nm1160: good afternoon ladies and gentlemen perhaps we could make a start [3.8] 
thank you very much er [1.3] a couple of quick announcements [0.5] before we 
start er [0.6] would the [0.2] group of students who are due to meet [0.7] 
namex that's not the one that's already [0.4] had the first class but the other 
group [0.6] he's asked me if you could meet him at three o'clock on Friday [0.
5] this week [0.5] in room two-five-seven [1.2] so if you could [1.9] meet him 
in room two-five-seven at three o'clock [0.7] this Friday afternoon [2.9] the 
second is to announce that the last four lectures which are [0.4] on your er 
sheet as to be announced [0.5] will be given by er namex [0.9] er [0.6] and [0.
9] er she's asked me also to point out that she intends to [0.5] er reinstate 
the human rights lecture [0.4] and we're going to delete the one on [0.3] er [0.
5] domestic sources of foreign policy [2.9] today i'm going to [0.3] turn my 
attention to probably one of the [0.5] longest lasting theories of 
international [0.5] relations [1.3] er and that is the theory of realism [1.2] 
in international relations [2.5] for many years [0.3] the [1.1] key textbook on 
international politics [0.5] was a book by a man called Hans J Morgenthau [0.7] 
an American academic [0.3] who wrote [0.3] various editions [0.3] of his [0.7] 
major work [0.2] Politics Among Nations [1.8] in this book [0.5] Morgenthau 
outlines the theory of realism as it applies [0.4] to international politics [0.
7] and he begins with a very [0.2] famous [0.6] er sentence in his book [0.6] 
international politics he says [0.4] like all politics [0.3] is the struggle 
for power [2.3] he then [0.2] proceeds to define [1.0] international relations 
[0.3] in terms of power [0.4] and how states acquire retain [0.7] and er [0.3] 
sustain [0.2] themselves [0.8] as power er in power [2.9] for the realist [0.6] 
power is the [0.2] currency of international politics [0.3] it's the way in 
which you get on [0.2] it's the way in which you [0.3] achieve your objectives 
[1.6] power is therefore [0.4] crucial [0.5] if you are [0.2] to be [0.2] 
successful [3.3] there is no other criteria [2.1] you don't act [1.0] in a way 
which is right [1.0] morally or [0.4] in any other way [0.8] you simply [0.2] 
do what is necessary [2.6] morality plays no part [1.7] power is everything [1.
2] and the world according to 
the realist analysis is divided into two [0.5] broad [0.2] groups [0.2] of 
states [0.8] those who are satisfied [0.7] with the status quo and therefore 
will [0.3] seek to sustain it [0.8] and those who are dissatisfied [0.4] with 
the status quo who have [0.3] one of two choices they can either change the 
status quo [0.6] or [0.2] they have to accept it [1.3] so you have dissatisfied 
powers or revolutionary powers [0.4] at one end [0.3] and satisifed [0.2] 
status quo powers [0.6] at the other [1.1] the world is seen as a hierarchy [1.
5] with the most satisfied and powerful states at the top [0.6] and the least 
satisfied [0.3] and least powerful states [0.3] at the bottom [1.2] realists 
therefore [0.7] define international politics as the struggle for power [1.3] 
the struggle for [0.8] supremacy [1.6] they are in many respects rather like 
Hobbes' [0.8] analysis of man and the state of nature [1.5] they see human 
nature [0.5] and [0.2] the nature of states as being [0.4] much the same [1.0] 
states are [0.5] like Hobbes' man [1.0] motivated by greed and fear [1.6] 
according to Morgenthau no state will [0.2] willingly lose power or give up 
power [0.5] or indeed threaten [0.9] itself or its position [0.4] by 
taking actions which it er cannot achieve [1.9] so for the realist [1.0] the 
analysis is very simple [2.2] but it becomes a circular argument [2.6] power is 
defined in terms of the national interest [0.4] all states pursue [0.3] the 
national interest [1.2] but in a sense [0.3] that creates a real problem 
because [1.5] it [0.2] follows that everything that states do is always in the 
national interest [0.4] and what [0.7] the national interest is in is [0.3] is 
always what states do in other words you can't [0.3] get below that er level of 
analysis [0.7] because no state will act [1.0] out of the [0.2] interests [0.5] 
of its national [0.4] concerns [4.2] now [0.8] Morgenthau may have some [0.8] 
relevance because of course he was arguing against the ideas [0.4] of the 
nineteen-twenties and the nineteeen-thirties [0.4] which had seen [0.3] a view 
that international politics should be more cooperative [0.9] as initially it 
had seen the idea of internationalism [0.7] as being crucial and essential [0.
8] if progress was to be made [1.9] the future of the world as seen after the 
end of the First World War [0.3] as lain [0.2] with international cooperation 
[1.6] in [0.2] 
establishing new forms of international morality [0.8] in establishing [0.3] 
some forms of cooperative behaviour [0.3] between states [0.5] a collective 
agreement as to what was right [0.4] and what was wrong [1.9] Morgenthau argues 
strongly against this [2.6] his view [0.3] was such a [0.3] er the the liberal 
[0.7] idealist view of the world [0.7] that in fact you could create a [0.4] a 
a [0.3] cooperative world was simply [0.9] not [0.5] related [0.3] to the 
realities of politics [0.7] but what in fact happened then was that you simply 
threatened [0.2] your own existence [1.1] by being nice to people [0.2] you 
ended up [0.2] in more trouble [0.2] than being nasty to them [1.1] states who 
didn't [0.2] seek to defend [0.4] their power position [0.3] simply [0.2] would 
[0.2] not [0.4] be able [0.7] to survive [1.2] so that was the problem [1.0] 
the problem as far as Morgenthau was concerned was if you acted morally [0.3] 
you put at risk [0.7] the interests of your state [3.3] and therefore [0.2] 
states should simply ignore morality [0.7] he wrote a famous article called The 
Twilight of International Morality [0.6] in which he argued very strongly that 
the purpose of morality [0.4] 
purpose of ideology as well [0.4] was simply [0.2] to provide a gloss [0.2] for 
what you would do [0.2] anyway [2.1] in other words nobody goes out and says [0.
2] i'm going to war against this country because it's smaller [0.3] and i can 
beat the hell out of it [0.5] you go to war because of [0.2] international 
principles [0.6] but the reality is [0.2] that you choose war [0.2] because you 
think you can win it [1.4] and then you find some reason [0.3] for doing [0.4] 
for for taking [0.2] er the military [0.2] action [0.4] you don't [0.3] in 
other words [0.3] er [0.4] make moral judgements [0.2] about [0.2] the use of 
force [3.4] so Morgenthau presents a very s-, extreme view of realism [1.1] 
that the only thing that matters is power [0.4] that the only way in which 
states will [0.5] will respond to each other [0.3] is [0.3] in their perception 
[0.3] of other states' power [1.3] and that [0.5] essentially [0.4] 
international politics is an anarchic system [0.4] in which only the powerful 
will succeed [3.7] the problem however [0.3] with Morgenthau's analysis and 
with the realist analysis [0.6] lies in the number of directions [1.5] the 
first is [0.9] that [1.9] they're not united in what [0.4] they 
believe [0.7] should be [0.4] the role of states [0.2] even Morgenthau [0.5] 
who in his book [0.2] claims that [0.5] his analysis of international politics 
[0.2] simply reflects [0.2] what actually happens [0.5] complains [0.4] er 
halfway through the book that America isn't actually [0.4] conforming [0.2] to 
the rules which he's actually laid down [0.6] and has asserted that all states 
[0.2] always follow [0.4] so in other words he's actually saying [0.4] here's 
the theory [0.2] but in fact unfortunately [0.4] er states don't [laugh] [0.3] 
abide by my theory [0.4] which of course [0.2] is nevertheless [0.2] an 
accurate description [0.3] of how states always behave [2.9] so [0.8] in 
reality states don't always act as the realists [0.4] would wish [0.9] 
nevertheless the realists did have a genuine point [0.5] in the sense that they 
were arguing against those [0.4] who believed that [0.4] policy should be 
motivated by [0.4] idealistic [0.3] and morali-, er moralistic [0.3] views [0.
7] to take one example [1.0] in the post-nineteen-forty-five period [0.5] there 
were those in the United States who sincerely believed [0.5] that because 
democracy [0.3] and [0.2] ec-, and the market economy [0.2] was so 
morally superior [0.4] it was the duty of the United States [0.4] to roll back 
the frontiers of communism [0.3] to liberate Eastern Europe [0.4] by military 
means [0.2] if necessary [1.5] whilst the realists might agree [0.2] that that 
would be a laudable objective [0.5] they equally firmly argued [0.2] that that 
was not [0.3] a real [0.4] possibility [0.5] that you could not roll back 
frontiers of communism [0.3] because such [0.6] to try to do so [0.2] would 
simply put at risk [0.3] all [0.2] that the United States stood for [2.0] 
and [0.2] particularly in the age of nuclear weapons and once [0.4] the Soviet 
Union could respond in nuclear kind [0.3] it was the there was little point [0.
6] in doing so [0.9] there was no point in being right [0.4] but very [0.2] 
very [0.2] dead [1.5] so for the realists the argument is very much a practical 
one [0.3] as well [0.4] as a theoretical one [1.1] now that doesn't mean to say 
that realists and idealists don't always agree [0.8] indeed in Korea [0.9] 
during the Korean War [0.4] or perhaps more recently during the Gulf War [0.6] 
you could get both realists and idealists agreeing [0.5] on the outcome even 
though they actually [0.2] 
came to it [0.2] from two entirely different viewpoints [0.6] on the one side 
the realists [0.2] would argue [0.3] the key issue in the Gulf is oil [0.2] and 
therefore it's in [0.3] the United States' interests [0.4] to secure oi-, oil 
supplies [0.2] prevent [0.4] Saddam Hussein from controlling a large [0.6] er 
section of the world's oil supplies [1.8] so the United States should take 
military action [0.3] and on the other side there would be the idealists who 
said this was poor little country [0.3] invaded by a rather larger country [0.
2] it was the duty of the international community [0.3] to defend [0.4] the 
right of Kuwait [0.4] to sovereign [0.3] independence [0.3] and existence [1.4] 
so both agree [0.2] on military action [0.3] but from entirely different 
perspective [0.3] one saying it's our moral duty [0.3] the other saying it's 
the interests [0.2] of the state [0.8] which is important [4.9] there however 
[0.2] remain significant problems [0.2] with the analysis which er [0.3] 
Morgenthau and others [0.5] bring forward [0.8] first of all in defining what 
is the national interest [1.2] whose interests [0.4] are to be defined as the 
national interest [1.5] here we 
have the same sort of problem as you get in [0.3] political philosophy in 
relation to Rousseau [2.9] in relation to the will of all [0.5] and the general 
will [3.7] Morgenthau's answer to that is that in the sense the national 
interest [0.3] is so self-evident [0.6] that in fact you don't need to define 
it [2.1] but that's a bit of a cop out really because you do need to actually 
know [0.3] what the national interest is [0.4] if you're going to pursue it [0.
6] and simply to assert [0.3] that to retain your power is in the national 
interest [0.3] seems to me to be [0.2] an inadequate explanation [0.8] it's 
also very much related to time constraints [1.7] how much time has to expire 
before you know whether something is in the national interest [1.2] let's take 
the case of Germany [1.4] Germany between nineteen-thirty-six and [0.4] 
nineteen-forty-two or thereabouts [0.3] could be said to have [0.5] gained as a 
result of the Nazi [0.3] government they had expanded [0.3] Germany they had 
occupied most of Europe [0.5] they were being highly su-, [0.2] successful [1.
0] in military terms [0.8] between nineteen-forty-three 
and nineteen-forty-five [0.6] Germany lost everything so perhaps the Second 
World War wasn't quite so [0.3] in America er sorry in in Germany's [0.3] er 
national interest [0.9] but view that from the year two-thousand you could 
certainly argue that [0.5] not only was it in the national interests of Germany 
to fight the Second World War [0.3] it was in the national interests of Germany 
to lose the Second World War [0.3] because Germany has become by far and away 
the strongest state [0.5] in Europe [1.4] so in a sense [1.1] it depends on how 
you define [0.2] success [0.4] and what kind of time scale [0.4] you're looking 
at as to whether or not [0.3] a particular policy or a particular approach [0.
6] is [0.3] in the national interest [2.7] the third problem is the problem of 
power [0.5] what constitutes power [2.2] now we all have a fairly [0.8] broad 
view [0.3] of what we mean by power [0.8] but really the realists are only 
concerned [1.0] in their analysis with military power [1.7] military power is 
the tangible power that you can see [0.8] that states [0.2] actually have [1.1] 
but power is much more significant than that [1.2] power [1.3] 
may be the currency of international relations but some of it is not easily 
measurable [1.6] the bits that are [0.5] we can look at and compare [1.1] so 
for example [1.2] we can [0.4] look at the size of a country's [0.2] military 
capabilities [3.4] tells us very little how about the quality [0.4] of those [0.
2] capabilities [0.4] and there are some states who genuinely believe [0.3] 
that quantity [0.2] will always overcome quality [1.0] but nevertheless it is 
an important factor [0.2] which needs to be considered [1.9] how good [0.3] are 
the weapons [1.8] how accurate are they [0.2] how effective [3.8] what about 
the size of the population [1.0] that again gives you some clue [0.3] as to [0.
4] how [0.2] large an army [0.2] a country [0.2] might be able [0.5] to [0.3] 
er deploy [0.5] in times of emergency [1.2] what is the strength of the economy 
[0.9] is it a modern economy is it [0.3] is it [0.3] er is there a well 
educated population [0.6] we can measure most of these factors [0.5] in terms 
of almost every state and every year [0.3] for example the International 
Institute [0.2] for Strategic Studies [0.3] produces a list [0.3] of the 
military capability [0.3] of almost every state [1.6] so anybody 
who wants to look up how strong a particular country is [0.4] you can look up 
[0.3] and find out [1.1] but that doesn't really tell you [0.4] very much [1.8] 
there are also immeasurable elements [0.6] of power [1.3] power is relative [0.
5] and it is psychological [1.4] power is relative in the sense [0.4] that 
whilst we may have a general hierarchy [0.2] of states [0.5] you can still have 
regional great powers [0.4] who may not [0.2] necessarily meet [0.2] the reach 
the top ten [0.3] internationally [0.4] but who are still great powers [0.4] in 
their locality [0.2] and who can influence [0.2] and effectively [0.3] 
manipulate [0.3] states [0.2] around them [3.6] secondly people may perceive 
one state as being more powerful than it actually is or less powerful [1.4] 
Britain is a very good example of a state [0.4] that [0.2] after nineteen-forty-
five [0.5] proclaimed itself to be a great power [0.4] and possibly for about a 
decade after the end of the Second World War [0.3] was regarded by almost 
everybody [0.3] as a great power [1.1] so in order to be [0.5] to have your 
power acknowledged [0.3] is a very important factor in terms [0.3] of [0.6] 
public assessment [0.4] of your power 
capabilities [1.2] states simply can't assert that they are powerful [0.5] 
other people have to recognize it as such [4.4] states may [0.7] not be 
powerful if they are divided amongst themselves [1.3] however much [0.2] your 
military capability [0.3] may be it may be ineffectual [0.4] if in fact [0.3] 
you are [0.3] have a weak government [0.7] a divided country [1.3] a country 
which is simply [0.4] unable [0.2] to [0.2] get its act [0.2] together [0.7] to 
use one example [0.4] the example of Laos [0.3] or Cambodia during the [0.3] 
nineteen-fifties and sixties [0.2] had a neutralist government [1.0] to the 
north [0.4] er of the sort of er in northern [0.4] Laos and northern Cambodia 
you had communists [0.3] er [0.6] dominance to the south you had western [0.2] 
capitalist dominance [0.3] and so you had compromised on a government [0.2] 
that was a neutral government neither capitalist nor communist [0.4] but 
virtually incapable of doing anything [4.8] or France in nineteen-forty which 
collapsed [1.7] as a result of inter-, in part at least as a result of internal 
divisions [0.3] within France [0.8] and the effectiveness [0.4] of German 
propaganda [1.1] we cannot measure [0.4] people's 
determination to fight [1.4] and a classic example [0.5] of this [0.6] er would 
be [0.4] Israel in the modern [0.3] day [0.2] we can take Israel today [0.7] 
Israel [0.6] is [0.9] a very small country with a ve-, relatively small [0.3] 
population and certainly [0.5] if you simply add up the population [0.4] 
significantly weaker [0.3] than its Arab neighbours [1.0] and yet Israel has 
fought [0.3] a number of wars [0.2] in the past [0.5] and survived and been 
successful [0.9] why [0.6] because it is more determined to do so [0.9] it is 
more determined [0.9] because for Israel [0.7] one loss is one loss [0.2] too 
many [1.1] it simply would not survive [1.4] and therefore [0.4] however small 
you are you may be very determined [0.5] to be successful [0.3] and to survive 
[0.5] i'm not arguing that this will always be s-, [0.4] [laugh] er [0.2] er [0.
2] mean that you can [0.5] be successful [0.7] but the motivation is a very 
powerful element [0.4] in getting people [0.3] to fight [0.6] and to sustain 
their position [4.7] so [0.2] when we look at power [0.9] we can't always [0.2] 
add up [0.5] the numbers [1.0] and be certain [0.3] that one state is more 
powerful [0.4] than another [2.7] in the last analysis [0.7] power exists at 
three 
different levels [1.0] it exists at the level of influence how people [0.2] 
influence other states [0.7] well you can do that [0.3] physically by sending a 
gunboat [0.5] harassing people threatening people [2.1] but occasionally and 
quite often [0.4] influence can far exceed [0.7] your physical capacity [0.4] 
er to force an action [0.6] that is to say [1.1] organizations like [0.3] the 
Vatican [0.3] have enormous influence around the world [0.5] but have very 
little power [1.4] a country like Britain has got enormous influence [0.5] but 
[0.2] comparatively [0.3] declining power [4.7] you can also have [1.1] 
mobilized power [0.4] let's say [0.5] how much power you actually have 
available to you [0.2] at any given moment [0.8] mobilized power [0.2] is the 
amount of power [0.2] which you can normally deploy [0.3] in [0.6] peacetime [0.
4] conditions [1.0] and then you've got total power [0.3] which is what you can 
achieve [0.3] when you mobilize fully and completely [0.3] onto a war footing 
[1.3] and how quickly you can do that [0.3] how effectively you can do that [0.
4] is a further factor [0.5] in determining how powerful [0.3] you may be [0.9] 
many states [0.3] have often been frightened [0.4] of a 
surprise attack [1.1] and however powerful you may be [0.3] you can sometimes 
be the victim [0.3] of such attacks [1.1] furthermore [1.8] it's become 
increasingly clear in the modern world [0.4] that [0.9] the kind of military 
capability that states have [0.3] may not always be [0.4] relevant [0.2] to the 
particular operations [0.4] which they wish to undertake [1.4] nobody would 
suggest that because the United States failed in Vietnam [0.5] Vietnam was more 
in powerful [0.4] than the United States [0.6] all one can say [0.4] is that 
the f-, [0.2] power that was available to the United States [0.2] was 
inappropriate for use [0.3] in Vietnam [1.0] and therefore [0.7] no state [0.4] 
in a sense has absolute power [0.4] in the international [0.3] community [2.5] 
a second and perhaps more interesting point is that economic power [0.9] is [0.
7] equally significant [1.1] and something which in a sense the realists [0.3] 
have paid very little attention to [2.9] economic power [0.9] may be [0.2] 
differently distributed [0.5] from [1.6] military power [1.0] indeed if you go 
[1.6] back in history [1.2] when you look back to the nineteenth century and 
the eighteenth century [0.9] most of the 
knowledge great powers of that era [1.4] were in fact also the economic giants 
[1.2] but in the twentieth century [0.7] we find that that has not always been 
the case [1.0] if we look at the [0.3] period after nineteen-forty-five for 
example [0.3] nobody would really argue that the Soviet Union [0.3] was ever [0.
2] an economic great power [1.0] but militarily [0.3] it was second [0.8] in 
the world to the United States in terms of its military capability [2.3] so [1.
0] there has become a growing mismatch between economic power [0.4] and 
military power [0.9] and some states have used economic power [0.5] very 
sucessfully [0.2] to achieve their objectives [0.3] in the international 
community [1.6] so that economic power has become a new reality [0.8] which in 
a sense the realists [0.2] have failed to take into account [0.5] neo-realists 
[0.4] people like Kenneth Waltz and others [0.3] in more recent times [0.3] 
have however [0.3] taken that [0.5] into account in their analysis [0.5] of 
international politics [4.1] is it true [0.2] howe-, [0.2] also that in fact 
states do not behave according to some [0.6] basic [0.2] feelings [0.2] of 
morality [0.8] i think here again 
the realist analysis [0.3] is simply inaccurate [1.5] of course it's true that 
states will not [0.4] act simply out of [0.6] er a feeling that [0.2] what they 
should ought to do [0.5] should be moral [1.0] and states will of course choose 
to do [0.2] a series of immoral [0.5] actions [1.7] but as [0.2] Arnold Wolfers 
one of the early realists argued [0.8] in a famous er article [0.2] called 
Statesmanship and Moral Choice [0.8] states do make choices [0.8] and they do 
make them on the basis of some moral values [1.6] given the fact that you may 
have objective which can be achieved by more than one means [0.7] then you can 
choose the least immoral [0.4] of a range of immoral actions [0.9] that's not 
saying you're going to act morally [0.3] but there is a degree of moral choice 
[0.3] between sort of bombing somebody [0.2] and maybe [0.2] using less 
intrusive means [4.0] now the analysis which the realists have offered [2.0] 
adds [0.2] one further [0.6] element and rather interestingly [0.3] it becomes 
a moral imparity [1.7] the realist analysis [2.4] is that order [0.4] is more 
important than justice [0.3] in the international community [2.6] to the 
realist [0.5] 
what is important [0.8] is that peace is preserved [3.3] not because it is [0.
2] morally good [0.6] but because it benefits [0.4] those that are at the top 
of the international [0.6] system [2.4] when you're at the top [0.5] you don't 
want to risk anything [0.4] you become more conservative with a small C [0.7] 
you want to have [0.2] a conservative view [0.3] you don't risk anything [0.4] 
you don't put your head above the parapet [0.3] you want order [0.2] in order 
that your trade will continue [0.2] that your economic prosperity will continue 
[0.3] that your interests will be safeguarded [0.5] and you don't risk anything 
[1.1] of course [0.5] if anybody threatens you [0.2] you will fight them [0.6] 
and [0.5] presuming you're [0.6] as powerful as you think you are [0.5] you 
will defeat them [1.1] but the reality is [0.5] you want order [0.6] order is 
by far and away the most important value [0.3] as far as the realist is 
concerned [5.8] other people would argue that justice is more important [3.0] 
that you cannot have [0.2] a real [0.6] just [0.2] world [0.6] a peaceful world 
[0.2] unless there is proper justice [1.1] people will always be dissatisfied 
[0.6] if they cannot see [0.3] that their legitimate complaints [0.3] will be 
dealt with [0.4] and if at all possible remedied [2.1] 
the reality is that for those who are dissatisfied [0.3] with the status quo [0.
9] which is essentially what the realists support [1.9] have [0.5] to change 
that status quo [0.4] by military means [0.9] the only way [0.6] in which a [0.
6] status quo can be changed [0.5] is by [0.5] replacing those at the top [0.5] 
with a new [0.3] international order [2.3] and the general belief is that that 
can only be achieved by military means [3.2] now in reality of course [1.1] 
that may not be true [1.3] some states can achieve objectives using economic 
means [1.4] and provide tremendous impact on [0.5] the international economy [0.
5] such as raising the price of oil [2.0] but in [0.2] but in the realists' 
analysis [0.6] you are faced with a very stark choice [0.5] there is order [0.
8] in which [0.2] states [0.2] at the top [0.4] dispense [0.9] what they regard 
as justice [1.7] er or there is anarchy [2.7] others on the other hand would [0.
2] would argue that in [0.2] it is an anarchy because there is no justice [1.5] 
why is it that two-thirds of the world [0.2] consume [0.5] less than a third of 
the world's resources [1.3] is this not an unfair [0.4] and unreasonable 
distribution [0.6] both of [0.3] 
the resources of the world [0.2] and of power [1.7] that more equal division of 
power [0.4] will lead to more peaceful [1.8] relations [1.1] particularly [0.4] 
given the fact that more people will be satisfied [0.6] than dissatisfied [4.3] 
now [0.7] one way in which states can increase their power [0.3] is through 
alliances [0.9] they can achieve [1.2] what they cannot achieve alone [0.8] by 
joining with others [1.4] and alliances can be created [0.6] in the short term 
[0.3] for short term gains [0.4] they can be economic alliances they can be 
diplomatic alliances [0.4] they can be military alliances [0.7] alliances 
enable you [0.2] to change the power relationship [2.6] and to achieve far more 
collectively [0.7] than individually [2.4] but the difference between that kind 
of collectivism [0.5] which realists would approve of [0.8] and the 
collectivism [0.4] of [0.3] the idealists [1.0] is that [0.9] under alliances 
[0.3] you choose your partners [0.5] and you choose the purposes [0.4] for 
which [0.3] you form [0.2] an alliance [5.4] the [0.6] realists would argue 
that [0.7] it is only makes sense [0.3] if you have common objectives [0.3] to 
join together [0.2] to achieve them [1.3] as happened 
during the Second World War [0.2] it doesn't require ideological [0.5] 
considerations [0.5] if you have a common enemy [0.3] you'll join together [0.
2] to fight [0.2] against that common enemy [0.9] and [0.2] that's as really as 
we'd have predicted all that as quickly [0.4] as you came together [0.3] you 
disintegrated because you always fall out [0.3] over who's going to get [0.3] 
the biggest spoils [0.2] at the end [0.2] of that conflict [1.5] but alliances 
[0.3] are ways of increasing power [0.2] in the short term [1.3] very few 
alliances [0.4] last longer [0.4] than the existence [0.3] of the threat [0.3] 
that created them [6.3] so that realists have a view of the world which is very 
simple [3.1] the world is divided to some extent into good guys and bad guys [1.
4] the good guys are the people you agree with the bad guys are the people who 
are trying to upset you [1.4] they have a simplistic view [0.6] of how states 
interreact [0.7] they see it in terms of power [1.5] the only thing that 
matters [0.3] is whether i am more powerful [0.4] than another state [0.3] or 
that state is more powerful [0.3] than i am [1.9] and it's a very simplistic [0.
2] 
analysis of power because it simply [0.3] seeks to identify [0.2] military 
power [0.5] of the main means by which states [0.5] interreact [2.5] it 
excludes morality [0.3] there's no moral [0.5] considerations at all [1.5] 
except in so far as you might choose [0.7] not so bad [0.8] a means [0.4] of 
achieving your objective [1.1] and the example which Wolfers uses [0.3] is the 
example [0.2] of the Cuban missile crisis [1.7] where he says look [1.9] let's 
consider what the options of the United States were [1.0] they could have 
written a nice letter to Mr Gorbachev [0.2] sorry to Mr gru-, Khrushchev [0.4] 
and say [0.2] er please take your missiles away [0.5] doesn't seem very likely 
that would be happen [1.2] they could ignore it they can simply say it's none 
of our business [1.8] they could bomb the missile sites [1.5] they could invade 
[1.0] or they could [1.0] set up [0.2] some kind of quarantine [0.4] to stop 
the military [0.5] capability [0.2] getting through [2.2] Wolfers' argument is 
that Kennedy chose [0.4] the least worst of those options that were available 
to him [0.2] he dismissed the idea of writing to Khrushchev [0.6] or ignoring 
it completely [2.2] 
and that was to set up a quarantine [1.1] because that was the least worst 
option because it threatened nobody [0.5] except those who wished to either [0.
3] run [0.2] the quarantine [0.6] or attempt [0.2] to er [0.3] er force their 
way through it [2.6] it threatened no Cubans it threatened no Russians [0.9] 
but it demonstrated America's commitment [0.3] to do something [0.2] positive 
[0.2] about getting rid [0.5] of the missiles it achieved its objectives [3.8] 
so there is an element of morality but it's not very [0.2] strong [1.6] where i 
think there [0.2] there is a weakness however [0.2] is that most states seek to 
defend their actions in moral terms [0.5] very few states [0.3] seek to 
actually [0.6] announce that they're doing something [0.4] just because they 
can do it [0.9] they always find some reason [0.8] ideological [2.1] or moral 
[0.7] to justify the actions [0.3] which they have taken [3.0] and you have to 
ask yourself why [0.9] why do states do this if in fact [0.4] everybody knows 
that states are simply out for themselves [0.5] if everybody knows that the 
only thing that really matters [0.3] is power [0.8] why do you feel the 
necessity to defend yourself [1.0] against [0.3] world opinion [1.6] and i 
suppose the answer to that is [0.4] that in fact states like to be liked [2.0] 
they don't like to be seen [0.2] as bullies [0.6] they don't like to be seen [0.
4] as people who ignore the rights of others [2.4] and so states do feel a 
certain degree of obligation [0.8] to [0.3] justify their actions [1.7] 
furthermore i think [1.2] realism [0.2] excludes the possibility [1.5] and it's 
a growing one [0.9] that [2.0] states can simply [0.3] isolate themselves [0.5] 
from the ouside world [1.2] the growth of television the growth of [0.2] mass 
communications [0.5] have meant it's virtually impossible [0.6] for states to 
ignore [0.4] what is going on [0.2] around them [1.3] and public opinion [0.4] 
has become more important in some respects within states [0.8] forcing states 
to do things which they might not otherwise [0.6] do [2.5] so the strict 
application of power [0.3] in terms of [0.5] maintaining the hierarchy [0.8] of 
ignoring the interests of others is simply [0.3] being slowly [0.5] withered [0.
2] away [1.0] i'm not suggesting that there's [0.4] a tremendous amount of [0.
4] international compassion [0.3] and so forth [0.3] 
but there is certainly a view [0.4] that today's states cannot get away [0.5] 
as often [0.4] as they did [0.4] with simply [0.2] doing things because it's in 
their interests [0.4] to do so [3.8] furthermore [1.1] there has been a second 
line of [0.4] criticism of rea-, of realism [0.8] not this time from the 
idealists [1.0] who simply [0.2] throw up their hands in despair at the idea [0.
2] that states should simply behave [0.3] in such a a [0.2] cavalier way [0.9] 
but from those [0.2] who wish to see [0.4] a more clearer analysis [0.5] of 
international relations [0.5] based on a more scientific [1.0] method [0.5] of 
[0.5] er study [2.5] into the [0.6] debate if that is the right way of [0.3] 
putting it [0.7] came a group of [0.7] scientists mainly [0.9] who sought [0.5] 
to criticize [0.4] Morgenthau's view [0.5] that what he had put forward was a 
scientific [0.3] theory [0.3] of international relations [0.5] by pointing out 
first of all [0.2] that Morgenthau did not set out any [0.4] preconc-, er [0.6] 
did not set out any propositions [0.3] that he sought to test [0.4] but merely 
[0.2] asserting [0.3] that the behaviour of states was as he described it [0.5] 
and therefore [0.6] was able to fit everything into his theory [2.0] but he 
also failed to [1.6] discard [0.4] his own ideological views [2.7] and that 
what was needed was a more scientific [0.5] and rigorous approach to the study 
of international politics [1.3] that yes states behaved [0.8] in certain ways 
but they could be seen as behaving [0.2] in certain ways [0.3] because of 
certain [0.2] variables [0.2] which operated [0.3] across all states [0.4] and 
in the same way [0.3] across all states [1.1] so the scientific analysis of 
international politics [0.8] would analyse [0.5] the ways in which states 
behave [0.7] not by [0.3] asserting beforehand [0.4] what they would do [0.5] 
but by looking at what they did [0.3] and then trying to understand [0.3] why 
it was they behave [0.4] in the way in which they did [2.0] Morton Kaplan in 
his [0.4] book System and Process in International Politics [0.3] introduced 
this new [0.7] idea of systems analysis [1.0] that there was such a thing as an 
international system [0.3] and the international system [0.3] simply had to be 
analysed [0.3] in terms of the way in which [0.2] it was structured [0.2] and 
how [0.3] the [0.2] subsystems within that system [0.5] interreacted [3.9] 
traditionalists like Morgenthau and others [0.7] 
simply found this [0.9] beyond comprehension [0.8] they argued strongly [0.3] 
that you couldn't have a scientific study [0.3] in that sense [1.8] you 
couldn't have [0.4] a study of politics [0.6] which discounted the human [0.2] 
element [0.5] within it [2.9] they argued that their analysis of international 
politics the realist analysis of international politics [0.5] reflected [0.3] a 
broad philosophical [0.6] tradition [0.2] about [0.3] the nature [0.3] of human 
beings [1.5] human beings [0.6] behaved [2.4] selfishly [1.5] that the nature 
[0.4] of [0.4] individuals [0.5] was such [0.4] that they [0.2] behaved in the 
way in which [0.6] to Morgenthau and others states behaved [0.8] why [0.3] 
because states were made up of human beings [1.2] the people who made decisions 
for states [1.5] translated their individual [0.6] er [0.4] methods of working 
[0.5] to the state level [1.8] it was individuals who made decisions on behalf 
of states [1.0] states [0.2] themselves couldn't make any decisions at all [1.
9] so that the [1.2] debate which went on was between those who thought you 
could understand the international system [0.6] by looking at [1.2] issues [0.
2] in a scientific way [0.6] and those who asserted that it was simply 
impossible [0.5] to do so [3.3] 
at a later stage in this debate which to some extent became rather sterile with 
each side [0.7] shouting at the other and not really communicating [1.0] there 
developed [1.1] a new version of realism [1.0] or neo-realism as it became [2.
7] the leading er figure in this er analysis [0.4] was a man called Kenneth 
Waltz [1.0] er [0.6] now Kenneth Waltz's analysis [0.4] of international 
relations [1.3] was very much [1.5] to attempt [0.2] the broad principles of 
realism [1.7] but to argue [0.3] that in a sense it needed to be modernized [0.
3] and brought in up to date [0.4] and to accept a wider range of factors [0.4] 
than people like Morgenthau [0.5] and the early realists [0.3] had suggested [1.
9] the Waltz book [1.1] or [0.2] series of books [1.0] he made his name for 
example by [0.3] an analysis of war entitled Man the State and War [0.5] in 
which he tried to analyse the different levels [0.5] of which war [0.4] might 
be seen to have been the cause [1.8] he then went on to look at the balance of 
power [0.4] as a theory [1.1] because as you'll see next time [0.4] in which 
i'm sure you'll be pleased to know will be my last appearance er [0.7] in this 
lecture thea-, [0.3] er series [0.5] er [0.6] we er [0.4] er he identified the 
balance of power as being one of the most crucial elements [0.6] er for [0.2] 
the realists and indeed for the maintenance of order [0.5] within international 
[0.5] relations [2.9] but he also saw it in terms of the nuclear balance of 
power [1.7] but what you had to do was you had to see the balance of power [0.
4] within the nuclear [0.3] context [1.1] and rather interestingly [2.2] he and 
others have argued very strongly [1.2] that deterrence is best achieved through 
the acquisition [0.3] of nuclear weapons [1.3] but Waltz went further [0.7] he 
actually argued that as many states as possible [0.5] should have nuclear 
weapons [0.9] because that way [0.4] every state would [0.2] deter [0.5] every 
other [1.3] and that war [0.2] would simply be abolished [0.2] through 
deterrence [1.3] he wrote a famous article called [0.4] Nuclear Weapons More 
Would Be Better [3.3] and that [1.3] what he's trying to argue it seems to me 
[0.6] is that you can create some kind of stability and order [0.8] within 
the international [0.5] community [1.2] the search for order [0.6] while as it 
is primarily concer-, the concern of the realist [0.6] who assert that it is 
far more important than justice [0.4] remains a key factor in international [0.
4] relations [1.6] in the next few lectures that we shall be er [0.4] having [1.
3] er and giving [1.7] it is answering the questions of how we avoid war [0.7] 
that will be central [0.4] er to the discussions [0.9] now half the reason for 
that [0.5] is that even if you believe in international justice [0.8] there is 
a general feeling [0.4] that wars are destructive [0.7] and should be avoided 
if at all possible [1.1] the fact that war does exist and continues to exist [0.
5] is a key factor [0.3] in understanding international politics [0.9] how you 
avoid it [0.6] and the answers to what the best means of achieving [0.4] the 
avoidance of war [0.4] is a matter [0.3] which varies [0.3] for individual 
approach [0.3] to individual approach [0.5] but next week [0.3] i shall be 
looking at in detail [0.3] at the balance of power [0.3] as a concept [0.5] for 
managing international relations