nm0140: the er [0.3] handout [0.7] i've got a new handout on your handout today 
[1.5] last week i gave a a sort of supplementary [0.4] handout for chapters two 
and three [0.4] if you didn't get that then copies of those handouts are 
available in the Philosophy department [0.2] office [0.3] okay [0.6] that's 
just to explain what's going on what i've got there are the new handouts which 
i'll give out in just a minute or two [1.8] secondly just before we start 
apologies for the fact that as you can [0.3] probably hear i'm [0.3] suffering 
at the moment [0.3] and er [0.5] it's distorting my voice in a variety of ways 
and also [0.8] er [0.4] i'm not feeling too good so i hope i survive this 
lecture [2.2] can you [0.5] is the [0.2] is er microphone on [0.2] 
ss: no 
nm0140: no i thought i [0.3] thought i couldn't hear anything there [0.6] it 
the red light is on here [3.5] er [0.9] well there we are [2.1] [laughter] well 
[0.4] typical isn't it on a day when i'm i'm losing my voice i haven't even got 
the microphone [1.3] er [0.4] well [0.9] got this flight console here maybe i 
can do something and see what happens 
sf0141: yeah 
sm0142: 
nm0140: 
if i'm bold [0.2] if i stand in this one place then it's going to be all right 
sf0143: yes 
nm0140: but as you already [0.2] as you know i'm [0.3] could actually even just 
like to wander around all the time [0.3] i'm going to see if i can actually get 
the [0.2] the remote mike to work [0.7] 
sf0144: [0.4] 
nm0140: oh [16.5] [laughter] i'll just check whether this has worked i've got a 
these mikes to see if the remote mike is working so [2.3] right is the is it 
working now 
ss: no 
nm0140: no [0.2] okay [0.2] [13.8] no [1.1] one more try [0.5] shh [0.5] no [0.
2] no okay i'm going to abandon it and just speak loudly [7.3] okay what we're 
going to do in the er the rest of these lectures today [0.2] tomorrow and next 
week is to look at the [0.5] chapters three four five and six we're going to 
spend one lecture on each of those chapters as i said at the very beginning [0.
7] we spent relatively more time on the earlier chapters because they contained 
a lot of er [0.2] material in them and a lot of the kind of basis of what s-, 
[0.3] Searle [0.7] er Searle's arguments for 
the later chapters are going to be [1.6] what i'm going to do for these 
chapters [0.2] three four five and six [0.9] is to distribute to you [0.2] 
notes [0.2] quite specific notes on the content of those chapters [0.5] and 
then in the lectures what i want to do is to try and get over to you what the 
point of the chapter is [0.7] so there's going to be kind of more detailed 
summation in the handouts than there actually is [0.5] er in the lecture [0.2] 
so you'll need the handouts to fill out some of the [0.2] s-, points the 
handouts form a kind of commentary on the text [0.8] er whereas the lectures 
are going to try and [0.2] get what the main point of it all is of each of 
those chapters [0.2] okay [0.3] so what i'm going to do now is to hand out [0.
7] er [0.4] the [0.2] notes on chapter three [0.4] and tomorrow i'll hand out 
notes on chapter four next Wednesday on chapter five [0.5] next Thursday on 
chapter six [2.5] again just to repeat as always if there are previous handouts 
that you need [0.5] then you can obtain those from the [0.7] Philosophy 
department office [22.5] okay [4.0] you'll recall that [0.2] Searle [0.4] [1.3] 
says that there are two [0.2] claims which are typical of [0.2] strong A-I 
strong artificial intelligence [1.5] one of those claims [0.2] is that [0.2] 
computers put very [0.2] very briefly that computers can think [0.4] or that [0.
7] put it slightly less briefly [0.2] a suitably programmed [0.3] digital 
computer may at some time [0.8] at in the future [0.3] be said to be able to 
think [1.4] there are of course people in A-I who think [0.6] that the very 
strongest claim is true that computers already can think [0.6] an example of 
such a person is the Professor of Cybernetics at this university Kevin Warwick 
[0.8] who holds [0.2] rather a controversial opinion and one of those is that 
already you can say that computers can think [0.2] er [1.5] the other claim [0.
2] second claim [0.9] okay first claim [0.2] computers can think [0.4] the 
second claim is [0.8] that [1.7] a digital computer [0.2] provides the suitable 
model [0.4] for thinking about the human brain [0.6] or put it more briefly [0.
2] the human brain is like a digital computer [0.7] okay that's the second 
claim [0.5] that second claim [0.6] that a human brain is like a 
digital computer [0.4] is [0.2] the claim which is discussed in chapter three 
[0.4] on cognitive science [1.0] okay [1.1] [3.4] Searle starts off by 
observing [0.6] that [1.0] we seem to have available to us two different ways 
of being able to explain human behaviour [1.4] the first way of explaining 
human behaviour was the sort of [0.2] way of explaining human behaviour that i 
was talking about last week [0.5] when i said that as far as human beings are 
concerned [0.4] we can explain human behaviour in terms of [0.4] the purposes 
the ambitions the drives the wishes [0.4] that people have [0.5] those provide 
a sort of general background which makes it sensible to say [0.8] er why 
somebody is doing something [0.4] why is somebody doing something somebody 
somebody who's doing something absolutely bizarre [0.7] you know they're 
standing on one leg like this and you see them and say why are they doing that 
[0.7] and you say oh well [0.2] one thing [0.4] might [0.5] you know they're 
being a [0.2] street performer of some sort [0.9] okay [1.3] so that will be 
one way of explaining human behaviour [1.6] now 
there's another way of explaining human behaviour which might be open to us [0.
4] and that is a scientific explanation of human behaviour [0.2] and in 
particular [0.5] as it's a scientific explanation of human behaviour i mean [0.
2] science can explain all sorts of things er it can explain chemical reactions 
it can explain [0.5] er [0.2] you know the er [0.5] way one billiard ball hits 
another billiard ball with mechanics and physics and so on [0.4] but if we're 
explaining human behaviour there might be a sort of scientific explanation [0.
3] which addresses itself to explaining human behaviour [0.4] why is somebody 
doing that [0.2] well we produce an explanation in terms of science [0.4] and 
that might be in terms of for example neurophysiology [0.4] in terms of what's 
going on in a person's brain [1.4] well the first sort of explanation by and 
large is concerned with [0.7] explaining what's in the person's mind what their 
motive what their intention [0.3] what their desires wishes purposes are [0.2] 
the second sort of explanation [0.2] in terms of 
what's going on in their brain in the [0.2] in the stuff in here [0.4] in terms 
of their neurophysiology [2.1] that first [0.2] common thing for psychology the 
sort of explanation that we deploy all the time in everyday life in talking 
about other people [0.5] is often talked about in the literature the literature 
of [0.5] er psychology the literature of philosophy the literature of popular 
science is often referred to as folk psychology [0.5] and what all the folk 
psychology [0.2] come across it says [0.3] all that folk psychology means is 
simply common sense approach [0.4] okay [1.5] now there's a problem [0.9] 
Searle says i've taken his [0.9] statement of the problem from page twenty-two 
of the book [1.2] the problem is there's a sort of gap [0.2] between these two 
sorts of explanation [1.6] he says the first of these sorts of explanation 
works well enough in practice [0.6] we explain other people's behaviour in 
terms of their desires their motivations their wishes their intentions and that 
seems to work in a certain sort of way [0.7] 
but it isn't scientific [1.4] and the second sort of explanation is certainly 
scientific [0.6] but we've no idea how to make it work in practice [0.6] in 
other words if you do see somebody standing on a leg like this [0.4] and you 
say why are they doing that [0.4] then [0.2] it's actually [0.3] very very 
difficult to produce a neuroph-, neurophysiological explanation which 
satisfactorily explains [0.4] why they're doing that [1.5] and Searle says [0.
5] we've got no idea how to bring together these two sorts of explanations 
integrate them [2.0] we've no idea how to integrate or unify common sense [0.2] 
explanations with neuroscientific ones [0.3] he says just to con-, [0.3] 
continue that [0.5] quotation at the bottom of the slide [1.6] since we've no 
idea how to [0.2] integrate [0.9] or unify common sense explanations with the 
explanations of science pure scientific ones [0.3] we are tempted to think that 
there's a gap [0.4] between [0.2] the mind and the brain [0.5] now chapter 
three [0.2] is concerned with attempts that people have made [0.3] to fill this 
gap [0.4] the gap between common sense 
explanations and scientific explanations [0.9] okay [2.4] this [0.2] appearance 
of a gap [0.2] has led philosophers and others and psychologists and a whole 
series of er o-, other sorts of scientists [0.5] into thinking that the gap 
needs filling [0.2] and that what we need when you fill a gap [0.2] you use an 
intermediate level explanation [0.6] you fill the gap by producing another 
level of explanation [0.2] intermediate between common sense psychology and 
neuroscience [1.5] an explanation which will [0.3] explain how common sense 
psychological phenomena [0.4] derive from goings on [0.2] in the central [0.2] 
nervous [0.2] system [0.9] 
okay [1.4] [2.3] and [0.3] he he says in a [1.0] another place not in Minds 
Brains and Science but in a review he wrote [0.5] he talked about filling this 
gap and he says couldn't there be [0.7] a third possibility [0.2] between 
common sense psychology and neuroscience [0.4] a science of human beings that 
was not introspective common sense psychology [0.4] but was not neurophysiology 
either [0.8] this has been the great dream of the human sciences [0.4] in the 
twentieth 
century [0.9] okay [1.6] that's [1.7] the background [6.6] now [2.1] Searle 
says that in the twentieth century [0.6] there's been a whole series of 
attempts to try and [0.2] fill [0.3] the gap [1.6] and [0.9] he says [0.3] look 
all of these [0.3] attempts have been failures none of them have satisfactorily 
managed to fill the gap [0.7] and he surveys what some of these attempts [0.2] 
have been [0.8] and we can just look [0.5] briefly at [1.1] some of those [0.2] 
[1.3] previous gap-filling efforts [0.5] for example behaviourism [1.0] 
behaviourism a highly influential psychological theory particularly just post-
Second World War [0.6] er [0.2] surrounding in particular one [0.6] figure [0.
2] B F Skinner [0.5] and Skinner's [0.7] behaviourist psychology [0.7] was [0.
2] extremely influential as a [0.3] way of trying to explain human behaviour [2.
8] then there was [0.2] Gagne's theory [0.4] again very influential [0.2] 
actually in the fifties and sixties [1.2] er cybernetics [0.5] became extremely 
influential from about the fifties and sixties onwards [0.6] through the works 
of people like Stafford Beer [0.2] and others [0.9] information theory [0.2] 
highly influential particularly as 
computer science developed [0.9] structuralism [0.4] became extremely 
influential through work in [0.4] in linguistics [1.5] and [0.7] more recently 
[0.5] we've seen sociobiology [0.2] and a part of sociobiology evolutionary 
biology [0.3] the work of people like Richard Dawkins say in particular The 
Selfish Gene and other books like that [0.6] attempts to try and produce 
explanations of human behaviour [0.3] which in some way or other fill the gap 
[0.5] between the everyday explanations and [0.5] the more [0.2] as it were 
basic level biochemical neurophysiological explanations [1.5] Searle claims 
that all of these attempts have failed [0.2] which of course is a bold a bold 
claim [0.6] since [0.4] although some of them seem to have withered and died 
many of them still live in one form or another and there are plenty of people 
who still [0.7] stake their reputation in one way or another on some of these 
theories [4.0] now i er observe what is the on the rest of this slide is 
something which isn't in er [1.0] [cough] it isn't in Searle's 
chapter but i'm just observing something about these sorts of modes of 
explanation [0.9] very often when people try to produce large scale 
explanations of human behaviour [0.2] large scale theories of which all of 
these are examples [0.6] which large scale explanations of human behaviour are 
often based on some sort of [0.5] reductionist idea [1.1] a reductionist view 
of human behaviour [1.2] and what i mean by a reductionist view of human 
behaviour [0.8] is trying to explain [0.2] all human behaviour [0.9] by means 
of a single explanation [0.9] a single motive [0.6] a single explanation [1.6] 
and i'll ju-, just two examples so that you have in mind the sort of thing that 
i'm getting at here [0.6] Thomas Hobbes the [0.3] extremely influential English 
moral and political philosopher [0.6] who wrote the great [0.3] book The 
Leviathan [1.4] most famous i suppose for saying that [0.2] if there were no 
human society [0.6] then human life would be solitary poor nasty brutish and 
short [0.6] his most famous sentence [1.3] his view was that all human 
behaviour [0.4] every act of every human being was 
selfish [0.5] okay [0.8] okay [0.3] the whole explanation of human behaviour [0.
3] was that it was selfish every single human act of every single human being 
[0.2] was selfish [0.7] and so you've got one explanation [0.2] for all human 
behaviour [1.3] okay [1.5] another example would be a slightly simplified 
version [0.3] of [0.4] early Freud [0.2] not necessarily later Freud [0.2] but 
early Freud [0.4] where we might say that all human action is motivated by 
sexual desire [0.7] later Freud brought in a number of other possible [0.2] 
principles as well but we might [0.2] produce that as a kind of slightly 
caricatured version of what Freud said [2.1] now such explanations have a 
greater appeal because they are so [0.3] there are two reasons why they have 
great appeal one is that they provide an enormously strict explanation for 
everything [0.7] one motives [0.2] [0.3] great simplicity of explanation [0.9] 
and secondly they're very appealing because they kind of [0.9] if we might put 
it [0.2] deflate the pompous [1.0] you know [0.7] to say that all human actions 
are selfish [0.4] is in one way appealing [0.6] 
because it enables us to think in some way or other [0.3] that even the most 
saintly person [0.4] is motivated by the same base [0.4] motivation [0.3] as [0.
2] we are [0.7] and deflates the pompous [0.2] or [0.3] in the case of Freud [0.
4] it's attractive because [0.2] you know [0.3] even the most puritanical 
uptight person is being motivated by sexual desire [0.2] and that kind of 
tactic is a [0.5] you know kind of [0.2] deflates them in some way or other [0.
6] so there's a great appeal [0.4] because of the simplicity of explanation [1.
5] but at the same time of course if you hold such a theory a reductionist view 
of human behaviour in which all human behaviour is explained by [0.2] just one 
motive [0.4] you've got work to do [0.8] because you've got to explain how it 
is [0.4] that the most saintly action is really selfish [0.5] or [0.2] that the 
most puritanical person is really motivated by sexual desire [0.8] you've got 
to explain away all the apparent [0.2] counter-examples to your theory [1.1] 
and so what such [0.2] reductionist accounts will do [0.8] will be to produce 
an enormously elaborate [0.2] structure of human 
behaviour [0.4] an enormously elaborate account [0.4] in which there will be 
for example in Freud [0.2] repression the ego the id the conscious mind the 
unconscious mind drives and so on [0.2] a whole enormous kind of hydraulic 
scheme [0.4] representing his world [0.3] in order to be to be able to explain 
why it is that every single action [0.6] er is motivated by sexual desire [1.5] 
so combined with great simplicity of explanation [0.3] is a hugely elaborate 
structure of human behaviour [0.8] but that's appealing too [0.7] because 
although the simplicity of explanation appeals to us [0.4] we also want to 
think that human beings are [0.5] mysterious and deep and complicated [0.6] er 
the [0.5] complicated explanation which is necessary for Hobbes or Freud to 
produce [0.4] again appeals to us [0.3] so these reductionist accounts [0.2] 
appeal for two quite contradictory reasons [0.6] one is they appeal because of 
the simplicity of explanation [0.5] and the other is they appeal because of the 
complexity of theory which goes with it [0.5] so it provides us with 
two things both of which you want to like [0.5] simplicity and complexity [1.1] 
okay [1.7] [5.1] th-, okay i'm sorry that the quota-, the what i've said at the 
bottom there is just cut off a bit what i what i was saying there [0.6] is to a-
, [0.2] to attempt to produce a simple explanation of human behaviour [0.3] 
will actually involve a highly elaborate theory [0.4] for which there will be 
[0.4] frequently no empirical evidence [0.5] er to explain [0.2] apparent [0.5] 
counter-examples in other words the rest of that sentence was just what i've 
been saying to you [0.2] okay [1.2] [6.8] now [2.5] previous attempts [0.2] 
having failed [0.7] there's [0.3] a new attempt in town [0.3] Searle says [0.6] 
and a new attempt to fill the gap [0.2] is [0.2] cognitivism [0.8] and it's 
cognitivism which is then Searle's main [0.3] target [0.2] in this chapter [0.
7] so what is cognitivism [1.2] well cognitivism and cognitive science are 
terms which have been [0.2] used in the last thirty years or so [0.4] to cover 
a wide variety of different [1.0] areas and disciplines in philosophy of mind 
in [0.4] linguistics in psychology in 
computer science cybernetics and in [0.3] strong artificial intelligence and so 
on [0.5] these are the term cognitivism cognitive science those terms [0.4] 
have been used quite widely [0.7] so what does Searle mean [0.3] by [0.5] 
cognitivism [1.1] [3.5] basically [1.1] the view [0.8] is [1.0] as i said at 
the beginning of the lecture [0.6] the view of cognitivism [0.2] that he's 
concerned with [0.3] is that the mind ought to be thought of [0.6] on the model 
[0.2] of a computer [0.6] that's the theory which [0.7] he thinks is the 
essence of cognitivism [0.4] and which is his target of attack [1.0] because 
that view [0.4] like the previous [0.4] gap-filling [0.3] theories [0.4] is one 
[0.3] which Searle thinks is wrong [0.8] so [0.5] first important point is that 
Searle is going to be attacking cognitivism [0.9] so in red there is a summary 
from page forty-three of the book of what Searle thinks cognitivism is [0.4] 
but remember this is a theory which he's going to be attacking [0.6] so what it 
says in red is a quotation from Searle [0.2] but it's the theory which is his 
target [0.4] which he's going to attack [0.8] okay [0.6] please remember that 
this is 
the direct quotation from Searle [0.5] these are not thoughts to be attributed 
to him [0.4] these are thoughts he's going to attack [0.5] okay [1.0] so [1.5] 
what he's going to attack is the idea that thinking [0.3] is [0.2] processing 
information [1.2] but information processing is just [0.3] symbol manipulation 
[1.4] remember in the Chinese room example [0.6] Searle wants to draw a very [0.
2] strong distinction [0.5] between mere symbol manipulation [0.4] which is 
what the computer does although man in the Chinese room who doesn't understand 
Chinese [0.2] does [0.5] from [0.7] real [0.2] thinking [0.5] okay [1.5] 
so [0.2] again thinking is processing information but information processing is 
just symbol manipulation [0.2] computers do symbol manipu-, manipulation [0.6] 
so the best way to study thinking [0.7] or cognition [0.4] is to study 
computational symbol manipulation [0.2] programs [0.3] symbol manipulating 
programs [0.4] whether they're in computers or in the brains [0.6] on this view 
the view he's attacking [0.6] the task of cognitive science is to characterize 
the brain [0.5] not at the level of nerve cells the 
neurophysiological level [0.7] nor at the level of conscious mental states [0.
2] the common sense psychology level [0.6] but rather at the level of its 
functioning [0.3] a sort of information processing system [0.5] and that's 
where the gap gets filled [1.0] it's alleged [0.4] Searle disagrees with that 
[0.3] doesn't mean that he does agree with that [0.4] okay [1.4] so the 
cognitivist's [0.2] big idea [1.1] is that we can fill the gap [0.3] between 
the mind and the brain [0.4] by focusing on an intermediate level [0.8] the 
level of information processing [1.1] [57.8] 
nm0140: i was just searching for a [0.9] actually was round here for a minute 
or two [0.4] i was just searching for a a after slide which i couldn't find [0.
8] [0.9] what i wanted to say was this that [4.9] throughout history [1.3] 
human beings have tried to [1.4] understand what goes on [0.4] in the human 
brain in the mind [0.9] by means of various different models or analogies [0.3] 
i mean Searle discusses this is in the chapter [2.6] and it's interesting to 
look at what [0.5] some of those previous models or analogies have been [1.8] 
er for instance the [0.3] the Greeks [0.9] compared 
the human mind to [0.2] a catapult [1.8] which sounds to the class to be rather 
[0.7] odd [1.4] it's interesting that [0.8] that in different societies at 
different times the model which has been used to try and explain the workings 
of the human mind or human brain [0.4] has often been to do with the lastest 
technology available [0.6] and of course the catapults had formed a part of [0.
2] military technology for the Greeks [1.4] later [0.2] Leibniz the great [0.4] 
German philosopher [0.8] er [0.4] whom Searle quotes from talks about a bit 
later in the chapter as well [0.6] saw the human mind as being like a mill [0.
5] you know a flour mill [0.2] grinding [0.4] separating the wheat from the 
chaff making flour [0.8] and again that's a kind of technological [0.6] analogy 
[1.3] model of the human mind [1.6] later in the er nineteenth century [0.7] er 
[0.4] people compared this [0.4] compared the human mind to the telegraph 
system [0.6] remember that the the telegraph system was developed in the [0.4] 
early to mid- [0.4] nineteenth century [0.2] it's quite an early piece a quite 
remarkable piece of technology [1.2] er 
the telegraph which predated [0.2] the telephone [0.6] enabled people to 
communicate with each other over long distances [0.3] got the first telegraph 
cable between England and America was for example the [0.3] first telephone 
cable [1.0] and er [0.2] do any of you know the book about the telegraph system 
which [0.2] calls it the Victorian internet system [0.3] no any of you read 
that book [0.5] it's a it's a really extraordinary book published about two or 
three years ago [0.2] about the early development of the [0.5] of the telegraph 
[0.2] and there are extraordinary comparisons between [0.2] the mid-nineteenth 
century telegraph system and the Internet [0.6] people had their own private 
accounts people communicated with each other privately [0.2] over the telegraph 
people used various sorts of abbreviation and code and [0.5] there were worries 
about you know pornography on the telegraph [laughter] things like that 
extraordinary set of [0.7] er comparisons between the [0.5] you know late 
twentieth century internet and the [0.3] 
mid- [0.5] nineteenth century telegraph system [0.8] actually you might just 
see that book in [0.3] the science areas of libraries or book shops you might 
look at it [0.3] can't remember the exact title but it's [0.6] i think in the 
title there's some reference to the Victorian internet system [0.3] okay [2.1] 
er then later [0.2] er [0.2] for instance in my childhood a very common analogy 
[0.2] for the human brain [0.4] was [0.4] the telephone system [0.3] and that's 
to say the old-fashioned telephone system not a modern telephone system [0.3] 
but the old-fashioned telephone system where you have an operator [0.2] sitting 
[0.3] you know at a board [0.2] you know saying oh hello Mrs Baker you want to 
be put through to Mrs Jones okay [1.6] and that kind of idea you know [0.2] 
pulling out plugs and then pulling in putting in plugs [0.3] was used for a 
long time as an analogy for what goes on [0.4] in the brain [1.4] for [0.2] 
Freud [0.5] as i already [0.2] partly indicated as a kind of analogy to what 
goes on in the brain as a kind of hydraulic system [0.7] Freud in a way thought 
of the human brain er brain as being a 
vast system of [0.3] pipes that were connected together through which fluids [0.
3] pass [0.5] and if you push the fluid from one part to a-, [0.2] another it 
would come to erupt somewhere else [1.0] and er [0.2] he also Freud sometimes 
used a kind of electromagnetic [0.3] er analogy for the human brain [0.6] and 
now there's the idea of the digital [0.3] computer [0.9] as the model for the 
human brain [0.6] so [0.5] what i'm pointing out is there's been a constant 
series of attempts to try to explain what goes on in the human brain [0.3] by 
means of invoking the lastest bit of technology [2.2] [2.4] now there are all 
sorts of reasons why people have found cognitivism attractive [0.6] and Searle 
lists these in the chapter [0.2] and in the notes that i've handed out i've 
gone through [0.3] er [0.2] some of the reasons why cognitivism might be 
thought to be attractive [0.4] i'm not going to go through [0.3] those [0.4] 
now [0.2] you can read those in the book itself [0.4] you can read the sort of 
summary the comment that i've made about those [0.4] reasons why con-, [0.2] 
cognitivism might be 
thought attractive [0.4] er in the handout there are various sorts of pieces of 
psychological evidence [0.3] which might be thought to support the idea that 
the human brain is information processing [2.6] what i want to do [0.7] is to 
as it were [0.7] get to the very [0.2] nub of the matter [0.5] and to consider 
[0.2] the sort of claim that cognitivism makes and the reason why Searle thinks 
it to be [0.3] wrong [1.7] okay [9.1] here's one example [2.7] i saw a 
programme on er television a few years ago [0.5] now [0.6] er [1.6] it was a a 
science [0.2] in one of a science series called Big Science [1.6] on B-B-C-two 
[0.6] in the early evening it was one of those [0.2] one of those television 
programmes where they thought it necessary in order to present science to [0.5] 
have a kind of mode of presentation which i found highly irritating so you had 
[0.2] for example [0.2] you know the face of somebody on the screen speaking 
and behind them you had a whole series of kind of flashing lights and moving er 
[0.2] you know amoeba-like things and [0.2] streaming across underneath there 
was you know bits of text and 
you know [0.2] there's all kind of [0.6] somehow or other the producers [0.5] 
it seemed to me [0.4] there was something fundamentally wrong here the 
producers were thinking [1.0] you know at some level they were thinking look 
science is so boring [0.2] we're going to have to make this attractive by 
producing lots of big visual effects [0.3] and that seemed to be a terribly [0.
4] you know patronizing view [0.7] anyway [1.0] er [0.2] sorry about that [1.5] 
in Big Science there was an Oxford [0.4] scientist an Oxford psychologist [0.6] 
who had just discovered something very important he thought [1.1] he'd 
discovered how it was that cricketers managed to catch cricket balls [0.7] okay 
[0.4] he'd done a lot of research on this [0.8] and er [0.2] he had filmed a 
lot of cricketers catching cricket balls [0.4] and he'd used in particular [0.
2] Mark Ramprakash [0.3] the [0.7] England cricketer in the news this week 
because he's just [0.2] transferred from Middlesex to Surrey [2.1] and er [0.7] 
what [0.6] this scientist said [10.0] i've got the [0.4] yeah [0.9] okay 
nineteen-ninety-four [1.1] he says this [2.0] in order to catch a ball [0.2] 
your mind your 
subconscious mind [0.4] calculates the second order differential equation of 
the sort A-level students struggle with [0.8] i think he's got an optimistic 
view of A-level students actually but still [laughter] [0.5] er [0.3] a sort of 
[0.5] s-, seco-, second order differential equation sort of thing that [0.7] 
undergraduate maths students struggle with anyway [0.4] er [0.5] it calculates 
that the second differential of the tangent of the angle of gaze is zero [0.8] 
so in other words what you do you know the ball's in the air and you're running 
to catch it [0.2] and your mind is working out the second order differential 
eca-, equation so that the [0.2] you know the [laughter] [0.5] tangent of the 
angle of gaze is zero [0.4] and then when it's successfully worked out that [0.
3] you know it tells you stand there [whoop] [0.3] like that [2.8] it shows [0.
6] Dr McLeod [0.6] said [0.4] how powerful the subconscious mind is [0.5] and 
Mark Ramprakash [0.8] on the programme was asked [0.3] [laughter] how do you [0.
4] how 
do you catch the ball and he said i just try to catch it [0.4] [laughter] okay 
[1.6] now look [0.5] [laughter] [1.5] this a-, in this quotation in this 
programme [1.1] i think we have revealed [0.3] something [0.9] about [0.7] the 
cognitive [0.8] cognitive science approach [0.5] but something why it seems [0.
2] weird [0.8] because the sort of claim [0.3] that Dr McLeod is making [0.3] 
is just the sort of claim [0.5] cognitivism is making [1.0] but what our brains 
do [0.2] is complicated information processing [1.0] okay [1.0] and so when we 
catch a ball [0.8] we've gone through a complicated process [0.4] of [0.3] 
information processing [2.7] now what's [0.7] you might say well what's wrong 
with that [0.4] i mean who's to say [0.5] that our unconscious mind doesn't up 
the process [1.3] now Searle admits in the chapter that he doesn't have [0.7] a 
knock-down argument against cognitivism [0.4] he doesn't have an absolutely 
decisive argument against cognitive cognitivism [0.5] as he thinks he does [0.
5] against [0.6] the first claim of A-I he Searle thinks [0.2] the Chinese room 
argument [0.5] disposes of the first claim [1.1] but he admits that he hasn't 
got such a knock-down argument for this [1.0] and he wants to show us [0.2] how 
implausible such a claim is [1.0] now i think actually [0.2] just by showing 
that sort of claim to you [0.5] some of you already felt that that was just 
kind of implausible [0.6] but let me emphasize let me produce a se-, a second 
example [1.8] and this example is taken from Searle but not i think from the 
chapter [0.6] but from [0.2] er Searle on many other occasions [0.5] for 
example Searle when he was standing [0.3] right here [1.1] er four-and-a-half 
years ago [0.4] Searle came to a conference at namex University [0.5] and he 
gave a lecture just where i'm giving [0.4] the lecture now [0.3] that he 
produced [0.2] this example which i'm now going to produce for you [1.7] he 
said he had a [0.3] dog [1.1] and a dog called Ludwig [1.7] and he says that 
the dog loves to [0.3] as [0.3] many dogs do loves to [0.2] fetch things catch 
things bring them to him and so on [0.7] and a game that he often plays with 
Ludwig [0.4] is that Searle will [0.4] throw a tennis ball against a wall [0.4] 
and then [0.2] Ludwig will go on and catch the tennis ball in its mouth [0.9] 
okay [1.0] 
now [1.0] think [0.2] what Ludwig has to do [0.6] think what Ludwig has to do 
[0.7] first of all [0.7] Searle throws the tennis ball against the wall [0.9] 
so in order for Ludwig to calculate [0.3] where to go to catch the ball [1.0] 
first of all [0.2] Ludwig must know the angle of incidence is equal to the 
angle of reflection [0.6] okay going sort of [0.2] if Searle [0.2] throws the 
ball like that then the ball's going to go up like that [1.1] then the dog has 
got to calculate what the initial velocity [0.3] of Searle throwing the ball is 
[0.6] and then what the effect of [0.2] friction [0.2] of the of air [0.4] will 
do and the effect of gravity [0.5] on decreasing the speed of the tennis ball 
[0.9] and then what the effect of the actual surface of the wall will be [0.2] 
the coefficient of friction of the wall and various other factors which may [0.
2] slow down the rate of the ball [0.6] okay [0.2] and then you take into 
account wind speed and so on [0.9] and that's not going to be it [0.3] because 
then Ludwig has got to calculate [0.4] what amount of energy to release in its 
legs that'll push it [0.2] you know [0.2] to it's got to calculate 
all of these things [0.2] it's a miracle Ludwig ever gets that [0.8] but he 
does every time [0.8] okay [2.0] now [1.6] one thing that Dr McLeod didn't say 
[0.3] but i heard other people talking about cognitivism say [1.0] one thing he 
didn't say [0.4] was [1.3] h-, [0.4] he didn't say it shows how powerful the 
human mind is [0.3] he just said subconscious mind [0.4] if he had said human 
mind then the Ludwig example be would be even more [0.2] pertinent [0.4] 
because of course it isn't just Mark Ramprakash that manages to catch a ball 
dogs do it too [0.8] but anyway [1.3] is it [0.2] plausible to suppose [0.4] 
that the dog [0.3] actually [0.2] calculates all of those things [0.6] what if 
there were another type of explanation which as it were disposes of the need [0.
6] for giving such an explanation [0.9] i mean [1.5] we don't have to disagree 
with Dr McLeod's [0.6] physics [0.4] it may very well be [0.8] that in order to 
calculate [0.2] where a ball is going to land [0.2] you're going to calculate 
it [0.2] [sniff] it may be true [0.3] i'm [0.2] i take it [0.4] from him that 
it is true [0.3] that the second differential of the angle of gaze [0.7] of the 
tangent 
of the angle of gaze has to be zero i take that as being true if you're going 
to calculate it [1.0] but isn't there another way [0.3] isn't it just that 
human beings like dogs [0.3] learn how to do things [0.6] they learn how to do 
things by trial and error [0.6] dogs and human beings are not very good at 
catching balls to begin with [0.5] you know watch a three year old trying to 
catch a ball you know [0.4] misses it it's fine we gradually get better at it 
[0.8] now is that because we're getting more sophisticated at differential 
equations [1.1] or is it because somehow or other our body is learning how to 
do a particular task [2.0] because we have to come back to a point that i've 
made so many times now in the last few lectures [0.5] we have bodies of a 
particular sort [0.3] bodies which are adapted to perform particular sorts of 
tasks [0.7] those tasks that we've described in mathematical terms [1.1] but 
that doesn't mean that we have to perform that mathematics [0.3] in order for 
our body to perform [1.1] okay [0.9] any more than you have to suppose 
that even something quite inanimate [0.5] has to perform [0.3] a particular [0.
2] task to behave as it does [0.8] the cricket ball [0.6] the cricket ball [0.
7] you throw the cricket ball in the air [0.8] how does the cricket ball know 
where to land [0.6] does it have to calculate the second order differential of 
blah blah blah blah blah [0.3] no [0.3] it is just pe-, [0.3] it's just as it 
were obeying laws of physics doesn't have to calculate [1.0] and our bodies too 
behave in certain ways [0.4] which can be explained [0.3] in certain sorts of 
mathematical terms [0.3] but that isn't [0.2] to say that those are the causes 
of the way in which they behave [0.2] okay [2.2] an example from the chapter [1.
8] is walking okay here i am walking around [0.7] and every now and then 
getting slightly unbalanced [0.7] but i manage to correct myself [0.5] how do i 
do that [0.4] okay [0.7] well [1.2] we know [0.7] that there's a way in which 
human beings manage to maintain their balance [0.6] we know in some sort of [0.
3] rough [0.2] degree of detail or [0.2] relatively good detail depending on 
how much we know about physiology [0.7] and unfortunately i know 
rather little about physiolo-, [0.2] physiology [0.5] but [0.2] i [0.6] know 
something like this that there are these semicircular canals in the ear in 
which there [0.4] is some sort of fluid and that as we [0.3] you know [0.2] tip 
our [0.3] head [0.2] around the place then [0.4] different levels of the fluid 
in the inner ear will [0.3] enable them to [0.2] keep ourselves upright and 
there are people who have [0.6] various sorts of er malfunction of those 
semicircular canals find it very difficult to maintain their balance [0.4] as 
often happens in old people [1.2] Searle discusses that particular example [0.
4] [9.7] and the point that he's making [0.4] is [1.6] [cough] [1.5] that in 
behaving as we do [2.1] in a lot of the tasks that we perform [0.6] we are not 
following rules [1.4] and therefore it's wrong to suppose that there's some 
sorts of unconscious calculation going on [1.4] when i [0.2] when i walk along 
and maintain my balance [0.3] i'm not [0.3] following a rule [0.6] although 
there are in me as it were scientific laws that apply [0.5] to my behaviour [10.
0] how does the brain [0.5] 
manage to enable me [0.2] to keep my balance [1.3] Searle says the brain just 
does it [2.2] he says there's no particular answer for how does the brain 
perform a task [0.2] it just does it [1.4] in particular he says there's no 
answer like this [0.5] this isn't the way [0.2] it goes [1.7] so the bit in red 
again is Searle saying what doesn't happen [0.4] okay [0.8] the brain [0.3] 
does it by assuming that gravity is constant assessing how the internal fluids 
are distributed and calculating the angle at which the head is inclined to the 
body [0.3] then calculating that the body needs to lean over to the right to 
the tune of five degrees in order to remain upright [0.9] no such calculation 
takes place [0.5] it simply is the case that as i [0.3] start to [0.3] lean 
over [0.2] then [0.3] i adjust myself to go back [0.5] now [2.8] although many 
people [0.5] would agree [1.0] that the [0.4] Mark [0.2] Ramprakash [0.2] Dr 
McLeod [0.5] explanation the Dr McLeod explanation of catching a cricket ball 
seemed implausible and it seemed implausible to suggest [0.5] that a cricketer 
does go through that calculation as to even unconsciously [0.5] but 
although many people would agree that it does seem implausible to suggest that 
Searle's dog Ludwig goes through [0.2] a massive series of physical and 
mathematical calculations [0.2] even if unconsciously [0.6] and although many 
people would agree that it does seem implausible to say [0.6] that the brain [0.
2] goes through a series of calculations like that [0.5] nevertheless [0.3] a 
number of people [0.2] find it kind of er unsatisfactory when Searle says that 
the brain [0.3] just does it [0.4] that's a phrase that he uses quite a lot 
i've heard him use it again and again [0.7] [0.2] how is it that i catch a 
cricket ball [0.3] well Mark Ramprakash [0.2] i'm sure in complete ignorance of 
Searle [0.2] did answer i just try and catch it [0.6] and it so happens [0.7] 
and [0.5] w-, [0.2] i don't i mean s-, [0.2] the point here i don't think 
Searle [0.5] i don't think Searle is saying [0.7] that there's nothing to be 
explained in here [1.0] i think what he's what he's pointing out and if [0.2] 
if you look in the chapter it's quite clear [0.3] what he's pointing out [0.4] 
is that [0.6] because we are the sorts of 
creatures that we are because we've got the sorts of bodies that we have [0.4] 
because those bodies have evolved in a certain sort of way [0.6] they are 
particularly good at performing certain sorts of tasks [0.5] tasks they learn 
to perform [0.4] over a period of time [0.6] children learn to do things [0.3] 
and they learn to do things by very simple processes of trial and error [0.3] 
and all of that all of that provides a perfectly satisfactory explanation [0.5] 
of how they manage to do it [0.9] okay [1.7] there are other ways in which 
their behaviour could be described [0.5] we can talk about the physics of 
catching a cricket ball [0.4] and that's a perfectly gi-, legitimate area [0.7] 
despite it [0.5] but it doesn't mean that we have to do the physics [0.5] to 
catch the cricket ball [0.9] any more than the stars [0.3] have to perform [0.
3] calculations [0.6] to stay where there are in the sky or planets to [0.3] 
perform calculations to move around the sun [1.1] okay [1.4] that's the point 
of it [0.5] chapter four tomorrow