will probably hear [0.2] a bit more about [1.2] in the 
future again [0.6] which is essentially also a means of trying to [0.5] 
stimulate norms [3.7] just to make the [0.6] i know i'm overrunning slightly [0.
5] just to 
make it complete [2.8] these are a few examples of confi-, confidence and 
security building measures [3.1] which as i said before are aimed at initiating 
a dialogue [0.2] and [0.7] building trust through talking to one another [1.6] 
how far they are they can be in themselves [1.7] an instabil-, or a stability 
increasing tool [0.4] without any other ingredients [0.4] is highly doubtful [0.
9] there has to be at least the initial will [0.6] and that is often tied in 
with incentives as to what [0.2] will be the actual gain out of [0.2] 
negotiations [1.2] er [0.2] before anything substantive happens [3.3] but the 
other examples are essentially the ones that i have mentioned already [5.3] in 
other words exchange of observers well exe-, exchange of [0.2] e-, exchange of 
observers [0.5] is essentially [1.7] it's it's tied in with the notification of 
military exercises er idea [0.5] and that is if if one [1.2] for example at the 
end of the Cold War if the Warsaw Pact exercised or NATO exercised [0.8] each 
side NATO would send [0.2] or would be invited to send observers to some of the 
exercises [0.4] in the Warsaw Pact [0.3] 
and the Warsaw Pact was invited to send [0.5] some observers to NATO exercises 
[0.4] only selected ones but [0.4] at least a beginning [2.4] now where do we 
go from here [4.4] arms control has become a lot more complicated in the 
contemporary environment because we don't have the blocks any more [1.3] well i 
can over overrun another five minutes but i don't think that would be a very 
good idea [1.3] er [3.4] the possibly most promising way of approaching arms 
control issues is really in a multilevel [0.8] er [0.4] set up [1.4] that we 
don't only rely on international [0.3] arms control measures but also [0.4] on 
regional or try to simulate regional arms control [0.4] and bilateral 
understanding [0.4] between [0.5] states that are at risk of [0.8] accelerating 
arms races or [0.2] running [0.8] up [0.7] or [0.6] well [1.2] engaging in an 
arms race in the first place [1.8] one of the [0.2] principal advantages of 
doing that [0.3] would be that [0.2] neighbours [0.2] who need to talk to one 
another 
before [0.2] any confidence can be built [0.8] are actually then capable of [0.
2] sitting down together and trying to [0.4] sort out their differences [0.8] 
how much the international community can help in this [0.5] if we look at south 
Asia [0.6] then [0.2] it's not enormously encouraging [1.0] it may be [0.5] 
that in some areas or some regions [0.3] we [0.2] will just have to wait [0.2] 
until arms control becomes a possibility [0.4] and that there isn't an awful 
lot that can be done [2.5] what within [1.0] the scholarly community has become 
[0.2] a major issue [1.1] in researching arms control is how [0.3] norms can be 
established and particular [0.5] norms in the international [0.2] on the on an 
international level [0.4] and how norms can be preserved [0.7] so that [0.3] 
what has already been gained for example in the context of nuclear arms control 
[0.4] isn't going to be reversed [0.2] er in the future [5.3] so much for today 
[0.4] thank you very much for your attention i do apologize for the [0.4] 
rather accelerated speed at the end [laughter] [0.7] shan't happen on Thursday