nf0157: er [2.3] okay er [1.9] i'll just say a few things about the book [0.5] 
er [0.4] w-, [0.2] as you know we've spent [0.2] last term and the first part 
of this term [0.4] talking about Locke and Berkeley [0.5] er we're now moving 
on to Hume so the next six lectures [0.6] er the last six lectures of this 
course are on Hume [0.3] this is a copy of Hume's Treatise [0.4] er i'll say a 
little bit more about that in a minute so that hopefully [0.4] it will reach a 
larger audience when a few more people have got here [0.6] er [1.5] so i'm just 
going to say i'm going to say a few things about Hume and a few things about 
the Treatise [0.5] er [0.3] and then [0.2] we'll start by looking at [0.4] 
Hume's sort of philosophical method you might call it [2.8] okay so [0.3] Hume 
[0.6] out of the three philosophers we study on this course Hume is probably 
the most famous [0.4] of the three [0.3] and he's certainly he's famous for his 
[0.4] very very famous theories of cause and effect [0.4] which we'll look at 
in a couple of weeks' time [0.3] and 
for his influence on later philosophers particularly Kant who of course you're 
looking at [0.6] in [0.2] Modern Phil Texts [0.4] er [0.2] that is unless 
you're joint honours [0.6] er [0.4] handout [1.2] er [0.9] Hume of course 
follows on from Locke and Berkeley he's an empiricist like Locke and Berkeley 
[0.4] like [0.3] Locke and Berkeley [0.3] he thinks that all of our interest 
and knowledge [0.4] is derived from experience and we'll be talking much more 
about that [0.3] today what that actually comes down to for Hume [0.5] and he's 
also following on from the arguments from the kind of from the challenges that 
were laid down by Locke and Berkeley [0.3] so he takes on a lot of Locke's [0.
5] er [0.2] a lot of the the [0.2] terminology used by Locke and Berkeley [0.3] 
and he looks at another lot of the same kind of problems [0.3] i mean 
particularly he's interested in abstraction [0.6] and [1.1] scepticism [0.3] 
whether Locke and berk-, whether Locke's account in particular [0.5] ap-, 
implies [0.4] er scepticism about the ex-, external world whether empiricism 
implies scepticism about the external world [0.5] and [0.3] er the most i mean 
one of the most [0.4] famous [0.2] things that he takes on from Locke and 
Berkeley is is the theory of personal identity [0.5] er [0.2] he looks at 
Locke's account he looks at Berkeley's account [0.2] and then he proposes his 
own account and we'll be looking at personal identity [0.3] the very last 
lecture of this term [0.4] in week ten [1.3] er [0.2] but i mean [0.6] so those 
those are Hume's er some of Hume's [0.4] philosophical antecedent why he's 
called an empiricist [0.4] but i mean i think one of the [0.5] another really 
huge influence on Hume which i talked about in the very first lecture of this 
course back at the beginning of last term [0.3] with Newton [0.8] er [0.2] 
Hume's a scientist really [0.2] he he's [0.3] he's really taking a scientific 
method and applying it [0.4] to philosophy [0.3] so Newton offers us this this 
kind of mechanistic [0.3] account of matter [0.3] it's this [0.2] this whole 
new science of matter [0.3] in which all of the movements of of [0.4] particles 
of bodies can be described in terms of equations [0.2] so it's moving towards 
the kind of deterministic science that we really take for granted 
today [0.4] the fact that if something happens in the world [0.3] there will be 
a reason for it there'll be an explanation for it [0.5] and [0.2] Hume [0.4] in 
i-, i mean this is really i suppose the [0.6] the [0.2] biggest [0.2] shift in 
thinking in Hume [0.5] is that Hume saw man as another part [0.5] of the 
natural world [0.7] i mean just another part of the natural world and and if 
you think [0.3] well okay so what's so exciting about that [0.4] i mean just 
think about how the rationalists say Descartes viewed [0.6] viewed man [0.6] in 
the rationalist picture of of human [0.2] kind [0.3] is of this sort of [0.3] 
this being in the image of God [0.5] someone who whose life is governed 
controlled purely by reason [0.8] right [0.2] so for the rationalists you know 
you're not a part of nature sort of [0.4] swept along with everything else your 
reason governs your life you have control [0.4] in virtue of being a rational 
animal [0.3] right that's the rationalist picture [0.6] but Hume [0.4] 
completely [0.7] turns that on its head i mean it's te-, in reason is the slave 
of the passions [0.3] very famous 
quote from Hume [0.4] reason is the slave of the passions so [0.4] reason is is 
a sort of [0.3] secondary thing the passions the emotions the feelings [0.3] 
are what really govern us and not reason reason is something that comes in 
later [0.6] and er [0.4] i mean [1.0] so [0.7] basically what that means is 
that man humans [0.3] are just another part of the natural world [0.3] we can 
explain human behaviour [0.3] in exactly the same kind of way as we explain [0.
3] things scientifically [0.8] and then again i mean just as a sort of modern 
comparison i mean you might want to think about [0.3] Searle that you did last 
year in part one i mean the sort of [0.3] contrast between the kinds of exan-, 
explanations we offer of [0.5] of human action and the kinds of explanations of 
[0.9] scientific phenomena [0.3] basically what Hume's saying is there's one 
kind of explanation that's applicable to all of these things i mean obviously 
the [0.4] the things we're explaining are slightly different [0.5] in in terms 
of humans in terms of of [0.2] of human thought human action we're [0.4] 
dealing with 
with maybe ideas or thoughts or whatever as opposed to physical objects [0.4] 
but basically there's one kind of explanation and it's a naturalistic kind of 
explanation [0.6] so that's the the [0.4] the [0.7] huge [0.2] sort of shift in 
thinking that that we get in Hume [0.6] and i mean Hume [1.1] Hume sees this as 
a kind of an experimental enquiry [0.6] so [0.4] h-, [0.2] he takes this [0.3] 
empirical scientific method [0.3] which Newton [0.2] applied with such success 
but which goes right i mean you may remember the historical [0.6] sort of 
picture i was giving you back at in at at the end of at the beginning of last 
term [0.5] er th-, the sort of going right back to Bacon the sort of empiri-, 
the rise of empirical science [0.3] and Hume's taken that picture and what he 
wants to derive [0.4] is [0.3] write some [0.3] the science of man [2.4] okay 
[0.3] so Newton gave us this er [0.6] when somebody starts writing this down 
you see [0.3] this is Newton gave us the science of matter [0.4] and Hume is 
giving us the science of man along [0.3] exactly the same lines [0.3] so he 
wants to come up with some kind of [0.3] 
laws of association you know just like Newton has this equation you can [0.5] 
draw the the fall of a billiard ball or whatever the the fall of a [0.2] not a 
billiard ball [0.7] things that you drop off towers and things you can measure 
[0.5] their velocity in terms of the forces acting on it [0.4] Hume thought a 
similar kind of account would be possible [0.8] for [0.2] the man the reason 
for [0.9] what goes on in our [0.6] our understanding [0.7] er [0.6] right okay 
[0.2] how does he do this well how are we going to [0.4] how are we going to 
empirically investigate [0.3] the human mind [0.9] well of course the methods 
of neuroscience the methods of [0.5] of [0.6] you know [0.4] looking at medical 
methods looking at people's brains obviously weren't very far advanced [0.3] 
and anyway maybe that's the wrong place to look i mean Hume's interested in 
thoughts and feelings and so on [0.5] so really the method that we use is of 
course introspection [0.8] we look into our own minds we see what's going on 
there [0.3] and we can [0.3] posit [0.2] laws relations we can carry out this 
empirical [0.4] investigation [0.4] 
into [1.3] all the whole nature of human [0.3] understanding so this is the 
project [4.1] well [0.4] in the [0.5] the next six lectures so today and [0.2] 
and the rest of this course [0.5] er we're going to look at various topics in 
Hume's philosophy [0.4] and these taken from [0.4] book one of Hume's Treatise 
of Human Nature so this is the Treatise [1.1] it's a very fat book [0.7] er 
however [0.4] this this particular one is very fat because it contains [0.4] a 
large amount of introductory material [0.4] and [0.2] er [1.0] glossaries and 
notes and all this kind of stuff [0.4] if you're going to buy the Treatise so 
this is a quick [0.6] st-, [0.2] step back from Hume for a second 'cause i 
wanted to say this at the beginning [0.5] er [0.3] if you want to buy a copy of 
this this is very very good value this is a tenner [0.3] and it's quite [0.2] 
can you see how thick it is that's quite a lot of book for a tenner [0.5] if 
you given how expensive philosophy books are [0.5] er [0.3] this is edited by 
Norton and Norton [0.4] er [0.4] and it was on the reading list right at the 
start of term so you should [0.5] have that already [0.4] er [1.0] there are ve-
, er they 
should be available in the bookshop i haven't actually checked i did ask them 
to order some copies [0.4] er [0.3] there are lots of other editions of the 
Treatise so you don't have to get this one but this one's got a very big fat 
introduction so [0.5] er it [0.2] it might be useful [0.4] er [0.3] the 
Treatise in fact has has three [0.6] books [0.2] in it [0.3] er [0.4] and we're 
only going to be looking at book one [0.7] book one [0.2] is entitled Of the 
Understanding so this is Hume's [0.5] the the beginning of hu-, Hume's science 
of man as it applies to [0.5] to reason [0.3] and to thought [0.7] er [0.4] 
we'll be look-, i-, it [0.2] basically introduces this philosophical method and 
then it looks at applying that to a number of philosophical issues such as [0.
5] space and time causation knowledge and belief [0.5] personal identity [0.6] 
er [0.3] the [0.4] second book is is Of the Passions [0.4] so that is an 
account of o-, o-, a a really [0.5] i mean an account that was discredited for 
a while because of [0.2] things like Freudian [0.2] psychoanalysis and things 
like that but [0.4] now is is is people looking at it more and it 
gives an account of the emotions [0.4] the desires things like pride and lust 
and [0.5] and [0.3] and pity and [0.2] and [0.2] and of course human freedom 
which is probably one of the most important things in a [0.2] in book two [0.5] 
and then book three is is Hume's moral philosophy and i'm not sure i meant to 
ask [0.4] Philip whether you do any hu-, of Hume's moral philosophy do you do 
any of Hume's moral philosophy [0.6] in your morals course [0.6] well [0.6] 
even if you don't it's certainly something that people will refer to so the [0.
2] the moral philosophy is in [0.4] book three of the Treatise but as i said 
we're only going to be looking at book one [0.4] and we're going to look at [0.
3] number of topics from book one [0.3] we're going to start by looking at 
Hume's philosophical method [0.4] and then next week we'll talk about belief [0.
5] then two weeks on his theory of causation [0.4] his scepticism and then 
finally his theory of personal identity [0.8] that's the plan [1.6] any 
questions [0.3] about Hume [0.8] in general [2.1] cool [1.1] right [0.2] okay 
[0.3] so what i want to do today is just [0.3] i mean having 
sort of given you a little tiny tiny bit of an overview of what [0.5] Hume's 
about [0.5] er is just look at [0.6] that he's basically his his tennets of his 
empiricism what his empiricism means for Hume [0.5] how he sets it out what the 
basic principles he's working with are [0.4] and these basic principles are 
vital because these are the principles [0.2] that he later applies [0.3] when 
he comes to look at specific problems [0.3] so when he looks at causation he 
uses the principles we're going to look at today [0.3] in order to analyse the 
notion of [0.2] of cause [0.2] so this is basically the [0.3] the most 
important [0.2] ground work [0.4] the basic foundations of of Hume's empiricism 
[0.7] and er [0.2] this [0.9] er [0.3] basically comes down to his distinction 
between ideas and impressions and what he does with it [1.1] so [0.2] this is 
[0.3] on the handout [0.4] er c-, [0.2] first talk about what the distinction 
is [0.2] why it's important [0.8] and what we might [0.5] think about it [0.7] 
okay [0.9] right so er the very very very first thing Hume does in the Treatise 
after he's he's written the introduction [0.8] is he starts [0.4] 
talking about [1.4] starts out this introspective enquiry by looking into the 
mind and seeing what he finds there [0.4] and the first things he said is this 
is the first sentence of the Treatise [0.7] all the perceptions of the human 
mind resolve themselves into two distinct kinds [0.4] which i shall call 
impressions and ideas [1.1] 
okay and then he talks about [0.3] the difference between them [0.4] and the 
first thing i want to draw your attention to is [0.4] is his terminology [0.5] 
now [1.2] what did Locke call [0.9] what was Locke's term for the contents of 
the human mind all the objects of perception [0.8] 
sf0158: idea [0.4] 
nf0157: idea [0.2] right so Locke uses the term idea as this general term for 
the [0.4] the objects of of the mind the things in the mind [0.3] and Hume 
starts out by saying all the perceptions of the human mind [0.4] resolve 
themselves into two distinct kinds which i'll call impressions and ideas [0.3] 
and so [0.2] Locke is imme-, er Hume's [0.2] beg your pardon Hume is 
immediately laying down his terminology [0.3] in a 
different way from Locke [0.3] and in fact he has a footnote here [0.5] and he 
says i here make use of these terms impression and idea [0.5] in a sense 
different [0.3] from what is usual [0.2] and i hope this levity will be allowed 
me [0.6] perhaps i rather restore the word idea to its original sense [0.3] 
from which Mr Locke has perverted it [0.5] in making it stand for all our 
perceptions so he's s-, started by having a go at Locke [0.4] who's [0.4] er [0.
2] used this term idea to stand for all of our perceptions [0.3] but really [0.
4] perceptions is is [0.3] Hume's term for idea so [0.3] where's my pen [0.5] 
so Locke's [0.8] idea [0.8] is basically what Hume calls [0.8] perceptions [1.
4] now you may not think that's very helpful because of course perceptions 
thereby are going to include things like [0.3] you know when i sit here and i 
imagine myself on that [0.5] beach with all those [0.3] men with six packs or 
whatever [0.3] that is n-, that is actually a perception in my mind although [0.
3] as you can see i'm clearly not [0.2] perceiving it more's the pity [0.4] so 
[0.4] er [0.6] that's [0.3] that's what 
Hume calls perceptions [0.4] this is what Locke calls ideas [0.3] and Hume defi-
, divides perceptions into [0.8] impressions and ideas [1.1] and this 
distinction is extremely important and is the whole foundation for his 
empiricism which is why i'm banging on about it so much [0.8] so what's [0.2] 
the difference [0.4] between impressions and ideas [2.0] well h-, the next 
sentence says the difference betwixt these consist in the degrees [0.4] of 
force and liveliness with which they strike upon the mind [0.4] and make their 
way into thought and consciousness [1.1] those perceptions which enter with 
most force and violence we may name impressions [1.0] and under this name i 
comprehend all our sensations [0.6] right so sensations things that we sense [1.
4] passions [0.3] and emotions [0.6] as they make their first appearance in the 
soul [1.4] by ideas [0.7] i mean the faint [0.2] images of these [0.4] in 
thinking [0.2] and reasoning [0.5] such as for instance are all the perceptions 
[0.3] excited by the present discourse [0.9] excepting only those which 
arise from the sight and touch [0.9] et cetera [0.3] so [0.5] the distinction 
seems to be being made here in two ways [0.5] on the one hand [0.4] the 
distinction is is bet-, i-, [0.2] with the degrees of force and liveliness with 
which they strike upon the soul so impressions [0.3] are the more forceful and 
lively [0.7] perceptions [1.1] well we can talk about f-, what [0.3] Hume 
exactly means by forceful and lively in a minute [0.7] er but impressions are 
the more f-, forceful [0.2] and lively ones and [0.2] ideas are the faint 
copies [0.6] of impressions so [0.4] ideas are fo-, er impressions are [0.6] 
forceful [0.5] ideas are fainter [1.1] and then [1.6] Hume says [0.8] under 
impressions i comprehend all our sensations passions and emotions [0.4] so 
impressions [0.5] are [0.3] the ones that we get directly from the senses or 
directly from the emotions so there's an [0.4] interesting [0.7] sort of 
addition here that when we talk about [0.5] mental objects we tend to be 
talking about [0.6] er [0.8] objects of perception or objects of propositional 
attitudes [0.6] but in fact Hume's 
including here emotion so if you feel really angry [0.6] you know someone [0.5] 
pushes in front of you in the [0.3] queue for the petrol station or something 
and you're sitting there going [0.3] [growl] [0.3] really angry [0.3] and that 
is an impression [0.4] right [0.7] i mean there's noth-, there's not [0.5] sort 
of an object of that in the sense there's not something angry that you're 
seeing [0.6] that is an impression of angriness [0.4] mean it's your anger [0.
2] is the impression so we enclose emotions in here as well as things you 
perceive [1.2] ideas on the other hand [0.5] are [0.3] so what does Hume says 
[0.4] er the faint image of these in thinking and reasoning [0.4] so if [0.4] 
you [0.3] read a book [0.9] and it's talking about Hume [0.5] you may form an 
idea of Hume [1.0] but [0.4] er this is a a f-, a f-, this is not an impression 
you're not seeing Hume [0.5] it's a it's a [0.2] a [0.5] fainter [0.2] idea [0.
2] that's being used in thinking [0.9] yeah [0.2] namex 
sf0159: is [0.6] is it then [0.4] er [0.4] reflections on emotions [0.2] er 
nf0157: right exactly [0.6] ideas are also going to include reflections on 
emotions so if 
you think back [0.4] to a week ago [0.4] when your friend said something really 
rude to you [0.4] down the pub and you were really angry [0.2] then you might 
remember that anger now [0.4] okay you might think back to it [0.4] and 
remember that you felt angry [0.2] now it may be that you may also feel angry 
now [0.8] but it may also be that you don't feel angry now you've you've got 
over it you've forgiven your friend [0.3] but you remember the anger [0.3] and 
so in that way the anger is [0.4] is an idea it's a faint copy [0.5] of the 
anger [0.4] that you felt before [1.6] but what i want to what i want to [0.2] 
to draw out here is is [0.4] i said there are two ways of making this 
distinction one is [0.8] in terms of forcefulness [3.4] okay so you've got the 
impressions of forceful and the ideas of the faint copies can everyone see the 
board sorry the lights are not on [0.9] where is it [2.9] okay [0.5] that's 
better [1.0] on the other hand impressions are to do with sensing [1.4] or [1.
1] immediate perception as it were [2.8] and ideas are to do 
with [0.5] thinking [1.2] or reflecting [1.8] or [0.4] maybe remembering or 
whatever [0.7] and [0.4] and th-, [0.2] Hume wants to have both of these [1.5] 
so i'm going to come back to whether this actually [0.5] cuts the distinction 
[0.7] in a minute [1.5] okay th-, there are there are so there are two things 
that are going on in these first sort of basically three or four sentences of 
the Treatise [0.4] that impressions are forceful and ideas are faint [0.3] that 
impressions are to do with sensing and perceiving and that ideas are to do with 
[0.4] later thinking or reflecting on things [0.8] er [0.2] and i mean of 
course [0.7] your ideas [0.3] you can you can read a book [0.6] about [0.7] say 
[0.6] i don't know some place you've never been some exotic island you can read 
a book about it [0.4] and get lots of ideas of it [0.3] those are nonetheless 
still only going to be ideas because they're [0.4] created by thought rather 
than [1.0] created by [0.2] sensation the question is [0.5] can Hume maintain 
this forcefulness distinction in that way so i'm getting ahead of myself now 
i'm going to come back to that in a 
minute [0.4] but is that [0.3] basically clear yeah [1.1] good [0.2] right [0.
3] okay [0.6] the second thing that Hume does that's that's very important 
which is in [0.3] the n-, second paragraph of of the Treatise [0.4] and [0.4] 
this is the [0.2] division in simple and complex perceptions i don't want to 
say a huge amount about this 'cause it's fairly obvious [0.3] and we've also 
come across it in Locke already [0.4] so in roughly the same way that Locke 
does [0.5] er [0.2] Hume distinguishes between simple and complex ideas [0.3] 
but [0.3] this [0.3] has [0.5] a big significance for him [1.4] and what does 
he say about this he says well we can divide our perceptions [0.3] into simple 
and complex [0.3] simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such [0.5] as 
admit of no distinction nor separation [1.2] okay [0.8] complex ideas are 
contrary to these and may be distinguished [0.4] into [0.2] parts er [0.9] so 
[0.5] what does he mean by this well if you have a sensation er an idea [0.5] 
or a sensation or whatever and you can't break it down into smaller parts [0.5] 
then it's simple [0.6] if you can 
break it down into parts [0.4] then it's complex so what kind of things are 
going to be [0.5] simple [0.3] perceptions [0.3] example [2.4] 
sf0160: red [0.2] 
nf0157: red [0.3] good yes okay [0.4] any others [0.6] anyone want to [0.9] 
sm0161: blue [0.3] 
nf0157: blue yeah okay all right 
sf0162: [0.4] 
nf0157: colour ones colour ones are going to do 
sm0163: rough [0.4] 
nf0157: rough yeah okay [0.8] that [0.5] that's probably [0.3] pretty simple [0.
3] yeah [0.9] 
sf0164: secondary qualities 
nf0157: yeah pretty much all secondary qualities are going to count as [0.4] 
simple perceptions [0.4] the immediate [0.8] feel the immediate [0.3] but again 
this is controversial so we're going to come back to this later [0.9] er [0.4] 
complex perceptions [2.1] what kind of complex perceptions are you having right 
now [1.9] er actually no i don't want to know about some of them [laughter] but 
are there a-, any you want to share [6.3] namex [0.2] come on keeping me 
sm0165: 
nf0157: [0.7] okay i mean look [0.2] supposing i'm looking at 
sf0166: the table [0.3] 
nf0157: the table okay the table is going to be a pretty complex [0.3] 
perception because [0.4] er it's got [0.4] i mean [0.2] i can physically divide 
it into it's got a colour [0.4] it's got a a hardness it's got a [0.6] 
sound if i bang on it [0.8] there are there are b-, we can divide this up into 
a bunch of things and in fact that's the kind of example Hume [0.5] gives if 
you're thinking of ord-, perceptions of ordinary physical objects they're going 
to be divisible into parts [0.4] so he's got an apple [0.6] says though a 
particular colour taste and smell [0.5] are qualities all united together in 
this apple [0.5] it is easy to perceive they're not the same but at least 
distinguishable from each other [0.3] so we can distinguish in the perception 
of an apple [1.1] the colour taste and smell i think they had better apples 
around when [0.2] Hume was alive but anyway [0.3] so one one can imagine that 
there are these [0.2] these physical objects we can divide [0.3] perceptions 
into parts [0.3] right okay [0.3] this may [0.5] er [0.2] ring a bell [0.2] er 
[0.2] in your your lectures on perception [0.6] you may recall [0.3] er talking 
about er [0.3] phenomenalism [0.4] logical positivism [0.9] breaking [0.4] er 
[0.7] immediate [0.2] objective perception down into the [0.3] sense data [0.6] 
that make them up so objects are constructions out of 
sense data does that [0.6] ring any bells at all [1.4] yeah [0.2] okay well 
whatever [0.6] okay so [0.3] er [0.9] we can divide we can divide complex 
perceptions into parts [0.2] right [1.4] this [0.2] leads to a very very 
important principle that Hume [0.6] formulates [0.5] which is [0.2] that [0.6] 
if you have [0.4] a simp-, w-, [0.2] w-, okay [0.8] s-, [0.2] start at the 
beginning [0.2] what's the relationship between our ideas and our impressions 
[0.5] is it the case that [0.3] every idea corresponds to an impression and 
every impression corresponds to an idea [0.7] 
that's the question he then asks [0.3] if you've got an idea does it have to 
corres-, is there does there have to be some impression to which it corresponds 
[0.4] now if you see why this is important for the empiricism because of course 
recall that the impressions [0.5] are the ones that are derived [0.2] directly 
from the senses [0.9] okay can anyone think of an example of an idea [0.4] that 
might not be derived from an impression [3.9] so are there ideas that you have 
[0.3] that you haven't [0.5] derived from impressions 
sf0167: an idea [0.4] 
nf0157: sorry 
sf0167: is it God [0.2] for example [1.3] 
nf0157: 
God is difficult okay 
sf0167: 
nf0157: because [0.5] i mean some people might think that you can actually have 
[0.5] er [0.4] direct experience of God 
sf0167: mm [0.4] 
nf0157: okay [0.2] you could perceive God [0.4] er i mean i [0.2] er people 
like Berkeley [1.2] what Berkeley says about that is quite hard to [0.9] to [1.
1] divine given his his theory of perception but [0.3] i mean certainly around 
this time that was [0.2] thought of as heresy so maybe God would would [0.5] 
would count in this way [0.4] but i mean is there a more ordinary example than 
God [0.4] 
sf0168: is it the things like the unicorn again 
nf0157: right exactly i mean [0.3] i-, you've got an idea of a unicorn if i say 
unicorn [0.4] you form in your [0.3] mind an idea of a thing with a [0.4] looks 
like a horse but it's got a horn on the front of it [0.3] have you ever had an 
impression of a unicorn [1.1] no [1.0] so [0.3] you have an idea which doesn't 
correspond to an impression [0.4] so Hume [1.1] thinks of examples like this [0.
2] i mean his example in the Treatise is the New Jerusalem which is a biblical 
reference [0.3] and it's th-, this fantastic mythical city where the 
streets are paved with gold and rubies or whatever you know and [0.3] 
dadadadada [0.3] one can have an i-, an idea of the New Jerusalem without ever 
having seen it or or a unicorn or whatever [0.5] so there are [0.3] but he also 
thinks that there are [1.4] impressions [0.8] of which you have no ideas as 
well [0.2] and his example for that is a bit more [1.2] bit more [1.1] 
complicated i mean it's basically say [0.5] i mean [0.7] ho-, how many people 
here have been to Paris [1.7] er quite a few [0.3] now those of you who've been 
to Paris [0.3] you have an impression of Paris i mean you were there you saw er 
[0.6] okay [0.4] but could you now [1.0] unless you are anyone who actually 
lived there for a while can shut up for a minute but the rest of you [0.5] did 
[0.3] could you [0.5] give your idea of Paris could you [0.3] sort of [0.3] 
give a [0.2] a say a street plan of Paris or a sort of [0.3] description of all 
the details of Paris [0.7] well of course you can't because even if you saw 
those i mean even if you saw those details in the first place [0.7] you're not 
now [0.2] necessarily going to be able to produce them [0.5] so the 
idea sort of [0.7] may have been there originally but it's now [0.3] faded away 
[0.8] er and this is exactly the example that [0.9] Hume gives he says i have 
[0.2] excuse me [0.6] i have seen Paris [0.6] but shall i affirm i conform such 
an idea of that city [0.4] as will perfectly represent all its streets and 
houses in their real and just proportions [0.5] so sometimes we can have [1.1] 
impressions with no ideas [1.4] and sometimes we can have ideas with no 
impressions [1.3] well [0.7] okay so so [0.5] that's where we've got to [0.6] 
right now this isn't going to help this empiricism [0.3] but Hume points out 
that all of these [0.5] places where there isn't a correspondence a case is a 
complex of ideas and impressions [0.3] right [0.3] the unicorn [0.4] is a 
complex idea [0.5] you can separate out the parts [0.8] you can separate out 
the horse and the horn [0.3] yeah [0.5] familiar example [0.6] er [0.8] could 
the same be true of simple ideas and simple impressions [0.5] and this is [0.5] 
basically the question for for the lecture today [0.4] could there be a simple 
idea [0.5] with no corresponding [0.2] 
simple [0.2] impression [2.7] okay what do you reckon could there be a simple 
idea with no [0.2] corresponding simple impression [0.2] 
sf0169: what do you mean by simple idea i get the simple impression like 
colours and things 
nf0157: right 
sf0169: what would be a simple idea [0.2] 
nf0157: well a simple idea would be [0.2] i mean if you [0.3] sh-, sort of r-, 
imagine now that particular shade of [0.5] er [0.3] blue that's Conservative 
Party blue [0.2] right [0.2] i mean it's not in front of you [0.4] but you [0.
2] can imagine it [0.3] so that's an idea of that colour [0.4] i mean if if you 
remember what colour your carpet is at home or something like that [0.5] so 
that's an idea of a [0.2] a colour which isn't corresponding to a present 
impression [1.4] or remembering a smell or remembering a taste or something 
like that [2.0] so could we have [0.3] a simple idea [0.5] that [0.9] having 
had the corresponding simple impression [0.3] 
sf0170: i thought we couldn't [0.5] 
nf0157: right 
sf0170: because [0.5] er there is a th-, er example of the Mary the scientist 
[0.2] 
nf0157: 
yes [0.2] yes 
sf0170: who works hard in the laboratory 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
sf0170: she's very smart she [0.2] but o-, everything in the laboratory is 
black and white [0.3] 
nf0157: yes 
sf0170: and she knows everything every physical [0.7] er theories about colours 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
sf0170: but then she [1.3] if she if she's shown like s-, for example red [0.3] 
she doesn't know which colour it is [0.2] 
nf0157: right right and when she sees red [0.3] she gets a new experience [0.7] 
could she imagine red could Mary so this is Mary who's grown up in this [0.3] 
cruel and entirely black and white environment [0.4] could Mary [0.3] have an 
idea of red [0.2] if she's never seen it [1.7] okay does anyone think you can 
[0.2] have a simple idea without a corresponding impression right who thinks 
you can't [1.5] right okay [0.4] what about the rest of you [0.2] 
sm0171: if it's er 
nf0157: not sure [0.2] 
sm0171: i think you can make something up can't you 
sf0172: mm 
nf0157: mm-hmm [1.0] 
sm0171: ridiculous things 
nf0157: right [0.8] like what [0.6] 
sm0171: er [1.7] 
nf0157: the [0.2] key question being are they simple or complex [0.7] 
sm0171: yeah i'm trying to think of a simple one actually then you think 
nf0157: mm-hmm [0.5] 
sm0171: complex thing like a book with no printing in it something like that 
that's a bit complex isn't it [0.2] 
nf0157: right right [0.3] and this is the problem that [0.2] of course 
our imaginations are hugely powerful [0.4] and we can think up lots of complex 
ideas of [0.3] strange things that [0.5] we've never actually seen [0.3] 
question is could we think up [0.5] a simple idea [0.2] one that couldn't be 
further divided [0.4] where we haven't had [0.2] a corresponding [0.2] 
impression [0.4] 
sf0173: with the simple ideas don't we have to have experienced them in the 
first place to know what they are so therefore you have to [1.7] 'cause of the 
secondary qualities 
nf0157: what 
sf0173: you [0.3] always [0.2] you have to experience it to understand it like 
if you're deaf even if someone [0.8] i don't know [0.8] explained writes down 
what [0.3] sound is i mean 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
sf0173: you're never going to know [0.9] 
nf0157: right [0.2] i mean there's a there's a difference i think that's a 
that's a very good point and this is wh-, h-, an example that Hume uses in fact 
[0.4] i mean [0.2] the the question is [0.6] it's it's not would would we know 
what to call it i mean i suppose in a [0.3] a way [0.3] it's not that Mary 
doesn't know [0.2] what to call red [0.3] that she sees wh-, she sees the 
different colours and she 
doesn't know their names [0.4] because i mean that would be true [0.3] if you 
just [0.4] didn't know any colour words you know if you were in a foreign 
language and you didn't know what to call them [0.3] something like that [0.3] 
but it's just that [0.2] when [0.5] i mean so the example of Mary goes she sees 
red [0.2] she's having an experience that she's never had before [1.7] right 
that she couldn't have imagined that experience [0.4] before she actually saw 
it [1.5] all right well look i i [0.2] i want you to think about this 'cause 
this is a this is really quite important [0.4] er [0.2] i'm just going to go 
through what [0.2] Hume [0.3] says [0.4] about these [1.2] these er [0.5] 
arguments [0.7] er [0.5] well no before i do that i mean i'll just say what the 
the the important principle is [0.3] and this [0.5] er [0.9] the the [0.2] the 
the basic [0.7] the thing that Hume is is very very keen that Hume has to 
establish [0.3] is that [0.4] complex impressions and ideas [0.4] there may be 
one without the other [0.4] but basically [0.2] at the level of simple 
impressions and simple ideas there is a one to one correspondence [0.3] between 
simple impressions 
and simple ideas [0.4] so if you've got a simple impression you've got a simple 
idea if you've got a simple idea [0.6] the second one is much more important if 
you've got a simple idea [0.3] you must have had that corresponding simple 
impression [0.7] right [0.5] why is that an important principle [0.5] well 
basically this is what empiricism is for Hume [0.6] so Hume's an empiricist he 
thinks all of our knowledge is derived from experience and the bottom line of 
this [0.5] is that [1.1] is this that what we might call a principle of 
significance [0.6] that [1.5] and this is this is famously [0.2] expressed in 
his i-, i-, in-, [0.3] Inquiry have i put this on my [0.7] handout [2.6] [0.5] 
no i haven't [0.3] ah [0.2] well okay [0.3] i mean [3.3] if we if if we have [0.
7] er [0.3] all our simple ideas [0.2] are derived from simple impressions 
which are correspondent to them and which they exactly represent [0.5] er [3.3] 
there it is it is on the handout it's the third bullet point [0.5] under the 
significance of Hume's distinction [0.6] er [2.2] if [0.9] Hume's concern that 
philosophers particularly scholastic philosophers 
people talking about things like substance [0.4] have no empirical foundation 
[0.6] are just talking rubbish [0.6] it's not just that they're sort of [0.4] 
putting forward [0.3] philosophical principles which we're not sure if they're 
true or not [0.6] his [0.3] basic [0.3] this this this [0.2] one to one 
correspondence between ideas and impressions [0.4] is intended to guarantee [0.
4] that [1.2] that [0.2] in order for a word or a phrase or or something that 
we talk about to be significant to be meaningful [1.1] there has it has to 
ultimately reduce down to impressions to things that we can have knowledge of 
[3.4] in the abstract from the Treatise [0.3] he [0.3] offers this sarcastic 
remark [1.0] so this is someone who's who's going through philosophical 
treatise he's looking [0.2] through trying to figure out what's going on [0.3] 
and i-, he says [0.5] when he [0.2] he being presumably Hume [0.7] when he 
suspects that any philosophical term [0.3] has no ideas annexed to it [0.4] as 
is too common [0.8] he always asks [0.4] from what impression [0.4] that 
pretended idea [0.3] is derived [0.5] and if no 
impression can be produced [0.6] he cont-, he concludes [0.5] that the term [0.
3] is altogether [0.4] insignificant [0.8] right [0.4] so [0.3] whenever [0.3] 
you're looking at a philosophical concept a philosophical idea [0.5] or [0.2] 
some [0.2] other [0.2] thing [0.2] that we might be talking about [0.5] we say 
[0.3] from what impression [0.2] is that idea derived [0.7] now if it's a 
complex idea [0.2] there may be a complex impression to which it corresponds [0.
4] so for example a complex idea of say [0.3] father [0.6] bears an impression 
[0.3] of a father so that's okay [0.5] but if we're talking about something 
like substance [0.6] right recall substance from [0.5] from Locke [0.5] from 
what impression is our idea of substance derived [2.4] well [0.3] maybe there's 
a complex idea of substance [1.4] no [0.3] can't find that [0.2] maybe we can 
break it down [0.4] into [0.4] simple [0.3] impressions which we've built up 
like with the case of the unicorn [0.5] right we have the a complex idea of a 
unicorn we've built that up from [0.4] simple ideas which are derived from 
simple impressions a simple idea of [0.8] well more simple ideas of the horse 
and the horn or 
whatever [0.5] with substance are there simple [0.4] ideas which correspond to 
impressions from which our [0.6] our idea of substance is derived [0.4] and 
Hume says [0.6] well no there aren't [0.3] what does that mean about the 
philosophical term substance [0.9] it means that this term is wholly 
insignificant [0.7] right it's not just that there isn't any substance [0.3] 
it's just that substance doesn't mean anything [1.8] right so [0.2] this term 
[0.3] is not just [0.8] doesn't apply to anything it's actually meaningless 
it's insignificant [0.6] so [0.4] this [0.6] distinction between impressions 
and ideas [0.6] guarantees Hume's empiricism it guarantees that [0.3] all the 
terms we use [0.4] at base [0.3] have to refer back to something [0.2] which 
we've [0.5] observed [1.3] 
and that's the important [0.9] i mean of course it also [0.3] er [0.3] allows 
Hume to say things like [0.5] he can he wants to be able to redu-, rene-, [0.3] 
refute [0.4] the principle of the arguments the doctrine of innate ideas [0.5] 
er [0.2] he thinks this will [0.3] this will offer a foundation for the science 
of man and so on and so forth [0.3] but the bottom line of this is [0.7] from 
what impression [0.3] is this pretended this supposed idea derived [0.6] and if 
[0.2] it isn't [0.3] derived from simple impressions at bottom line [0.3] then 
it's not really an idea it's not really something that [0.3] you can have [0.4] 
you may think you have an idea of substance [0.2] but really you don't it's not 
really an idea at all [1.9] that's the bottom line that's that's empiricism for 
Hume [1.5] so [0.4] whether or not you you [0.2] you like this 
which we're going to come back to in a second [0.4] this is this is a [0.3] a 
highly significant [0.7] doctrine that [0.2] at the bottom line there is a 
there's the one to one correspondence between simple ideas simple impressions 
[0.4] er [0.5] simple impressions are all derived simple ideas are all derived 
from simple impressions [0.5] and [0.2] you couldn't have a simple idea without 
an i-, simple impression [0.4] and we can build up more complex ideas from them 
but if you have an idea [0.3] you've got to either have an impression that 
directly corresponds to it [0.3] or you've got to be able to break it down into 
simple ideas which correspond to impressions [0.6] and then [0.4] and if you 
can't then it's it's not something that's significant or meaningful [2.2] right 
[0.8] 
sm0171: do you not get ideas in mathematics about any impressions [1.6] 
nf0157: mathematics Hume didn't like very much [0.5] he's things he says about 
mathematics are not really [0.2] very helpful [0.4] i mean [0.7] it's it's 
difficult for [0.2] empiricists to talk about [0.3] abstract objects in maths i 
mean [0.3] you know okay so i might have the idea of i don't know how 
many people are there in this room [0.8] twenty-something [0.2] whatever twenty-
three i might [0.3] do i have the idea of twenty-three [0.3] because i can see 
twenty-three things [0.8] or is twenty-three is the idea of twenty-three [0.4] 
sort of some much more abstract thing but if so how could i ever have an 
impression of it [0.9] i mean these are the kinds of questions that empiricists 
in in mathematics have to face [0.6] but [0.2] i mean [0.2] the i mean [0.2] i 
suppose one could sort of say that [0.7] most mathematics is built up from [0.
7] kinds of [0.3] basic principles to do with counting to do with systems of [1.
6] numbers of things [0.7] or or [0.4] properties of [0.7] numbers [0.6] 
whatever you [0.4] call them [1.5] and if you call them minus numbers then 
they're like positive numbers but with an extra operator on or something [2.2] 
so [0.2] so [0.4] i mean there's there's a big question there about how far you 
can get if you're an empiricist philosopher of maths but you can get quite a 
long way [2.5] but [0.2] by just breaking things down to numbers [0.3] which 
arguably you know [0.3] okay i see three people sitting 
here [0.4] so i have an [0.5] an impression of three [0.4] 
sm0171: is progress in science not [1.3] almost always from ideas [0.2] before 
we can have impressions [1.1] 
nf0157: but the point is not that there could be ideas of which we've not had 
impressions i mean Hume's quite happy that we have an idea of a unicorn for 
example 
sm0171: mm [0.5] 
nf0157: or of some huge scientific theory that we've postulated that's fine [0.
7] that's fine because we can break the unicorn down into simple ideas [0.3] 
which do correspond to impressions and the same with your theory 
sm0171: it's not simple is it [0.6] if if [0.3] if you think that if 
something's scientific [0.2] it's not like a simple idea is it 
nf0157: but we can break it down into simple ideas 
sm0171: mm 
nf0157: and those simple ideas must correspond to impressions 
sm0171: mm 
nf0157: because if they don't [0.2] i mean it's not just that [0.3] you know 
it's not just that they don't [0.6] they don't correspond to impressions it's 
that we can't have those thoughts [0.7] i mean if you take something like 
substance which which is one of the targets of of Hume's criticism here [0.4] i 
mean [0.2] remember what 
Locke said about substance he didn't think we had this clear idea of substance 
and we were just trying to sort of [0.4] figure out exactly what its properties 
were [0.3] we have a confused and and vague idea of substance right [0.4] and 
[0.2] Hume would say well the the reason that you have this confused and vague 
idea is is because it's not really an idea at all [1.5] 
sf0174: what is it [1.1] 
nf0157: well it's not anything [0.2] i mean it's just it's a mistake [1.3] i 
mean you think you've got you may think y-, do you think you ha-, i mean i 
don't know do [0.2] do you think you've got an idea of substance 
sf0174: yes [1.3] 
nf0157: u-huh 
sf0174: [0.5] 
nf0157: well [0.3] er [0.3] in that case you shouldn't have [0.2] i mean 
because [0.3] [laughter] the things i mean it's like [0.3] it's like having an 
idea of a round square [1.0] i mean have you got an idea of a round square you 
can try and sort of think well i've got some kind of idea of it's like of a 
round square [0.6] but 
sf0175: can you say that [0.4] can you just [0.6] an idea of [0.7] er [0.2] 
substance by abstraction [0.7] 
nf0157: right and thi-, and and Hume has a lot to say about [0.4] abstract 
ideas [0.2] 
i mean he th-, basically takes ra-, Berkeley's view on abstract ideas he thinks 
of ideas [0.4] as [0.6] you can't have [0.3] i mean remember Berkeley's 
criticism of Locke [0.3] the abstract general idea of a triangle would have to 
have [0.3] be both [0.2] be all three of equilateral isoceles and scalene 
that's not possible [0.6] and Hume follows that line he thinks abstract ideas 
are particulars [0.6] particular ideas [0.5] of which we notice certain things 
and so you couldn't have an idea of sub-, substance by abstraction [0.4] 
because [0.4] er [1.0] it would just be not consistent [1.0] so [0.3] you know 
the idea that [0.6] we think we've got of substance it's just not a possible 
idea it's like the idea of a round square 
sf0176: the idea so [1.0] how do we get well what do we get it from [0.6] if we 
have the idea i if the word appears in the language so [1.2] 
nf0157: well i mean i mean this is the thing that we can we can invent words 
for things [0.3] that are just [0.3] in i mean if you think of er say an an 
aetheist's account of God [0.2] they're going to say well God is a word sure [0.
3] but 
there isn't any such thing as God it's just something that people have decided 
to call but really it's not [0.6] it's not something that's [1.1] consistent or 
coherent or anything like that [0.6] so when you actually come down to say what 
is this you you shouldn't you don't have an idea of God [2.5] right okay [0.3] 
er [1.1] i just want to say two things about [0.9] Hume's distinction [1.8] er 
[6.8] i said i'd come back to this distinction now [1.0] first thing to say 
about this distinction is Hume wants to make this distinction he [0.3] it's 
important for his empiricism [0.3] that impressions are the things that we get 
through perception [0.6] or through [0.5] a perception in the sort of extended 
sense [0.3] that it includes emotions that it includes immediate [0.8] 
emotional feelings [0.5] but [0.3] he makes the distinction officially [0.3] in 
terms of forcefulness and liveliness [0.4] so [0.2] the impressions are the 
forceful perceptions and the ideas are the faint copies [1.0] now [0.7] does 
that seem [0.5] a good way [0.2] to make the distinction so forget about [0.2] 
can [0.2] if if we take the top one as 
the official [0.7] definition [0.3] does it correspond to [0.8] forceful ones 
are the ones you sense and the [0.4] less forceful ones are the ones you 
reflect on [4.4] so [0.3] could you sometimes reflect on something [0.4] that 
was more forceful than something you're seeing [4.2] yeah [0.3] yeah okay [1.3] 
exam-, can we [0.2] er can you think of an example 
sf0177: can it like if you perceive something that was [0.2] had a bit impact 
on you [0.3] 
nf0157: right 
sf0177: so you would [0.4] you would think about that [0.3] in [0.2] more [0.5] 
with more impact than if you just kind of [0.6] you know remembering some [0.2] 
old man crossing the road and you weren't really paying attention [0.2] 
nf0157: right [0.2] or even more [0.3] er if you were seeing an old man 
crossing the road and you weren't paying much attention i m-, 
sf0177: you were too busy thinking about this [0.2] 
nf0157: this 
sf0177: awful thing that had happened the other day 
nf0157: 
yeah er this [0.3] ho-, dreadful thing right okay [0.2] i mean this seems to be 
true [0.3] that sometimes the things that we think about or reflect about can 
be much more forceful [0.5] yeah namex [0.2] 
sf0178: doesn't she mean though that er [0.4] that's the idea and impression of 
of the same thing so like [0.4] it's say if you had a car crash 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
nf0157: okay so that [0.6] that er reflection when you're thinking about it in 
your mind [0.3] that might be more forceful than yeah see seeing an old [0.5] 
man but [0.2] would it be more forceful [0.2] than actually being in that car 
crash 
nf0157: right okay and i think that's a good point and i think that's where he 
he sort of gets his his terminology from [0.3] that when obviously when you 
have [0.3] your [0.2] idea of remembering the [0.2] the car crash later [0.2] 
it is only a faint copy of the original [0.3] impression [0.7] yeah that's 
certainly true because [0.3] the experience when you're right there is clearly 
more forceful [0.9] but unfortunately that's not going to do [0.2] i mean 
that's right but that's not going to do all the work that Hume wants it to do 
because [0.2] he can't [0.3] he can't make the he doesn't want to make the 
distinction between perceiving [0.4] and thinking [0.4] just in terms of [0.4] 
of what's going on out there [0.3] he needs to make this distinction 
introspectively [0.4] so it's no good to say well [0.2] impressions are the 
things where there is an external object [0.5] where it's actually happening 
now or whatever [0.4] and thinking and reflecting is when [0.3] the object's 
gone away [0.6] and you're just looking back on it [0.3] because that would 
just [0.3] that would just trivialize this distinction that would just be 
saying well [0.4] impressions are the things you perceive and ideas are the 
things you reflect on [0.4] but he wants to make the distinction between 
perceiving and thinking [0.3] by talking about impressions and ideas [0.5] so 
if he just defines it in that way he's not [0.5] he's he's not got a [0.5] 
basic distinction between perceiving and thinking [1.1] he wants to do it 
introspectively he wants to say you can just look into your mind [0.3] and 
distinguish between [0.4] impressions and ideas [0.6] right without referring 
to what's going on outside [0.4] and the problem is is that 
although in some cases like the one you mentioned [0.3] it will be quite 
obvious [0.3] at other times [0.3] there is other sort of [0.4] with [0.2] 
namex's example you know there are some very [0.5] faint and pathetic kind of 
impressions [0.3] and some very forceful lively exciting [0.4] ideas [0.6] and 
the distinction just doesn't seem to happen that way [1.1] 
sf0179: if [0.4] if you're when he says [0.3] if you perceive something [0.5] 
but it's not actually there [0.2] you you know we're not meant to be relying on 
the external thing but i thought perceiving was relying on the external thing 
[0.4] 
nf0157: right exactly i mean this is the problem that he wants to say that 
perception is when you have an impression [0.7] and thinking is when you have 
an idea [2.1] i mean he wants to make the distinction between perceiving and 
thinking in terms of forcefulness basically [0.6] and that just doesn't seem to 
quite work [1.3] i mean that that's the problem that's exactly the problem that 
it seems that you can have a forceful im-, a forceful idea [0.4] a forceful 
mental experience [0.3] even 
when there's nothing there [1.5] so it's just not true that the perceptions the 
real perceptions [0.3] are always more forceful [0.5] than the things you 
reflect on [1.7] and Hume in fact admits that i mean he says sometimes [0.5] 
you know our er our ideas our impressions of our ideas are very lively and our 
impressions are so low and faint that you can't really [0.2] distinguish them 
from my from [0.2] impressions [0.3] but generally we know what we mean [1.0] 
well okay [0.9] er [1.6] okay [3.7] how does [0.3] Hume [0.9] argue for this 
distinction how does he [0.4] rely [0.2] how does he [0.6] argue for the very 
very important principle which is [0.6] that [0.9] every simple idea must come 
from a simple impression because [0.4] this is the the touchstone of his 
empiricism this is the principle [0.3] on which he bases his criticisms of 
cause his criticisms of [0.4] personal identity right so his basic 
philosophical method is going to be saying that here's a philosophical term [0.
7] here it is like [0.2] like substance [1.0] where's the impression from which 
this [0.5] idea is derived [0.7] if we can't find one [0.6] 
then it's insignificant that is his big philosophical argument [0.7] and it 
relies on empiricism so it's pretty important for him to argue [0.4] for this 
principle that simple [0.3] ideas are derived from simple impressions [1.5] 
well [0.2] he gives us various arguments he he challenges anyone to produce a 
simple idea that's not derived from a s-, from a simple impression [0.4] he 
says [0.2] you know if you want he gives a sort of [0.6] earlier version of the 
Mary example if you want to teach a child [0.3] what red is [0.5] do you try 
and [0.2] explain it to them no you don't you show them red [0.4] so [0.2] for 
with children they get the impression and then they have the idea [0.3] that's 
the order it goes in [0.6] and [0.2] he gives the example of a a blind man so 
that was [0.3] Erika's example a deaf person he said look a blind man [0.3] can 
form no idea of colours [0.5] er [0.4] a deaf person [0.2] will have no idea of 
sounds [0.7] er someone who's never tasted a pineapple [1.0] doesn't know what 
a pineapple tastes like they have no idea of the taste of pineapple [1.2] okay 
[0.2] so that's his argument [0.6] er [1.0] 
unfortunately [0.2] he then offers a very famous counter-example to his own 
argument [0.6] which is a bit of a [0.5] a strange thing to do [0.7] er and 
this is the example of the missing colour shade so i'm just going to talk about 
that for two minutes and then we'll stop [0.8] er [0.4] and this this example 
of Hume's [0.2] is [1.8] let's just imagine that we have [0.2] a man [0.4] 
who's facing a sort of a series of colours so [0.3] we start with say we s-, 
with blue say we start with dark blue [0.3] and we move along the colour series 
to light blue [0.3] one into the other [0.3] but in the middle there's a gap [0.
9] and the the the [0.7] gap [0.2] corresponds to a shade [0.8] yeah so 
everyone got the picture so you've got dark going to light [0.3] and there's a 
gap where [0.2] one of the shades would be [0.3] and as it happens that shade 
[0.3] is not a shade [0.3] that the person [0.2] who's looking at the colour 
series [0.2] has ever seen before [0.5] so he hasn't had an impression [0.4] of 
that missing colour shade [1.0] and Hume says [1.0] can the man form [0.2] an 
idea [0.7] of [0.2] the missing colour shade [0.9] from the series presented to 
him [2.6] 
what do you reckon can he who thinks he can [0.3] [sniff] [0.2] right [0.6] who 
anyone think he can't [1.6] right okay so so [0.5] Hume says yes it does seem 
plausible to think that he can in fact form an idea of the missing colour shade 
[0.3] when he's had no impression of this [0.5] and what he says about this 
example is [1.0] what's he say about this example [0.6] er [1.6] he says [0.2] 
is it possible for him to supply this deficiency [0.2] and raise up to himself 
the idea of that particular shade [0.3] though it had never been conveyed to 
him by the senses [0.4] i believe there are few that will be of the opinion 
that he can [0.3] as has been empirically demonstrated in this class [0.6] and 
this may serve as a proof that the simple ideas are not always derived from 
correspondent impressions [0.8] though the instance is so particular and 
singular [0.3] that 'tis scare worth our observing and does not merit that for 
it alone we should alter our general maxim [0.8] so that's not very [0.3] good 
really [0.4] and then there's an enormous literature of 
course in the Hume literature saying well why did Hume do this [0.5] why having 
proposed this general theory which is so important to him [0.3] does he then 
offer us [0.3] this counter-example [0.4] and of course if you well [0.2] you 
can go away and read this for yourselves [0.4] er [0.7] okay [1.1] what do you 
reckon [1.4] so [0.5] let me remind you by the way that about [0.3] twenty 
minutes ago [0.3] y-, you you seemed [0.4] maybe to be [0.5] going for this 
principle that we can't have a simple idea without a simple impression [0.2] 
yeah namex 
sf0180: i don't think it's quite the same because [0.6] it's not [0.6] it's the 
whole thing about not being able to have a simple idea [0.2] 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
sf0180: without the simple impression [0.4] but i think if you [0.3] say with 
the example of the shades of blue [0.2] 
nf0157: yeah 
sf0180: you've given them sort of ninety per cent of the idea [0.5] 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
sf0180: and they've got to fill in from that so say somebody who never ever 
seen red at all [0.4] if you gave them the whole spectrum of red with a bit 
missing [0.3] 
nf0157: yeah 
sf0180: they will be able to fill that in 
just by sort of [0.6] you know [0.5] working it out from what's there [0.2] 
nf0157: right 
sf0180: you're not asking them to create anything from nothing 
nf0157: right 
sf0180: if you've given them so much to work from 
nf0157: right and i mean act-, actually that's that's very interesting because 
that is [0.3] basically the line that er Harold Noonan takes and i was going to 
say i didn't bring with me though [0.4] that you know those Routledge blue and 
green books like there's the one on Locke by E J Lowe and there's the Hume one 
by [0.3] guy called Noonan and that's very good and that's [0.2] pretty much 
the line he takes [0.4] but [0.7] i mean there are there are various things i 
mean that seems to imply that maybe [0.2] colour shades are not simple ideas [0.
6] that [0.2] we can sort of derive them from putting together other things [1.
0] the [0.4] the [0.3] i suppose 
the one problem with that is that Hume [0.4] did think that colour shades were 
simple ideas [0.3] it doesn't really explain why [0.3] he offered this as a 
counter-example and then [0.7] er changed his mind [0.2] 
sf0181: maybe he didn't know how light worked though because [0.2] i guess you 
could 
nf0157: mm-hmm 
sf0181: put it in a scientific sense 'cause [0.2] 
nf0157: yeah 
sf0181: you know [0.2] different [0.7] pure shades of light [0.3] 
nf0157: yeah they're they're different they're different wavelengths and and 
then we can [0.2] yeah [0.3] i mean [0.8] sure and maybe that's just maybe 
that's just er [0.6] a an unfortunate fact about [0.2] Hume's empiricism but of 
course you've got then got to think well how far does this apply to any kind of 
sense data theory about about [0.8] 
perception about what objects are [0.4] er okay [0.2] final thought i mean one 
thing [0.8] does this undermine Hume [0.4] because if it does we might as well 
stop here [0.3] and i mean i think the interesting thing is that one can tell 
various stories about why this might not undermine Hume [0.4] but i think the 
bottom line is that [0.3] this principle for Hume is very important [0.4] and 
he will go on to apply it in various areas [0.3] and this particular counter-
example doesn't really seem to undermine [0.3] his ef-, efforts to apply this 
principle in other areas [0.3] so particularly in the idea of causation [0.3] 
the idea of personal identity [0.3] that seems to be quite a different kind of 
principle [1.2] okay [0.3] so [0.5] next week belief