nm0146: okay before we start [0.3] er [0.9] brief announcement which is this [0.
2] er advertising [0.6] er [0.3] Philosophy Society weekend [0.2] away [1.3] 
that's not quite right is it [1.0] a philosophy weekend away day [1.8] still 
not right never mind [0.6] er [1.1] right [0.2] er you may or may not have know 
about this but every year we have a weekend away in Wantage [0.6] er it's in 
the sort of [0.8] er [0.2] Oxfordshire [0.4] countryside [0.8] er [1.1] and [1.
2] right there'll be three presentations by students and i think you're let off 
some essay if you do this [0.8] er [1.3] but we already have do we already have 
papers [1.9] don't know [0.4] but anyway [0.3] there's three there's er three 
presentations [0.8] er [0.5] and a discussion of those [0.2] on the the topic 
for this year is er personal identity [1.6] er [0.7] and then there's er a long 
walk along this very nice countryside [0.6] and [0.6] some modest drinking [0.
7] which gets a bit [0.6] immodest towards [0.6] late Friday evening [1.5] er 
[0.4] so that's all good fun er [0.3] if anybody's interested [0.8] er some 
leaflets up here [0.4] namex's organizing it [1.0] so further details can be 
got from her [0.8] and i'll [0.4] leave these with the handouts at the 
end of the lecture [1.4] okay so any questions on that just yet [0.2] er it's 
in June [0.9] the twenty-second to the twenty-third [1.3] any queries [1.1] 
going [2.0] okay [13.5] [2.8] okay last week let me just close the door [5.2] 
okay last week er [0.5] i laid out [0.9] various attempts to defend Kant's 
claim [0.6] that the only morally good motive [0.8] is the motive of duty it's 
the positive claim [0.8] er and also to defend the negative claim that no [0.6] 
motive of inclination can have any moral worth [1.1] and we saw that there were 
problems with [0.6] all of those arguments although [0.8] one came out better 
than the others [1.0] just had an unfortunate [0.7] er [0.5] implication which 
Kant wouldn't want to accept [0.5] i don't want to go carry on [0.7] trying to 
justify [0.9] Kant's claims [0.8] rather what i want to do now is assume [0.7] 
that some sort of a case has been made [1.5] and deal with some objections that 
are raised [0.8] against this conception [0.9] of what it is to be a morally 
good person or what it is [0.4] for an action to be a morally good action [2.0] 
right there's a number of [0.6] sort of worries 
that people have [1.0] which can be found expressed in writers like Bernard 
Williams who i'll come onto later [1.4] and er Michael Stocker [1.3] who i'll 
also cover later [1.9] er [1.3] first of all a couple of preliminaries [1.9] 
right [0.3] a morally good action for Kant is one that's done solely from duty 
[1.5] er [1.7] now one question one might ask is if you're acting [0.9] solely 
from duty if you're helping somebody just from [0.5] a sense of duty [1.8] and 
then whenever you ought to help them you only ever help them from a sense of 
duty [0.6] does this mean that you don't really care about them [1.5] a sort of 
worry here is [0.8] that er [1.4] the very notion of duty [1.0] suggests [0.2] 
or implies conversationally at least [0.7] the idea [0.2] that you don't really 
want to do it [0.9] right if you do some action out of duty that kind of 
suggests [0.5] that you don't want to do it [2.6] right so you might feel [1.1] 
yeah you might want to go and visit [0.8] your elderly grandfather [1.7] and do 
so quite happily [1.0] then you think about the cases where you do it from duty 
from a sense of duty [0.2] go and visit your 
elderly grandfather [0.7] well those'd be the cases where you don't really want 
to do it but you know you think oh i really should this er [0.8] up off you go 
and [0.2] go and get the visit out of the way [3.7] well does someone [1.3] do-,
does the con-, very concept of duty and acting from duty imply [0.6] that 
people really don't want to do what it is they ought to do [0.5] and hence 
don't care about [0.7] you know the cons-, er [0.7] the needs of others or 
other people in particular [0.9] that's one wo-, worry [0.2] one might have [0.
4] i don't know what do you think i mean given [0.6] what you know about or 
what i said last week about [0.9] what it is to act from duty [1.5] do you 
think that if you do act from duty [0.6] that suggests that you can't [1.1] 
really want to do what [0.2] you ought to do [0.2] and hence you can't care 
about [0.5] say the needs of the other person or the other person [6.5] well 
what is it to act from duty [1.9] anybody [0.3] what are you what are you [0.7] 
what is it to act from duty [8.0] 
sf0147: is it when [0.2] duty is the [0.4] the solely [1.1] is the only er [0.
3] motivation for it [0.8] 
nm0146: er [0.6] that that that's true but er [0.4] is there another way of 
expressing the thought that your motive is duty [1.0] you know that you're 
acting solely from duty [5.5] which make [0.2] you know well what i'm looking 
for is another way of expressing that sort of motivational structure [0.7] 
which doesn't carry with it the sort of negative connotations that duty does [1.
3] duty n-, it sounds sort of burdensome [0.5] yeah like a nuisance you talk 
about the sort of duties one has in a certain job [0.7] and the sort of [0.2] 
always the implication is that this is rather burdensome [0.5] something that 
[0.8] er you may take on but it only because it's part of your job or [0.5] you 
know [0.2] 'cause morality requires it [0.8] so what we're looking for is some 
sort of construal of duty [0.7] acting from duty which doesn't carry [0.9] 
those negative connotations with it [1.9] 
sf0148: er perhaps instinct [1.3] 
nm0146: er 
sf0148: rather than them actually thinking about it [1.1] 
nm0146: yeah [0.8] well should [0.4] yeah the notion of should i mean it s-, it 
captures the same sort of [0.9] er feelers' er duty [0.7] but already it's 
starting to lose some of its [0.6] 
negative connotrations [0.3] connotations doesn't sound quite so contractual [0.
9] you know duty sounds very contractual [0.7] sounds like the sort of things 
that [0.8] you know you're bound by some sort of contract to do [0.2] they're 
your duties [0.5] your duties as [0.9] a lecturer or whatever [0.3] 
sm0149: can we know that the that the word duty was used in the same way the 
same context as it is today [0.3] than [0.5] than when [0.3] say Kant was 
writing [0.4] 
nm0146: right [0.3] er well i can't tell you the answer to that as a ju-, sort 
of general thesis er [0.5] about sort of nineteenth s-, or eighteenth century 
Prussia [1.1] but it is true that Kant didn't for Kant it didn't have [0.6] 
this implication so it was a good one point to make [0.9] but the notion of 
duty [1.0] as Kant understood it [0.7] didn't carry these negative connotations 
[0.8] it didn't as we saw [0.5] i mean i quoted something e-, er from Kant [0.
3] er it was either last lecture or the lecture before [1.0] where he says that 
actually if you're unhappy in the performance of your duty [0.5] that rather 
casts doubt on your virtue [1.3] 
you know [0.7] so acting from duty from him mean a virtuous person is one who 
acts from duty [0.8] clearly if that's right then somebody who acts from duty 
[0.8] er [1.4] mean the concept of duty as it's being used there can't carry 
these negative connotations of disinclination [0.6] or burdensomeness [0.6] and 
it certainly didn't have that connotation for Kant [1.3] right [1.0] so if you 
can't shed those modern [0.4] connotations those negative connotations [0.5] 
then use some other concept [0.6] right don't talk about acting from duty [0.4] 
but talk about [0.2] say doing the right thing just because it's right [1.3] 
and rightness doesn't carry those strong negative connotations that duty does 
even though [0.6] these concepts [0.5] are close to being synonyms [0.8] 
sm0150: did Kant was your best possible will [0.5] 
nm0146: your best possible what 
sm0150: yes the best possible will i mean good will [0.9] 
nm0146: well this is what it is to have a good will is to be disposed to act 
from duty [0.2] 
sm0150: is that about duty [0.4] what is duty [0.6] [1.0] under your eyes under 
in the circumstances you don't know what your best possible will is [0.3] 
nm0146: er i don't i don't think you have to have thoughts about your will when 
you act from duty you've got to have thoughts about what you 
should do 
sm0150: so d-, [0.5] i thought Kant said it was [0.2] [0.5] good will 
nm0146: no it's the other way round a good will is one that acts from duty [0.
2] acting from duty is not acting with explicit thoughts [0.4] about what a 
good per-, willed person would do [0.2] 
sm0150: yes [0.5] 
nm0146: er [0.5] you know it's just to do the right thing because it's the 
right thing to do [2.4] okay so that's one word of warning just a preliminary 
[0.7] point [0.9] er [0.3] what makes it seem as though you can't really care 
about others when you act from duty [0.7] is the idea that ac-, er duty carries 
with it [0.6] that what you're doing is in some way burdensome [0.7] yeah [0.2] 
or a nuisance [1.0] or the implication you don't really want to do it [1.5] and 
if that were true if that implication were true [0.7] er then whenever you help 
somebody from duty it couldn't be because you cared about them [1.4] right 
'cause the duty would carry with it that negative connotation which meant you 
didn't really [0.5] but you've got to do it anyway [1.5] right [0.3] it doesn't 
have that negative connotation for Kant [1.0] so don't let [0.3] this the sort 
of the those modern [0.2] 
connotations [0.5] influence the way in which you understand this notion [2.3] 
another worry some people have is a worry about spontaneity [4.3] think 
somebody who always acts from duty will lack a certain spontaneity [2.1] do you 
think [0.3] you know [0.6] every situation they come to they got to think mm [0.
5] right now what should i do here on the one hand i've got these 
considerations [0.4] weighing in favour of this action mm not sure i want to do 
that [0.4] and then all things considered well perhaps i should do that and 
eventually you get round to doing something [1.0] right [2.6] 
and if you're concerned about the morality of your action [2.7] does this mean 
that your actions will lack a certain spontaneity [0.5] 'cause you'll always be 
worrying about whether you're going to be doing the right thing or not [0.9] mm 
[9.5] well [0.2] any thoughts [0.4] got a fifty per cent chance of getting this 
right [1.9] 
sm0150: some action which seem to attract more worth can be and spontaneous [0.
4] like the man who jumps on the hand grenade to save his comrades [0.2] it's a 
spontaneous act [0.5] 
nm0146: right [0.2] but does it s-, been suppose he 
did that from a sense of duty [0.2] t-, th-, [0.2] would that prevent its being 
spon-, 
sm0150: well no i think it does i think he does it 
nm0146: i know but the point is not whether he does or not it's point is 
whether [0.2] if he did whether that would [0.6] stop him from spontaneously 
reacting in that way when he first of all got to think well [0.4] you know [0.
4] is it really what i should do leap on i mean on the one hand i'm going to 
save those other people other pe-, i'm going to be scattered all over 
sm0150: 
nm0146: [laughter] [0.3] is this really what morality requires of me perhaps 
i'll try and persuade him to jump on it [0.4] you know and then get the same 
effect but i end up in one piece 
sm0150: but we can have s-, have spontaneous acts don't know whether that's 
another thing [0.2] 
nm0146: yeah sure sure nobody's arguing that we don't have spontaneous acts the 
question is [0.3] if you're motivating the way that Kant thinks is a good way 
to be motivated [0.7] could your actions still be spontaneous [0.2] 
sm0150: no [0.9] 
nm0146: why not [2.9] actually i was fibbing when i said you 
had a fifty-fifty chance as soon as you gave me an answer i was going to ask 
you why [laughter] [0.9] yeah [0.3] 
sm0151: yeah i think you c-, er can be so closely and [0.2] act not directly 
from the motive of duty just [0.3] [0.4] this maxim [0.3] is derived from [0.4] 
therefore [0.2] felt a general maxim to act in certain circumstances [0.2] in a 
certain way [0.3] you can act [0.2] could act spontaneously like that 
nm0146: yeah i'm not sure that [0.2] really i mean that all of that's right [0.
5] i'm not sure if it helps because in many situations [0.3] more than one of 
your principles is going to be appli-, [0.2] er going to be applicable [0.7] er 
[0.9] so you've still got er instead of weighing up particular considerations 
[0.5] you're going to be weighing up which principles over wh-, override which 
other principles [0.4] 'cause it you know might be that you can only help 
somebody by breaking a promise [0.3] and you got a prin-, er er [0.8] a 
principle [0.2] of promise keeping and a pro-, a principle of benevolence [0.5] 
well which one are you going to act you can't act wi-, in accordance with both 
of them [0.5] so you then got to think well which one overrides the other [1.3] 
so i'm not sure that that helps [1.7] i mean one thing one might [0.2] i mean i 
don't think he [0.2] that someone who acts from duty does lack spontaneity or 
need lack spontaneity [0.7] er [2.0] the thought [0.7] 
that they do is [0.2] driven by the idea that [0.6] in order to decide whether 
what you're doing is permissible [0.5] you've got to make various complex 
judgements [0.8] and typically that will take time [1.6] er [0.9] but if you 
think about other areas of our lives where we're constantly having to make very 
complex judgements [1.4] er but have no problem [0.2] acting spontaneously [0.
2] on the basis of those judgements [1.1] er [0.5] we can see that there's no 
conflict here [0.7] and what i'm thinking of is [0.4] you know driving a car [0.
3] right [1.4] right [0.2] when you're driving in a car [0.8] you're making 
hundreds [0.6] of [0.6] judgements about how you should sort of respond you 
know and whether so and so's going to pull out on you whether [0.5] some 
pedestrian might run out whether there's a dog up there not on the lead whether 
he's going to pull out whether the person's braking in front of you how hard 
you should brake [0.7] you know [0.2] traffic coming at you from all directions 
[0.4] traffic lights signs all these things you've got to make judgements [0.5] 
all various very complex judgements about [0.9] er and 
you've got to re-, react very quickly [1.5] right so it's a complex business 
any of you er who's learning to drive at the moment [1.0] anybody here learning 
to drive [1.2] guess you're already drivers [1.2] anybody who's learning to 
drive know how horrible it is [1.0] er [0.5] so when you start out you got to 
think explicitly about these things [0.4] and of course you can't react very 
quickly because you're [0.7] you know you're having to think about everything 
[0.5] you know in a very mechanical way [1.0] but the point is that the better 
you are you become at this the more skilled you become at driving [1.1] the 
more internalized [0.5] these judgements are the more spontaneous they are 
you're still making those very complex judgements [0.4] but it's kind of like 
second nature to you [1.2] it only slows you down [0.2] it only means that you 
can lack spontaneity [0.5] when you're a sort of novice [1.5] but the more 
skilled you are at driving [0.2] the quicker you internalize [0.3] those 
judgements [0.6] er they're still going on they're still being made [1.0] but 
when 
you see somebody's brake lights come on in front of you you've not got to think 
to yourself [0.5] er ah you know is he braking or has he just turned his lights 
on [0.3] ah hang on if he's [0.4] both lights go on i've got to push this 
middle pedal down [0.4] you know if you had all those thoughts you already hit 
him [0.6] before you do anything [0.8] er you just react straight away [0.8] 
but all of those judgements are going on all those complex judgements are going 
on [2.9] now i see no reason why it couldn't be just like that in the moral 
case [0.7] when you're a moral novice [1.1] right er right [0.2] you got your 
[0.3] moral L-plates on [0.9] right and you're struggling away you think oh 
well this consideration pulls me that way and that consideration [0.5] and er 
[0.3] you know this this this this and er okay i think i should do that [1.2] 
right when you're having mechanically to go through some process of [0.5] moral 
deliberation in that way [0.6] then sure [0.4] as a moral novice [0.3] you're 
going to your action's going to lack spontaneity [0.3] just like [0.5] the 
reactions of a learner driver are 
going to be very slow [0.5] because of the complex [0.2] judgements that have 
to be gone through in a very mechanical way [1.6] we're just like the driver 
who eventually masters [0.4] these skills [1.8] can react spontaneously once 
they're mastered [0.6] so in the moral case [0.5] once you actually [0.5] you 
know [0.4] come good at making these sorts of judgements [1.0] or at least 
think you are [1.3] then you can make [0.3] very there's nothing to stop you [0.
5] er responding very [0.2] spontaneously [0.5] even though your actions are 
informed by these very complex judgements [2.0] er [0.4] 
sm0152: er sometimes though er [0.4] w-, [0.2] it's easy to decide what you 
want to do when you're in a car 'cause if you're going to hit something you 
know you want to stop and you don't want to run into it whereas if you're 
making a moral decision [0.3] it [0.3] sometimes you might er [0.2] you know it 
might be difficult to choose what you want to do [0.3] 
nm0146: oh yeah sure i mean this is not to say i mean sometimes in a car [0.4] 
ma-, how skilled you are [0.7] you might not be sure what to do 'cause or it's 
an 
unusual situation [0.9] er so you may not be sure what the best thing to do [0.
6] the what the way you'll react in a car is not just 'cause you don't want to 
kill yourself yeah [0.4] if you wanted to then you ought not to drive in this i-
, you might drive in some completely different way [1.0] er [1.0] yeah you just 
sort of [1.1] th-, it's a s-, just the idea that i mean it do-, doesn't depend 
upon that the sort of judgements that are made [0.7] are judgements about you 
know just what's going on around you and your own desires and preferences don't 
really come into it apart from you know [0.3] your desire to get somewhere or 
other [1.6] and of course in many moral situations where they're complex [0.6] 
you really have to stop and think about it but then [0.2] clearly [0.6] you 
know it'd be inappropriate to try and make a snap judgement [1.3] the real 
worry is is not that [0.2] somebody who acts from duty [0.7] is [0.5] never [0.
2] spontaneous [1.3] sorry the criticism is that they're never spontaneous not 
that they must always be spontaneous [1.2] er [0.9] but they'd lack a certain 
[0.2] 
sort of [0.6] immediacy in their responses [0.7] and that would be a bit 
peculiar if we were like that [1.3] er [0.4] well once you think about what it 
is to master other skills and master other complex judgements in other areas [1.
3] you realize that it only slows you down [0.6] when you're a novice once you 
get good at it you can make snap decisions [0.3] and that there's no reason to 
think why that just couldn't be the case [0.6] in morality [0.5] actually 
morality is no more complex seems to me than driving a car [2.0] 
sm0153: when you're driving a car [0.3] you're try-, trained to make a reaction 
certain stimulations [0.9] [0.4] 
nm0146: well it's not just stimulus-reflex 
sm0153: 
nm0146: i mean there's all sorts of judgements going on [0.7] 
sm0153: i mean [0.2] child in the road [0.3] you don't think do you [0.3] 
because you've been trained child 
nm0146: yeah i know but if you're a novice you'll be thinking oh right er child 
right [0.3] clutch down [0.6] brake hard splat [0.2] [laughter] 
sm0153: 
nm0146: dead child [laughter] [0.5] yes [laughter] 
sm0153: 
nm0146: yeah but the thing is you're 
making snap judgements they're not just i-, it's not like [0.2] tapping your 
knee [0.4] and the foot [0.2] sticks out [0.7] it's just that you know you're 
not you don't go through those judgements [0.3] you know and your reason 
doesn't go through some slow mechanical process [0.8] er [0.5] 
sm0153: but i told you the prior training was there 
nm0146: well that's right 
sm0153: yes 
nm0146: but there's no reason why moral training couldn't be just like that 
sm0153: of duty [0.7] 
nm0146: well as i say there's no reason why moral training coul-, you know er 
[0.4] if you're going to say that it there's something very different then you 
have to point out what the differences are [0.5] why [0.4] being trained to [0.
6] to drive a car works [0.5] but being trained to be a sort of moral agent 
must always fail so you always got to have your L-plates on [2.2] okay [0.2] 
don't want to labour this point so i'm going to move on [2.4] the rule cri-, so 
there's a couple of preliminary points a worry about [1.2] er [0.7] you know a 
sort of lack of concern for others [0.4] and a lack of spontaneity [0.6] i 
think they should they should be quickly put aside 
really 'cause they're not the main worries [1.0] er [0.3] with the notion of 
acting from duty [1.2] the main worry that comes from this has been put forward 
by [0.8] Michael Stocker [0.9] and Bernard Williams [4.5] i'll start with 
Michael Stocker and it's the the worry that [0.6] the motive of duty's in some 
way alienating [2.0] okay so this is what i'm going to focus on in the rest 
rest of the lecture [1.4] er i'll just give you a quote [1.2] er [1.3] as to 
why Michael Stocker thinks that acting from duty [1.4] might be [0.3] er 
alienating [0.9] what he thinks it might alienate you from is your friends and 
loved ones [1.1] right so the worry here is that morality as Kant conceives it 
[0.5] seems to stop you entering fully into relations of friendship [0.5] and 
love [0.2] I-E these valuable but non-moral relationships [1.3] and he gives 
the example of a guy who's hospitalized [0.9] and his [0.3] well he somebody he 
thinks is his friend Smith [0.2] they're always Smith [1.1] er comes and visits 
him [1.2] right so i'll just quote from Stocker here [1.1] right you're very 
bored and restless and at loose ends [0.4] 
when Smith comes in once again [0.9] you're now convinced more than ever that 
he's a fine fellow and a real friend [0.3] taking so much time to cheer you up 
[0.5] travelling all the way across town [0.2] and so on [1.6] you're so 
effusive with your praise and thanks he protests he always tries to do what he 
thinks is his duty [0.6] what he thinks will be best [0.9] you at first thinks 
he [0.2] think [0.2] he's engaging [0.4] in a polite form of self-deprecation 
[0.6] relieving a moral burden [1.1] but the more you two speak [0.4] the more 
clear it becomes [0.3] he was telling the literal truth [0.8] but it's not 
essentially because of you that he came to see you [0.5] not because you're 
friends [0.4] but because it was his duty [0.2] perhaps as a fellow Christian 
or Communist or whatever [0.7] or simply because he knows of no one a-, more in 
need of cheering up [0.7] and no one easier to cheer up [1.8] unquote [0.6] 
that's from Michael Stocker [0.7] The Schizophrenia of model [0.2] Modern 
Ethical Theories [1.7] right so you imagine somebody who thinks [0.5] doing 
something [0.6] out of friendship [1.2] and you 
discover that he's not actually doing it out of friendship he's just saying 
well look you know [0.7] this is what i think i ought to do and i really strive 
to do what i ought to do [0.7] er it just happens [0.4] that visiting you in 
hospital [0.9] is something i think morality requires and it's because of that 
that i'm coming to visit you [3.0] not because you're my friend [0.6] or 
because i'm worried about you [1.9] right but because [0.6] morality requires 
this of me [2.5] 
right [0.2] now if you [1.1] i mean if Kant's account of moral worth meant that 
you got to be like this person like Smith [3.8] then it does seem as though 
you're not going to be able to at least fully engage [0.7] with non-moral 
relations of friendship and love [1.4] loving relations 'cause morality [0.5] 
you know you'll be always be doing things for the wrong reasons [1.9] you'll be 
doing it because morality requires you to [0.7] not because you know [0.4] this 
person's your mate [0.5] and he's bored [2.1] er 
sm0154: er i don't know just surely [0.7] in [0.5] er maybe he's deciding that 
morality i don't know your it's your duty to go see this person [0.2] you still 
have to choose which person you're going to see and you choose that person 
because he's your friend [0.8] 
nm0146: er [0.5] 
sm0154: as as opposed to 
nm0146: yes 
sm0154: the person lying next to him that you don't know [0.5] 
nm0146: yeah [0.7] yes but suppose 
er [1.0] you did it not because he's your friend but because you feel you ought 
ought [0.2] you know morally r-, morality requires you [0.7] to help someone [0.
5] and you might yeah it's much easier to you know to help your friends than it 
is some stranger who doesn't know you [0.6] you know going to cheer him up much 
more you know [0.3] er [0.4] than if i impose myself myself on some stranger [0.
7] okay [0.4] who may not like me [1.6] er [1.0] er [0.4] yeah some of the 
example-, i mean [0.2] part of the quote says that er [0.6] you know he chooses 
to go and visit [0.6] you know his friend [0.3] not 'cause he's his friend but 
because he's a fellow Christian or a fellow Communist [0.4] or something like 
that [0.7] not because he's in [0.2] er [0.3] his friend [1.0] but it may be 
because he's his friend he knows that he needs cheering up [0.4] and he's very 
easy to cheer up [0.8] so you go for something you're pretty sure is going to 
work [1.2] but that seems [0.9] to be the wrong sort of reason to go and visit 
your friend in hospital [6.5] right so i'm just sort of [1.0] but i think 
you're right that there's something 
fishy about this [0.7] and it stems partly from the first point i raised at the 
beginning of the lecture [0.9] that it's making it look as if you're concerned 
with the morality of your action [0.5] that will sort of take over and push out 
all other concerns [0.9] but that's just the worry that Stocker's [0.2] has [1.
0] thinks it's sort of [1.5] er [0.9] has this [1.0] sort of dominating [0.9] 
influence that once morality as Kant conceives of it [0.5] gets in on the 
picture all other values are going to be pushed out [7.8] right now the [0.5] 
the way to respond to this er and i here follow [0.2] er Marcia Baron [1.6] er 
[0.5] on this i mean all of the reading for this is in the er [0.3] the reading 
list for the [0.5] the lecture on the course handout [1.5] the way to deal with 
this is actually to locate what it is that's disturbing about this particular 
case [2.3] and once you've located where it is what you want to do is [0.5] you 
know [1.1] if the le-, if you find in locating what's disturbing about this [0.
5] it turns out that what's disturbing is his motivation Smith's motivation [1.
2] then [2.1] 
you know that will cast doubt on Kant's picture of [0.2] a morally good person 
[1.1] but if it turns out to be somewhere else [0.7] then it may not be that 
he's acting in this way [0.6] 'cause he's a Kantian good-willed individual [0.
9] may just be because he's insensitive cold [0.5] or something else but that's 
not Kant's fault [2.0] right [1.1] and the two things that Marcia Baron locates 
[0.5] is wrong with him his A his b-, [0.2] er his behaviour [1.1] right the 
fact that he's so cold and uncaring he must realize that saying [0.3] well i 
i'm not coming here to see you because i care about you [0.5] i'm coming here 
just because i feel morally required to [0.5] he must realize that's going to 
upset his friend [laughter] [0.4] or if he doesn't then he's er [0.7] he's 
suffering from some other vice namely complete and [0.3] sort of [0.9] er [0.3] 
complete [0.7] er insensitivity [1.2] to others even [0.2] even [0.2] er [0.5] 
people who seem to be his close friends [2.6] what's wrong with [0.3] what he 
do-, er [0.4] with this situation [0.7] is his actual behaviour [0.4] his 
coldness his insensitivity [0.8] his thoughtlessness [2.3] okay [0.4] but [0.5] 
this 
is focusing on [0.2] the way the things he says [0.5] and [0.4] his 
thoughtlessness [0.8] and his insensitivity [0.6] and none of those things are 
focusing on motivation [1.5] i mean if [0.9] i mean morali-, if his motivation 
is a concern for the morality of his actions [1.7] it'd be very peculiar if he 
thought that morality required him [0.7] to be cold [0.2] insensitive [0.7] 
indifferent [1.7] er distant [0.7] and all of these other things [1.9] surely 
he doesn't think that [1.6] so in acting in this co-, even if he does have no 
feelings for his friend at all [0.6] it seems that morality would require him 
not to show that [0.8] right you don't wear a great big placard saying i don't 
really care about you but [0.5] you know i've got to come so here i am [0.5] 
trying to cheer you up [3.8] right so that the first thing that we locate is a-,
what he actually [0.7] does and says [0.8] and certain [0.3] vices that these 
[0.3] his actions [0.6] er [0.4] express [1.0] it doesn't seem to cast [0.2] er 
for come to focus [0.3] on the motive of duty [0.2] the motive of duty's just 
doing [0.8] the right thing because you think it's right [0.7] but morality in 
no way 
requires him to be cold and indifferent [0.8] in this very peculiar way [2.6] 
another thing that's disturbing here [0.6] is his lack of genuine concern for 
his friend [1.4] there's well i'm not coming here because i care about you i'm 
coming here just because [0.6] morality requires me to come here [0.9] er [0.4] 
and i know that you're a bit miserable [0.6] and are pretty easy to cheer up so 
here i am [0.2] trying to cheer you up [3.4] there's nothing as i said at the 
beginning there's nothing about [0.4] duty as such or the thought [0.3] or a 
concern for the morality of one's action [0.8] the means w-, that one must lack 
a genuine concern [1.3] for other people or for one's friends or for one's 
loved ones [2.6] mm [0.7] now since the motive of duty doesn't make Smith act 
as he does in fact [0.5] the motive of duty should make him act in quite a 
different way [1.1] even if he doesn't care about his friend especially if he 
doesn't care about his friend [2.3] and since it's not responsible that sort of 
motivation is not responsible [0.7] for the apparent lack of concern he has for 
his friend [1.3] 
it's not clear [0.6] that the call although this is a very disturbing case it's 
one where [0.6] you know you won't if that's what a friend is you don't want 
friends like that [2.0] er [0.4] the problem is not located in his motivation 
[0.9] it's located elsewhere [2.7] er [0.5] does anybody want to come back on 
that [1.3] yeah [0.3] 
sm0155: what if his er [0.6] morality [0.7] er said that he couldn't lie [0.6] 
and so he wouldn't be [0.6] untruthful when his friend so thankful and like [0.
2] didn't want to claim praise where it wasn't due [0.3] 
nm0146: yeah [0.2] yeah [0.4] well there's i mean there's going to be cases 
where what morality requires of you is going to conflict and one thing it 
requires you not to do is not to [0.5] to [0.3] to lie [0.7] er but also tells 
you not to [0.3] hurt people [0.7] unnecessarily and so this is one of those 
conflict cases [0.6] and it may be that [0.2] er [0.6] you know [0.7] you think 
that [0.2] the requirement not to lie outweighs the requirement not to upset 
people [0.3] but even so and you sh-, that still doesn't mean that you should 
sort of [0.5] tell the truth in this cold way 
sm0156: not totally i mean from the suggestion i got from the the [0.5] example 
was that [0.3] was so [laughter] overtly [0.5] thanking him he was like saying 
thank you every se-, [0.2] every couple of you know words 
nm0146: right 
sm0156: the other person would be like oh well you know [0.4] he wouldn't have 
up to that point [0.4] had he not be so over the top in his 
thanks [0.2] 
nm0146: yeah yeah 
sm0156: it and say well it was my duty [0.8] 
nm0146: yes well er [0.6] that's one construal of it [0.2] perhaps sort of gets 
the blame somewhere else [0.5] er [0.7] seems to me that er [0.8] well you can 
imagine a similar situation where somebody's just all too willing to reveal [0.
8] their true feelings of indifference and coldness [0.6] and so at every 
opportunity it will pop up even though they're not being [0.3] you know praised 
for something [0.4] er you they don't think they deserve praise for [0.9] er so 
you can think of a sort of a a very close situation [0.6] where no blame can be 
put on [0.3] er [0.3] his hospitalized friend [0.8] er [0.3] well you know 
praising him too much [1.0] er where all the blame would land on this 
individiual and then all the same questions would pop up [5.9] okay well er [1.
4] let's move on [2.0] that's Michael Stocker's criticism [0.4] if er move on 
to Bernard Williams' criticism [3.5] and these are all [0.2] very closely [1.4] 
er aligned these are all really [1.1] driving at the same sort of worry but 
from slightly different angles [2.3] now Bernard Williams has two worries [8.7] 
the first 
is that the motive of duty rules out other motives [1.1] that if you act from 
duty you can't act from friendship [0.2] or love [2.6] right [1.3] so the worry 
here is that other other [0.2] motivations get pushed out [0.8] and since those 
other motivations are constitutive of what it is to enter into these valuable 
non-moral relationships [1.0] if they're pushed off the scene by the motive of 
duty [1.0] then it means then being moral will stop you fully engaging [0.7] in 
non-moral but nonetheless valuable relationships [2.0] that's the first worry 
[1.2] the second is [0.9] er [0.8] that the moti-, that if you always act from 
duty [1.1] then you'll [0.4] be motivated by explicitly moral thoughts about 
what you should and shouldn't do about what's permissible w-, about [0.4] 
what's not permissible [0.6] in situations when that's quite inappropriate [1.
4] er and the example very famous example Bernard Williams gives [1.7] is of a 
situation [0.7] where [0.2] you know your ship sunk [0.6] you're on the 
lifeboat [0.8] and you've got a choice between saving your wife [0.7] and 
saving some stranger [1.7] er [0.8] and he 
has this example of a Kantian good-willed agent [0.8] who's [0.3] er [0.3] 
motivated to save his wife [0.2] not just because she's his wife [1.2] but 
because she's his wife [0.2] and because it's permissible to save your wife in 
preference to a stranger [0.6] so [0.4] you know the sort of motivation there 
is partly moral it's a [0.2] a thought about the moral permissibility of his 
action [2.1] and he says that you know [0.2] some [0.5] for example his wife [0.
7] may have thought [0.2] that the thought that she is his wife would be 
sufficient [0.6] to get him to save her [1.1] er the moral thought seems to be 
[0.5] as er Bernard Williams famously put it one thought too many [2.7] it's 
not clear what's quite so disturbing there but er [0.6] i'll deal with these 
points [0.8] er in order [4.8] now once again er [0.2] Barbara Herman [1.5] er 
[0.2] well it's the first time i've menti-, Barbara Herman and [0.2] Marcia 
Baron [0.7] tried to deal with this and they tried to deal with this [0.8] 
first objection by distinguishing between primary and secondary motives [4.2] 
they say that duty can function [0.2] both as a primary motive [0.6] and as a 
secondary 
motive [0.8] and that once you distinguish these and realize that a mo-, a 
Kantian morally good person [0.6] doesn't always have to have duty as a primary 
motive [1.3] then sometimes other primary motives can come in and that's 
perfectly okay [0.4] other motives could be friendship or love [0.2] or 
whatever [2.3] what is the primary secondary motive distinction [1.4] well a 
primary motive is what you and i [0.2] ordinarily think of as somebody's 
motives [0.5] it's [0.4] to act from some primary motive [0.7] is to act from a 
consideration that you would cite if somebody asked you why did you do that [1.
1] right [1.2] and your answer might be quite simple mightn't you [0.2] why did 
you pull that woman out of the water [0.4] the answer might just be [0.3] well 
because she's my wife [1.6] and er that might be it [0.9] right in that case [0.
7] your primary motive is just the thought [0.2] that she's my wife [1.5] or it 
might be [0.6] more complicated might be [0.4] what motivates you might be a 
thought she's my wife and the thought that it's permissible to save my wife in 
preference to [0.4] a stranger in 
such situations [2.1] right so primary motives are just the specific reason 
you'd cite [0.5] in support of your action [3.6] er [0.3] in a specific er 
situation [1.0] it's the reason why you did what you did the specific reason 
for doing [0.4] that specific [0.3] s-, action [4.0] now secondary motives or 
[0.7] are are more like regulative principles [1.2] which needn't always 
function as primary motives [0.2] though sometimes they might [3.1] for duty to 
function as a secondary motive [0.9] is just for y-, er certain counterfactuals 
to be true [1.5] right [0.8] for example [0.5] for duty to function as a 
secondary motive [1.4] er [0.2] would just entail [0.5] that if you thought 
your action was wrong [0.5] you wouldn't do it [1.6] right so your actions are 
regulated by a concern [0.8] for the morality of your action [1.6] and that may 
just imply [1.1] er [0.2] that if you thought [0.8] that your action was wrong 
you wouldn't do it [0.5] or alternatively a subjunctive conditional [0.4] 
you'll er [0.5] you'll only well it's the conditional statement that if [1.1] 
you'll only do some act if you 
think it's permissible [5.3] now if to have duty as a secondary motive just 
means [0.5] that if you only just means that if you thought your action were 
wrong you wouldn't do it [1.0] as long as you don't think it's wrong [0.4] duty 
needn't not figure as a primary motive [0.8] it need not figure [0.4] amongst 
the reasons you would cite [0.8] for doing a particular action [5.2] you 
presumably you've got all sorts of regulative principles all sorts of secondary 
motives [0.6] right you might have a s-, a sort of self-interested regulative 
motive [0.7] er [0.2] principle namely if some action's going to kill you [0.2] 
you won't do it [2.7] right [0.3] but does that mean that thoughts about your 
own [0.6] you know [0.3] death [1.3] are always going to figure in your 
motivations well no [1.1] you know if he asked you well why did you come in 
here today you might say well [0.4] to hear the lecture [0.7] it wouldn't be to 
hear the lecture and because you were sure that you weren't going to die if you 
came in here [0.6] right [0.6] even though if you thought you were going to die 
if 
you came in here you wouldn't come [0.3] i take it [0.3] you're not that keen 
to learn Kant [0.7] right [0.5] learning Kant were fatal [0.8] then you'd [0.4] 
i take it be happy to be ignorant [3.8] right so even if you've got these 
regulative second order [0.3] not second order secondary motives [1.0] it 
doesn't mean that they're always going to be [0.2] f-, er [0.7] figure in your 
in the thoughts that act as your primary motives [1.3] it just means that your 
action is regulated in a certain way [0.5] and that'd mean you'd have no [0.9] 
implication [0.9] that you have thoughts with a certain content [0.5] about 
your own eventual death or [0.5] you know in the Kantian case about duty [5.0] 
okay so is that is you get a a sort of basic idea of the primary-secondary 
motive [0.5] distinction [0.5] one is a particular consideration for doing [0.
5] or reason you have for doing a particular action [1.0] the other is more of 
a general principle regulating [0.7] the sorts of actions you're going to do [1.
2] you might have a regula-, you know i'll do this as long as it's not self-
destructive [0.8] 
right [0.3] that might be it [0.5] but in doing some particular action one of 
the reasons you would cite for why you did it would not be [0.4] 'cause you [0.
2] didn't think it was going to destroy you you wouldn't have thoughts about 
your own destruction [0.5] for the most part [0.7] unless you thought there was 
some very good reason for thinking something's going to be dangerous [1.8] 
similarly if your secondary motive is duty [0.5] that just means [0.6] so long 
as you don't think the action is wrong [1.2] sorry you just means that you 
wouldn't do some action if you thought it was morally wrong [1.2] that needn't 
imply that every time you act [0.6] you've got a th-, a moral thought [0.5] as 
a primary motive [1.4] it need not actually impinge on your moral deliberatio-, 
er [0.2] in your deliberation about why you should do particular actions [7.6] 
that o-, is that okay [1.9] questions on that [0.6] 
sm0153: [0.6] probably draw that out from the meaning [0.3] 
nm0146: er 
sm0153: [1.7] [0.9] 
nm0146: oh i don't see why [0.3] well actually Kant doesn't talk about motives 
very much 
sm0153: no [0.2] 
nm0146: he talks about inclinations incentives [0.4] well 
actually inclination's just a particular sort of [0.6] incentive [0.4] talks 
about triebfedern [0.6] er which gets translated as er incentives [0.9] and he 
talks about maxims [0.7] so he actually very seldom talks about motives he say-,
a-, one place he distinguishes motives from [0.4] er incentives [0.7] but it's 
just one of these many places where Kant makes a distinction just forgets about 
it straight away [1.0] er [0.2] and what does most of the work in Kant actually 
is maxims principles of action [0.9] and they're not [0.6] primary motives 
although they'll be picking out the sorts of things [0.7] which er would count 
as motives for you counts as reasons for you [1.0] so i think [0.2] mean you're 
right Kant doesn't actually make this distinction himself [0.7] but it's a a 
distinction that fits very neatly into the Kantian framework [0.4] of practical 
rationality [4.6] but er no y-, there is nowhere where he makes this 
distinction [2.7] er that's not a problem i mean there's two ways you can go 
you i mean [0.3] as long as it fits neatly into the Kantian framework [0.9] 
then this could be a 
way he [1.0] er this would be a w-, er a legitimate way for Kant to respond [0.
5] the fact that he doesn't respond in this way or s say these things is not 
really the point [0.5] with all of these figures historical figures [0.7] we're 
really considering how defensible their position is [0.7] and even if they 
don't have a response to a particular criticism 'cause it wasn't made at that 
time [0.4] or they just didn't think of it [0.8] the real issue's whether they 
could respond [1.8] er [1.0] so [0.5] i don't mean [0.3] i don't think you need 
get too worried about that [1.3] this is a perfectly decent way for somebody 
who's sympathetic to Kant [0.6] to respond to the Williams style objection [5.
6] okay well once we've got [2.5] this distinction up and running [4.3] it's 
easy to see how you can apply it to Williams' objection [0.9] about how [0.7] 
duty seems to push out other motives [3.1] remember [0.4] the first worry you 
had was that [0.5] once duty gets on the scene it pu-, it all [0.3] i mean you 
can't act from friendship [0.6] or 
from love [0.7] and hence can't fully engage in those non-moral relations [2.7] 
well once you've got duty as a primary and secondary motive on [0.7] er 
established [1.0] then [0.2] you can see that there's plenty of room for non-
moral motives to get in [1.8] at the primary level at primary as primary 
motives for a a Kantian good-willed agent [1.6] right [0.4] to do something 
from friendship [1.3] from a a for a Kantian [0.3] er [0.3] good-willed 
individual [0.7] would just be for friendship to be their primary motive [1.0] 
er [0.3] and although they're they'll have duty still as a secondary motive [0.
7] that just means that they'll do [0.6] they'll act from the primary motive so 
long as it doesn't prompt them [0.5] to do something they believe is wrong [1.
6] right so [0.2] any sort of non-moral rela-, er motive can get in at the 
primary level [1.4] and the agent may act just from that motive [2.2] all it 
means i-, for duty to act as a secondary motive [0.8] is [0.6] for them to 
regulate the sorts of actions they'll do from those non-moral motives at the 
primary level [1.3] er in a certain way [0.2] namely they won't 
act [0.5] from those motives if those motives [0.4] point them towards doing 
something wrong [5.4] okay [0.2] so is it clear how that works [1.5] have to mo-
, get a bit of a move on 'cause i'm running out of time here [2.0] okay let me 
move on quickly to the final point i wanted to make which is the second part of 
Williams' objection [0.9] this is about [2.1] whether [2.2] a Kantian good-
willed agent can [0.2] would would have too many moral thoughts explicitly 
moral thoughts [1.5] and exactly the same [0.6] point could be made with the 
primary-secondary [0.6] motive distinction [3.4] i mean a Kantian good-willed 
agent doesn't have to have an explicit thought at the primary motivating level 
[0.7] about duty [0.8] er [1.3] in saving his wife in preference to a stranger 
he doesn't his motive his first [0.7] his primary motives don't have to be [0.
6] A [0.2] well because she's my wife and B [0.4] 'cause it's morally 
permissible [0.3] to save my wife in preference to a stranger in situations 
like this [0.4] at the primary level [0.7] the motivating thought could be 
solely a thought about 
his wife [1.1] and his concern for her [1.4] nonetheless he's still a Kantian 
good-willed agent [0.6] 'cause his action is regulated [0.5] by duty at the 
second [0.6] as a secondary motive [0.8] what that means is [0.5] he'll save 
his wife [0.3] just 'cause she's his wife [0.5] unless [0.8] saving her would 
involve [0.3] doing something he takes to be wrong [3.0] okay [0.2] that this 
is morally permissible to save my wife [1.1] now you make think even that's [0.
9] too [1.0] er [0.2] restrictive or [0.2] sort of inappropriate having duty at 
the the [0.2] as a regulative principle [0.5] it's still [0.5] there's 
something inappropriate about that [0.9] but at that point i think the Kantian 
just dig their heels in and say well [0.6] er [1.0] that there's nothing 
objectionable [0.2] about duty [0.5] as a secondary motive [3.8] and to make 
that clear [1.1] you know just consider [0.3] somebody who d-, who [0.2] is 
whose actions aren't regulated by duty as a secondary motive [0.9] er [0.3] 
they're just motivated at the primary level [0.2] by a concern for their wife 
[1.7] that means [0.2] that [0.6] no matter w-, whether this action is right or 
wrong [0.6] or whether they 
think it's right or wrong they're going to save their wives [0.5] so you know 
just imagine a situation [0.5] in which the only way you can save your wife [0.
4] is by throwing two kids off the lifeboat [0.9] so you think oh great [0.6] 
out they go [1.0] wife in [1.0] right [1.1] 
well in such a situation like that [0.2] as [0.6] er [1.0] Barbara Herman 
clearly points out [0.6] this seems like a case where the the the individual 
has one thought too few [1.2] right [0.2] rather than one thought too many [0.
7] it seems if saving a wife involves doing something like that [0.5] then you 
should [0.3] pause to think well you know is this really [0.6] sh-, okay [0.6] 
to do this [1.3] right [1.8] er [0.8] right and but [0.2] you know being 
willing to pause to think about whether you should do this action [0.4] in 
situation where it looks as though the only way you can do [0.6] what a motive 
of love or friendship prompts you to do [0.9] is by doing something that looks 
like it's wrong [0.8] i mean that sort of moral regulatively [0.2] regulative 
function [0.9] doesn't seem at all 
objectionable it doesn't stop you [0.5] spontaneously reacting [0.3] to the c-, 
er the needs of your loved one [0.5] or the concerns of your friend [0.9] 
doesn't mean you've got to [0.8] in some way not care about them [1.0] all it 
means is [0.6] that [0.5] you won't do anything for them no matter what it is 
[0.9] right there'll be a limit [0.7] to the s-, er [1.4] to what frien-, 
you'll think that friendship will permit you [0.4] or will allow you to do [1.
6] okay right i'll stop there [1.4] handouts at the front [0.8] anybody who 
wants the [0.4] leaflets on the philosophy weekend they'll be here as well