nm1159: er and we saw that in some ways the er [0.5] er a Lockean state of 
nature [0.9] was similar in some ways difference the some ways different [0.3] 
some ways it was er [0.8] er [0.5] er very different in that it was regulated 
it wasn't the ho-, necessarily the horrible state of anarchy [0.5] that you ha-,
had in the case of Hobbes [0.5] but nonetheless there are inconveniences in 
Locke's state of nature [0.8] and therefore [0.4] er individuals do need to 
come out of the state of nature [0.3] and set up er [0.3] a political community 
[0.4] er [0.3] which will have its a-, which will have a government er do you 
remember you need the need for an impartial [0.4] judge a judge who can en-, [0.
2] could enforce a [0.4] its decisions [0.8] er [0.6] and here we have the idea 
of the social contract again like Hobbes [0.2] Locke invokes the idea of a 
social contract of individuals contracting with one another [1.1] to set up [0.
5] government [1.1] and one of the again one of the ways to er [0.2] appreciate 
or u-, comprehend [0.2] Locke's idea of the social contract is to compare and 
contrast it [0.4] with Hobbes' idea of the social 
contract [1.6] er there are again similarities and differences [0.3] there is a 
similarity a basic similarity [0.5] in that you've got the idea [0.3] of [0.2] 
e-, every individual [0.9] agreeing with every other individual [0.3] to give 
up something to do with their natural rights [0.6] every individual agreeing 
with every other individual promising [0.2] every other individual [0.4] to 
give up [0.3] something to do with their natural rights [0.4] so that's the 
basic similarity [0.8] er [0.5] the difference [0.2] well the differences 
concern [0.3] what [0.2] precisely is given up [0.9] er [0.3] and [0.4] to what 
[0.4] these things are given up [0.9] so let's look at each of those [0.4] 
first of all [0.3] what [0.5] what [0.2] precisely is given up [1.2] now you'll 
remember that in the case of Hobbes [0.6] er what individuals give up [0.4] is 
the nat-, is natural right their natural right itself [0.2] er [0.2] with the 
exception of [0.3] the natural right to life and there were some puzzles and 
difficulties about that [0.4] as i suggested the the the exceptions here didn't 
really amount to much so [0.3] just [0.2] to permissibly oversimplify [0.4] in 
the case of Hobbes [0.5] what 
individuals give up [0.2] is their natural right or their natural rights but 
probably in the case of Hobbes better to s-, well to speak about their natural 
right [0.2] so in a sense they give up everything [0.7] er [0.9] in the case of 
Locke [0.8] they do not [0.6] there is a crucial sense in which they do not 
give up anything clearly that's [0.2] they do give up something and i'll 
explain that in a moment [0.4] er [0.4] but what they give up [0.2] is the 
right to protect their natural rights [0.4] and the right to enforce their 
natural rights [0.5] the key point is they do not give up those natural rights 
themselves that is a absolutely crucial difference [0.4] between [0.3] Locke 
and Hobbes they do not repeat do not [0.5] give up their natural rights [0.5] 
what they give up [0.4] is the right to enforce them [0.7] er you'll remember 
in the state of nature if somebody infringes your natural rights [0.2] you have 
the right to go and punish them [0.5] or to try and rectify the violation [0.6] 
er in in the social contract individuals say to each other we will no longer 
enforce our 
natural rights ourselves we'll give up that right [0.5] and will as you as you 
will s-, will see what they do is hand that right over to government and we'll 
come to that in a minute [0.6] er [1.4] one way of putting this is the way that 
er [1.1] er Nozick [0.3] put it [0.6] N-O-Z-I-C-K [0.4] er [0.2] a f-, a er [0.
9] er contemporary political theorists [0.4] er who wrote a famous or infamous 
book perhaps called Anarchy State and Utopia [0.5] published in nineteen-
seventy-four i think [0.4] some see Anarchy State and Utopia [0.4] as something 
on a level with er [0.4] John Rawls' A Theory of Justice as a profound [0.6] or 
and a penetrating work of political theory [0.4] others see it as a nasty right 
wing political tract er [0.3] i'll leave you to decide by [0.4] if you if you 
wish to [0.4] read or read about it the reason i'm referring to it here is [0.
5] that Nozick [0.2] s-, pes-, specifically starts from a Lockean conception of 
state of nature what he is saying is [0.3] let us assume [0.2] the validity of 
Locke's state of nature [0.3] and theorize from there [0.4] er in fact he 
theorizes he comes to somewhat [0.5] some 
slightly different well [0.7] er he theories differs from Locke's and there on 
to some extent but there are many similarities it's a [0.3] sort of updating of 
Lockean [0.5] political theory [0.5] i'm referring to him here because he makes 
a useful distinction between [0.2] procedural and substantive rights that is to 
say [0.6] in the social contract individuals do not give up their substantive 
rights they only give up their procedural rights [0.4] they give up the right 
to the procedure for enforcing those rights but they don't give up the rights 
themselves [1.7] that is to say as we'll see for Locke individuals keep their 
natural rights [0.4] whilst they're under government they do not surrender them 
by putting themselves under government [0.7] and this of course [0.4] crucially 
limits what a government can legitimately do [0.4] this of course is [0.3] a 
key reason why [0.3] Locke is the great [0.3] liberal political theorist [0.5] 
and er governments are not [0.4] er [1.1] do not have the authority [0.6] to [0.
2] infringe natural rights by individuals putting themselves under 
government do not give up their natural rights they only give up [0.3] their 
procedural rights to enforce their natural rights [2.3] for Locke then the 
inconvenience of the state of nature means that there are no [0.3] or [0.9] tha-
, i-, i-, in the state of nature there is no inf-, effective and impartial 
interpreter [0.3] of natural rights er an enforcer of natural rights and this 
is an inconvenience [0.3] so they [0.4] er g-, er by pref-, er br-, er they 
engage in the social contract [0.3] to set up [0.5] er [0.2] this i-, impartial 
enfor-, enforcer of er natural rights the government and i'll come say more 
about that in a minute [0.5] but the second difference you'll remember [0.2] 
regarded [0.3] between Hobbes and Locke here [0.3] regards [0.2] what precisely 
is given up in at social contract sorry to what [0.2] these things are given up 
[0.3] in the case of Hobbes you'll remember [0.2] individuals give up their 
natural rights hand over their natural rights [0.2] to the sovereign directly 
[0.3] to the sovereign [1.3] indeed [0.5] for Hobbes nothing else is possible 
[0.5] there is no other entity to 
whom [0.4] or to which [0.2] you could over hand over natural rights there are 
only individuals [0.4] er and they hand over partic-, [0.2] to a particular 
individual the sovereign or [0.3] particular group of individuals if er if the 
sovereign [0.5] er [0.6] er [0.3] er i-, is an assembly [0.6] in the case of 
Locke though we have another entity which is of great importance [0.4] sort of 
intermediate if you like between the individual and the government [0.5] the 
political community [0.2] the body politic [0.3] the commonwealth these are all 
[0.5] er words which Locke uses interchangeably [0.2] sometimes he pi-, the 
people or a people [0.8] er [1.3] so for for Locke individuals [0.3] give up 
what they do give up which is their procedural rights remember not their 
natural rights [0.2] to a political community [0.2] to a body politic [0.5] to 
a commonwealth [0.5] or if you like to a people [1.5] that people [0.4] that 
commonwealth that body politic [0.4] then sets up a government [0.2] so they 
don't hand over their procedural rights directly to a government they hand it 
their procedural rights over to a body politic [0.6] a 
people [0.3] which then [0.4] sets up a government [1.2] to to give an analogy 
let us er [0.6] think of individuals say within this university [0.6] who all 
interested in playing tennis so they get together and decide to form a tennis 
club that's if you like step one but having formed a tennis club they actually 
need to run the tennis club [0.3] so they then have to appoint a committee so 
there's two steps you form the club and then you form the committee [0.5] 
similarly for Locke [0.4] you form the body politic the body politic then forms 
it as it were [0.4] its executive committee [0.5] er that is the say [0.5] the 
government there's a bit more to it than that but that analogy [0.9] er [0.3] 
is fair enough i think [0.5] now some see this in terms of two contracts there 
is a temptation to see this in terms of two contracts [0.7] first contract [1.
6] amongst the individuals themselves to set up the p-, political community [0.
8] the people [0.6] second contract [0.7] er is sometimes seen as being between 
the people thus formed and the government [0.2] contract one between the 
individuals to set 
up a people contract two [0.2] between the people and the government [0.4] and 
it is sometimes seen in this way [0.3] er [0.7] the reason it is sometimes seen 
in this way because there are other theorists before Locke [0.2] who did 
conceive and i've mentioned this before [0.4] there are other theorists before 
Locke [0.4] who did conceive of there being a contract between the people and 
the government [0.4] Locke in-, actually doesn't see it that way although he 
comes up with er [1.1] er [0.4] ideas which have a similar effect [0.6] because 
Locke sees the people as setting up a government as a trustee [0.8] the 
government is a trustee [0.5] li-, er the idea here like a trustee that runs a 
trust fund [0.2] trustee that runs a trust fund [0.4] runs the fund on the beha-
, on behalf of and has duties to [0.3] the beneficiaries [0.5] well similarly 
the government is set up as a trustee of the people it runs [0.4] er affairs on 
behalf of the beneficiary [0.3] which is the [0.4] which is the people [1.1] so 
rather than the [0.5] er government and the people being in a contractual 
relationship [0.5] they are on the 
relationship of a trustee the government [0.3] to a beneficiary of the trust 
the people [0.6] but it's important to note [0.2] and we'll come back to this 
it's important to note [0.7] that the people are not just the beneficiaries [0.
5] they are also the interpreters of the terms of the trust [0.5] now normally 
where you've got a trust fund and a trustee [0.3] it is the [0.2] not the 
beneficiary who interprets the terms of the trust it is of course [0.4] the 
courts of law that interpret the terms and the be-, the beneficiary does not 
himself interpret the terms of the trust [0.6] in the case of Locke and 
government [0.3] as we'll see the people are not only the beneficiaries but 
they're also the interpreters [0.3] of the terms of the trust let's see what [0.
4] Parry i i mentioned before Geraint Parry in his helpful book [0.5] John 
Locke says about this this is pages [0.4] ninety-nine and one-two-four [1.1] er 
he says [0.5] er [0.3] for Locke contract created a political society [0.2] and 
is the means whereby once free individuals become subject to the new 
jurisdiction [0.8] government is not established directly f-, by contract [0.5] 
for some earlier political thinkers [0.3] government too had been the product 
of contract [1.2] Locke took a different line from these predecessors [0.3] the 
only contract is that of association [0.4] which is and then he quotes Locke 
which is all the compact there is or needs to be between the individuals that 
enter into or make up a commonwealth [0.9] government is instituted by a 
distinct [0.2] act of trust [0.6] whereby the associated community [0.5] 
transfers its executive right to a smaller body of persons [0.3] for the more 
effective performance of society's [0.6] duties [0.4] er and again [0.8] he 
says the political community is established by contract [0.7] civil government 
is established by a distinct act of trust whereby the people conditionally 
transfer their executive right [0.3] to some amongst themselves [0.3] who would 
act as umpires and rule-makers for the rest [0.8] this act of trust is the 
fundamental 
constitutional act of the political community [0.6] which determines the way in 
which the authority is institutionalized [0.5] it is the original and supreme 
act of society that's a quote from Locke [0.4] it establishes the form of 
government [0.5] the mode of succession [0.4] the relations of legislative to 
executive [0.5] all the institutions of government owe their authority [0.5] to 
[0.2] to that [0.4] act of trust and i think that expresses it [0.4] very well 
[0.7] er [1.4] note to come back to a point i've already made that this means 
[0.5] that the political community [0.4] the body politic if you like the 
people [0.4] is distinct from [0.2] and can remove the government [0.5] that is 
to say if the government breaks the terms of the trust [0.5] the poli-, the pol-
, body politic can remove [0.2] the people can remove [0.5] the government [0.
7] and it can do this without [0.3] threatening its own dissolution again the 
contrast is with Hobbes for Hobbes [0.3] if the government is removed [0.2] 
there is no people [0.4] the only thing that holds individuals together as a 
collective entity you'll remember is the s-, the authority of the sovereign [0.
2] no sovereign [0.2] no people [0.6] now for Locke it's not like that [0.5] 
there is a body [0.2] separate from the sovereign actually doesn't use the term 
sovereign so we must talk about the government meaning the legislature and the 
executive [0.6] the people can remove the government [0.2] and thereby [0.4] 
and not risk dissolving itself [0.5] er [0.8] er [0.6] the government er the 
the the the people the body politic can in fact remove one government and 
appoint another and of course he's very keen to make this point because that's 
how Locke conceptualized what went on at the English Revolution [0.4] the 
English people removed [0.5] one government [0.3] one king [0.3] and [0.4] er 
[0.7] James the Second and and and and and and and set up another [0.2] king [0.
4] William and Mary [0.4] er [0.2] so it's it's vital for hob-, for for what 
Locke wants to do to conceptualize the people as being able to act [0.6] er 
independently of the government and indeed to [0.4] to remove a government if 
necessary or w-, 
when the conditions are such that they ought to be removed and to set up 
another one [1.1] so to summarize then [0.2] er these points individuals form a 
political community [0.2] they already are remember [0.2] in a community of a 
sort in the state of nature [0.5] unlike for Hobbes where the state of nature 
is not even any kind of community [1.1] for Locke individuals are already in a 
form of community [0.5] but [0.2] it's not satisfactory so they form a 
political community a people [1.0] they give up to this political community 
this people this body politic [0.4] the right of enforcing their natural rights 
but nothing more they do not give up those rights themselves they only give up 
the right to enforce their rights [0.6] and this political community [0.2] this 
commonwealth this people then sets up a government [0.2] which executes this 
task for them this task of enforcing their natural rights [0.6] or enforcing 
the protection of their natural rights [0.6] er is done for the people [0.4] by 
the government which it sets up again that is all that 
the government does [0.3] let me rephrase that [0.3] that is all the gov-, that 
the government can legitimately do [1.1] er [0.5] unfortunately as we'll see 
not all governments are legitimate [0.4] er but that is all that the government 
can legitimately do [0.9] that is to say the government [0.5] ought to do can 
legitimately do no more [0.8] than what the political community was set up to 
do [0.3] in the first place [3.5] 
now i want to say move on to saying something about [0.2] er [0.6] Locke's 
account [0.4] of government by consent [0.5] you may wish i wasn't going to sa-,
[0.3] talk about this 'cause it's complicated and confusing [0.5] er [0.7] but 
it should be [0.2] talked about because er [0.4] the idea of government by 
consent [0.6] is important it's a crucial part of Locke's theory [0.6] er [0.5] 
very important part of Locke's theory [0.4] Locke as we'll see has often been 
criticized for being unclear about what he is saying [0.4] er many critics of 
Locke say either he is unclear [0.2] or what he is saying is silly or perhaps 
both [0.5] er [0.3] but it's er i-, i-, it i-, it is important it is important 
to 
try and understand it [2.5] the starting point is this er [1.1] Locke is not 
only saying [0.2] legitimate government is government which abides by natural 
law that is to say legitimate government is not only government [0.5] er [0.2] 
which doesn't infringe the term for the contract and invade natural rights [0.
2] it is [0.4] I-E it abides by natural law [0.5] a legitimate government is 
one which abides by natural law it doesn't infringe on our natural rights [0.9] 
but legitimate government is also a government which is consented to [0.8] 
which is consented to [0.6] er [0.5] government by consent a government cannot 
be legitimate unless it is consented to whatever that means and we'll try and 
flesh that [0.3] out a bit and so the starting point let's have a look at what 
he says para twenty-two page [0.4] two-eight-three [1.8] beginning of chapter 
four [0.8] the natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on 
earth [0.3] and not to be under the will or legislative authority of man [0.5] 
but to have [0.2] only the law of nature for his rule [0.7] that 
is the natural condition of man [0.9] the liberty of man in society [0.2] is to 
be under no under no other legislative power [0.4] but that established [0.2] 
by consent [0.7] the only way you can be legitimate power over [0.3] people is 
for that i-, is for a power which d-, er er er er for that power to be 
consented to [1.2] but what does this mean consenting to the power of 
government or consenting to government or consenting to be putting t-, [0.4] 
consenting to put oneself under government [0.7] and there are notorious 
difficulties here in in-, and interpreting and understanding Locke and as i say 
he he has been subject [0.3] to many criticisms [0.7] you may think [0.3] or 
may or may not think [0.4] these criticisms are valid [0.6] but let us er try 
and get hold of what Locke is saying [2.1] as i say i mean the the the idea of 
government ky-, [0.2] by consent is not just something you find in Locke er it 
has become very important [0.4] er you often talk about democracy we often 
characterize democracy today do we not as a system of government by 
consent [0.4] this idea of government by consent is held to be very important 
today [0.4] and dictatorial regimes are often criticized by Liberal Democrats 
precisely because in those regimes there is no [0.3] government by consent the 
Iraqi people are not being consented to be governed [0.4] by Saddam Hussein so 
[0.3] a Liberal [0.3] Democrat would say [0.3] er [1.2] and Locke is regarded 
as the fountainhead [0.2] of this idea of [0.4] government [0.2] by consent [0.
5] er so let us try at any rate to understand what [0.4] Locke [0.2] means by 
it [0.8] well the first point to note i suppose is that er [1.5] the [0.2] the 
idea of consent [0.2] is obviously tied in with the idea of the social contract 
[1.8] each individual contracts [0.2] with [0.2] with every other individual to 
set up a political society a commonwealth [0.5] and this involves the idea that 
each individual agrees with every other individual [0.7] er to to put himself 
under government he consents thereby to put himself under government each 
individual in the social contract [0.5] consents to being under [0.2] to 
putting himself [0.2] under government [2.5] er but 
so that's the the starting point and so far so good but there are notorious 
difficulties in giving more precise understanding to this notion of government 
by consent [0.7] many people say that [0.2] Locke is hopelessly vague o-, or 
incoherent or both [0.5] er [0.4] and he was subject as we'll see later [0.2] 
er next term [0.5] to i-, what many consider to be a devastating attack and 
critique by the philosopher David Hume for many people [0.2] Hume's attack 
seemed [0.4] k-, [0.6] killed this whole idea of [0.6] er consensual contract 
and all the rest of it stone dead whether that's really true or not is [0.3] 
something i think is an oversimplification we-, we'll we'll come to [0.5] er [0.
2] so [0.2] with those warnings about the [0.3] er difficulties of [0.2] 
getting hold of what h-, Locke is [0.4] trying to say [0.2] let us now look at 
what Locke is trying to say [0.4] er [0.7] and i think we can s-, [0.3] grasp 
[0.3] what Locke is getting at [0.4] better [0.5] if we [0.5] as it were 
separate out five questions [0.6] now these questions overlap [0.6] er 
interpenetrate [0.2] to quite quite an extent as we'll see but i think [0.4] i-,
i-, i-, it does help to 
initially at any rate distinguish [0.5] er [0.6] five [0.2] different sorts of 
questions one can ask even though as i say the answers overlap a great deal [0.
3] first question [0.5] what does consent mean [0.2] what does the word [0.3] 
consent [0.3] mean [1.9] second question [0.2] what [0.3] counts as the giving 
of consent [0.3] what actions words or whatever counts as the giving of consent 
[2.6] third question [0.4] who consents [1.2] in Locke's theory [0.3] who is 
doing this consenting [0.9] fourth question [0.5] what [0.3] do they consent to 
or to what do they consent [2.4] fifth question [0.3] in what circumstances 
does this consent occur [0.2] when does this consenting go on in what 
circumstances [0.7] does this [0.4] er [0.3] consenting occur [0.7] as i say in 
fact these questions [0.4] and their answers to them are all bound up together 
[0.3] er [0.8] in Locke's writing but i think it helps to [0.4] er abstract 
them out to some extent [1.8] first of all [0.2] what does the word [0.2] or 
the con-, what does the term consent mean what is the concept [0.2] of consent 
[0.6] amount to [0.9] now this is a tricky question in itself [1.2] er [0.2] 
consent [0.2] as it were typically or 
archetypically means something like this the giving of permission [1.1] er [0.
2] and notice that permission giving permission doesn't actually necessarily [0.
4] imply approval in in or a full-hearted approval at any rate [0.4] er speak 
in old-fashioned terms [0.2] a father might give permission for her daughter to 
get [0.4] for his daughter to get married without actually approving of the 
marriage he might think [0.5] the the the his prospective son-in-law might have 
all sorts of reservations about him but [0.2] for all for one reason or another 
he might actually [0.4] give permission so permission doesn't necessarily 
involve ap-, [0.2] approval it often will [0.2] but it doesn't necessarily [1.
0] and there is a trickier issue of to what extent the giving of permission [0.
2] has to be [0.3] free and unforced [0.3] to count as an authentic case of the 
giving of consent [0.6] there is in fact [0.2] when you think about it [0.5] 
something of a continuum here [0.6] er [0.2] at [0.2] tha-, at one end is the 
perfectly [0.3] fr-, er is [0.3] perfectly free consent [0.2] giving permission 
under no duress whatsoever you quite 
freely [0.2] give your permission to whatever it is [0.8] moving slightly along 
the scale there is grudging [0.2] consent i suppose one could call it well you 
give permission with some reservations in a grudging manner but nonetheless you 
give it [0.7] then there is acquiescence which is [0.2] i don't like it but 
i've got to accept it so you still are accepting it sort of [0.7] just about 
consent [0.4] and th-, further along the scale too there is forced acquiescence 
[0.2] does that count as consent well depends how much force is involved [0.4] 
in the forcing but if a man [0.3] holds a gun at your chest [0.4] and says i 
want to take your money [0.2] there is a sense in which you're going to consent 
[0.2] to the taking of your money because you don't like the alternative [0.3] 
but can you really say that's giving of consent [0.3] that's forced 
acquiescence [0.2] so just w-, how much of that spectrum can [0.3] legitimately 
be incorporated in this concept of consent there is room [0.4] for [0.2] room 
for some argument [0.5] and critics of Locke [0.2] sometimes in effect [0.3] 
accuse 
him [0.3] of counting acquiescence in e-, circumstances where little else is 
possible as the giving of consent I-E to simplify slightly [0.4] critics of 
Locke sometimes say that he will count forced acquiescence [0.4] as consent [0.
8] and as we'll see [0.4] this is a key component [0.3] a key component of 
Hume's criticism [0.4] of Locke's social contract theory [3.7] second question 
[0.6] what actions what words [0.3] or whatever can be counted as [0.3] showing 
that consent has been given how do you know that consent has been given [0.6] 
well the clearest case quite obviously [0.3] is [0.6] b-, er where expressed 
words are used [0.3] i hereby give my consent is perfectly unambiguous [0.3] 
quite clearly i have given my consent if i utter words like that [0.9] er [0.3] 
and for Locke this is quite clearly what goes on in the original social 
contract [0.6] er [0.5] this involves what Locke would call express consent 
express consent [0.8] er [0.6] er f-, [0.2] a form of words which quite 
categorically makes it clear that you're giving consent [0.2] that is express 
consent [0.6] no problem [1.3] trouble 
is [0.2] that Locke [0.2] also notoriously makes use of another concept the 
idea of [0.3] tacit consent [0.5] and this is where [0.3] critics tend to home 
in on Locke [0.3] this whole idea of [0.3] tacit [0.2] consent [0.8] critics 
says this is [0.3] far too loose a concept [0.4] and it's not really possible 
when you're talking about tacit consent [0.4] to say when consent has or has 
not been given [0.9] now what on earth is meant by tacit consent [0.5] well to 
give an [0.8] illustration not [0.2] given by Locke [0.5] say [0.2] you want to 
borrow a friend's car [1.5] er now if you ask [0.3] the friend and the friend 
says yes [0.4] i he-, i i consent to you borrow-, using my car this is express 
consent no problem you know perfectly well he's consented to your [0.4] using 
[0.3] his car [0.4] but supposing we envisage a different set of circumstances 
[0.8] the friend knows that you very much want to [0.3] borrow his car [0.3] 
you have often borrowed it in the past [0.6] your friend does not actually say 
i'm not going to give my consent on this occasion [0.2] nor indicate that he 
does not want you to use it [0.3] so you take [0.3] this [0.5] set of 
circumstances [0.2] as showing that he gives his consent [0.2] and indeed he 
may be giving his consent [0.2] but he's only tacit consent he hasn't expressly 
said so there are sets of circumstances [0.3] when it can be assumed [0.7] er 
[0.8] er or it can be taken that consent is [0.3] given [0.2] even though [0.4] 
there's no no express consent has been given that is the idea [0.3] of [0.2] 
tacit consent and you be-, c-, c-, begin to see that you might have [0.2] 
trouble with this [0.8] and we'll come back to that [1.0] because the critics 
say Locke does get into trouble with this [2.0] 
but we'll come back to that [0.4] er in the meantime [0.3] let us move on to 
the third question [0.3] who consents [2.9] now in the case of the social 
contract itself [0.6] er again [0.3] er er this is clear [0.5] the idea is 
clearly that each individual each and every individual consents [1.0] each 
individual makes a contract with every other individual so this is a case [0.2] 
of each and every individual [0.4] consenting [0.4] they consent [0.4] to the 
setting up of a political community you'll remember [0.4] er [0.3] and each 
individual [0.3] consents to be a member of the political community [0.3] and 
thereby consents to being under government because a political community is a 
community which is going to set up a government so consenting to be a member of 
a political community is to consent [0.4] to being under government [0.4] so 
here we have the idea [0.4] of each [0.4] er and every individual consenting [2.
3] but when the body politic thus formed when the people has been formed by 
this act of individuals con-, each and every individual consenting when the 
people has been formed it then sets up a government [2.9] er [0.2] and here you 
get the idea of the body politic the 
people [0.3] collectively consenting to the formation of the government [0.4] 
or to the formation of a particular government [0.3] it's not we don't we have 
now moved subtly from the idea of every individual consenting [0.2] to the idea 
of the people as a whole consenting [0.2] the collectivity now consents to the 
setting up of this government [0.6] er and Locke tends to shift between the 
idea of individual consent and collective consent [0.3] in a way which is not 
always [0.2] easy to follow and perhaps it's not always [0.3] necessarily [0.3] 
er consistent or coherent [0.9] er [1.1] also to further complicate the issue 
Locke sometimes makes use of the idea [0.5] as the people as a whole [0.6] 
consenting to [0.3] particular acts of government [0.3] you sometimes get the 
idea particularly when he's talking about [0.5] er taxation [0.4] he talks 
about n-, er [0.4] taxation needing the consent of the people [0.7] but reading 
this carefully it doesn't mean that er in order to impose a tax you've got to 
get the consent of every individual [0.3] oh no [0.5] it means that you've 
got the conse-, the consent of the [0.3] people as a collectivity in in india-, 
indeed it somehow it [0.3] gets more watered down than that [0.3] it turns out 
to mean in practice you've got to get the consent of the representatives of the 
people [0.3] taxation must have the consent of the representatives of the 
people [0.3] which is taken as the same thing as the consent of the people [0.
7] er [0.3] but this isn't [0.2] actually the consent of every individual and 
indeed he has a whole theory of majority decision making here [0.4] er [0.3] 
it's a er th-, er the people act collectively how do you know what the people 
[0.3] want or what the people say or what the peo-, what the decision of the 
people is [0.3] what do you see what the majority of the people say here you 
get the idea of majority decision making which has become a key part of [0.4] 
democratic thinking [0.4] the people act by majority vote [0.6] er [0.8] and 
there's a there's a whole sort of subliterature on this there's a er [0.2] well 
known book by Wilmoore Kendall called John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority 
Rule and he th-, no one nobody else seems to agree with him but [0.2] Wilmoore 
Kendall sees in Locke er [0.3] a theory of majority tyranny but leave that on 
one side at the moment it's it's not a [0.3] it's not a view [0.5] which many 
people [0.6] er share [0.2] but the point is that he moves subtly [0.2] from 
the idea that every individual consents [0.2] to the idea that the people 
consent and the people consents means the bu-, er means the consent of the 
majority of the people [0.4] and he he tends to shift between those fourth 
point [0.4] or fourth question [0.7] what is consented to now we've already 
raised this in talking about er er the previous question what is consented [0.
4] to [0.5] er er and there are some difficulties here [0.4] well we've already 
had difficulties and now we've got more [0.4] er [1.2] first of all [2.3] in 
some circumstances what is being consented to [0.2] is clearly to being a 
member of a political community [0.3] that's what individuals are consenting to 
in the original social contract that is what is going on [0.5] in the social 
contract [0.5] 
individuals [0.6] consent to being members of a political community [0.6] er [4.
7] each individual consents to being a member of the political community and in 
consenting to be a member of the political community individuals are thereby 
also consenting to being under government [0.3] they are consenting to obey the 
government [0.4] er as i said [0.2] before by [0.3] b-, consenting to be a 
member of a political community [0.6] you know that a political community is a 
community which is going to set up a government that's the definition of a 
political community [0.3] there-, [0.3] therefore [0.2] you're consenting [0.3] 
to being under government consenting to obey the government [0.5] er [0.6] as 
well as [0.2] being a member of the community [0.2] political community [0.4] 
er and notice this is again a matter of express consent [0.2] so going back to 
[0.4] what we were talking about earlier so in the social contract people are 
[0.2] individuals are expressly consenting to being members of a political 
community [0.4] which has the implication of [0.3] consenting to being [0.3] 
under government 
to obey the government [0.8] and that is tolerably clear [1.3] but now we get 
to something which isn't quite so clear [0.2] sometimes [0.4] in fact very 
often ma-, major part of what Locke's talking about [1.0] er [0.7] er [0.6] er 
we we we we have a d-, have a different idea and here confusion [0.4] er arises 
[0.4] because a lot of the time [0.8] i-, Locke is not talking about 
individuals [0.4] being a member consenting to being a member of a political 
community [0.4] but merely consenting to being under government without also 
consenting to be becoming members of a political community [0.6] er er puzzling 
idea [0.4] but part of what's going on here is this that er [0.7] er [0.3] such 
individuals who are under government but not members of a political community 
[0.4] er means they are not citizens of the community they do not have the 
accompanying rights such as the right to vote they're under government they 
conse-, [0.3] the idea they consent to government without being members of a 
political community if you were to go to another [0.2] on holiday to another 
country [0.2] as we'll see [0.4] er [0.2] 
if you were to go to France [0.3] for your holidays [0.4] you this could be 
construed as [0.3] or part of what [0.3] er you are ad-, er er i-, im-, 
implying you are doing is consenting to be under the authority of the 
government of France but you're not becoming a member of the French [0.2] 
French [0.3] French state [0.4] so when you visit another country [0.4] you are 
putting yourself under the government under the authority of the government of 
that country without being a member of the political community [0.5] and Locke 
a lot of the time is talking about individuals putting themselves or consenting 
to be under government [0.4] without necessarily being members of the political 
community and there are some [0.4] complicated points there [0.5] er [0.3] now 
the key point here one of the key points here that is that [0.3] this kind of 
consent to being a member of a political p-, sorry to be under government [0.4] 
is a matter of [0.2] tacit consent [0.4] people who form a political community 
[0.5] co-, expressly consent to becoming members of a political community [0.3] 
but a 
lot of the time what Locke is talking about is people tacitly consenting to 
being under government [0.7] er [0.8] and i'll an-, er [0.6] er i will now take 
this further [1.0] 'cause we now come to the fifth question this will take this 
further [0.6] when and in what circumstances is consent given [1.8] well the 
express consent to being a member of the political community in the social 
contract [0.4] er [0.8] is clear and this is [0.2] er [0.7] er this is one 
thing that when one one er notion of when consent is given at the original 
social contract [0.3] where people [0.3] er consent [0.3] individuals consent 
[0.6] expressly consent to being er a a p-, a p-, a member of a political 
community [0.3] Locke is not entirely clear under what other circumstances 
people expressly consent [0.3] to being members of a political community 
although it does see-, it does seem that he is considering [0.2] other 
circumstances [1.0] but let us not dwell on that because i want to come to what 
the the the difficult and important part of what Locke is saying [0.4] and this 
is an an and this is 
again involves the idea of tacit consent [0.7] because not only is when you 
think about it not only is consent given [0.3] or [0.3] Locke must be committed 
to saying that not only is consent given by individuals who set up the 
political community in the first place [0.3] after all when did that happen [0.
5] well [0.2] you remember Locke tells us it [0.3] it was so long ago [0.3] 
that it was before records began very often [0.2] this social contract [0.4] er 
if it were to to be taken literally at all happened a long long time ago [0.6] 
er [0.6] and it wasn't us that con-, did this consenting we weren't alive then 
nor were our [0.3] fathers or our grandfathers or even our great-grandfathers 
or great-great-grandfathers it happened a long time ago [0.4] all this express 
consenting to be members of a political community [0.3] so it's really got 
nothing whatever [0.3] to do with us today it's got really got nothing whatever 
[0.4] to do with an account of [0.3] government [0.3] as it exists [0.5] er [1.
1] er [0.3] and you might say at this point [0.2] and indeed er [0.3] er this 
is one of the things of course that critics 
of social contract theory say and including Hume you know well this nonsensical 
idea of giving of consent [0.3] or of having social contracts ages ago got 
nothing to do with government today [0.5] and you might say well at this point 
let's give up on the whole idea of taking Locke seriously [0.6] er but of 
course he doesn't just say this he does give an account of how we [0.2] or [0.
5] er what she's writing if we use Locke's theory today how we ourselves are 
giving consent [0.5] the point is this [0.7] what according to Locke's theory 
[1.1] consent is also given by individuals in subsequent generations it's not 
just the founding generation that give their consent [0.5] it is subsequent 
generations that give their consent not necessarily to be members of the 
political community [0.2] but at least being under government [1.9] er [0.3] 
each individual it is true is simply born into a political community or simply 
born under the authority of the government you might say [0.4] all right i was 
born [0.2] er er er er in Britain i was under the authority 
of the British government [0.4] er i never gave my consent to this nobody every 
asked me it just is like that [0.4] er you might feel you know er you're you're 
forcibly put under [0.4] er er er a government rather than consenting to be 
under it and many [laugh] [0.2] critics of Locke [0.4] will think there's a [0.
2] a great deal [0.4] in that argument [0.6] er [0.2] so certainly you have no 
choice in being born you have no cons-, no consenting goes on [0.3] when you're 
born into this world under the authority of a particular government it's 
nonsensical to say there's any cons-, process of consent [0.3] tacit or 
otherwise [0.3] involved in this and of course [0.2] Locke isn't saying 
anything so nonsensical as that [0.7] what Locke says is that [0.6] er [0.2] 
each individual [0.2] when he comes to adulthood [1.1] consents to remain under 
the government [0.6] when he comes to adulthood when he eaches reaches the age 
of majority [0.6] when he's a fully [0.4] a p-, a properly rational fully 
rational individual then he consents or doesn't as the case may be now whether 
this makes 
sense is highly [0.3] arguable and we'll come come to that in a minute [0.3] 
but the idea is that each individual when he reaches adulthood [0.5] then he 
consents to being under government he hasn't had any say in the matter [0.3] 
there's been no consenting up till that point but then of course [0.4] er [0.4] 
childhood is not a matter of consenting you do what you're told [0.5] but when 
you get to adulthood then you decide [0.5] half of what is being involved in 
being an adult is that now you [0.3] are a fully autonomous individual [0.3] 
and part of being a fully autonomous individual for Locke is consenting or not 
consenting [0.4] to being under government [1.5] 
but what does this consenting consist in do we have people coming round from 
the government knocking on our door saying [0.4] you're now reached age 
eighteen do you consent to be under government we don't have anything like that 
[0.4] so what on earth is Locke on about [0.5] er [1.0] and er as i say the 
thing to thing to remember is that [0.3] this is tacit consent and he says [0.
3] you consent to remain under government by for example [0.2] inheriting 
property if you inherit property [0.5] you're part of what this [0.4] can be 
taken as meaning is that you can consent to be under the government where the 
[0.3] er over which [0.2] er th-, [0.2] you can st-, [0.2] er under the 
government where that property is situated [0.4] or merely perhaps even staying 
within the territory of the state and this is what [0.4] Hume [0.2] and other 
critics fasten on what an absurd idea but let us see [0.3] what Locke actually 
says here [0.6] er [0.6] and this is [0.5] paragraph one-nineteen 
page [0.2] three-four-seven [5.7] every [0.3] er er [4.2] every man as have 
been showed naturally free and nothing being able to put him into subjection to 
any earthly power but only by his own consent [1.4] the difficulty is what 
ought to be looked upon as tacit consent [0.2] express consent that's that's 
clear enough [0.4] the difficulty is what ought to be looked upon as tacit 
consent [0.2] and how far it binds [0.4] I-E how far shall anyone be looked on 
[0.3] to have consented and thereby submitted to any government [0.2] where he 
has made no expression of it at all [0.6] and to this i say to this i say [0.5] 
that every man that hath any possession [0.2] or enjoyment of any part of the 
dominions of any government [0.4] doth thereby give his tacit consent [0.4] and 
is as far forth obliged to obey obedience to the laws of that government [0.3] 
during such enjoyment [0.4] as anyone under it [0.3] whether this is his posses-
, whether this his possession be of land to him and his heirs [0.2] for ever [0.
3] or lodging [0.3] er for only a week [0.3] or whether it be barely 
travelling freely on the highway [0.3] and in effect [0.3] it reaches as far as 
the very being of anyone within the territories of that government [0.7] that 
is to say [0.2] if you remain [0.2] under that government if you remain within 
the territories [0.5] er [0.4] over which that government has authority [0.4] 
that means you are tacitly consenting to be under that government [1.2] er [0.
7] as i say many critics think this is entirely nonsensical [0.8] er [1.0] and 
to say that merely staying within the territories signifies you've consented to 
be under that government [0.5] er critics have come down on this like a ton of 
bricks [0.3] er as i say Hume is the most er [0.4] best known [0.5] theorist 
who has criticized this [0.4] er [0.2] and we shall take up such criticisms 
there may be the criticisms aren't quite as [0.8] er [0.5] self-evidently [0.4] 
er true as many many [0.3] many think but we'll take up such criticism [0.3] 
when we look at Hume's critique of Locke's social contract [0.3] but we should 
remember here one thing sh-, we should remember here [0.6] and this makes it 
look a little less 
nonsensical [0.7] one thing we should remember here that Locke is talking about 
legitimate government [0.4] Locke is talking about legitimate government [0.7] 
er [2.2] he is not saying [0.6] that er such consent [0.2] occurs under 
tyrannies under despotical governments tyrannical governments [0.8] er indeed 
[0.7] the existence of consent is one of the marks of a legitimate government a 
legitimate government is one where there is consent [0.2] or to put the point 
the other way round [0.4] if there is no consent then that shows the government 
is illegitimate [0.4] and people are inclined to say and Hume does as we'll see 
say this sort of thing [0.5] there are some governments where it's s-, so 
manifestly impossible to leave their jurisdiction [0.6] as to say that if you 
remain there [0.3] er it cannot be shown as giving your giving of consent [0.4] 
to take a modern e-, or not quite modern a more modern example [0.5] people who 
remained in East Berlin [0.7] couldn't be sh-, [0.4] taken as showing they 
consented to the government of East Germany [0.3] why not [0.3] because they 
couldn't get 
out of East Berlin even if they wanted to not at their not at least without 
climbing over a dirty great wall and being shot while they did it [0.5] so the 
fact that people remained in East Berlin couldn't be shown [0.2] in any 
sensible way as showing they consented to be under the government of East 
Berlin [0.9] but [0.5] legitimate government now that's a different matter [0.
6] if you want to leave this country you don't have to climb over a wall 
nobody's going to shoot you and so on but anyway we'll leave those er er man-, 
many people say ah yes but in fact it's so difficult to do it that it's just 
the same thing but we'll [0.3] we'll leave the validity of those criticisms [0.
3] for another time [0.3] but merely to show [0.4] er [0.3] that that r-, do 
remember that Locke is giving account [0.3] of legitimate government he's only 
saying that this kind of tacit consent occurs under legitimate government he's 
not trying to say [0.5] and indeed [0.4] his very point is to point out that 
this kind of tacit consent does not occur under 
despotical government [3.2] so let's try and give a summary overall picture of 
er [1.2] er of Locke's account of government or rather [0.2] the nature [0.2] 
of legitimate government [0.5] er and remember that a key objective of Locke is 
precisely to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate government [0.4] 
er and of course you know thinking of the [0.2] historical circumstances [0.4] 
part of what he was doing was showing that the government of James the Second 
was illegitimate [0.7] er [1.3] legitimate government is voluntarily created 
and consented to [0.2] and its purpose is to uphold the natural law and natural 
rights and to do [0.3] no more than this it is limited government [0.5] er [0.
6] it is if you like [0.2] liberal government this is the er the the sort of 
archetypal expression of liberal political theories it's a liberal account of 
government [0.6] or to put the key points another way [0.5] government has to 
meet two conditions before it can be deemed to be legitimate [0.4] first [0.3] 
it must be consented to [1.4] second [0.5] it must stick to what it has been 
set up to do [0.5] 
uphold natural law and natural rights [0.2] that is to say it must not break 
the terms of the trust by which it was created [1.3] if it persistently 
violates natural law and natural rights [1.8] then it becomes illegitimate [1.
3] and it can quite pope-, quite properly be removed by other people [0.7] er 
this of course [0.2] according to Locke is what the English people did [0.2] to 
James the Second at the Glorious Revolution let's see what he actually says 
about this [0.3] er [1.9] paragraphs two-o-eight to nine pages four-o-four to 
five [0.7] he says er [2.3] and part of what he's trying do sho-, is to show 
here un-, un-, under what circumstances it is proper for people to seek to 
remove the government [0.5] because he's er [0.2] cognisant of the criticism [0.
3] that if every time the government does something which is against the rules 
people say ah we can overthrow the government this is er [0.3] er clearly going 
to [0.3] er [0.3] er lead to er [0.7] er [0.3] er instability [0.7] er s-, so 
he talks about the right of resisting [0.3] he talks about the resight-, of er 
[1.0] er 
resisting [0.4] manifest acts of tyranny [0.3] which will not suddenly or on 
slight occasions disturb the government [0.4] for if e-, [0.3] for if to reach 
no farther than some private men's cases though they have a right to defend 
themselves and to recover by force [0.3] what by unlawful force is taken to 
them [0.3] yet the right to do so will not easily [0.3] engage them in a 
contest [0.3] wherein they are sure to perish [0.4] it being as impossible for 
one or a few oppressed men to disturb the government [0.4] where the body of 
people do not think themselves concerned if just a few people think they're 
being unduly oppressed by the government [0.5] er as a few individual 
grievances [0.2] we're not going to get any [0.3] any removal of the government 
[0.6] but if either of these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the 
people [0.4] or if the mischief and oppression has lighted [0.3] only on some 
few but in such cases as the precedent and consequence is seen to threaten all 
[0.7] and they are persuaded in their 
consciences that their laws and with them their estates and liberties and lives 
are in danger [0.3] and perhaps their religion too [0.6] how will they be [0.3] 
how [0.2] how they will be pe-, hindered from resisting illegal force used 
against them i cannot tell I-E [0.3] when there's general [0.6] er infringement 
of natural rights [0.3] and when it's affecting all or at least a majority of 
the people when it's affecting a few people in a such a way as [0.4] er leads 
the rest of them to think they're under threat [0.3] then [0.3] er removal or 
resistance against the government [0.2] can become possible and it b-, can can 
[0.3] can become [0.5] er [0.2] legitimate [0.5] er [1.4] and there's two 
points to note about this and we'll end on this [0.4] er [1.2] first of all [0.
2] who is to judge who is to judge whether the government has broken the terms 
of the trust [0.6] er [0.5] Locke havers a bit on this [0.4] but essentially he 
says [0.4] it is the [0.3] it is the people who must decide it is the people 
who must decide [0.3] paragraph two-forty page four-two-six [2.3] who shall be 
judge 
whether the prince or legislative that is to say the legislator [0.4] ha-, act 
contrary to their trust [0.4] the people shall be judge [0.3] for who shall be 
judge [0.3] whether his trustee or deputy acts well and according to the trust 
reposed in him [0.4] but he who disputes him and must by [0.4] having disputed 
him still have power to discard him when he fails in his trust [0.4] so 
crucially it is the people [0.6] who decide whether the trust has been broken 
[0.2] and some see in this of course the genesis of er a theory of democracy [0.
6] er [0.3] the second point to note is to return to a point i've made several 
times already [1.0] er [1.3] that th-, th-, [0.3] this idea of the people 
removing the government [0.2] implies [0.3] or involves the idea [0.4] er [0.3] 
of the people as an entity which can act [0.5] er apart from the government 
I-E the people themselves can act to remove the government remember this 
doesn't make sense for Hobbes the people [0.4] only exist can only act [0.2] 
through the sovereign [0.6] er no sovereign no people for Locke [0.5] er [0.2] 
the government and the people are separate entities [0.3] and the people can 
act as an entity [0.3] to remove the government [0.6] they can then be without 
a government and set up another government so that here's the people as an 
agency as it were [0.4] er which is something which doesn't even make sense for 
Hobbes [1.0] well next time which will i think will be the last lecture because 
on the following Thursday actually term ends er er and by convention cert-, er 
term doesn't er ends at midday i think [0.4] er [0.9] er i'll be talking about 
s-, [0.3] controversies regarding Locke's account of private [0.2] property