nf1161: er [1.4] could you postpone your conversations until after the lecture 
please thank you [0.6] er i believe someone wanted to announce something about 
political clubbing [0.3] er [0.4] are the people here or 
sf1162: [0.2] yes sorry 
nf1161: yes [0.2] come forward please we'll do it now because otherwise [0.5] 
at the end everyone wants to rush out 
sf1162: sorry i 
nf1161: sorry [0.4] 
sf1162: i could do it tomorrow 'cause it's not [0.5] 
nf1161: 
sf1162: er [0.5] hi everyone my name's namex er i've just set up a political 
society this year [0.5] er and it's just a quick announcement we're having er 
next Monday we're having [0.3] a debate on the fuel crisis [0.3] er it's in 
Mondial it's at seventy-thirty [0.3] anyone wants to come join in [0.3] or just 
watch er [0.2] then you're free to join [0.2] okay [0.3] 
nf1161: where is it [0.2] 
sf1162: er Mondial [0.2] 
nf1161: Mondial 
sf1162: Mondial [1.3] 
nf1161: did everyone get that [0.9] good [0.7] turn up in large numbers [4.5] 
now first of all apologies er [0.2] my car broke down last week [0.4] er i got 
to the petrol station and then it didn't want to start any more again [0.9] so 
[1.6] i hope that there won't be any [0.3] 
involuntary [0.2] spare times anymore i mean [0.2] without warning [0.6] er the 
the er upshot of that is that we'll do alliances today [0.4] ne-, er on 
Thursday [0.2] deterrents and arms races [0.5] on next Tuesday [0.6] er arms 
control and disarmament and on the thurs-, er on Thursday week [0.3] neutrality 
[0.4] and so everything gets pushed down a little bit but er [0.3] you will 
have the full complement of lectures [1.5] unless [0.6] the weather decides 
again to [0.3] be completely awful and horrible [1.8] right collective defence 
and military alliances [3.0] the [3.0] collective defence [1.1] but even more 
so military alliances are generally associated [0.4] with [0.6] realist 
assumptions about how international relations work [2.2] these are basically as 
you all know but just to [0.2] to recall them that armed force is the most effe-
, most effective foreign policy tool [0.3] because in the end if you can't [0.
3] coerce [0.3] a potential adversary into [0.3] complying with your wishes [0.
4] then you can alway-, if by other means like political diplomatic or economic 
means [0.5] the er the use of armed force if you have superior 
armed force [0.4] might actually achie-, achieve that objective [1.2] this is 
seen to be very important [0.3] by neo-realists and also realists er because [0.
2] they assume that the international system [0.3] is a monarchic system [0.5] 
and essentially all s-, all states [0.2] rely on self-help [0.3] because there 
is no [0.4] government or no form of governance [0.4] above [0.2] the state 
level [1.9] now that entails [0.2] in itself this conception for states [0.6] 
er [0.8] entails several problems [0.2] because [1.3] what if one state [0.8] 
arms itself or begins to arm itself more [0.5] than it has done previously [1.
0] its neighbours [0.2] may start wondering [1.4] what the intent is [0.3] of 
that state [1.0] it increases its capabilities and as you know [0.3] realists 
see [0.3] military or economic [0.2] capabilities [0.4] as a central defining 
element of state power [1.3] now what does it want to do with these [0.3] 
capabilities [1.3] may it want to [0.5] establish a superiority in armament 
levels so that it can use force [0.5] in any sort of conflict with its 
neighbours [0.2] or a state [0.2] somewhat further afield if its military [0.5] 
er machinery can reach it [1.9] now [0.2] in 
order to [0.2] not let this escalate [0.2] as you know from a previous lecture 
[0.4] diplomats and politicians [0.4] before the Second World War and before 
the First World War attempted [0.4] to estab-, or to maintain [0.4] what was 
known as a balance of power [0.4] so that no state [0.3] could really [0.5] go 
beyond the point [0.5] of arming itself and then using [0.3] its armed force [0.
4] in a political conflict to settle that conflict militarily [1.9] however [0.
4] if states felt that they were [0.9] left [0.4] alone [0.7] or they couldn't 
possibly come up with the military [0.3] er with the economic and resources in 
order to build up their military [0.8] they would consider [0.3] aligning 
themselves [0.2] with other states [1.1] in order to compensate for one state 
which might be [0.5] superior in its military potential [3.6] so the idea of 
alliance building [2.0] was [0.8] that they should alliances should enhance 
national security [1.6] and [0.4] seen from an economic perspective [0.8] by 
forming alliances and joining forces [0.6] you might be able you I-E a state 
might be able [0.3] to maximize the cost-benefit equation [0.2] of [0.5] 
national 
defence spending [0.2] I-E [0.3] everyone spends [0.2] as much as they possibly 
can [0.3] but because they joined forces [0.4] their economies aren't going to 
be [0.3] burdened too much by military expenditure with in [0.2] which [0.2] 
with its [0.5] essentially unproductive use of capital [1.5] however because 
there is also there was also the risk or in short term alliances there was also 
the risk that [1.2] a state which on one in one hand wants to be allied with 
you [0.3] but then if its fortunes change [0.6] it might decide no longer to 
want to be allied with you [1.0] and in fact might become your enemy [0.4] 
there was a preference for short term alliances another reason [0.5] to to 
prefer short term alliances was of course [0.4] that [0.6] the idea that you 
wanted to protect your national security and [0.2] and the secrets surrounding 
your national security policy [0.4] er [1.0] was was seen as rather paramount 
[1.5] now the [1.8] the related to these reasons [0.8] er alliance formation 
could take place because [0.4] a [0.4] a threat should be [0.2] deterred [0.6] 
not necessarily to go to war but because [0.6] a a threat should be 
deterred now i'm going to talk about deterrence at much greater length on 
Thursday [0.4] so i'm just going to go over that very quickly [0.8] either 
deterrence of a perceived military threat I-E a state as i explained earlier [0.
2] er or hy-, hypothesized earlier [0.2] a state which starts increasing its 
military capabilities [0.8] or [1.0] er [1.8] the possibi-, [0.3] beca-, well 
[0.6] either because it justs increases its er its er [0.4] capabilities but 
hasn't really declared an aggressive intent [0.4] or because there is actually 
[0.3] an aggressive intent by a distinct adversary [4.7] now another 
characteristic of pre-forty-five alliances [1.2] or some of them [0.4] was that 
they would be formed [0.8] for wars of aggression [3.0] in that case they would 
also be [0.6] or that those alliances would be particularly short-lived because 
there was a political objective which was to be achieved militarily [0.7] and 
for that purpose the alliance would be formed [0.3] once those obj-, objectives 
were f-, were er [0.2] achieved [0.9] the alliance would disintegrate [1.8] the 
problem is [0.2] that of course 
inh-, [0.3] built into such short term alliances is a high degree of 
instability [0.5] because at the time the alliance is formed [0.6] the state 
which joined into the allia-, [0.2] joined in the alliance [0.5] might have [0.
2] shared objectives [0.6] but what if the war [0.2] doesn't go as they 
intended or as they have [0.2] had anticipated [0.5] if the war [0.8] doesn't 
go in favour of [0.2] some of the al-, allies objectives [0.6] the alliance 
might might fall apart [2.8] er [0.3] finally [0.7] defence [0.5] if one [0.2] 
state is under serious threat it might look [0.2] round for allies [0.5] to [0.
3] increase its national security in a short term because it can't possibly 
build up its military potential [0.4] and produce [0.2] the weapons it might 
need [0.4] in order to defend itself [1.3] or [0.2] in order to re-establish 
the balance of power [3.8] now problems of alliances [4.6] are manyfold [1.6] 
firstly [1.7] for states that intend to join into an alliance [0.8] it is 
necessary that they reconcile different expectations [1.1] how do they define 
national security [1.3] it depends on where you sit as a state [0.2] where you 
are geographically located who your 
neighbours are [0.3] what your s-, resources are [0.5] er [0.8] what your 
natural resources are [0.9] that those those [0.7] factors influence how you 
define national security [0.9] what also defines your national [0.2] security 
policy [0.4] is what your outlook is do you want to be [0.2] er [0.8] just a 
state that exists and trades and and doesn't really have a very [0.5] active 
international policy [0.2] or foreign policy [1.1] or do you want to be a state 
which wants to [0.2] have further reach [1.1] er including your neighbours or 
[0.6] regional reach or maybe even global reach [0.9] depending on what the 
outlook is of different alliance members [0.7] that's going to [0.2] define how 
they define their national security and therefore the utility [0.6] of an 
alliance [0.3] is likely to differ [0.8] depending on [0.4] how they define 
their national security objectives [1.2] and that 
is also going to define as a consequence of course the defence requirements [0.
6] the amount of spending that [0.2] that the state is prepared to put into [0.
2] procuring [0.5] er armed forces [0.5] and the kinds of capabilities the 
state might want to have [0.8] if you take [0.3] today [0.6] if you compare the 
U-S [0.3] with any European country [0.6] the U-S military machinery is much 
much more [0.4] wide-reaching much more capable [0.4] much more differentiated 
[0.5] than any of the European [0.5] er [0.6] militaries or [0.2] armed forces 
are [1.4] and so [0.4] these different [0.6] preconditions of course shape how 
an alliance is likely to [0.5] develop [1.3] a further issue in alliance 
formation even if its a sh-, a relatively short-lived alliance [0.2] is [0.5] 
the question of trust and reliability [1.4] if you join forces with allies [0.
7] there are a few things which you want to [0.4] avoid [1.2] one is [0.8] the 
states that are in the alliance want to avoid that some of them [0.7] spend 
enormous amounts of military on military capability [0.6] whereas others don't 
[0.4] now [0.2] those who don't spend [0.4] er an equivalent [0.6] proportion 
of their national [0.4] budget [0.7] on armed forces [0.4] can 
use [0.2] might use [0.9] these [1.0] this proportion of the budget [0.4] for 
[0.6] building up trade building up their economic infrastructure [1.1] now 
some of the allies would then finance [0.2] the military security [0.2] of [0.
4] these allies that spend less [0.8] so the question is how do you make sure 
[0.3] within an alliance that everyone chips in [0.8] evenly [0.2] and that 
there aren't some [0.4] who live at the expense of an ally [0.4] this is called 
if that happens this is called s-, the free-rider syndrome [1.1] what you also 
want to avoid in an alliance is the risk of entrapment [0.5] entrapment means 
[0.8] that one ally [1.1] doesn't [0.3] either doesn't necessarily say in 
advance when it approaches [0.2] a future ally [0.6] that there isn't a quarrel 
it has with another state or it develops a quarrel with another state [0.4] and 
then drags the other alliance members [0.4] into [0.4] that conflict which is 
really only a conflict which is nationally motivated [1.1] the allies may not 
have any interest in being involved in this conflict [0.5] or they may actually 
see that as a huge problem because they have very 
good relations with that state which has a quibble with one of the allies [0.9] 
so entrapment is another risk which alliance members have to [0.3] be able to 
deal with [1.1] the opposite of that is the risk of abandonment [2.1] which is 
[0.9] similar to defection but slightly less harsh [0.2] er abandonment would 
[0.4] happen if a state [0.4] declares that it will assist [0.4] in the defence 
[0.4] of [0.3] an alliance [0.3] territory or interest [0.8] and then doesn't 
come through [0.3] with that commitment [0.5] it abandons its allies [0.2] er 
in their [0.2] attempt of [0.5] er [0.5] fulfilling the al-, alliance 
objectives [0.5] defection is if the ally leaves the alliance entirely [0.7] 
which [0.2] entails [1.0] an added risk and that is that the ally which has 
defected [0.3] might join [0.4] a hostile alliance which may have formed [0.3] 
in response to your own alliance formation [0.7] which is of course also 
something that allies would want to [0.2] avoid [6.7] from a systemic 
perspective [2.1] if alliances form [0.7] in response to inbalances in the 
balance of power [2.0] then [0.6] states which are outside the alliance [0.2] 
might feel it 
necessary to form alliances themselves [1.0] now that might [0.5] recreate the 
security dilemma on a higher level [0.7] now very briefly [0.3] the to [0.3] 
rec-, recall what the security dilemma is [0.4] security dilemma is essentially 
if one state [0.6] starts building up its arms the neighbouring state doesn't 
necessarily know what it intends to do but thinks it wise [0.4] to build up its 
own arms [0.4] er [0.3] oh arsenal as well its its its armed forces [0.8] then 
both start building up [0.4] their armed forces [0.4] in response to each other 
[0.4] which means they spend [0.2] quite a lot of money [0.5] on [0.7] 
procuring military equipment and maybe [0.5] er [0.2] getting getting more [0.
3] er [0.8] people to join the armed forces [0.9] and in the end will be no [0.
3] safer than they were before [0.3] because they both [0.3] have just pushed 
[0.2] the balance of power [0.4] o-, up to a higher level [0.3] with the added 
risk [0.5] that one of the states might say [0.5] well if this continues [0.5] 
then we may [0.2] in the end be [0.6] outarmed by the other side [0.4] but at 
the moment we still have a possibility we we still might have [0.5] er some 
chance 
in winning a war if we do it [0.3] right [0.5] and [0.4] they might start [0.2] 
they might actually [0.3] state A might actually attack [0.3] instead of [1.4] 
waiting what happens with with [0.2] the er [0.2] with balance of [0.2] 
military power [1.0] so [0.2] in essence the security dilemma might lead [0.3] 
to a much more unstable situation [0.5] than where the two sides started from 
and [0.4] if you have [0.5] you can have that between states but you can also 
have that between alliances [2.6] now [0.7] in case of a crisis or a war [0.3] 
it's of course [0.9] of utmost importance for the allies to [1.0] know [0.2] 
that they [0.2] can rely on each other and that each side [0.5] that has joined 
the alliance will implement a mutual defence agreement [1.9] but here of course 
you have again [0.2] possible problems [0.6] in that [0.3] they don't 
necessarily agree on the strategic and operational parameters [1.1] er [0.2] 
one example for that would be [0.3] Britain and the U-S [0.4] er in the early 
stages of the Second World War [1.7] you again run into the problem of 
abandonment and entrapment [0.6] and [0.9] the question is how [0.2] how can [0.
7] the alliance the allies then [0.2] deal with 
this situation in such a way that [0.2] the survival of all of them [0.5] is 
actually going to be guaranteed [0.4] and the stronger member of an alliance [0.
2] doesn't go [0.4] well [0.4] this smaller state is dispensible in some way [0.
8] er it may [0.3] it may be better for us all if we sacrifice one of the 
alliance members [5.9] now [0.2] before World War Two [0.2] as i mentioned 
before [1.5] there was a stong belief in the offence [0.5] because the idea 
that if you launch a surprise attack at a potential enemy [1.6] then [0.2] you 
have [0.2] at least in that first initial er in that initial phase [0.3] the 
upper hand [1.6] er [0.7] so you would get tight alliances [0.5] which [0.7] 
because they wanted to [0.2] go for a surprise attack [0.5] would have very 
high arms procurement [0.6] and [0.7] launch [0.2] a massive attack as quickly 
as possible [1.8] needless to say this was of course [0.4] quite an unstable 
way [0.3] of relating to one another [0.6] in the interwar period [0.7] the 
whole [2.0] the whole [0.3] philosophy sort of changed the other way round at 
least amongst [0.3] those countries that had [0.6] won the seco-, the First 
World War [1.0] in 
particular France and the U-S er and and the U-K [1.4] because they [0.2] felt 
it was necessary to spend [0.4] more time attention and resources [0.4] on 
their domestic policies and on the economy [0.5] and military issues were [1.3] 
well [0.3] kept [0.3] as low on the agenda as possible [1.7] er [0.3] that led 
to [0.3] a defensive strategy [0.2] especially on the part of of Britain [0.9] 
and [0.9] led of course as you all know [0.2] to a s-, highly a very strong [0.
6] very offensive Germany which launched the Second World War [2.3] 
ss: 
nf1161: excuse me [laughter] [1.3] grumble grumble [laughter] [1.4] okay [0.2] 
i'll w-, wait for your signal [1.0] am i standing in anyone's way [0.3] 
ss: yes [laughter] 
nf1161: oh right [laughter] [0.7] tell me when i can come in again [17.8] ready 
[0.6] 
ss: mm [0.4] 
nf1161: mm [1.1] we have a lot to do today that's why i'm rushing a bit [6.7] 
done [5.7] now [0.8] after the Second World War [0.6] partly [2.7] if if at the 
end of the session you find that [0.3] you have missed that fifty per cent of 
what i have said [0.6] i'll try to make a few copies of this and then [0.2] er 
[0.8] they will be very 
small [0.3] because there is quite a lot here [0.4] but er i can hand them out 
[0.3] some time either [0.5] on Thursday or next week [0.2] so you won't have 
missed out [1.8] er [1.1] where were we [0.3] alliances [0.2] collective 
defence after the Second World War [0.6] in the general [0.4] atmosphere of 
needing to [0.2] stabilize the international system as i talked about [0.5] now 
a week ago [1.7] but at the same time [0.2] having to sort of deal with the 
issue of armed [0.2] aggression [0.8] er [0.3] in the international system as 
well [1.4] what developed was [1.4] something called collective defence now [0.
2] we've [0.2] i've talked about collective security last time [0.9] collective 
defence [0.5] is much more focused on [0.2] the military aspects [0.5] of 
collective security [1.1] er [0.2] of course it has political dimensions [0.9] 
but [0.2] it is essentially a further development of [0.3] alliance building [3.
7] now [0.5] central to a system of collective defence [0.4] is the mutual 
commitment that attack er an attack [0.3] against one is seen as an attack 
against all [2.2] but that also means that [0.3] within [0.3] the framework [0.
3] of [0.3] the treaty which establishes the the collective 
security system [0.6] there was a need to define active aggression [1.0] i'll 
tell you later or i will show you later that NATO [0.3] as the one [0.7] almost 
prominent example of a [0.2] collective defence system [0.6] has [0.2] has done 
that in the Washington Treaty [2.5] now [0.2] collective defence systems tend 
to be [0.4] established with a longer term view not like alliances [0.5] er of 
the pre-World War Two period [1.7] now [0.7] that means [0.2] that if you have 
a more integrated and [1.1] er [0.2] a sort of longer lasting system [1.6] that 
has ramifications of how the allies cooperate [0.8] and [0.5] little is as 
sensitive as [0.2] the issues of national security when it comes to [0.9] 
military national security [0.6] 'cause all the allies of course want to keep 
each other out [0.5] at the same time [0.3] in a collective defence system 
there is a need to share some of [0.7] what it would otherwise would be 
considered secret [1.4] so [0.3] in [0.3] an organization which is meant to 
establish a collective defence system [1.5] the way in which the institution is 
set up has to strike a balance between [0.3] respecting the sovereignty 
of all the er of all the members of the collective security system [0.8] and at 
the same time [0.3] tending to the need [0.3] of [0.3] to the needs of this 
collective security system for it to work I-E [0.4] a degree of openness [1.8] 
now again [0.3] of course you have the same alliance problems they [0.2] they 
are [0.3] played out in a different way [0.5] er which i mentioned before [0.5] 
the question of [0.5] defection abandonment and and as well as entrapment [0.3] 
and NATO if you look at the [0.5] history of NATO has had a fair share of 
discussions about this [0.7] you ready [1.4] don't want to incur your wrath 
again [0.9] er [4.3] but [0.4] overall [0.6] what [0.5] Britain France [1.0] 
and [0.3] the U-S [0.4] saw [0.2] paramount in establishing NATO [0.5] was [0.
3] were the benefits [1.2] er and these benefits were an enhanced deterrence 
capability [0.4] not least because [0.4] and this was of special interest for 
Britain and France [0.6] er and the Benelux countries [1.1] beca-, er to tie 
the U-S [0.4] militarily [0.8] into a europ-, European security system [0.2] a 
or collective defence system [1.7] A because of the experiences of World War 
One and Two [0.2] and the 
failure of the balance of power system and Britain's inability [0.5] to 
guarantee [0.4] or to to be [0.5] a stabilizer in the balance of power [0.2] on 
the European continent [0.7] Britain was economically and militarily [0.3] 
after the Second World War no longer capable of of playing this role [0.5] so 
the U-S [1.1] one of the paramount [0.6] policy objectives for Britain was to 
tie the U-S [0.4] into [0.3] a European collective defence system [2.6] now [0.
3] doing this [0.2] in with a long ter-, longer term perspective [0.4] meant [0.
6] ultimately [0.4] that the military processes [0.3] which were [0.4] separate 
nationally [0.6] had to harmonized in some way [1.0] because [0.6] on a on a 
completely [0.2] sort of practical operational level [0.4] the armed forces of 
[0.4] now [0.6] sixte-, nineteen different countries but during the Cold War 
sixteen different countries [0.5] had to work together [0.8] they had to be 
able to talk to one another [0.6] and if they don't have the radio equipment to 
do so then then they can't talk to one another [0.3] they have to have [0.2] a 
common 
language [0.7] they have to have planning procedures [0.4] and [0.2] traces and 
and just operational procedures which are [0.3] comparable [1.0] and they need 
to be able needed to be able to [0.7] share [0.3] to a to a degree [0.5] er 
their equipment [0.3] especially equipment [0.2] where [0.6] the [0.2] the arm-,
the national armed forces tried to [0.3] work together [0.8] and that meant 
that on an on an institutional level [1.1] other than alliances of the pre-
World War Two kind [0.9] a separate identity [0.6] emerged [0.5] where NATO 
became gradually over over decades not from the very beginning [0.5] but over 
the [0.2] over the over its history [0.4] became [0.3] a separate [0.2] entity 
[0.4] which had a separate [0.5] language a separate way of [0.2] of [0.2] 
operation [0.5] er the wa-, it had different [0.2] standard operating 
procedures it had its own [0.4] planning [0.4] er [0.3] procedures [0.5] and [0.
4] these would then be handed down to the national [0.6] military and political 
planners [0.8] er [0.4] which were or who were then tasked with implementing 
what NATO desired [0.4] now [0.4] there are many studies [0.4] ex-, er 
exploring exactly that linkage between NATO level planning [0.3] and 
national level planning [0.3] because national level planning [0.4] always 
massively undercut what NATO thought it might need [2.2] another [0.5] aspect 
[0.2] which and NATO is really the reference point for collective defence 
systems because it's the only [0.5] er long lasting [0.6] example that we have 
for a collective defence system [2.0] another aspect of it is political 
cooperation [1.6] er [1.2] confidence building [0.2] on the one hand because if 
[0.3] former enemies especially after [0.2] Germany er joined NATO as well [0.
8] if former enemies or potentially [1.0] not hostile [0.4] neighbours but [0.
3] but neighbours who are not entirely confident or comfortable with one 
another [0.5] if they start talking to one another on a political as well as on 
a military level [0.3] it's because NATO has a a [0.4] a political organization 
which is based in Brussels [0.6] er [0.2] ever since France left NATO [0.4] in 
nineteen-sixty-six [0.4] and it has a military organization which is er [0.4] 
which is based in [0.2] er Mons near Casteau [0.3] which [0.4] is about [0.3] i 
don't know [0.2] an hours drive outside Brussels [1.1] er [1.0] if on the 
political and on 
the military level [1.5] the member nations or representatives of the member 
nations [0.2] meet [0.5] regularly [0.8] there is a very different [0.3] over 
time a very different understanding of each other [0.7] emerges [0.3] which [0.
5] again contributes to [1.7] some degree of [0.3] separate identity of NATO as 
an organization [0.2] and that can then [0.4] be translated down into [0.5] 
national decision making levels as well [2.1] if you talk to people within NATO 
they would even go so far that [0.3] conflict resolution within [0.3] these 
structures [0.5] can be possible without this ever [0.2] becoming an issue [0.
5] that [0.2] really hits the headlines [2.1] one problem [0.4] that NATO has 
had all the time is this issue with free-riding [1.0] er it's commonly called 
within na-, within the NATO [1.3] er [0.3] scholarly literature [0.5] the 
burden sharing debate [0.6] it emerged [0.2] in [0.2] the nineteen-sixties in 
the nineteen-seventies in the nineteen-eighties [0.4] and it's going to come up 
again [0.4] if [0.8] well depending on who wins the er U-S elections today [0.
8] but with [0.5] president if if it was to be President Bush i'm pretty sure 
[0.6] i would hazard 
the guess that the issue will come up again [1.5] the U-S [0.6] especially the 
more [1.2] the more conservative and the more [0.4] western orientated [0.5] 
proportion of the U-S Congress [0.8] has [0.4] especially since the nineteen-
seventies very strongly lobbied [0.3] against a permanent commitment [0.4] of U-
S troops in Europe [0.9] because they argued that [0.3] er Europe [0.2] is [0.
5] from the seventies onwards Europe was doing economically well enough [0.4] 
to defend itself [0.4] and the U-S would still maintain its nuclear umbrella [0.
3] but there was no need [0.3] for [0.3] U-S troops to be based [0.2] in Europe 
[1.9] er [0.2] and if they were [0.7] to [0.3] remain in Europe [0.3] then the 
Europeans should spend a lot more [0.4] on their own defence [0.5] now there 
was a lot of number crunching that can go on [1.0] er over the issue of [0.4] 
burden sharing because it depends on how you calculated defence expenditure [0.
5] er if you want to make the argument that no Americans and the Europeans are 
contributing e-, equally [3.5] 
i'll get back to the problem of different perceptions [0.3] U-S and Europe of 
NATO [0.2] er in a minute [1.9] problems with collective defence [1.5] er [1.2] 
one i have just mentioned [0.4] because there is a long term perspective [0.5] 
there is an enhanced risk of free-riding [1.0] the long term perspective also 
requires that the alliance itself adapts [1.2] because [0.5] for for many 
different reasons [0.9] er [0.9] A [0.8] the alliance's rationale under which 
the alliance may have been founded in the first place [0.5] may no longer be 
there if the international system changes [0.4] or if [0.3] the relationship 
between [0.4] those [0.2] whom the alliance was meant to deter [0.6] and the 
alliance itself [0.6] improves [2.4] if it does not improve [0.2] or if there 
is no concensus that the er the relationship has improved [0.2] the question is 
how high should the defensive cap-, [0.9] of what nature should these defensive 
capabilities be [1.8] and [0.2] how committed [0.2] are the allies [0.3] 
depending on how much they contribute to the 
defensive capabilities [0.3] and how they stand [0.2] politically [0.7] when 
France left NATO in nineteen-sixty-six that was seen as a major crisis [0.6] 
because it was [0.2] seen as entailing [0.3] ha-, have you finished [0.8] oh 
i'm asking now [laughter] [1.7] er [2.2] it was seen as entailing the 
possibility that the Soviet Union might see [0.8] NATO as falling apart [2.5] 
other changes that might happen [0.3] are [0.4] changes in the domestic 
environment of alliance members [1.2] better or worse economic performance [0.
5] now the external threat [0.2] which [0.2] NATO as [0.4] on the NATO level 
agreed on [0.7] may have required [0.3] very high defence expenditure from the 
perspective of NATO planners [0.9] but in the early nineteen-seventies [0.5] 
neither the U-S [0.5] nor Britain [0.4] nor any of the other European countries 
were really in the position to spend an awful lot of money on defence [0.5] 
they still did [0.6] but they were under serious eeconomic pressures [0.4] A 
because of [0.2] the oil prices [0.5] and [0.2] the U-S [0.2] because it had 
exhausted itself in the in the Vietnam War [0.2] and had then [0.4] deferred 
some of the costs it paid 
in the Vietnam War [0.6] over to the Europeans through its economic policies [0.
2] and financial policies [2.4] another possibility of change is that [1.3] the 
alliance itself might change its role in the international system [1.6] maybe 
some alliance members are interested [0.2] or might be interested in [0.4] 
increasing [0.5] the operational area of the alliance [0.4] some may not [0.6] 
that's a debate you had in NATO in the early nineteen-eighties [0.6] when the U-
S and [0.6] Britain to a degree [0.4] argued that NATO should take on a lot 
more [0.3] what was then called out of area responsibilities [0.5] I-E that 
NATO should no longer just be responsible for [0.4] the defence of western 
Europe [0.9] but [0.4] also take on [0.5] the Soviet threat as it was perceived 
[0.5] in other areas such as Africa [0.2] the Middle East [0.3] er [0.3] south 
Asia [1.1] or central Asia [2.5] now all this can become rather aggravating 
because of course in an alliance you have [0.4] in in a collective defence 
system such as NATO [0.8] you have [0.3] collective decision making [0.9] now 
the policy formulation should [0.5] in [0.4] the 
spirit of collective decision making [0.7] take place [0.4] by mutual agreement 
[0.5] but of course [0.2] some states as what i've said [0.3] before [0.2] some 
states are more equal than others [0.4] and if the alliance is very much 
dependent on some [0.2] of the states or [0.2] maybe one of the state [0.5] 
states then [0.4] er they this particularly state mi-, have may might have a 
lot more leverage in pushing through its own policy objectives [1.0] er and 
then you risk the dom-, [0.2] the the alliance risks being dominated by larger 
allies [3.4] further problems [0.3] and we've come back to [0.4] the security 
dilemma [1.6] are outside perceptions [1.4] now NATO was founded [1.5] with 
defensive intent [0.7] and [0.7] nobody [0.2] amongst those [0.3] leading 
figures who helped NATO into being [1.8] could s-, [0.3] well [0.9] saw [0.2] 
NATO as an aggressive alliance [1.1] there are people on record saying well [0.
4] nobody [0.2] who has [0.4] in any way a clean conscience in other words 
doesn't [0.2] doesn't want to er [1.9] attack NATO [0.4] can see NATO as [0.3] 
an aggressive [1.2] er [0.2] well international organization or er or alliance 
[1.4] however the Soviet Union saw it very 
differently [0.6] the Soviet Union was convinced [0.2] until the la-, second 
half of the nineteen-eighties [0.3] that NATO [0.3] had aggressive intent okay 
in the nineteen-seventies détente [0.2] er [0.2] saw this [0.4] slightly well 
the the the [0.2] general mood between East and West [0.4] eased up a bit [0.6] 
but there was always the fear [1.0] that NATO might attack [0.9] the Warsaw 
Pact [0.9] and [0.6] with the foundation of or with the founding of the of the 
Warsaw Pact in response to NATO [0.4] you have the same [0.3] you have what 
i've mentioned earlier that [0.4] that the [0.2] an instance where [0.5] the 
formation of one alliance triggers the formation of another alliance in 
response [4.3] the other issue i've i've already [0.3] sort of [0.2] hinted at 
as well very briefly that intra-alliance arguments may be interpreted as a lack 
of cohesion [0.9] one of these the red lines going through NATO debating itself 
[0.9] or scholars debating NATO during the Cold War was always [0.5] if we do 
not [0.5] portray an image of a cohesive a politically cohesive life [0.5] if 
we show that there are so too many disagreements [0.2] 
between the Europeans and the Americans [0.4] or amongst the Europeans [1.7] 
then NATO is going to be perceived as a weak alliance [0.3] because then [0.2] 
the Soviet Union is likely to [0.4] exploit [1.3] this this [0.3] or and and 
the Soviet Union is likely to exploit this weakness [0.3] that it sees in [0.2] 
NATO cohesion [2.9] finally from [0.7] again a systemic perspective [1.5] if a 
collective defence system persists [0.6] the question is [0.4] does this 
persistence [0.7] maintain the status quo ante [0.4] I-E before [0.3] the 
system changed [0.3] and the threat disappeared [0.5] such as NATO post end of 
Cold War [1.2] or might it need two new alliances [0.5] or [0.2] as NATO did [0.
4] might it [0.5] survive find new roles [0.4] and transform itself but then 
does that perception [0.6] of NATO in its Cold War identity [0.2] automatically 
go away [1.6] very very [0.2] weighty questions which we still haven't solved 
entirely yet [5.8] now [1.5] NATO [1.2] as i said before [0.2] combines a 
political and a military mission [2.1] in its [0.5] founding treaty so the 
Washington Treaty you can [0.3] see all these documents on the NATO website 
which is just W-W-W-dot-NATO-dot-org [0.5] 
or in the library in the in the Politics department library [0.3] there is a 
NATO handbook which has [0.2] all the basic information from a NATO perspective 
obviously [0.5] but it's a good start into [0.2] the official [0.3] 
presentation of NATO as an organization [0.8] and that includes also the 
Washington Treaty [2.4] the declared purpose [0.3] of NATO was [0.4] defensive 
[0.7] and it subjected itself to the principle [0.4] principles of the U-N [0.
4] it was as i said before [0.7] a defensive [0.9] a a collective defence 
system [0.4] which saw itself as [0.4] a subsystem to [0.3] the collective 
security system [0.3] established [0.6] under or with the U-N [2.4] it declares 
that it was [1.2] the [0.7] the founders declared that they [0.2] founded NATO 
[0.3] to safeguard the freedom the common heritage [0.2] and civilization of 
their peoples [0.5] founded on the principles of democracy individual liberty 
and the rule of law [1.0] now if you look at [0.4] NATO from that perspective 
[1.1] you get [0.6] immediately a host of areas which you can investigate [0.4] 
in order to [0.6] critically assess [0.2] the functions of NATO [0.9] to ask 
questions well what is the purpose of [0.2] this alliance [2.1] how far is this 
alliance compatible [0.4] with [0.6] the way in which [0.7] international 
relations work now [0.8] has it adapted itself [0.8] if it is tied to the ideas 
that [0.4] on which liberal democracies are are based [0.7] is it justified for 
NATO [0.2] to [0.4] protect Albanians in Kosovo against Serb aggression [0.5] 
or maybe it's not [2.3] but [0.6] although [0.3] al-, military alliances are 
mostly not [0.2] investigated from that perspective [0.9] it is rather a 
rewarding [0.4] idea to [0.5] at least question the political and the [0.2] 
ideological underpinnings [0.5] of military alliances [0.3] because in the end 
[0.5] armed force is used for political purposes [1.8] now NATO also [0.3] 
fulfilled the other requirement that it needed to defend er to define [1.4] 
what an armed what what aggression is what is an incident of aggression [1.2] 
now article five of the Washington Treaty does that [2.2] A that [0.2] an armed 
attack against one shall be considered [0.3] er an armed attack against all [1.
0] but [2.8] in response [0.3] to [0.2] such an act of aggression [0.2] each of 
the parties in in 
exercise of their right to individual or collective self-defence recognized by 
article fifty-one of the U-N charter [0.6] will assist those attacked by taking 
individually or in concert with the other parties such action as it deems 
necessary [0.3] now this is an essential point [0.7] such action as it deems 
necessary [1.0] this is this is [0.3] NATO founders bowing to [0.7] sovereignty 
[1.0] they do not say we predetermine how we are going to defend NATO territory 
[0.3] or territory of an ally [0.8] er against an act of aggression [0.2] armed 
aggression [1.0] they say [0.4] in the event [0.2] of an attack [0.4] each of 
the NATO members [0.5] can decide [0.2] how much [0.4] and in what way [0.5] it 
wants them to contribute to [0.5] a defensive act or to to defensive action [2.
8] of course in NATO planning especially in NATO planning [0.3] er for a 
contingency in an [0.2] in in [0.2] well in a confrontation with the Soviet 
Union [0.8] 
was based on [0.2] on the assumption that all NATO members would [0.2] throw in 
[0.3] all they had in order to defend themselves [0.9] but this is an issue 
which is now [0.2] becoming much more relevant [0.8] plus if it had been [0.3] 
not the Soviet Union but someone else attacking a NATO member [0.4] then the 
situation would have probably been rather different [2.3] and they undertook 
the obligation to report an attack and countermeasures to the U-N Security 
Council [1.8] they did not say [0.4] we are going to ask for permission by the 
U-S Security Council I-E a mandate [0.9] for [0.2] any [2.0] er [1.3] action [5.
0] you don't have to write down these things look them up in in i mean [0.4] 
the the er [0.9] the article bits which i had [0.4] sort of quoted on this on 
this slide [0.6] don't write them down just look them up on the web or [0.2] in 
in the handbook it's much easier [1.2] and it's not so salient unless [0.4] 
unless you are interested in looking at NATO and and investigating something [0.
5] pertaining to NATO questions [0.6] er then you go [0.2] co-, go to [0.2] er 
the NATO handbook or or its website but you don't [0.5] it's not 
essential [0.2] nobody's going to ask you that in your exams [0.4] can you 
quote article five of the er of the Washington Treaty [1.8] er [2.3] during the 
Cold War [0.4] as i said NATO's [0.2] principle objective [0.2] was to deter 
the Soviet Union [0.8] everything [0.2] that NATO did [0.5] was subordinate to 
that and of course it had to do this [0.3] A [0.4] through [0.2] nuclear 
deterrents well it didn't of course have to do this [0.6] did eventually have 
to do it when the Soviet Union [0.4] acquired nuclear weapons in nineteen-forty-
nine [0.3] and built up a nuclear arsenal [2.1] that also meant it was utterly 
dependent on the U-S [0.2] because nuclear deterrents only worked with U-S 
involvement [0.8] and this is where i come back to why the Europeans were so 
keen on having [0.5] U-S military personnel based in Europe [1.8] the U-S 
soldiers based in Europe [0.4] and pilots and [0.5] sailors [0.6] were 
essentially [0.8] hostages [0.4] in [0.5] the game of nuclear deterrents [1.1] 
because by having U-S [0.2] military personnel based in Europe [0.5] that 
military personnel could become [0.3] a target [0.6] for Soviet aggression [0.
9] which 
meant from a European perspective [0.4] the U-S [0.4] would have extended 
national security interests in Europe [0.4] in the shape of soldiers [0.3] 
based [0.3] on European soil [1.1] which meant again from a European 
perspective [0.3] that the likelihood that the U-S [0.3] would use nuclear 
weapons in response to an attack a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union [0.9] was 
much higher [0.9] than [0.5] if [0.2] no U-S personnel had been based [0.4] on 
the European continent [2.0] burden sharing debate and this issue [0.2] were 
often [0.2] very closely linked [4.8] at the same time milita-, er [2.4] NATO 
tried to [1.2] underline its defensive [0.3] attitude [0.8] by declaring that 
military action was dependent on unan-, unanimous decisions [0.4] if the 
smallest member of NATO did not want to [0.9] take action [0.5] NATO wouldn't 
have taken action [0.5] well [0.3] unless this member was had [0.5] er its arms 
twisted massively by all the other members [8.4] on the issue of cohesion [1.8] 
not only the burden sharing [0.2] debate was an issue but also [0.7] arms 
control [0.8] and i'll talk about arms control [0.4] er [1.1] next in a week's 
time [0.8] so just to sort of [0.2] give you a 
pointer [0.7] er the SALT negotiations in the late nineteen-sixties early 
nineteen-seventies from a European perspective [0.5] were seen as [0.6] 
entailing at least a risk [0.6] of the Soviet Union and the U-S coming to [1.0] 
a separate agreement [0.6] which suited their national security interests [0.3] 
but not necessarily [0.5] the Europeans' national security interests [0.5] 
which meant [0.3] that they perceived the risk of being abandoned [0.3] by [0.
2] the U-S [0.6] as it turned out [0.4] the U-S reiterated its commitment to 
European security and to NATO [1.0] but [0.3] in that period in the late 
sixties early seventies [0.2] there was [0.2] quite a lot of [0.4] concern 
about the issue of abandonment [4.0] now [0.4] to finish very swiftly [2.1] 
NATO in the post Cold War environment [1.6] NATO [0.2] didn't want to abolish 
itself as you all know [2.2] NATO was also seen as still being a child of the 
Cold War and harbouring aggressive aten-, intent against Russia and the 
successive states of the Soviet u-, [0.2] the other successive states of the 
Soviet Union [2.3] so NATO spent [0.2] the nineteen-nineties [0.5] reinventing 
itself [0.4] A [0.8] as [0.6] one [0.9] little wheel [0.2] well actually quite 
a dominant wheel [0.7] in the European [0.3] framework [0.7] of institutions 
which [0.3] were responsible or which which have remit [0.5] for political 
economic and military security and development in Europe [1.2] NATO enlargement 
was [0.2] one [0.6] major aspect of this [1.0] which NATO [0.7] couldn't [0.4] 
which is [0.2] it would be unjustified to see as [0.4] just something that NATO 
pursued in order to find a new [0.2] er [0.5] rationale for itself [0.7] those 
countries which had been previously Warsaw Pact members [0.5] and [0.2] were 
very keen on [0.2] establishing their links with western Europe [0.7] were very 
keen also on becoming members of NATO not least because it became clear very 
soon [0.3] that the E-U [0.4] would [0.4] drag its feet a lot longer [0.2] in 
[0.6] er [0.4] admitting new members [0.3] whereas NATO [1.0] both from a NATO 
perspective and from from a U-S perspective was much more prepared [0.5] to 
contemplate [0.2] letting in new members [0.5] so last year Hungary Poland and 
the Czech Republic became new members of NATO [1.7] NATO also er established 
itself as one organization [0.3] which had [1.0] a cooperative role [0.4] 
within [0.7] the European [0.4] the E-U system of [0.6] er designing [0.3] a 
common foreign and security policy [1.0] but of course [0.3] again there you 
have [1.3] p-, potentially huge problems [0.5] of transatlantic relations the 
different orientations of [0.3] the European [0.3] the E-U members [0.5] er [0.
2] towards [0.2] the the their different attitudes towards the U-S conflicting 
[0.3] with the European idea [1.1] finally [0.4] NATO became [1.0] well [0.2] 
one could say a subcontractor at least for a while [0.3] to the U-N and the O-S-
C it offered [0.7] it [0.2] it made itself available [0.2] as a military tool 
[0.4] er for [0.2] U-N authorized or O-S-C-E [0.4] os-, er authorized [1.2] er 
operations [1.1] this meant also that NATO does no longer only have to [0.8] 
respond under article five it [0.3] can [0.7] it has [0.5] inscribed in in into 
its new strategic doctrine [0.4] the possibility of legitimate action [0.3] in 
peace enforcement and peace keeping operations [0.5] so its mission its self-
imposed mission [0.3] has changed [0.3] to [0.4] quite a significant degree [1.
7] that was an extremely fast rundown er [0.3] betw-, from alliances of 
collective security to NATO [0.7] i hope you remember some of it [1.1] and i'll 
see you on Thursday [0.7] for [0.3] deterrence [1.1] thank you