nf1161: er could you postpone your conversations until after the lecture please 
thank you er i believe someone wanted to announce something about political 
clubbing er are the people here or 
sf1162: yes sorry 
nf1161: yes come forward please we'll do it now because otherwise at the end 
everyone wants to rush out 
sf1162: sorry i 
nf1161: sorry 
sf1162: i could do it tomorrow 'cause it's not 
nf1161: 
sf1162: er hi everyone my name's namex er i've just set up a political society 
this year er and it's just a quick announcement we're having er next Monday 
we're having a debate on the fuel crisis er it's in Mondial it's at seventy-
thirty anyone wants to come join in or just watch er then you're free to join 
okay 
nf1161: where is it 
sf1162: er Mondial 
nf1161: Mondial 
sf1162: Mondial 
nf1161: did everyone get that good turn up in large numbers now first of all 
apologies er my car broke down last week er i got to the petrol station and 
then it didn't want to start any more again so i hope that there won't be any 
involuntary spare times anymore i mean without warning er the the er upshot of 
that is that we'll do alliances today ne-, er on Thursday deterrents and arms 
races on next Tuesday er arms control and disarmament and on the thurs-, er on 
Thursday week neutrality and so everything gets pushed down a little bit but er 
you will have the full complement of lectures unless the weather decides again 
to be completely awful and horrible right collective defence and military 
alliances the collective defence but even more so military alliances are 
generally associated with realist assumptions about how international relations 
work these are basically as you all know but just to to recall them that armed 
force is the most effe-, most effective foreign policy tool because in the end 
if you can't coerce a potential adversary into complying with your wishes then 
you can alway-, if by other means like political diplomatic or economic means 
the er the use of armed force if you have superior 
armed force might actually achie-, achieve that objective this is seen to be 
very important by neo-realists and also realists er because they assume that 
the international system is a monarchic system and essentially all s-, all 
states rely on self-help because there is no government or no form of 
governance above the state level now that entails in itself this conception for 
states er entails several problems because what if one state arms itself or 
begins to arm itself more than it has done previously its neighbours may start 
wondering what the intent is of that state it increases its capabilities and as 
you know realists see military or economic capabilities as a central defining 
element of state power now what does it want to do with these capabilities may 
it want to establish a superiority in armament levels so that it can use force 
in any sort of conflict with its neighbours or a state somewhat further afield 
if its military er machinery can reach it now in 
order to not let this escalate as you know from a previous lecture diplomats 
and politicians before the Second World War and before the First World War 
attempted to estab-, or to maintain what was known as a balance of power so 
that no state could really go beyond the point of arming itself and then using 
its armed force in a political conflict to settle that conflict militarily 
however if states felt that they were left alone or they couldn't possibly come 
up with the military er with the economic and resources in order to build up 
their military they would consider aligning themselves with other states in 
order to compensate for one state which might be superior in its military 
potential so the idea of alliance building was that they should alliances 
should enhance national security and seen from an economic perspective by 
forming alliances and joining forces you might be able you I-E a state might be 
able to maximize the cost-benefit equation of national 
defence spending I-E everyone spends as much as they possibly can but because 
they joined forces their economies aren't going to be burdened too much by 
military expenditure with in which with its essentially unproductive use of 
capital however because there is also there was also the risk or in short term 
alliances there was also the risk that a state which on one in one hand wants 
to be allied with you but then if its fortunes change it might decide no longer 
to want to be allied with you and in fact might become your enemy there was a 
preference for short term alliances another reason to to prefer short term 
alliances was of course that the idea that you wanted to protect your national 
security and and the secrets surrounding your national security policy er was 
was seen as rather paramount now the the related to these reasons er alliance 
formation could take place because a a threat should be deterred not 
necessarily to go to war but because a a threat should be 
deterred now i'm going to talk about deterrence at much greater length on 
Thursday so i'm just going to go over that very quickly either deterrence of a 
perceived military threat I-E a state as i explained earlier er or hy-, 
hypothesized earlier a state which starts increasing its military capabilities 
or er the possibi-, beca-, well either because it justs increases its er its er 
capabilities but hasn't really declared an aggressive intent or because there 
is actually an aggressive intent by a distinct adversary now another 
characteristic of pre-forty-five alliances or some of them was that they would 
be formed for wars of aggression in that case they would also be or that those 
alliances would be particularly short-lived because there was a political 
objective which was to be achieved militarily and for that purpose the alliance 
would be formed once those obj-, objectives were f-, were er achieved the 
alliance would disintegrate the problem is that of course 
inh-, built into such short term alliances is a high degree of instability 
because at the time the alliance is formed the state which joined into the 
allia-, joined in the alliance might have shared objectives but what if the war 
doesn't go as they intended or as they have had anticipated if the war doesn't 
go in favour of some of the al-, allies objectives the alliance might might 
fall apart er finally defence if one state is under serious threat it might 
look round for allies to increase its national security in a short term because 
it can't possibly build up its military potential and produce the weapons it 
might need in order to defend itself or in order to re-establish the balance of 
power now problems of alliances are manyfold firstly for states that intend to 
join into an alliance it is necessary that they reconcile different 
expectations how do they define national security it depends on where you sit 
as a state where you are geographically located who your 
neighbours are what your s-, resources are er what your natural resources are 
that those those factors influence how you define national security what also 
defines your national security policy is what your outlook is do you want to be 
er just a state that exists and trades and and doesn't really have a very 
active international policy or foreign policy or do you want to be a state 
which wants to have further reach er including your neighbours or regional 
reach or maybe even global reach depending on what the outlook is of different 
alliance members that's going to define how they define their national security 
and therefore the utility of an alliance is likely to differ depending on how 
they define their national security objectives and that 
is also going to define as a consequence of course the defence requirements the 
amount of spending that that the state is prepared to put into procuring er 
armed forces and the kinds of capabilities the state might want to have if you 
take today if you compare the U-S with any European country the U-S military 
machinery is much much more wide-reaching much more capable much more 
differentiated than any of the European er militaries or armed forces are and 
so these different preconditions of course shape how an alliance is likely to 
develop a further issue in alliance formation even if its a sh-, a relatively 
short-lived alliance is the question of trust and reliability if you join 
forces with allies there are a few things which you want to avoid one is the 
states that are in the alliance want to avoid that some of them spend enormous 
amounts of military on military capability whereas others don't now those who 
don't spend er an equivalent proportion of their national budget on armed 
forces can 
use might use these this proportion of the budget for building up trade 
building up their economic infrastructure now some of the allies would then 
finance the military security of these allies that spend less so the question 
is how do you make sure within an alliance that everyone chips in evenly and 
that there aren't some who live at the expense of an ally this is called if 
that happens this is called s-, the free-rider syndrome what you also want to 
avoid in an alliance is the risk of entrapment entrapment means that one ally 
doesn't either doesn't necessarily say in advance when it approaches a future 
ally that there isn't a quarrel it has with another state or it develops a 
quarrel with another state and then drags the other alliance members into that 
conflict which is really only a conflict which is nationally motivated the 
allies may not have any interest in being involved in this conflict or they may 
actually see that as a huge problem because they have very 
good relations with that state which has a quibble with one of the allies so 
entrapment is another risk which alliance members have to be able to deal with 
the opposite of that is the risk of abandonment which is similar to defection 
but slightly less harsh er abandonment would happen if a state declares that it 
will assist in the defence of an alliance territory or interest and then 
doesn't come through with that commitment it abandons its allies er in their 
attempt of er fulfilling the al-, alliance objectives defection is if the ally 
leaves the alliance entirely which entails an added risk and that is that the 
ally which has defected might join a hostile alliance which may have formed in 
response to your own alliance formation which is of course also something that 
allies would want to avoid from a systemic perspective if alliances form in 
response to inbalances in the balance of power then states which are outside 
the alliance might feel it 
necessary to form alliances themselves now that might recreate the security 
dilemma on a higher level now very briefly the to rec-, recall what the 
security dilemma is security dilemma is essentially if one state starts 
building up its arms the neighbouring state doesn't necessarily know what it 
intends to do but thinks it wise to build up its own arms er oh arsenal as well 
its its its armed forces then both start building up their armed forces in 
response to each other which means they spend quite a lot of money on procuring 
military equipment and maybe er getting getting more er people to join the 
armed forces and in the end will be no safer than they were before because they 
both have just pushed the balance of power o-, up to a higher level with the 
added risk that one of the states might say well if this continues then we may 
in the end be outarmed by the other side but at the moment we still have a 
possibility we we still might have er some chance 
in winning a war if we do it right and they might start they might actually 
state A might actually attack instead of waiting what happens with with the er 
with balance of military power so in essence the security dilemma might lead to 
a much more unstable situation than where the two sides started from and if you 
have you can have that between states but you can also have that between 
alliances now in case of a crisis or a war it's of course of utmost importance 
for the allies to know that they can rely on each other and that each side that 
has joined the alliance will implement a mutual defence agreement but here of 
course you have again possible problems in that they don't necessarily agree on 
the strategic and operational parameters er one example for that would be 
Britain and the U-S er in the early stages of the Second World War you again 
run into the problem of abandonment and entrapment and the question is how how 
can the alliance the allies then deal with 
this situation in such a way that the survival of all of them is actually going 
to be guaranteed and the stronger member of an alliance doesn't go well this 
smaller state is dispensible in some way er it may it may be better for us all 
if we sacrifice one of the alliance members now before World War Two as i 
mentioned before there was a stong belief in the offence because the idea that 
if you launch a surprise attack at a potential enemy then you have at least in 
that first initial er in that initial phase the upper hand er so you would get 
tight alliances which because they wanted to go for a surprise attack would 
have very high arms procurement and launch a massive attack as quickly as 
possible needless to say this was of course quite an unstable way of relating 
to one another in the interwar period the whole the whole philosophy sort of 
changed the other way round at least amongst those countries that had won the 
seco-, the First World War in 
particular France and the U-S er and and the U-K because they felt it was 
necessary to spend more time attention and resources on their domestic policies 
and on the economy and military issues were well kept as low on the agenda as 
possible er that led to a defensive strategy especially on the part of of 
Britain and led of course as you all know to a s-, highly a very strong very 
offensive Germany which launched the Second World War 
ss: 
nf1161: excuse me [laughter] grumble grumble [laughter] okay i'll w-, wait for 
your signal am i standing in anyone's way 
ss: yes [laughter] 
nf1161: oh right [laughter] tell me when i can come in again ready 
ss: mm 
nf1161: mm we have a lot to do today that's why i'm rushing a bit done now 
after the Second World War partly if if at the end of the session you find that 
you have missed that fifty per cent of what i have said i'll try to make a few 
copies of this and then er they will be very 
small because there is quite a lot here but er i can hand them out some time 
either on Thursday or next week so you won't have missed out er where were we 
alliances collective defence after the Second World War in the general 
atmosphere of needing to stabilize the international system as i talked about 
now a week ago but at the same time having to sort of deal with the issue of 
armed aggression er in the international system as well what developed was 
something called collective defence now we've i've talked about collective 
security last time collective defence is much more focused on the military 
aspects of collective security er of course it has political dimensions but it 
is essentially a further development of alliance building now central to a 
system of collective defence is the mutual commitment that attack er an attack 
against one is seen as an attack against all but that also means that within 
the framework of the treaty which establishes the the collective 
security system there was a need to define active aggression i'll tell you 
later or i will show you later that NATO as the one almost prominent example of 
a collective defence system has has done that in the Washington Treaty now 
collective defence systems tend to be established with a longer term view not 
like alliances er of the pre-World War Two period now that means that if you 
have a more integrated and er a sort of longer lasting system that has 
ramifications of how the allies cooperate and little is as sensitive as the 
issues of national security when it comes to military national security 'cause 
all the allies of course want to keep each other out at the same time in a 
collective defence system there is a need to share some of what it would 
otherwise would be considered secret so in an organization which is meant to 
establish a collective defence system the way in which the institution is set 
up has to strike a balance between respecting the sovereignty 
of all the er of all the members of the collective security system and at the 
same time tending to the need of to the needs of this collective security 
system for it to work I-E a degree of openness 
now again of course you have the same alliance problems they they are played 
out in a different way er which i mentioned before the question of defection 
abandonment and and as well as entrapment and NATO if you look at the history 
of NATO has had a fair share of discussions about this you ready don't want to 
incur your wrath again er but overall what Britain France and the U-S saw 
paramount in establishing NATO was were the benefits er and these benefits were 
an enhanced deterrence capability not least because and this was of special 
interest for Britain and France er and the Benelux countries beca-, er to tie 
the U-S militarily into a europ-, European security system a or collective 
defence system A because of the experiences of World War One and Two and the 
failure of the balance of power system and Britain's inability to guarantee or 
to to be a stabilizer in the balance of power on the European continent Britain 
was economically and militarily after the Second World War no longer capable of 
of playing this role so the U-S one of the paramount policy objectives for 
Britain was to tie the U-S into a European collective defence system now doing 
this in with a long ter-, longer term perspective meant ultimately that the 
military processes which were separate nationally had to harmonized in some way 
because on a on a completely sort of practical operational level the armed 
forces of now sixte-, nineteen different countries but during the Cold War 
sixteen different countries had to work together they had to be able to talk to 
one another and if they don't have the radio equipment to do so then then they 
can't talk to one another they have to have a common 
language they have to have planning procedures and traces and and just 
operational procedures which are comparable and they need to be able needed to 
be able to share to a to a degree er their equipment especially equipment where 
the the arm-, the national armed forces tried to work together and that meant 
that on an on an institutional level other than alliances of the pre-World War 
Two kind a separate identity emerged where NATO became gradually over over 
decades not from the very beginning but over the over the over its history 
became a separate entity which had a separate language a separate way of of 
operation er the wa-, it had different standard operating procedures it had its 
own planning er procedures and these would then be handed down to the national 
military and political planners er which were or who were then tasked with 
implementing what NATO desired now there are many studies ex-, er exploring 
exactly that linkage between NATO level planning and 
national level planning because national level planning always massively 
undercut what NATO thought it might need another aspect which and NATO is 
really the reference point for collective defence systems because it's the only 
er long lasting example that we have for a collective defence system another 
aspect of it is political cooperation er confidence building on the one hand 
because if former enemies especially after Germany er joined NATO as well if 
former enemies or potentially not hostile neighbours but but neighbours who are 
not entirely confident or comfortable with one another if they start talking to 
one another on a political as well as on a military level it's because NATO has 
a a a political organization which is based in Brussels er ever since France 
left NATO in nineteen-sixty-six and it has a military organization which is er 
which is based in er Mons near Casteau which is about i don't know an hours 
drive outside Brussels er if on the political and on 
the military level the member nations or representatives of the member nations 
meet regularly there is a very different over time a very different 
understanding of each other emerges which again contributes to some degree of 
separate identity of NATO as an organization and that can then be translated 
down into national decision making levels as well if you talk to people within 
NATO they would even go so far that conflict resolution within these structures 
can be possible without this ever becoming an issue that really hits the 
headlines one problem that NATO has had all the time is this issue with free-
riding er it's commonly called within na-, within the NATO er scholarly 
literature the burden sharing debate it emerged in the nineteen-sixties in the 
nineteen-seventies in the nineteen-eighties and it's going to come up again if 
well depending on who wins the er U-S elections today but with president if if 
it was to be President Bush i'm pretty sure i would hazard 
the guess that the issue will come up again the U-S especially the more the 
more conservative and the more western orientated proportion of the U-S 
Congress has especially since the nineteen-seventies very strongly lobbied 
against a permanent commitment of U-S troops in Europe because they argued that 
er Europe is from the seventies onwards Europe was doing economically well 
enough to defend itself and the U-S would still maintain its nuclear umbrella 
but there was no need for U-S troops to be based in Europe er and if they were 
to remain in Europe then the Europeans should spend a lot more on their own 
defence now there was a lot of number crunching that can go on er over the 
issue of burden sharing because it depends on how you calculated defence 
expenditure er if you want to make the argument that no Americans and the 
Europeans are contributing e-, equally 
i'll get back to the problem of different perceptions U-S and Europe of NATO er 
in a minute problems with collective defence er one i have just mentioned 
because there is a long term perspective there is an enhanced risk of free-
riding the long term perspective also requires that the alliance itself adapts 
because for for many different reasons er A the alliance's rationale under 
which the alliance may have been founded in the first place may no longer be 
there if the international system changes or if the relationship between those 
whom the alliance was meant to deter and the alliance itself improves if it 
does not improve or if there is no concensus that the er the relationship has 
improved the question is how high should the defensive cap-, of what nature 
should these defensive capabilities be and how committed are the allies 
depending on how much they contribute to the 
defensive capabilities and how they stand politically when France left NATO in 
nineteen-sixty-six that was seen as a major crisis because it was seen as 
entailing ha-, have you finished oh i'm asking now [laughter] er it was seen as 
entailing the possibility that the Soviet Union might see NATO as falling apart 
other changes that might happen are changes in the domestic environment of 
alliance members better or worse economic performance now the external threat 
which NATO as on the NATO level agreed on may have required very high defence 
expenditure from the perspective of NATO planners but in the early nineteen-
seventies neither the U-S nor Britain nor any of the other European countries 
were really in the position to spend an awful lot of money on defence they 
still did but they were under serious eeconomic pressures A because of the oil 
prices and the U-S because it had exhausted itself in the in the Vietnam War 
and had then deferred some of the costs it paid 
in the Vietnam War over to the Europeans through its economic policies and 
financial policies another possibility of change is that the alliance itself 
might change its role in the international system maybe some alliance members 
are interested or might be interested in increasing the operational area of the 
alliance some may not that's a debate you had in NATO in the early nineteen-
eighties when the U-S and Britain to a degree argued that NATO should take on a 
lot more what was then called out of area responsibilities I-E that NATO should 
no longer just be responsible for the defence of western Europe but also take 
on the Soviet threat as it was perceived in other areas such as Africa the 
Middle East er south Asia or central Asia now all this can become rather 
aggravating because of course in an alliance you have in in a collective 
defence system such as NATO you have collective decision making now the policy 
formulation should in the 
spirit of collective decision making take place by mutual agreement but of 
course some states as what i've said before some states are more equal than 
others and if the alliance is very much dependent on some of the states or 
maybe one of the state states then er they this particularly state mi-, have 
may might have a lot more leverage in pushing through its own policy objectives 
er and then you risk the dom-, the the alliance risks being dominated by larger 
allies further problems and we've come back to the security dilemma are outside 
perceptions now NATO was founded with defensive intent and nobody amongst those 
leading figures who helped NATO into being could s-, well saw NATO as an 
aggressive alliance there are people on record saying well nobody who has in 
any way a clean conscience in other words doesn't doesn't want to er attack 
NATO can see NATO as an aggressive er well international organization or er or 
alliance however the Soviet Union saw it very 
differently the Soviet Union was convinced until the la-, second half of the 
nineteen-eighties that NATO had aggressive intent okay in the nineteen-
seventies détente er saw this slightly well the the the general mood between 
East and West eased up a bit but there was always the fear that NATO might 
attack the Warsaw Pact and with the foundation of or with the founding of the 
of the Warsaw Pact in response to NATO you have the same you have what i've 
mentioned earlier that that the an instance where the formation of one alliance 
triggers the formation of another alliance in response the other issue i've 
i've already sort of hinted at as well very briefly that intra-alliance 
arguments may be interpreted as a lack of cohesion one of these the red lines 
going through NATO debating itself or scholars debating NATO during the Cold 
War was always if we do not portray an image of a cohesive a politically 
cohesive life if we show that there are so too many disagreements 
between the Europeans and the Americans or amongst the Europeans then NATO is 
going to be perceived as a weak alliance because then the Soviet Union is 
likely to exploit this this or and and the Soviet Union is likely to exploit 
this weakness that it sees in NATO cohesion finally from again a systemic 
perspective if a collective defence system persists the question is does this 
persistence maintain the status quo ante I-E before the system changed and the 
threat disappeared such as NATO post end of Cold War or might it need two new 
alliances or as NATO did might it survive find new roles and transform itself 
but then does that perception of NATO in its Cold War identity automatically go 
away very very weighty questions which we still haven't solved entirely yet now 
NATO as i said before combines a political and a military mission in its 
founding treaty so the Washington Treaty you can see all these documents on the 
NATO website which is just W-W-W-dot-NATO-dot-org 
or in the library in the in the Politics department library there is a NATO 
handbook which has all the basic information from a NATO perspective obviously 
but it's a good start into the official presentation of NATO as an organization 
and that includes also the Washington Treaty the declared purpose of NATO was 
defensive and it subjected itself to the principle principles of the U-N it was 
as i said before a defensive a a collective defence system which saw itself as 
a subsystem to the collective security system established under or with the U-N 
it declares that it was the the founders declared that they founded NATO to 
safeguard the freedom the common heritage and civilization of their peoples 
founded on the principles of democracy individual liberty and the rule of law 
now if you look at NATO from that perspective you get immediately a host of 
areas which you can investigate in order to critically assess the functions of 
NATO to ask 
questions well what is the purpose of this alliance how far is this alliance 
compatible with the way in which international relations work now has it 
adapted itself if it is tied to the ideas that on which liberal democracies are 
are based is it justified for NATO to protect Albanians in Kosovo against Serb 
aggression or maybe it's not but although al-, military alliances are mostly 
not investigated from that perspective it is rather a rewarding idea to at 
least question the political and the ideological underpinnings of military 
alliances because in the end armed force is used for political purposes now 
NATO also fulfilled the other requirement that it needed to defend er to define 
what an armed what what aggression is what is an incident of aggression now 
article five of the Washington Treaty does that A that an armed attack against 
one shall be considered er an armed attack against all but in response to such 
an act of aggression each of the parties in in 
exercise of their right to individual or collective self-defence recognized by 
article fifty-one of the U-N charter will assist those attacked by taking 
individually or in concert with the other parties such action as it deems 
necessary now this is an essential point such action as it deems necessary this 
is this is NATO founders bowing to sovereignty they do not say we predetermine 
how we are going to defend NATO territory or territory of an ally er against an 
act of aggression armed aggression they say in the event of an attack each of 
the NATO members can decide how much and in what way it wants them to 
contribute to a defensive act or to to defensive action of course in NATO 
planning especially in NATO planning er for a contingency in an in in well in a 
confrontation with the Soviet Union 
was based on on the assumption that all NATO members would throw in all they 
had in order to defend themselves but this is an issue which is now becoming 
much more relevant plus if it had been not the Soviet Union but someone else 
attacking a NATO member then the situation would have probably been rather 
different and they undertook the obligation to report an attack and 
countermeasures to the U-N Security Council they did not say we are going to 
ask for permission by the U-S Security Council I-E a mandate for any er action 
you don't have to write down these things look them up in in i mean the the er 
the article bits which i had sort of quoted on this on this slide don't write 
them down just look them up on the web or in in the handbook it's much easier 
and it's not so salient unless unless you are interested in looking at NATO and 
and investigating something pertaining to NATO questions er then you go co-, go 
to er the NATO handbook or or its website but you don't it's not 
essential nobody's going to ask you that in your exams can you quote article 
five of the er of the Washington Treaty er during the Cold War as i said NATO's 
principle objective was to deter the Soviet Union everything that NATO did was 
subordinate to that and of course it had to do this A through nuclear 
deterrents well it didn't of course have to do this did eventually have to do 
it when the Soviet Union acquired nuclear weapons in nineteen-forty-nine and 
built up a nuclear arsenal that also meant it was utterly dependent on the U-S 
because nuclear deterrents only worked with U-S involvement and this is where i 
come back to why the Europeans were so keen on having U-S military personnel 
based in Europe the U-S soldiers based in Europe and pilots and sailors were 
essentially hostages in the game of nuclear deterrents because by having U-S 
military personnel based in Europe that military personnel could become a 
target for Soviet aggression which 
meant from a European perspective the U-S would have extended national security 
interests in Europe in the shape of soldiers based on European soil which meant 
again from a European perspective that the likelihood that the U-S would use 
nuclear weapons in response to an attack a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union 
was much higher than if no U-S personnel had been based on the European 
continent burden sharing debate and this issue were often very closely linked 
at the same time milita-, er NATO tried to underline its defensive attitude by 
declaring that military action was dependent on unan-, unanimous decisions if 
the smallest member of NATO did not want to take action NATO wouldn't have 
taken action well unless this member was had er its arms twisted massively by 
all the other members on the issue of cohesion not only the burden sharing 
debate was an issue but also arms control and i'll talk about arms control er 
next in a week's time so just to sort of give you a 
pointer er the SALT negotiations in the late nineteen-sixties early nineteen-
seventies from a European perspective were seen as entailing at least a risk of 
the Soviet Union and the U-S coming to a separate agreement which suited their 
national security interests but not necessarily the Europeans' national 
security interests which meant that they perceived the risk of being abandoned 
by the U-S as it turned out the U-S reiterated its commitment to European 
security and to NATO but in that period in the late sixties early seventies 
there was quite a lot of concern about the issue of abandonment now to finish 
very swiftly NATO in the post Cold War environment NATO didn't want to abolish 
itself as you all know NATO was also seen as still being a child of the Cold 
War and harbouring aggressive aten-, intent against Russia and the successive 
states of the Soviet u-, the other successive states of the Soviet Union so 
NATO spent the nineteen-nineties reinventing 
itself A as one little wheel well actually quite a dominant wheel in the 
European framework of institutions which were responsible or which which have 
remit for political economic and military security and development in Europe 
NATO enlargement was one major aspect of this which NATO couldn't which is it 
would be unjustified to see as just something that NATO pursued in order to 
find a new er rationale for itself those countries which had been previously 
Warsaw Pact members and were very keen on establishing their links with western 
Europe were very keen also on becoming members of NATO not least because it 
became clear very soon that the E-U would drag its feet a lot longer in er 
admitting new members whereas NATO both from a NATO perspective and from from a 
U-S perspective was much more prepared to contemplate letting in new members so 
last year Hungary Poland and the Czech Republic became new members of NATO NATO 
also er established itself as one organization which had a cooperative role 
within the European the E-U system of er designing a 
common foreign and security policy but of course again there you have p-, 
potentially huge problems of transatlantic relations the different orientations 
of the European the E-U members er towards the the their different attitudes 
towards the U-S conflicting with the European idea finally NATO became well one 
could say a subcontractor at least for a while to the U-N and the O-S-C it 
offered it it made itself available as a military tool er for U-N authorized or 
O-S-C-E os-, er authorized er operations this meant also that NATO does no 
longer only have to respond under article five it can it has inscribed in in 
into its new strategic doctrine the possibility of legitimate action in peace 
enforcement and peace keeping operations so its mission its self-imposed 
mission has changed to quite a significant degree that was an extremely fast 
rundown er betw-, from alliances of collective security to NATO i hope you 
remember some of it and i'll see you on Thursday for deterrence thank you