nm0182: er last time as you know that er [0.4] er tape recorder broke down [0.
2] i've in fact done a rerecording rather swiftly last night for anyone who did 
miss the lecture [0.3] and needs to make use of that material [0.6] er but it 
er [0.3] it is now in S-R-C [0.9] er somebody said could i put in a box 
available [0.5] er [0.8] the er O-H-Ps that i've been using well i've put er er 
er copies from which i've copied O-H-Ps [0.4] in the box in the philosophy 
common room [0.7] and somebody else was saying what about our essays [0.5] er 
[0.2] to which the answer is yes [0.2] what about your essays indeed [0.4] er 
i'll hope to be able to let you have them [0.2] er next week [1.7] er right [1.
0] now we said today that we'd talk [0.2] about Kant [1.4] in considering the 
three [0.3] dominant strands of ethical thinking [0.2] that emerged out of the 
break-up of the medieval synthesis [0.9] i've sketched the appeal to pleasure 
[1.1] with particular reference to utilitarianism [1.4] er from er from Bentham 
onwards [0.7] and last time i was talking about the appeal to moral insight [0.
3] from Butler's [0.3] conscience [0.4] to twentieth century [0.2] intuitionism 
[0.9] and there 
remains [0.4] the appeal [0.2] to law [1.8] now first let's get some [0.5] 
quite proper objections out of the way [1.7] there are well known objections to 
conceiving of morality in terms of law [1.5] it's misleading [0.2] to compare 
[1.7] er morality [0.2] or moral laws with laws of nature [0.9] because we no 
longer believe [0.4] that the stars and [0.3] other such bodies being subject 
to the laws of nature [0.3] we no longer believe they're animate [0.5] bodies 
[0.9] er or animate beings who consent [0.2] to obey [1.2] their instructions 
[2.3] it's also misleading [0.8] to compare [0.3] morality with [0.2] the 
product of legislation [0.4] since as we saw in an earlier lecture [0.8] an act 
can be immoral [0.2] without being illegal [0.7] or may of course require [0.2] 
what our conscience condemns [1.6] and perhaps more important [0.3] than all 
these [0.7] legalisms it's sometimes called [0.6] is a term for a recognized 
moral failing [1.4] the scrupulous legalist [0.4] will [0.2] go to absurd 
lengths [0.4] in fulfilling commandments to the letter [1.2] er and the lax one 
[0.6] will take advantage of every possible [0.2] loophole [0.5] and indeed [0.
2] the legalist may show both traits together [1.2] and 
the fault of course lies precisely [0.7] in the fact that duties are 
interpreted as if [0.7] they consisted in obedience [0.4] to a fixed [0.2] and 
all sufficient [0.2] code [0.6] and as many of you will know the New Testament 
[0.3] is no-, [0.4] er notably severe [0.6] on this sort of approach [2.7] and 
[0.3] another objection [0.6] moral rules can conflict in particular situations 
[0.4] we've already seen that [1.4] and then of course one has to look if one's 
er [0.4] thinking of morality in terms of rules or laws [0.3] one needs to look 
for further rules to decide which to set aside [1.1] and the resultant elib-, 
elaboration can get [0.4] er very unrealistic [0.7] and that incidentally is 
part of the attraction of something we've come across before and i'll raise 
again with you [0.2] particularism [0.6] sometimes called situation ethics 
where you don't look for rules or laws at all you say let's look to each 
particular case [1.7] and the final objection that i'm just going to touch on 
[0.6] if morality is wholly dependent [0.2] upon a set of [0.2] rules [1.1] or 
laws [0.7] it becomes difficult to describe those who live by very 
different codes from our own [0.3] as [0.2] moral [0.2] or morally good [0.6] 
but of course [0.5] right from the beginning people are seen as the sophists 
saw [0.5] that even quite alien and by our [0.2] er light misguided codes [0.5] 
may foster [0.2] distinctive forms of virtue [0.6] which perhaps are worthy of 
respect [0.8] and certainly not just to be dismissed as moral errors committed 
in good faith [1.8] so there are all those objections [0.3] to thinking of 
morality in terms of law [0.8] and for present purposes [0.3] i'll accept them 
all [1.0] right [1.1] but [0.4] even if we accept all this [0.8] there is [0.2] 
something i've left out there's one very important feature of moral judgements 
[0.6] that thinking of morality in terms of law [0.6] helps to bring out [1.2] 
and this very general feature [0.2] makes difficulties for what i've called 
moral [0.2] particularism [1.3] and the point is this [1.1] just as laws [0.2] 
are of universal [0.4] application [2.1] they enjoin [0.3] conduct of a certain 
type in all circumstances of a certain type [1.2] so [0.4] moral judgements 
appear [0.3] to have a universalist [0.3] element [2.1] and i think i can 
present the 
argument like this [1.5] whenever we make [0.5] whenever we make a moral 
judgement [0.8] about [0.3] for example [0.4] an act [4.8] whenever we make [0.
2] a moral judgement [0.3] er about something an act for example [1.0] and this 
differentiated from just telling someone what to do [0.3] issuing an imperative 
[0.7] whenever we make a moral judgement about something call it an act [0.4] 
we must make it [0.4] because of something [0.2] about [0.4] the act [0.7] the 
focus isn't right is it [2.2] that's better [1.8] er [0.3] [1.8] and then it 
always makes sense to ask [0.2] what this something is what is it about it [0.
9] that [0.7] justifies that moral judgement [1.0] now it may be difficult to 
put into words [0.3] but [0.3] in making a moral judgement [0.2] rather than 
just saying do this [0.5] you're saying that there's a reason [1.6] now this 
feature of moral judgement as i say differentiates it just from simple [0.2] 
commands simple imperatives [1.1] so to every particular moral judgement [0.8] 
it would appear [0.6] there corresponds a universal judgement [0.5] to the 
effect [0.2] that a certain feature of the thing judged is [0.6] so far as it 
goes [0.4] a reason for making [1.3] a 
certain judgement [0.2] about it [1.7] now that's an argument and i've put it 
up there which [0.3] e-, what with i'm calling for the moment universalists 
accept or universalism in morals [0.6] universalists accept [0.4] and 
particularists reject [0.3] this argument [2.1] let's just take it a little 
further give you an example [0.2] [0.9] if i say that a particular act is good 
[0.7] because oh i don't know [0.3] er suppose we say because it's the act of 
[0.2] helping a blind person across a road [2.0] then [0.2] i seem to be 
adhering to the universal judgement [0.7] that it's good [0.8] to help blind 
people across roads [0.4] er assuming they desire our assistance [0.8] er 
assuming that er you know [0.3] they're not horribly lost and in fact [0.2] 
they their destination is this side of the road [0.3] all those other things [0.
4] if [0.2] they desire properly our assistance then it's good to help blind 
people across roads appears to be the universal judgement [0.5] that [0.2] lies 
behind [0.4] that was a good act [0.2] because it was helping him across the 
road [1.6] and that [0.7] that universal judgement [0.2] appears to be there [0.
7] we're not just 
talking about this particular person across this particular road [1.5] so i say 
the people who accept that sort of example [0.7] i can call for the present 
purposes universalists [0.5] and particularists [0.5] will reject it [1.6] now 
a universalist [0.4] is not committed to the view [0.2] that it's a good act to 
help blind people across roads [0.2] on all occasions [0.5] just because it is 
on this [0.8] you can find all sorts of circumstances under which it would not 
be [0.2] obviously [1.1] the universalist is only committed to the view that it 
would be a good act [0.4] in the absence of something to make a difference [0.
4] from this one [1.4] something more than the mere fact [0.4] that it is 
different [2.5] now [0.6] this [0.5] if you accept that [1.4] this general 
feature of moral judgements [1.2] can be used for interesting purposes [0.4] 
and Kant effectively did accept it [2.7] Kant [0.4] provided er used this 
general feature of moral judgements [0.4] to provide a test [0.8] for [0.2] the 
validity [0.4] of particular [0.4] moral judgements [1.1] and so as one might 
say [0.9] er [0.2] Kant [0.6] er [0.5] [0.2] pr-, uses the general form of 
moral judgements as i've 
just sketched them up there [0.5] to provide [0.3] a test er [0.6] for their 
proper [0.6] content [3.2] and from this ethical premise about the nature of 
moral judgements [0.6] he drew [1.1] a moral conclusion [1.5] and the general 
form of that moral conclusion [0.5] he laid out [0.3] in what he called his 
categorical imperative [0.4] which has various versions i'll just give you [0.
4] perhaps [0.4] the [0.3] most important one [1.6] Kant's categorical 
imperative [0.5] act only on that maxim [0.8] through which you can at the same 
time will [0.5] that it should become [0.3] a universal [0.2] law [8.9] and of 
course [0.7] as you will see it's a [0.2] rather formal way of putting it [0.6] 
but it has much in common with something that's not formal at all the famous 
golden rule [1.0] er [0.2] do unto others [0.2] as you would they did unto you 
[4.9] now [0.7] there seems to be at least [0.4] a tolerable plausibility [1.2] 
in terms of widespread intuitions [1.0] er for it seems a reasonable 
plausibility for regarding this [0.2] as the [0.6] a anyhow [0.2] foundation 
stone [0.3] of morality [1.5] it is a powerful argument in many cases [0.7] if 
a person is contemplating some [0.5] act [1.3] to ask [0.2] her 
or him [0.2] what it is about the act [0.2] which makes them call it [0.4] 
right [0.7] and whether if some other act [0.2] possessed those same features 
[0.7] but their own role in it [0.2] were different [1.4] would [0.5] she or he 
judge [0.2] in the same way [3.6] of course [0.2] whether or not they would 
still prefer to act in this way remains a matter about which [0.2] they [0.3] 
may still have to make up their minds [1.2] though one might still distinguish 
between silly and sensible choices [0.6] so there's still freedom of moral 
decision [0.4] and action [1.0] but it's not irrelevant [0.9] to ask the 
question [1.0] what if the roles [0.3] were reversed [5.3] now [1.0] this [0.3] 
universalist [0.5] feature [0.7] of moral judgements [2.5] er er does though it 
does as i say embody a [1.2] central feature [0.6] of laws in general [1.9] is 
not what [0.2] is usually being pointed to when people talk about laws of 
nature [0.3] so he's not talking about laws of nature [0.2] for reasons i'll 
explain shortly he's talking about what he calls laws of freedom [2.1] Kant 
didn't think of himself as working out laws of nature [1.9] he [0.3] sees these 
as a function not of the way that 
nature has to go [0.4] but of what we are free [0.7] to [0.3] act on [0.2] so 
he calls them laws of freedom [0.8] obscure terminology and i'll explain it a 
bit [4.9] now i think to explain it i just need to go back slightly [1.3] one 
one of the criticisms that i [0.7] raised [0.2] a few minutes ago [0.8] er to 
thinking of morality in terms of law [1.4] is that it's misleading [0.3] to 
compare morality [0.5] to a law of nature in the scientific sense [1.3] for we 
no longer suppose [0.4] that [0.7] various items stones stars various bodies [0.
3] we no longer think of them [0.5] as in some sense animate beings [0.6] who 
consent to obey their instructions [0.5] and of course in days when people 
thought of the order of nature [0.3] as following the orders of a divine 
lawgiver [0.4] who was also the source of the moral law [0.6] then that analogy 
made a lot of sense [1.8] human beings on that traditional account [0.6] were 
unlike the rest of the created order [1.2] in that [0.2] er [0.5] we were given 
freedom to choose [0.4] whether or not [0.2] to obey [0.2] the divine laws [0.
6] whereas the rest of creation [0.6] has no choice [2.0] in this freedom [0.8] 
lies the 
possibility of morality [0.2] and hence of virtue [0.9] for virtue [0.9] virtue 
lies in freely [0.4] obeying [0.4] the laws of God [2.6] and so [0.2] for men 
[0.4] the law of God is seen [0.3] under the aspect of a moral law [0.9] 
whereas for the rest of creation [0.2] law is a matter of necessity [0.3] i 
take it that model is fairly familiar to you think of [0.8] the whole universe 
is under the law of God [0.5] what distinguishes human beings from the rest of 
creation we have some or do we have free will [0.2] so we can decide [0.3] in 
within a restricted range [0.2] whether to set ourselves within or outside the 
law of God not completely [0.2] we can't defy the law of gravity or if we do 
we'll end up with broken bones or death [0.4] but there are certain [0.2] moral 
laws [0.2] that we can defy [0.4] and if we do [0.2] that's what's called sin 
[0.6] and we have freedom to sin that that model is familiar [0.3] talking 
about the moral law as giving [0.3] the laws which are made possible by human 
freedom [0.9] makes a form of sense [0.2] in that framework [2.0] er [0.8] now 
[0.8] since Newton [1.5] er we've not [0.5] really thought [0.2] of laws of 
nature in 
this way [2.8] science [0.4] has become independent [0.3] of religion and of 
theology [1.9] we tend to think of scientific laws of nature now much more as a 
matter of statistical regularities [1.4] and i think what we see in Kant [0.9] 
is perhaps [3.4] an attempt to salvage what can be salvaged of the general 
picture i've just sketched [1.3] er that general picture of morality as 
embodying laws of freedom [0.5] what can you salvage from that when the old 
prescientific notion of a law of nature [0.5] in terms of obedience to orders 
[0.3] has disappeared [0.5] how can you do this [0.6] how can you s-, how can 
you to what extent can you salvage this [0.4] without theological [0.5] 
premises [1.2] and that's really what Kant's trying to do [0.7] and [0.4] i 
think the argument [0.4] can be reasonably displayed like this [3.1] there were 
two [1.5] quite closely connected [0.6] differences [0.8] between [0.3] moral 
laws [0.5] and laws [0.5] of nature [1.7] one difference plainly is [0.2] our 
subjectivity [1.6] er we have a subjective sense of obligation to obey moral 
laws [1.2] but none [0.8] to obey [0.3] laws [0.2] of nature [1.0] we don't 
feel any moral obligation [0.4] to obey the law 
of gravitation [0.5] er if we can [0.8] er get round it in some way or another 
[1.0] perhaps by [0.2] flying [0.3] then [0.2] we have no qualms about doing so 
[0.3] of any moral sort [2.7] so that's one obvious difference [1.3] er we have 
a subjective sense of obligation to obey moral laws but none [0.8] natural laws 
[0.8] and second [1.2] moral laws [0.5] have [0.4] what is sometimes called a 
prescriptive [0.9] a practical import that is [0.3] they tell us what to do [1.
3] in contrast to laws of nature [0.7] which are purely theoretical or 
descriptive [0.8] they tell us [0.9] how things are [0.5] they tell us [0.3] 
what is the case [3.3] human beings then [0.4] are unusual [0.3] perhaps unique 
[0.7] in that they are subject both to natural laws which tell us how things 
are and you express in the [0.3] indicative [0.2] er grammatically [0.5] er 
indicative mood er [0.7] how things are [1.0] but we're also subject [0.2] on 
this account to moral laws [0.3] which tell us [0.2] what to do [0.8] prescribe 
actions [0.7] are imperatival [5.1] in other words we're both physical 
organisms and rational agents [0.9] we're half animal half angel if you like [1.
0] we're half sensual [0.2] half rational [2.2] the way we act [0.7] reflects 
[0.6] 
this [0.2] predicament [0.7] often our [0.3] sensual nature [1.3] our [0.4] 
glands and so on pull us one way [0.6] and our rational nature [0.6] another [1.
4] and the tug of war [1.2] sometimes goes one way [0.2] sometimes another [0.
8] you know you ought to get out of bed [0.8] and you don't [laugh] [0.3] right 
[0.7] you know you ought to get out of bed [0.7] and you do [1.2] who's to tell 
in advance which will work [2.0] [0.9] we're tempted when our desires conflict 
[0.2] with what we believe we ought to do [0.7] sometimes we resist [0.6] 
temptation [0.4] sometimes [0.5] we succumb [0.8] sometimes no doubt we succumb 
with finesse [2.4] of course sometimes perhaps there's no conflict [0.9] we may 
want to do something [0.8] our consciences may not object either way [1.0] or 
indeed we may think we ought to do something and our desires raise no 
difficulty [2.1] so [0.9] er what one might call sensuous impulses [0.4] are 
the determining factor in many of our actions [1.1] and here to use the 
language of [0.2] David Hume [0.5] er reason is the slave of the passions we 
use our reason [0.2] to help us get what we want [0.7] of course [1.0] but [0.
2] on this account [0.8] that isn't the only [0.5] part [0.2] of the 
story [0.9] because in moral actions reason plays a different role [0.8] 
leading [0.3] rather than following [0.9] we perform these actions not for some 
further [0.3] end given by our [0.7] bodily desires [0.8] but simply because of 
the principal [0.6] they embody [1.4] the moral worth [0.4] of an action on 
this account and i quote now from Kant [0.6] lies not in the purpose to be 
attained by it [1.6] but [0.9] in the maxim in accordance with which [0.2] it 
is decided on [1.9] er where we're governed by our [0.3] bodily desires [0.2] 
we have an aim [0.5] we have a purpose give-, beset by that desire [0.4] and er 
we judge [0.2] the satisfactoriness or not of our action by whether it gets us 
closer to that desire fine that's a a moral that [0.3] we're all familiar with 
[0.3] but not all the time [0.9] er the moral worth as distinct from the [0.6] 
other forms of worth [0.3] the moral worth for Kant [0.3] of an action [0.2] 
lies not [1.0] in its further consequences [0.6] but [0.3] in the maxim or the 
principle [0.4] in accordance with which [0.4] the action [0.4] is decided [0.
4] on [1.7] er [1.0] a-, and it needs to be of course for it to be morally 
worthy [0.2] a maxim go back to the 
categorical imperative [1.0] a maxim [0.3] which you can will [0.4] that it 
should become [0.5] universal [5.1] let's explain this further [4.1] Kant held 
[0.6] and it seems on the face of it [0.2] not unreasonable [1.0] that the 
starting point [0.4] of [0.2] moral philosophy [1.0] must be the ordinary 
deliverances of [1.1] our moral understanding [1.7] uncorrupted preferably by 
philosophy so far as that's possible [1.9] otherwise the danger is [0.3] that 
what will be studied won't be morality but something else [0.9] probably a 
construction of the thinker's own invention start with what you actually 
recognize in your own experience [1.4] well [1.3] at a very [0.2] 
commonsensical level how do we [0.6] ordinarily distinguish [0.6] moral [0.5] 
precepts [0.2] from other ones [2.4] well according to Kant we normally 
distinguish them [1.1] er from precepts [0.3] which are designed to promote our 
pleasure or our advantage we say if that may bring me pleasure that may bring 
me advantage but is it right [0.3] we say we can separate them out [0.3] right 
[3.7] just because [0.3] an action brings about something we want [0.8] doesn't 
show that it's moral 
again i'm talking at the level of common sense at the moment we distinguish 
between [0.5] a moral considerations [0.4] and these other ones [0.8] 
associated with [0.5] Watts [0.5] and you can see that in making this move [0.
2] i'm already beginning to move away from certain forms of utilitarianism [5.
6] when [0.8] we think of precepts which are designed to promote our pleasure 
or our advantage to bring about something we want [1.6] we normally say well [0.
2] do this [0.2] if [0.2] you have that [0.7] goal [0.2] in mind [1.2] yeah [0.
6] if you want [0.2] to be rich [1.3] then [0.6] follow this [0.3] regimen [2.
4] if you [1.0] want that form of pleasure [0.2] then [0.2] do this [0.3] and 
so on [1.8] these are [1.0] these do thises [0.5] are imperatives but they're 
hypothetical imperatives [0.2] i've touched on this earlier this term [0.3] a 
hypothetical imperative is one that's governed by an if clause [0.3] if you 
want to do something [0.3] then [0.7] do X [0.5] right that's a hypothetical 
imperative [0.9] and [0.2] where er the hypo-, where the hypothesis comes from 
relates to your desires or your wants or whatever [0.3] and these may be given 
[0.3] indeed by [0.3] er your s-, er by by your er bodily [0.6] er [0.6] er 
pressures [7.3] press the switch [0.2] if you want the light to go on [1.1] you 
ought to earn some money [0.2] if you want to get on in life [0.9] 
okay [1.9] Kant's point is [0.3] that whilst [0.3] a-, as a matter of practical 
reason [1.1] these are perfectly acceptable and we use them all the time of 
course [0.3] they're not moral reasons [2.4] not to say they're wrong but 
they're just not moral ones [0.7] in distinctively moral situations these sorts 
of hypotheticals are out of place [2.6] in a moral situation we say you or 
possibly i [0.4] ought [0.2] or ought not to do such and such [1.0] and not [1.
3] if you want X or Y [1.1] but rather [0.2] there's no reason of that sort you 
just ought [0.8] and this there's no reason [0.3] is designed [0.2] to [0.2] 
exclude these sorts of appeals [0.4] to consequences [1.2] so [0.3] common 
sense reflection [0.9] uncorrupted by philosophy [0.4] it is suggested [0.7] 
indicates [0.3] that duty [0.4] is distinct [0.2] from pleasure [0.2] or indeed 
utility [2.4] further Kant thinks [0.5] that [1.0] er [0.5] being prepared to 
follow the dictates of [0.2] morality as so understood [0.9] being prepared to 
do what you know you ought to do [0.9] moral virtue [0.4] or what he calls good 
will [0.9] what's sometimes called [0.5] er [0.2] conscientiousness that is 
acting out of a recognition of duty [1.0] according to Kant [0.8] 
being prepared to do that having a good will [0.3] being prepared to and 
actually acting [0.5] out of a recognition of [0.3] what is your duty [0.8] is 
[0.5] in a a very important sense [0.2] for Kant [0.2] the supreme good [1.8] 
to which everything else [1.2] is to be [0.6] subordinated [1.6] so on this 
account [1.3] the highest good is that of the good will [0.8] which seeks to 
act according to the dictates [0.5] of the moral law [1.2] that is not to say 
that doing that doesn't have consequences [0.5] of course everything that you 
do has consequences [0.9] but the sort of effect or the reward of virtue [1.2] 
is not [0.3] happiness [1.3] as er [0.8] er [0.2] [0.3] Aristotle said a long 
time ago [0.7] he who says [0.2] that a man is happy if only he be good [1.1] 
even when he's being tortured on the rack [0.3] is talking nonsense whether he 
knows it or not [0.8] it may be that someone resisting their torturers because 
they know they [0.2] it is their duty to er keep faith with their comrades [0.
3] may be doing what they believe to be or even know to be the right thing [0.
8] is not to say that that's giving them happiness [0.5] it may not at 
all [0.4] it may give them [0.3] the reverse of anything that could be 
plausibly called happiness [0.4] but they are retaining [0.9] their dignity [0.
8] and they are showing that degree of freedom [0.6] of refusing [0.5] to be [0.
6] er [1.1] er forced to do what the torturers [0.3] are wanting it may end in 
their death [0.2] sure [0.5] but that is a choice yet again [0.8] of course [0.
8] it's said [0.3] that everybody [0.6] may be i don't know but with a skilled 
torturer [0.5] forced to submit [0.4] that may be true and if it is true that 
removes their freedom [1.5] but the reward of virtue [0.2] certainly [0.2] is 
not going to be happiness in all circumstances we hope it will in many [1.0] 
but [0.6] we need to go right back to that distinction i mentioned to you 
between Plato and Aristotle [0.4] Aristotle is indeed concerned with [0.4] 
finding a form of society where in general happiness [0.2] goes together with 
virtue [1.0] Plato who remembers [0.4] person [0.4] that he respected most in 
all the whole world Socrates [0.5] obeying his duty was f-, was executed [0.6] 
says well [0.9] one needs to give an account of [1.0] how one should live which 
takes account of [0.2] the situation [0.2] in 
which the good person [0.2] may be made [0.5] to drink the hemlock [1.3] if 
you're going to say that Socrates remains happy [0.2] then you're going to 
redefine happiness in quite a significant way [1.3] [sniff] [0.7] so [0.7] this 
again is fairly common sense reflection [0.6] er [0.2] that [0.6] the [0.3] er 
[0.9] er [1.4] er [0.5] th-, th-, good will [1.5] er in a certain sense [0.3] 
is what [0.3] we may quite reasonably subordinate [0.2] the other values to and 
[0.5] of course often we don't [0.5] but we respect the person [0.2] who stands 
up for what they believe to be right [1.1] despite loss [1.1] of [1.1] all the 
normal goals we don't always reckon that we could do that but we can see the 
value in it [3.4] other things that we ought and really and quite properly call 
good [0.5] riches talents [0.2] worldly wisdom [0.3] comfort and so on [0.7] 
they are only good as far as Kant's concerned on concer-, er o-, on condition 
that they are used compatibly [0.2] with a good will [1.0] when [0.4] riches or 
talents worldly wisdom or anything else [0.3] are used maliciously [0.5] by a 
bad will [1.0] the evil of the situation is greater [0.5] than if the malicious 
person [0.3] were less well [0.7] endowed [1.5] that after all is 
why in mythology [0.3] the devil [0.3] is a fallen [0.2] angel [2.7] so on this 
account then [0.5] we are both [0.6] animals plainly [0.4] and also rational 
beings [1.1] and in so far as we are rational because we are rational beings [0.
8] we can recognize ourselves as subject to the moral law [1.7] the moral law 
[0.4] expresses not [0.2] hypothetical imperatives of prudence [1.3] but 
categorical imperatives [0.5] prescribing actions [0.4] regardless of the 
informations [0.2] of our animal nature [1.9] the highest good [0.2] is that of 
the good will [0.8] if you like conscientiousness but i don't like that as a 
translation because the word's come down in the world [0.8] and good will 
attempts to act according to the dictates of the moral law [2.1] in so far as 
we are moral [0.5] we can form our will to the moral law [0.9] acting as reason 
tells us [0.9] and to that extent free [0.3] of our purely animal [0.2] nature 
[0.3] our animal nature plainly is subject to the regularities of the laws of 
nature [1.8] in so far as we are [0.2] immoral [1.0] we are [0.4] irrational [0.
3] slaves to our natural [0.2] inclinations [1.0] and that's why [0.5] the 
capacity 
that we have as human beings [0.4] to consider rationally what we should do to 
ask ourselves can i really will that be a universal law [0.3] and adjust our 
action to suit [0.7] provides us with the ability of moving against what our 
natural inclinations will lead us [0.2] it frees us it gives us a space of 
freedom [0.2] to say no [0.5] to our natural inclinations [0.9] and [0.2] that 
is why [0.7] our recognition of the moral law [1.0] is [0.2] in fact [0.4] the 
condition [0.3] of our freedom [2.0] the reward of virtue [0.6] is [0.7] 
dignity [0.4] and freedom dignity interesting word [1.2] dignity in er Kant's 
terminology [1.1] something has dignity if it has no exchange value [0.3] most 
things have exchange value [0.9] some think and [0.2] some cynics say 
everything has exchange value [0.4] every man has his price [2.1] Kant says no 
[1.5] there are some th-, there are people that think that of course [0.6] and 
that shows that they're immoral [2.1] there is nothing [0.6] that can be 
exchanged [0.4] for virtue [1.3] there's nothing that can be exchanged [0.2] 
for a good will [1.6] without [0.3] loss [0.7] of course [0.9] people do 
exchange that's a practical er er it's a rhetorical matter [0.3] but in terms 
of value [0.6] there there is er there is [0.3] inevitable loss you can't just 
say well [0.3] that was an unjust act but lots of people were made happy by it 
so it's okay it's not okay [0.3] if it was an unjust act even if people were 
made happy by it [0.6] that sort of [0.2] moral loss t-, er lo-, loss adj-, er 
adjusting [0.3] is for Kant [0.4] a symptom [0.2] of corruption [3.1] we can 
set ourselves against Kant [0.7] our [0.5] perceptions and beliefs about [0.5] 
what would be nice for us or good for us even [0.9] we can [0.2] move against 
the dictates of our [0.3] bodily nature [0.4] and recognize that some things 
are incumbent on us [0.2] and some are not [1.3] and [0.2] that [0.4] provides 
us with our dignity [1.2] it provides us with our freedom [0.4] it may [0.4] 
not [0.2] lead [0.2] to happiness [0.7] but [0.6] it is liberating [1.9] [3.1] 
mankind indeed one might say in fact Kant does say [0.6] has dignity to the 
extent [0.5] that it is capable [0.8] of [0.4] morality [0.4] of recognition [0.
3] of and hence [0.6] living in accordance with [1.8] er rationality [0.5] and 
in the practical sphere rationality involves [0.3] living according [0.2] to [0.
8] the moral law [0.5] the categorical imperative [3.5] so [0.5] to summarize 
this [1.3] ethics for Kant [0.8] 
articulates the laws of freedom [1.2] which a rational being [0.3] imposes [0.
2] on her or his [0.2] own actions [0.8] and expect other rational beings to 
recognize [0.4] and obey [2.7] and the justification for these rules [0.8] lies 
in the fact that moral rules are those which can be followed consistently [0.4] 
by all rational beings [0.9] so [0.4] to determine whether my action is right 
[0.4] my proposed action perhaps is right [0.8] i have only to consider [0.5] 
whether the principal upon which it's based [0.3] what Kant calls the maxim [0.
5] i need to consider whether the principal upon which my action is based [1.2] 
is such [0.4] that i could will that that maxim become a universal law [0.5] 
governing not merely this particular action of mine [0.7] but the action of all 
agents similarly [0.5] circumstanced [1.8] and an action is only [0.2] 
permissible [0.8] for me [1.2] if it is permissible [0.3] for anyone [0.2] in 
my situation [2.0] to put it [0.8] in a very simple [0.2] and commonsensical 
fashion [1.1] moral rules hold [0.5] without [0.2] distinction [0.4] of persons 
[1.2] not without distinction of position [0.2] of course [0.3] people may have 
a certain 
role and therefore have certain responsibilities for them [0.4] but [0.9] 
that's the position [0.3] if you were in that position rather than her [0.3] 
then you would have that similar role [0.9] now [0.5] plainly some of these are 
physical impossibilities [0.5] unless [0.2] er er unless science gets a move on 
pretty fast [0.3] i'll never be able to be a mother [0.5] but [0.4] that's er 
that's a misfortune of mine no doubt [0.6] but while rational being [0.9] it is 
merely a contingency [4.7] it'll probably help [0.6] if i took [0.2] one of 
Kant's own [0.2] examples [0.8] and i'll follow the summary [0.4] which is a 
quite nice and elegant summary [0.4] er provided by Alasdair MacIntyre [0.2] in 
the book i recommended A Short History of Ethics [1.7] er suppose i'm tempted 
[0.2] to break a promise [1.8] the maxim [0.6] on which i'm considering action 
[0.6] might be er formulated as [0.5] i may always break a promise when it's in 
my interest to do so [0.9] we all know people who seem to act on that [1.7] now 
[0.2] can i consistently will [0.4] that this precept [0.7] i may always break 
a promise when it's in my interest to do so [0.7] can i consistently will that 
this 
precept [0.2] should be universally accepted and acted upon by all [2.1] if [0.
2] all people [0.2] acted on this precip-, [0.2] precept [0.2] and broke [0.3] 
their promises whenever it suited them [0.9] the practices of making and 
relying on promises would of course break down [1.8] because nobody would be 
able to trust the promises of others [1.7] and consequently [0.4] utterances of 
the form [0.3] i promise to [0.5] would cease [0.2] to have point [1.6] so [0.
3] to will that this precept should be universalized [0.5] is to will [0.9] 
that promise keeping should no longer be possible [2.0] but to will that i 
should be able to act on this precept [1.7] i may always break a promise when 
it is in my interest to do so [0.7] and clearly i must will this as part of 
willing that the maxim should be universalized [1.1] to will this [0.6] is to 
will that i should be able to make promises [0.3] and break them [1.2] and that 
of course is to will that the practice of promise keeping should continue [1.3] 
so that i can take advantage of it [2.6] so [0.2] to will that this precept [1.
0] i may always break a promise when it's in my interest 
to do so [0.7] to will [0.4] er that this precept should be universalized [0.3] 
is to will both that promise keeping as a practice should continue [0.5] and 
also [0.4] that it should not [1.8] so [0.5] i cannot universalize this precept 
consistently [0.9] and so [0.2] it cannot be a true moral rule [1.7] think 
through the consequence of universalizability [0.2] and in this particular 
instance you actually lodge yourself in a self-contradiction [2.7] and that is 
indeed er i i'm quoting or citing MacIntyre but it is in fact er er one of 
Kant's leading examples and it's quite an interesting one [4.4] so [0.2] on 
this account i can't universalize [0.2] that precept [0.3] and so it cannot be 
a true moral rule [0.2] in accordance with the categorical imperative [0.8] on 
the other hand [0.6] a rule such as do not make false promises [0.8] can [0.2] 
in principle be followed without exception [1.5] can that is in the logical 
sense [0.6] and thus [0.6] may qualify [0.3] as a moral [0.3] duty [1.4] okay 
so far [3.0] so [1.3] in [0.2] determining [0.5] what the moral law [0.2] 
commands [0.7] i have initially at my disposal [0.4] no other resources [0.3] 
than [0.2] that it must be 
universalizable [0.6] and that is [0.2] applied [0.4] impartially [2.7] but of 
course in practice [0.8] this criterion is held [0.2] to carry others with it 
[0.3] and Kant thinks it does [1.5] if the moral law [0.2] applies without 
distinction of persons [0.9] it follows says Kant [0.6] that i must treat [0.2] 
all human beings [0.3] as equally entitled to rights under it [1.1] must treat 
them as persons [0.4] too [3.5] and therefore [1.5] i must regard other people 
[0.3] as ends [0.2] in themselves [0.8] not just means to my own ends if they 
are centres of moral agency [0.5] as i am [0.9] then we're in the same boat [1.
7] and so [0.3] since er the moral law applies without distinction of persons 
[0.4] all moral agents [0.2] are ends in themselves so another version [0.6] of 
the categorical imperative [0.6] is er [0.4] treat [0.2] er other persons [0.5] 
er never as means [0.3] but only [0.4] as ends [2.8] there are about five 
different versions i'm not going to go through all of them you'll find them 
laid out [0.2] in the material i circulated er [0.3] last time [2.4] at the 
moment i'm trying to get at the nerve of what's going on here [4.1] further [2.
5] once i recognize [1.4] that other people are morally [0.7] in the 
same position as i am myself [2.0] once i recognize that we all belong to the 
same moral community [0.2] in virtue of our being rational agents [1.1] and 
therefore under the aegis of the moral law [0.3] and of course the criterion 
for being a moral agent is [0.3] potential pot-, er er capacity [0.4] to [0.4] 
recognize [0.5] er and act on maxims that we can universalize [1.6] once we 
recognize that i'm in the same position [0.4] as others [1.1] i recognize both 
[0.5] that i can [0.2] legitimately [0.8] pursue those of my purposes [0.4] 
that do not conflict with the moral law [2.1] okay if it doesn't conflict with 
the moral law i can follow those purposes [0.3] and therefore [0.4] i have a 
duty [0.5] to facilitate the likely pursuit [0.3] on the part [0.3] of my 
fellows [1.2] and so in another version of the categorical imperative [0.5] er 
[0.5] Kant speaks of what he calls the kingdom of ends the point about kingdom 
is it's a form of [0.3] polity not there has to be a literal king [0.4] er [0.
2] the notion of a community in which [0.4] each sees a responsibility to 
facilitate each other's [0.3] ends [3.6] well [0.6] so much [0.2] for the 
moment [0.6] for [1.0] 
exposition [3.9] and although it is [0.6] more complicated as i say there are 
five different versions of the categorical imperative and i've only touched on 
three [0.6] er so you can get the detail [0.3] from that Paton summary [1.8] 
the main line of thinking [0.6] is as i've laid it out [2.9] and i think there 
is a great deal [0.2] to be learned from Kant's ethical thinking [1.2] and 
indeed Kant is one of the great masters of modern philosophy [0.4] and his 
moral thinking has provided the dominant image [0.5] for most subsequent debate 
[0.6] and er i should mention i mentioned right at the beginning of term that 
the words ethical and moral were used in a lot of different ways [0.4] i told 
you the way i wanted to use it but i said there was another way [0.3] where [0.
5] er [0.6] morality is seen as a subclass of ethics and ethics is seen as the 
general er enquiry into how one should live [0.8] and the subclass some people 
have picked out as being er [0.7] er morality [0.2] is precisely that subclass 
picked out by Kant [0.4] those considerations subject to [1.0] 
universalizability [0.6] in Kant's 
fashion [0.3] that is er er those of you who've read er [0.4] Bernard Williams' 
book Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy [0.3] where he criticizes morality [0.
9] but defends ethics [0.6] he's saying within the sphere of practical 
reasoning [1.0] the Kantian model that i've been sketching is deeply flawed and 
we should move away from it [0.4] yes he says Kant is dead right it does 
capture many of our central intuitions [0.3] which have arisen out of a 
historical context [0.3] and that historical context is damaging [0.4] and 
those of you who are into Nietzsche in a big way [0.2] who sees himself as an 
immoralist [0.3] what does he mean by morality when he describes himself as an 
immoralist given that he clearly has his own views [0.2] about how to live [0.
2] nobody and so on [0.6] it's Kant he once again has in his sights [0.3] Kant 
as providing [0.2] the clearest model of what [0.2] the intuitions of morality 
[0.5] amount to [0.3] and Nietzsche has a [0.5] a slightly curious story [0.6] 
where er he er relates this back to er the history of Christianity and the 
christiani-, and the history of [0.6] classical Greece [0.4] er 
which is [0.5] flawed in a number of ways [0.4] leave the history aside for the 
moment [0.5] again [0.2] er h-, h-, what i-, however it came about [0.6] the 
model of morality [0.5] with which [0.4] Kant is operating [0.2] provides a 
recognizable model today [0.3] about which there is a good deal of debate [0.3] 
and Kant as i say [0.3] focuses that [0.6] er supremely well [2.1] er [0.9] 
there are however [1.3] many difficulties [0.4] both external to the system 
people can criticize from outside and also internal to it [1.0] and i'm just 
going to in the closing minutes of this lecture mention four [1.6] first [1.5] 
er [0.6] the insistence on the fundamental principle of morality being 
categorical [1.8] not a hypothetical imperative [0.7] you may well challenge [1.
9] er [0.3] and that's precisely what people who say morality is [0.3] a 
defective subclass within ethics more generally will often say [0.9] you may 
certainly the notion of duty [0.3] detached from any particular role [1.1] in 
the singular rather than the plural what is my duty not what are my duties as 
such and such the notion of duty [0.7] er [0.4] is [0.5] one often found in 
popular thinking sure [0.6] but 
historically it only emerged a century or so before Kant [1.1] and it's 
arguable [0.2] that it only represents the ghost of a dead concept [0.6] that 
only lived when embedded in particular social situations [0.4] which was 
disintegrating by Kant's time [0.3] and have disintegrated by now [1.9] perhaps 
[0.3] someone said [0.4] Kant's duty is rather like that concept of decay 
justice [0.7] in the sophist's time [0.2] it at this stage remained a central 
moral notion [0.5] everyone agreed that justice was a good thing [0.6] but the 
descriptive content [0.2] had been eroded by social change [1.5] perhaps the 
notion of duty [0.2] people say [0.4] made good sense in a feudal set-up [0.5] 
where everybody had their respective rights and duties [1.1] and this provided 
the framework within which everyone lived their lives [0.8] so it's clear what 
your duties are and it's best to fulfill them [0.9] but the shift to thinking 
of duty in the singular [0.5] out of any such social context [0.5] empties that 
concept [0.3] of all [0.2] significance [1.0] and the refusal to give any 
reason for the 
dictates of the moral law [0.2] it's categorical you just ought [1.2] reflects 
a collapse of the moral community [0.6] not [0.3] as Kant thinks the key to all 
moral thinking [0.5] and that line of er [0.2] argument you'll find in 
MacIntyre both in the book i've mentioned [0.3] and in subsequent writings such 
as After Virtue [1.9] that's the first objection the notion of duty [0.2] is 
empty [1.6] second [0.3] it is possible to object to Kant's doctrine [0.2] that 
it's my duty to act according to the imperative [0.2] and not look to the 
consequences might say consequences matter [1.7] Kant for example says [0.2] 
it's categorically binding on us we ought not to tell lies [1.4] and when i've 
discerned a categorical imperative i've discerned a rule with no exceptions [1.
3] so i ought not says Kant to tell a lie [0.3] even from benevolent motives [1.
8] but what if i'm to save a potential victim from a murderer [1.4] some might 
[0.4] say no [0.5] the insistence on keeping one's own soul pure [0.2] at the 
expense of others [0.2] is grossly [0.2] immoral [2.0] there's an old slogan [0.
9] fiat justitia [0.4] fiat justitia ruat caelum [0.8] 
approximately let justice be done [0.5] though the heavens fall [0.9] fits in 
with Kant beautifully [1.5] there is however [0.4] a well known and equally 
ancient [0.2] retort [1.3] if the heavens fall [1.1] justice won't be done [2.
3] there is [0.4] many would say a genuine [0.2] dilemma here [0.8] which Kant 
is insensiv-, to er is insensitive to [0.3] sometimes consequences can override 
[0.3] what Kant would see as the moral law [0.2] and surely it is blind [0.3] 
to ignore it [1.1] third [0.8] just giving four [0.2] standard objections [0.4] 
third [0.3] although Kant interpreted his principles in this very rigorous 
manner [1.4] it's often agra-, argued [0.2] that his system doesn't really [0.
8] require that [0.3] but [0.4] in fact it's much too loose [0.8] he doesn't 
really provide conclusive reasons for doing [0.4] rigorous [0.2] arguing on 
Kant's manner [0.5] on the contrary can sanction almost anything [0.9] for how 
am i to decide [0.3] what is the correct description [0.3] and hence maxim [0.
3] of any proposed act [1.3] the Kantian test of a true moral precept [0.4] is 
that it's one i can s-, consistently universalize [0.8] but with sufficient 
ingenuity [0.7] perhaps one can find [0.3] a 
consistently universalizable maxim [0.2] for almost any action just specified 
[1.3] in enough detail [1.1] er [0.5] just characterize the proposed action in 
such a way that the maxim will permit me to do what i want whilst prohibiting 
others from doing [0.6] what would [0.3] nullify the maxim if universalized [7.
0] however [0.3] i don't think this is [0.7] to say that nothing can be 
salvaged [0.2] from Kant's approach [0.3] or even from the notion of 
universalizability [0.9] because [0.2] what Kant is getting at or part of what 
Kant's getting at [0.7] in his categorical imperative [0.7] is that a person 
who says he or she ought to act in a certain way [0.4] is guilty of an implicit 
contradiction [0.6] and this may well be true [1.1] once a maxim has been 
specified then [0.3] if it's to be a moral maxim [0.4] it must be 
universalizable [4.5] now as i've mentioned to you the prescriptivists like 
Hare [0.2] have taken up this approach and have argued that a person isn't 
genuinely making a moral ju-, er judgement [0.4] unless he or she [0.2] is 
prepared [0.3] to universalize the maxim [1.3] for to judge that something is 
right [0.2] is to commit oneself to choosing that course [0.2] of action [0.5] 
even if it's open [0.8] to one er er er if it is open to one and approving of 
others doing so [0.3] when it's open to them [1.7] so if the Nazi's judgement 
[0.3] that gassing Jews is right is to be a genuinely evaluative judgement [0.
6] not just a descriptive one [0.6] then he must be committed to the position 
[0.2] it would be right for he himself to be gassed [0.5] if it were 
unexpectedly discovered that he were of Jewish parentage [1.7] if he's not 
prepared to universali-, er universalize his maxim in this way [0.3] he is not 
genuinely accepting the imperative [0.4] let Jews be gassed [0.7] he's hence 
not making a moral judgement [1.0] of course it's possible for him to change 
his mind [0.5] and if his Jewish ancestry [0.2] were discovered he might well 
do so [0.6] the point is [0.3] you cannot genuinely hold [0.4] that gassing 
Jews is right unless you accept [0.8] the [0.2] er er maxim [0.5] er is in 
principle universalizable [0.3] and of course more generally [0.3] bringing 
home to a person [0.6] what [0.4] might be involved in certain circumstances in 
universalizing a maxim may be a way of bringing people [0.2] and often is [0.2] 
to change [0.2] their minds [2.0] now as you know [0.2] there are well known 
objections to prescriptivism [0.8] but [0.2] and this is the note i'm going to 
end on [1.7] the type of argument i've sketched doesn't stand or fall either 
with Kant [0.2] or with prescriptivism [1.0] if you take the line that what a 
person commits themselves to [0.4] in saying X is right [0.4] is not [0.2] just 
the imperative [0.3] let me do X [0.2] but [0.4] there are sufficient reasons 
of a moral kind for doing X [1.3] then you could still argue [1.0] that [0.5] 
to the extent the two situations are of the same type [0.5] what are sufficient 
moral reasons for doing X in one situation [0.6] are sufficient [0.2] in 
another [0.9] if there are sufficient moral reasons [0.4] for gassing Jews when 
i happen to be the executioner [0.8] then there are sufficient moral [0.4] 
reasons for doing so [0.3] when i happen [0.2] to be a victim [1.1] and with 
this we come back to the heart of the Kantian enterprise and what i want to 
leave you with [1.3] Kant is concerned [0.5] to 
establish ultimate moral [0.2] principles [2.2] which are at once autonomous 
that is determined by the agent's own rational will not by anything external to 
that will [0.6] whether the will of another [0.2] or even one's own desires [1.
3] establish moral principles once autonomous [0.3] and objective [0.3] not 
depending on the desires [0.3] or even the nature [0.4] of the agent [0.3] 
moral principles [0.2] bottom of this [0.3] are at once [0.3] autonomous [0.7] 
and [0.4] objective [1.9] and this meets the dual sense we have of morality 
that in facing moral decisions it's important [0.2] to get it right [1.0] and 
yet no one has the right to tell us what we ought to do [0.7] the point at 
which McNaughton starts his book [1.8] er [0.2] [0.6] we are autonomous beings 
[0.4] but these two requirements [0.2] it would seem [0.5] of objectivity and 
autonomy [0.5] can only be met if certain moral principles are demanded [0.4] 
by the formal character of morality itself [0.6] a morally good action must be 
rationally chosen [0.3] in accord with a law [0.3] rational er v-, valid for 
all rational beings universally [0.6] and determined by nothing [0.2] beyond [0.
2] itself [1.4] so given 
that [1.0] a correct moral judgement [0.5] is one that could in principle be 
reached [0.2] by anybody [1.5] so such judgements must be made in terms of 
features [0.2] which the actions or situations possess [1.0] so any feature 
picked out as relevant [0.6] must be one that's always relevant [0.4] unless 
there's some special explanation why not [1.1] so [0.8] what anyone ought to do 
in a given set of circumstances [0.2] is what anyone else ought to do [0.2] so 
long as the case isn't relevantly [0.2] different [0.6] and this gives us [0.3] 
Kant's [0.3] insistence [0.2] on [0.4] universalizability [2.3] and of course 
[0.5] the principle that one ought to treat similar cases similarly [0.7] is a 
general formulation [0.2] of the particular requirement of justice [0.8] that 
any form of treatment [0.2] thought right for one person [0.4] must be right [0.
2] for all others [0.7] unless the others are significantly different [1.1] and 
this thesis [0.3] about justice [0.6] is what i shall begin to consider [0.9] 
next time [1.0] thank you very much