nf0098: er [0.8] where are you going [0.5] 
sf0099: Cornwall 
nf0098: oh that can't be any better than the Philosophy weekend 
sf0099: well no but it's paid for [laugh] [0.3] i might come for the day on 
Friday 
nf0098: yeah good plan [1.5] okay then anyway perhaps we should get started [1.
5] so [0.3] we're looking at proper names [0.2] at the moment [1.0] right 
remember from last week [0.4] and we started off last week by looking at a 
Millian [0.2] theory of proper names [0.8] anyone want to remind me [0.2] what 
a Millian theory of proper names is without looking [0.2] at [0.3] your handout 
[0.2] 'cause that would make me really depressed if you can't remember what a 
Millian theory of names is without looking at your handout [0.5] namex 
sm0100: that they are are labels [0.2] 
nf0098: they're labels [0.2] exactly right so what's the meaning of a proper 
name for Mill [1.1] 
sm0101: the er hook they cos-, they correspond to in the er world [0.2] 
nf0098: yeah exactly the object that it hooks up with in the world [0.5] so for 
Mill [0.2] the answer to what is the meaning of a proper name is very very 
simple it's just the object [0.2] in the world [0.2] that 
it hooks up with [1.1] and we finished off last week by looking at three [0.3] 
worries [0.2] with that kind of [0.4] Millian theory of names [0.6] anyone want 
to remind me [0.9] what the problems were [3.5] 
sm0100: i don't know fake names like [0.5] [0.3] 
nf0098: exactly right [0.2] not [0.4] tend to call them empty names 
sm0100: empty names 
nf0098: names that don't have anything relating to them in the world exactly 
right namex [0.7] problem with empty names [3.6] er there was a problem with [0.
6] how we decide on the [0.4] denotation remember [0.2] the Millian difference 
between denotation and connotation [0.4] denotation being the object in the 
world [0.4] connotation being a kind of a property [0.6] er and if we think 
that names are things which just have denotation and don't have connotation [0.
4] we've got a trouble [0.5] on [0.9] settling or determining [1.0] the 
referent [2.8] how do we find out what thing it is in the world that the name 
is supposed to hook up with anyway [0.9] and one more problem [0.4] anyone 
remind me of a last problem [0.4] 
sm0102: the Hesperus and Phosphorus [0.2] problem 
nf0098: Hesperus and Phosphorus exactly right there's a 
problem [1.0] with what i called cognitive difference [4.0] okay [1.2] and that 
was the worry about [0.5] think if [0.2] all there is to the meaning of a name 
is [0.2] just the thing in the world that it hooks up with [0.4] how do we 
explain the fact that sometimes [sniff] [0.4] er you can not realize that fact 
[1.0] sometimes you can think things like [0.3] Hesperus is not Phosphorus [0.
8] even though in fact those two names pick out exactly the same object in the 
world [1.7] okay and it's this problem [0.2] the problem of so-called cognitive 
difference [0.3] that we're going to concentrate on [0.3] for the next sort of 
week and a half [0.8] [sniff] and we're going to concentrate on it because [1.
8] this [0.2] kind of problem [0.4] was first brought to the fore [0.2] and 
made most of by [0.4] Frege [0.8] so we're going to see [0.3] how Frege [0.2] 
established this problem [0.5] and what sort of theory [0.2] it led him [0.3] 
to develop for names [0.2] it's going to be a non-Millian theory of names that 
Frege developed [0.3] in response [0.3] to this kind of worry [1.9] okay then 
so what exactly is the problem [0.2] of cognitive difference 
then what is the worry [0.2] here [1.1] well i've said on the handout [1.0] 
some sentences which state sameness of referent [0.3] like [0.2] Cicero is 
Cicero [0.4] or the first postmaster general was the first postmaster general 
[0.4] seem very uninformative [0.3] [sniff] [0.3] you know if i stand up here 
and lecture to you and tell you [0.4] hey Cicero was Cicero [0.8] you're going 
to think you're being [0.3] sold short [0.2] you know that's not particularly 
informative or useful thing [0.6] er for a university education to equip you 
with [0.4] but [0.2] on the other hand [0.4] if i stand up here and tell you [0.
8] Cicero [0.2] was Tully [1.0] or [0.4] the first postmaster general [0.4] was 
[0.2] the inventor of bifocals [0.6] or even [0.3] Abraham Lincoln [0.5] was 
the first postmaster general [0.4] or [0.3] the first [0.2] er the inventor of 
bifocals [0.5] you've learned something useful [0.6] right [1.9] fairly useful 
anyway [0.2] seems like taxpayers' money is not going to waste here you've 
learned something [0.4] got a useful fact to take away with you [0.3] but how 
can the Millian explain something like that [2.6] because according to the 
Millian [0.2] the meaning of the name is 
entirely given by its referent hello namex [1.1] recovered from your hangover 
leaving the union at two o'clock in the morning [laughter] [0.4] 
sm0103: yes [0.3] 
nf0098: yes [laughter] very good and it's only taken you till two o'clock the 
next day that's fantastic [laughter] [0.9] er [1.1] so if the Millian is going 
to tell you [0.3] that the meaning of the name [0.6] oh [1.0] can't believe it 
i got a new pen the other day and it's run out already [1.0] er the meaning of 
the name [0.5] Cicero [0.2] is just given [5.6] by your little [0.9] Greek 
orator [1.2] there he is [0.5] meaning of the name Cicero given by your Greek 
orator [1.0] how does he [0.2] explain the fact [0.7] that it can be useful 
then to learn [0.3] that Cicero [0.9] is Tully [2.2] because if the meaning of 
those two names is entirely given [0.5] by the object they pick out in the 
world [0.4] then [0.4] you know how is one any more informative [0.2] than the 
other [0.5] how would Cicero is Tully [0.2] be any more informative [0.2] than 
Cicero is Cicero [4.2] okay [2.7] so i say on the handout this difference would 
seem inexplicable if all there was 
to the meaning of a name is the object [0.2] it refers to [1.0] and i say this 
is sometimes known as Frege's problem [0.3] or the problem of cognitive 
difference [1.4] well we might perhaps note here that i'm being just [0.2] 
slightly [0.2] disingenuous [0.3] i guess [0.6] because i'm saying the problem 
as if there's a single kind of problem we can identify here [0.4] when actually 
it's more like a kind of bundle [0.2] of worries [0.6] because if you read any 
of the literature here you'll find that this problem is sometimes stated in 
slightly different ways [1.1] okay so i've said that it's [0.5] you know what 
we're going to call Frege's problem [0.3] is the difference between [0.2] 
identity statements of the form A-equals-A [1.0] and identity statements of the 
form A-equals-B [1.0] and that's one way of stating the problem [1.4] but in 
other areas you might find the problem stated as er [1.1] see [1.9] er [0.6] 
the fact that it might be rational for someone to believe [6.2] okay [1.6] say 
that the object [0.3] named by the label A [0.2] is the object [0.2] named by 
the label B [1.6] would it be 
rational [0.3] could it be rational to believe that A is not B [2.9] yes [0.3] 
even after [0.2] nineteen pints namex can see that [laughter] it would be 
rational to believe that kind of thing [0.7] would it be rational to believe 
that A is not A [3.0] do you think [0.6] no very good [0.4] wouldn't be 
rational doesn't seem [0.2] to matter how confused you are about your 
environment [0.8] it never seems to be rational to believe [1.4] something of 
this form [0.2] that an identity sign [0.5] using the same label on both sides 
for the same object [0.7] er [0.5] that those two objects are non-identical [0.
6] so sometimes Frege's problem [0.3] is stated as the fact that it would be 
irrational [0.3] to believe [0.2] something in form A is A [0.3] A is not A [0.
4] but irrational to believe something in form A is not B [1.9] sorry did i 
give that the wrong way round [laughter] [0.2] 
sf0104: we understood 
nf0098: other way round you know what i'm saying [1.9] er and a third way that 
you might find [0.4] this problem stated [0.2] is to do with [1.5] exchange in 
certain contexts [1.6] okay [0.4] so in certain contexts it looks as if you can 
always exchange [0.5] coreferential terms [0.4] 
what's called [0.2] salva veritate [0.8] get all classical on you there [1.3] 
did we do this last term did we do the term salva veritate [0.5] 
sm0105: er [0.8] 
sf0106: er [0.3] it was mentioned [1.1] 
nf0098: that was a quick statement for no [laughter] no certainly didn't do 
that what the hell is it [laugh] [0.4] salve veritate means exchange [0.2] er 
[1.7] without alteration in truth value [2.0] if you can exchange something 
salva veritate that means that you can exchange two things without [0.2] 
altering the truth [0.5] value [0.3] of the sentence in which they occur [2.3] 
so do you remember all the stuff you did in [0.4] er [0.2] logic in the second 
year [0.7] you did stuff about truth functional connectives like and [1.5] and 
or [0.8] and not [2.2] things of that form you can [0.2] always exchange 
coreferring terms salva veritate [0.5] if you've got a sentence like [1.9] 
Cicero [0.2] er [3.7] went to the market [sniff] [3.0] or [0.6] i don't know [0.
4] er Cicero went to the market or Caesar did [1.6] you can [0.2] always 
exchange coreferential terms in this kind of context without altering the 
truth value [0.6] if this whole sentence is true [0.7] then the sentence [2.6] 
Tully went to the market or Caesar did [0.2] has to be true as well [0.6] if 
Cicero is Tully [2.3] yeah [1.1] 'cause these guys [0.5] like or [0.4] that's 
truth functional all they worry about is the truth value [0.5] of the sentences 
they're connecting [0.2] and if it's true that Cicero went to the market then 
it has to be true that Tully went to the market [0.3] if Cicero is Tully [1.2] 
so in some contexts then you're guaranteed to be able to exchange coreferring 
terms salva veritate [0.9] but in some contexts [0.7] you're not [1.4] anyone 
[0.5] think of a context in which [1.1] you might not be able to do that [2.5] 
sf0107: John believes that Cicero 
nf0098: yeah classic example [1.9] if you've got something like John believes 
[1.8] that [1.4] Cicero went to the market [7.0] [sniff] [3.6] something like 
this [0.2] a so-called intentional context [0.7] using a term like believes or 
hopes or desires [0.4] a term picking out a mental [0.4] state [0.3] er [0.7] a 
propositional attitude [2.0] in contexts like these [0.2] you pretty obviously 
can't go around exchanging 
coreferential terms [0.3] salva veritate [0.9] John believes that Cicero went 
to the market [0.2] so this whole sentence is true [1.8] okay [0.2] this whole 
thing is true [1.0] am i guaranteed [2.3] that the sentence John believes that 
Tully [0.3] went to the market [0.4] is also true [6.6] 
sm0108: no [0.4] 
nf0098: no [0.3] exactly right [0.2] not guaranteed that at all [0.4] John 
could easily believe that Cicero went to the market and disbelieve [0.5] that 
Tully went to the market [0.2] precisely if he doesn't know [0.3] that Cicero 
is Tully [2.6] so in contexts like these [0.5] believes contexts hopes contexts 
desires contexts things like that [0.8] it doesn't look as if we can exchange 
coreferring terms [0.4] salva veritate [0.6] we can change the truth value of 
the whole sentence [0.4] by swapping [0.7] two terms [0.3] which pick out the 
same object [2.3] so this is another way that you'll find [0.3] Frege's [0.9] 
point made Frege's argument made [0.5] because obviously there would be nothing 
to explain [0.8] this difference [0.8] in [0.9] the kind of context where you 
can exchange [0.3] coreferring terms [0.3] if all there is to 
the meaning [0.5] of a proper name [0.4] is its referent [2.6] the meaning of 
Cicero is completely exhausted [2.9] by [0.3] our Roman orator [3.9] how are we 
going to explain the fact that you can expla-, you can exchange [0.4] the terms 
Cicero and Tully in this context [0.3] but you can't exchange them [0.2] in 
this context [3.1] 
it looks as if you're going to have to [1.9] introduce some [0.2] other element 
into the meaning of the name [0.5] to explain [0.3] this variation [2.3] okay 
do people see that [0.8] namex [0.7] mm [1.0] vaguely [0.7] namex you're 
looking kind of dazed [laughter] [0.4] is that just because it's 
sm0100: that's just me usually 
nf0098: week three of term just the usual okay okay cool [1.5] right so those 
are three different ways that we might find Frege's [0.4] problem stated 
there's the idea of informative identity statements that it's better to learn 
something of the form A-equals-B than it is to learn something of the form A-
equals-A [1.1] er [0.8] there's the fact that it's sometimes irrational to 
believe something of the form [0.7] A-does-not-equal-A [0.2] even though it's 
rational to believe that A-does-not-equal-B [0.7] and we've got the fact that 
in some contexts you can exchange two coreferential terms you can exchange A 
and B [0.3] but in other contexts [0.3] it looks like you can't [1.3] so this 
this whole kind of cluster of worries [0.7] that often get referred to as 
Frege's problem [0.7] or as the 
problem of cognitive difference [8.1] so that's a whole kind of cluster of 
worries [0.9] but [0.3] i put it to you [0.6] if we're going to be driven from 
our nice simple intuitive [0.2] clear [0.5] er Millian position on names [0.3] 
we want more than just a kind of cluster of [0.4] you know [0.2] general slight 
worries about what's going on here [0.4] we want an argument [0.4] goddamn it 
we're philosophers we want a nice clear argument that shows us why we can't be 
Millians given all these [0.2] states of affairs [1.6] and actually [0.2] i 
think it's harder [0.3] to get an argument [1.0] in this case [0.2] than we 
might initially expect [1.4] devil's in the detail like it always is you know 
[1.0] so how might we formalize the kind of argument that's going on [0.2] in 
cases like the ones we just looked at [1.1] well i've given you [0.2] a kind of 
example on the handout [0.3] or [0.3] a way we might try it on the handout [1.
2] we start off [0.2] with a piece of data [0.4] right [1.4] the data is say 
that senten-, the sentence [0.2] Hesperus is cold [0.4] and the sentence 
Phosphorus in cold [0.5] is cold [0.2] differ in cognitive value [0.6] because 
a rational 
agent can know both and assent to one [0.2] while dissenting [0.3] to the other 
[1.8] so there's a piece of data [0.2] for you [1.1] and that seems [0.4] er 
incontrovertible right that's just [0.7] clearly right [2.5] now secondly [1.0] 
if that's our premise so if that's our piece of data we need some kind [0.2] of 
second [0.2] premise [0.4] connecting [0.4] the objects of knowledge [0.2] and 
the expressions of our language [0.7] because look [0.6] what premise one tells 
us [0.7] is that an agent can know both of these things [0.5] and can assent to 
one and dissent to the other [0.5] the first premise is one about epistemology 
[0.2] right [0.4] it's one about what people know [0.9] but what we're trying 
to get at is a conclusion about [0.5] the meaning of linguistic items [1.9] so 
we need a premise connecting [0.4] the things that people know about bits of 
language to the meaning [0.2] of bits of language [2.0] and we could just do 
that in some very general way by saying there is some kind of connection 
between the objects of knowledge and expressions in the language [2.0] now if 
we can establish that if we can establish that 
there is this connection then we do seem able to draw a conclusion that [0.6] 
Hesperus [0.2] the term Hesperus and the term Phosphorus [0.5] differ [0.4] in 
something other than [0.3] and i've put in here [0.2] bedeutung [1.0] that's 
the German phrase [0.3] that [0.3] Frege uses [0.3] sometimes translated as 
reference [0.7] sometimes as nominatum [0.6] sometimes as designation i'll 
almost always say reference but [0.4] you should just be aware that that's [0.
9] er an issue about exactly how that term should be translated [1.9] okay we 
can obviously get that conclusion because if you've got the two sentences 
Hesperus is cold and Phosphorus is cold [0.4] the only bit they differ in [0.5] 
is [0.3] the names they contain [1.2] yeah [0.6] so we can trace [0.4] if there 
is going to be a difference [0.8] er between the meaning of those two whole 
sentences [0.3] we know it's got to come [0.3] in the meaning of those two [0.
3] bits of sentences [1.1] so we do get the conclusion that Hesperus and 
Phosphorus differ in something other than reference [1.4] that would seem to be 
a good conclusion 'cause that's what Frege wants to conclude 
because he's going to say that the meaning of name isn't just [0.5] its 
reference [2.8] but [0.7] i think you should know that as it stands [0.2] the 
conclusion in three [0.2] isn't particularly interesting [0.6] oops [0.4] 
[laughter] [0.4] you can't get that back now either 'cause that's stuck in the 
middle [laughter] [0.5] going to have to go under the table Andrew [2.6] very 
good [1.0] okay so the conclusion in three isn't an interesting conclusion [1.
0] why not [0.7] why isn't it interesting to be told that [1.7] Hesperus and [0.
4] Phosphorus [4.8] differ in something other than reference [9.9] well the 
answer is [0.3] clearly [0.2] why it's not interesting to be told that Hesperus 
and Phosphorus differ in something other than reference [0.5] it's 'cause that 
they clearly differ in something [1.5] they're not the same thing are they [0.
6] this isn't like saying Hesperus and Hesperus differ in something other than 
reference [0.6] these are two different syntactic items [1.6] they've got 
different orthographic properties 
they've got different phonetic properties [0.4] they've got different 
properties about occasions of use [1.5] there are lots of different properties 
that these have [1.5] regardless of the fact [0.2] that they don't differ in 
reference [2.2] so what Frege needs to make this conclusion of his argument an 
interesting conclusion [0.5] is not the claim just that they differ in 
something other than reference [0.5] but that they differ [1.0] in meaning [5.
4] that's the interesting conclusion [1.3] that Hesperus and Phosphorus differ 
in meaning [1.9] because if that's the case [0.3] then we know that meaning 
can't just be reference [0.8] it can't be the Millian position [0.6] because we 
know that Hesperus and Phosphorus [0.5] both pick out [1.9] Venus [1.7] yet 
again this week looks a bit like Mercury [0.2] but anyway [1.3] we know they 
both have the same reference [0.3] if we know that they both have the same 
reference [0.5] er but yet they differ in meaning [0.2] then we know that 
meaning and reference aren't synonymous [0.4] aren't the same thing [2.3] so 
that's 
the conclusion that Frege needs to get [0.8] whoops [0.9] he needs to get [0.2] 
that Hesperus [0.3] and Phosphorus [0.2] differ in meaning [1.9] and that's a 
claim [0.3] that's been [0.2] disputed [0.2] by some people [1.6] some 
philosophers want to accept [0.4] the initial [1.4] kind of uninteresting claim 
that i put up to begin with that Hesper and [0.2] Hesperus and Phosphorus 
differ in something other than reference [0.4] and yet not accept [0.2] that 
they differ [0.8] in [0.4] meaning [0.7] I-E not accept that there is a 
semantic level difference between these two guys [2.3] how might you do that [0.
4] well you might do that by appealing say to the syntactic properties [0.3] of 
each expression [0.5] or [0.9] i guess a probably more popular [0.2] move [0.4] 
is to appeal to the kind of pragmatic properties [0.4] that these expressions 
have [1.8] the fact that on some occasions of use [0.2] it's fitting [0.2] to 
use the term Hesperus [0.5] and on some occasions of use it's fitting [0.4] to 
use the word [0.4] Phosphorus [1.9] so what these kind of people like [0.2] er 
Nathan Salmon [0.3] wrote a whole book [1.4] Nathan Salmon one of the great 
fish philosophers [0.2] of the century 
did we look at him last term [1.1] no [0.9] er Nathan Salmon wrote a whole book 
called Frege's Puzzle [0.2] in which he argues that [0.4] the only difference 
[0.4] that's relevant here between Hesperus and Phosphorus is a pragmatic 
difference [1.6] why don't you say something like [6.8] the ancient astronomers 
believed [5.1] Hesperus was Phosphorus [1.6] okay it was the ancient 
astronomers that introduced the two different terms Hesperus and Phosphorus [0.
4] one for the star that you could see in the morning [0.3] one for the star 
that you could see in the evening [1.8] so [1.4] they introduced these two 
terms they didn't realize that they were naming the same planet [0.4] 'cause 
obviously that wouldn't have been very helpful to have used two different words 
for something they realized was the same planet [0.9] they introduced two 
different words for it [0.3] called one Hesperus and one Phosphorus [1.7] er [0.
7] so it doesn't sound right to say that the ancient astronomers believed that 
Hesperus was Hesperus [0.3] even though it does seem right [0.6] to 
say that the ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus [0.4] was Hesperus [2.
3] that's the kind of failure of exchange [0.3] that w-, [0.4] Frege's Puzzle 
is interested in [1.0] but people like Nathan Salmon want to say well look [0.
2] actually you can say both those things [1.2] both of those sentences are 
perfectly [0.9] r-, [0.5] right they're perfectly true [0.7] because [0.9] 
semantics is just to do with reference [0.4] it's just that this one [0.2] this 
first sentence [0.3] is not very acceptable [0.8] there are pragmatic reasons 
that you don't want to er [0.2] attribute this kind of thing [0.4] primarily 
because this isn't something [0.3] that the ancient astronomers themselves [0.
7] would have assented to [0.7] even though when they were believing that 
Hesperus was Hesperus they were really believing that Hesperus was Phosphorus 
[0.5] that's not the way they would have chosen to phrase their beliefs [2.0] 
now i can see certain people [0.2] like namex [0.2] [laughter] [0.3] and namex 
not looking totally convinced by this manoeuvre here [0.4] and i [0.5] i'm in 
sympathy with you really it doesn't sound 
like an intuitively very compelling manoeuvre [0.3] although you know Salmon's 
book's [0.3] worth having a look at because he gives this kind of line a really 
[0.9] good go you know it's a big book [1.2] lots of arguments for his position 
[0.9] but [0.9] if you're feeling a bit [0.2] kind of sceptical about this sort 
of worry then i think that's fair enough [0.4] really [2.2] and maybe if that's 
the way you are feeling [0.3] then [1.8] we can kind of let Frege off the hook 
[1.0] even if we can't find a really strong way to kind of [0.2] codify his 
argument [0.4] perhaps it is the case that the worries he raises [0.4] are [0.
2] good enough [1.2] that if he can get to the conclusion that Hesperus and 
Phosphorus differ in something other than referent [1.2] we just kind of feel 
that has to be something to do with the meaning [0.3] of the expressions 
involved even if he can't actually get you to that conclusion [1.1] deductively 
[0.4] perhaps it just seems reasonable that the thing that they differ in [0.2] 
has to be a thing to do with the meaning [0.3] it can't be something to do just 
with the pragmatics [0.7] as Salmon 
tries to argue [3.1] okay how are we doing people clear on the [0.2] kind of 
argument [1.3] yeah [2.1] 
sf0109: can i just ask is the 
nf0098: yeah [0.6] 
sf0109: is the Salmon position something we really need to sort of know about 
in detail 
nf0098: no [0.7] no [0.5] 
sf0109: if you er er 
nf0098: it's if you're interested you should have a look at it 
sf0109: mm 
nf0098: but it's not [0.2] 
sf0109: it's not going to be an exam question or anything [laughter] 
nf0098: oh [0.7] God what sort of question is that i'm not answering questions 
like that [laughter] [0.9] okay then so that's Frege's argument [0.4] this kind 
of cluster of worries that seem to show us that the Millian position which 
tells us that the meaning of a proper name is just given by the object it 
refers to [0.3] that that position is somehow [0.4] unsatisfactory [3.5] so 
clearly we know that position is unsatisfactory [1.1] and we've got a good 
argument against it [0.8] what we need to do next [0.3] is to come up with a 
better position [1.3] we need to find a positive suggestion [0.6] as to what 
the meaning [0.2] of a proper name is which is going to 
allow us to avoid [0.2] these kinds of difficulties [1.5] and Frege's [0.7] got 
a solution [0.8] and being a great philosopher he's got two solutions [0.7] one 
of which he made in an early stage of his career went on to reject [0.4] and 
the second one which has become a kind of standard of philosophy of language [1.
2] so his first suggestion which he made in Begriffsschrift [0.8] one of his 
earlier works [0.9] was that a sentence like Hesperus is Phosphorus [0.3] 
should be read [0.2] as saying something like [0.5] the object denoted by the 
expression [0.3] Hesperus [1.2] is the same as the object [0.2] denoted [0.2] 
by the expression [0.8] Phosphorus [2.0] okay you all remember from last term 
[4.0] notice the way that's not a question that's a statement you do all 
remember from last term [0.3] i know you do [1.0] the difference between [1.8] 
using and mentioning [1.8] anyone want to remind me what the difference between 
using an expression and mentioning an expression is [1.1] we did it in the 
first week of the first term so you know [0.4] way back [laugh] [4.1] namex [0.
6] 
sm0103: er well [0.3] one of them's [0.2] kind of quotation marks round it [0.
5] er [0.2] which means that you're [0.3] referring to the [0.3] word 
nf0098: mm-hmm 
sm0103: rather than what the word [0.5] refers to [0.2] 
nf0098: exactly right [0.3] perfect [0.8] the difference between [0.2] saying 
something like [0.7] John [1.1] is happy [1.4] which tells you [2.6] [sniff] [1.
5] that [1.7] right [0.8] and saying [1.5] er that's single quotes [6.1] 
which tells you what [3.4] 
sm0110: the word [0.2] John [0.4] is that [0.6] 
nf0098: yeah [0.2] doesn't really make much sense [0.4] this tells you 
something about the word because you've enclosed it [0.4] in quote marks you're 
mentioning it [0.2] you're not using it [0.3] you're talking not about [0.9] 
this big eared guy up here [0.2] with a grin on his face [0.3] you're talking 
about the linguistic item [0.2] the word itself [1.0] and you can use it to say 
true things like [5.6] like that [1.2] John has four letters [0.5] that's fine 
[0.8] and if you take off the quote mark [0.9] what does that mean [1.6] 
sf0111: the person John has four letters 
nf0098: exactly [0.7] maybe that's why he's so happy [2.5] [laughter] it's his 
birthday he's got four cards [0.2] [laugh] [0.5] er [0.7] so [0.4] Frege's 
first manoeuvre here [0.5] is try [0.5] to differentiate [0.3] use and mention 
[1.8] what he's saying really is 
that when you have [0.2] a sentence like Hesperus is Phosphorus [0.4] you're 
really not saying something about the world [0.6] you're saying something about 
your language [1.0] what you're saying is that [4.7] the object referred to [4.
8] by that [2.9] is [0.9] the object referred to [0.9] by that [3.6] okay [0.5] 
put your name Hesperus and your name Phosphorus [0.4] you've enclosed them in 
quote marks [0.3] so you're mentioning them you're not using them [0.5] and 
you're saying that the thing [0.2] which is picked out by this linguistic item 
[0.3] is the same as the thing picked out by this linguistic item [3.6] now 
this was Frege's first proposal [0.8] but he rejected it pretty quickly [0.3] 
oh we might talk about this as a metalinguistic [0.2] proposal [0.4] okay [0.9] 
because it's explaining a linguistic fact [0.3] by using [1.0] items [0.2] from 
the language [0.7] in the explanation [sniff] [0.3] it's kind of going one 
level higher than language right it's metalinguistic because it's [0.4] 
mentioning [0.4] bits [0.7] of the linguistic system [1.9] so this was his 
first proposal [0.3] but he rejected it pretty quickly [0.4] because he just 
thought 
that actually [0.2] on reflection [0.6] this whole claim here [0.6] just isn't 
[0.4] what's meant [0.4] by a claim like Hesperus is Phosphorus [3.1] he just 
decided that this [0.8] equivalence claim to do with bits of your language [0.
5] isn't what's meant by a claim [0.5] like this without the quote marks [1.6] 
and he thought that [0.3] because [2.1] if you look at a sentence like Hesperus 
is Phosphorus [0.2] or a sentence like [0.7] er Abraham Lincoln was the first 
postmaster general [1.0] or Cicero was Tully [1.6] those claims don't [0.2] 
seem to be telling you something about your language [3.0] i'm guessing [0.2] 
that none of you knew that Abraham Lincoln [0.3] was the inventor of the 
bifocals when you came in here 
sf0112: Benjamin Franklin [0.2] 
nf0098: was it was wasn't it 
sf0112: 
nf0098: you're absolutely [laughter] right oh my goodness [laughter] 
sm0113: that's why none of us knew it i think 
nf0098: [laughter] that's very true [0.3] or i could have bluffed my whole way 
through here [laughter] and you could have got a degree from a university and 
gone out with a completely false piece of knowledge [laughter] 
couldn't i [1.0] absolutely right Benjamin Franklin [0.3] this is the this is 
the example gets used in all the books as well so it shows how carefully i've 
been reading things [laughter] [0.6] Benjamin Franklin indeed was the inventor 
of the bifocals [1.3] so [1.3] namex block your ears now but i'm assuming some 
people [0.4] in fact nobody knew that Abraham Lincoln was [laughter] the 
inventor of bifocals when you came in here so that's a good example [laugh] [0.
4] er [1.2] but when you learn something of that form [0.4] it doesn't seem 
like you learn something about your language [0.8] it looks like you learn 
something about the world [1.2] you learn a genuine useful fact to go out and 
apply [0.2] in the world [0.9] and not just something [0.3] to do with your 
language [1.6] and because of that [0.4] Frege thought that this kind of [1.0] 
restating of the problem [1.0] in terms [0.4] of a [0.7] comment about the 
language [1.4] wasn't [0.2] a good way to go [0.9] so even though this sort of 
approach might solve the problem [0.4] he just thought it was getting things 
wrong [5.1] okay [0.6] so once he'd rejected this sort of 
proposal [0.5] what's he going to do [1.1] well being a very smart guy he's 
going to come up with a whole new theory [0.2] of the meaning of proper names 
[1.6] according to Frege [3.5] in his classic paper [0.2] Sinn und Bedeutung [1.
3] he's going to tell you [0.6] that there are [0.2] two [0.2] elements [0.4] 
to the meaning [0.2] of a proper name [1.7] Mill tried to tell you that there 
was just one [0.8] there was just this guy [0.2] in the world [2.1] the 
denotation [0.2] or the referent [9.0] but what Frege's going to tell you [1.4] 
is that although [0.2] this is right although this forms one element [0.2] of 
the meaning of the name [0.4] there's another element [1.6] and that element is 
the sense [1.8] sometimes also called the mode of presentation [4.7] whoops [4.
7] so for Frege [0.4] the meaning of a proper name is a kind of [0.3] 
bifurcated [0.3] thing it's got two elements to it a [0.2] dual [1.0] er [0.2] 
feature [0.2] two features [1.9] on the one hand [0.3] you've got the object 
referred to in the world [0.8] the referent [1.2] or the denotation [0.7] and 
on the other hand [0.4] you've got the way in which that object [0.5] is 
presented [2.9] so think 
about Hesperus and Phosphorus again [0.2] you might think that [0.4] the sense 
[0.2] of Hesperus [0.5] is [0.8] the bright star seen in the morning [0.3] and 
you might think the sense [0.2] of Phosphorus [0.3] is the bright star [0.3] 
seen in the evening [1.2] even though [0.4] the referent is the same for both 
of those expressions [1.8] or here [0.2] you might think that [0.3] the 
referent of Cicero [0.6] is [0.2] our Greek orator [1.2] but the sense is [1.9] 
not entirely sure what the sense of Cicero would be [0.4] er the author of [0.
2] certain works [4.1] and it's going to be this element [0.4] that's going to 
explain [0.3] why it is [0.5] that we get [0.3] cognitive difference [1.6] okay 
and why is it [0.5] that you can believe [0.4] Superman can fly [1.3] when you 
don't believe that Clark Kent can fly [0.4] well that's because [0.6] even 
though [0.2] you've got the same referent in the world [3.5] for Clark Kent [2.
8] you've got a sense to do with [2.1] wearing glasses [2.5] being a bit of a 
[0.4] skinny wimp [1.6] working for a newspaper [2.6] whereas for Superman [1.
9] you've got a sense to do with [1.4] wearing a cape [1.4] wearing his 
underwear outside his trousers [0.3] flying 
around [0.5] flying that's pretty good you don't get flying with Clark Kent [2.
4] so even though you've got the same object being presented in both these 
cases [0.6] you've got radically different [0.9] kind of modes of presentation 
of that object [0.3] namex [0.2] you're looking [0.4] 
sf0112: so [0.6] are things like definite descriptions like the first 
postmaster general or [0.2] something like that are they senses or are they 
names 
nf0098: well [0.7] we're going to need to look more carefully at exactly what a 
sense is here 
sf0112: mm 
nf0098: i'm trying to give you a kind of [0.3] rough idea to start with [0.2] 
and then we're going to try and spell out what the technical notion of a sense 
is [2.2] the question about definite descriptions er [1.0] we need to remember 
we're talking about proper names [0.6] er [1.2] in a kind of non-technical 
sense at the moment [1.1] it was quite clear when we looked at Mill that he had 
a fairly restricted notion of proper names [0.3] but Frege has a much more 
liberal notion [0.3] 
sf0112: mm 
nf0098: okay Frege's going to tell you [0.4] that something like Cicero is a 
proper name something like Clark Kent is a proper name [0.3] something like 
Superman is a proper name [0.5] he's also going to tell you though that 
something 
like the first postmaster general 
sf0112: mm 
nf0098: is a proper name [0.9] because he's got a class of what he calls [1.1] 
eigename [0.6] eigenamen [1.5] which contains both ordinary proper names and 
definite descriptions [0.5] 
sf0112: does that mean then when we're trying to sort of work out how to 
express the sense of Cicero we couldn't use something which is like unique to 
Cicero [0.3] because if we did 
nf0098: well 
sf0112: wouldn't it be a proper name [0.8] 
nf0098: er 
sf0112: [0.2] as the sense [0.5] 
nf0098: there's going to be a question about whether senses are just forms of 
definite description [0.7] 
sf0112: right 
nf0098: some people read them as just being [0.5] forms of definite description 
[0.4] although even then [2.4] you might want to be careful because er talking 
about replacing a name like Cicero with a definite description [2.0] there 
might be distinctions when we come to look at Kripke we'll see there are 
distinctions between saying that the meaning of this is given by a description 
[0.3] as opposed to saying that the reference is fixed by a description 
sf0112: mm [0.3] 
nf0098: so there might be questions about exactly what it means 
to say that this can be replaced by a description [0.8] but [1.1] to get ahead 
of ourselves a little bit as well [0.5] it's not clear that a sense has to be 
[0.2] a definite description [0.2] 
sf0112: right [0.7] 
nf0098: people like Evans kind of [0.3] modern-day [0.2] neo-Fregeans as they 
get called [0.4] want to tell you that there's a notion of sense [0.3] which 
isn't [0.3] akin to being a definite description [0.2] which isn't akin to say 
[0.3] er [0.6] the guy who i believe can fly and loves [0.2] Lois Lane and [1.
2] wears a cape and all that kind of thing [1.3] there's a notion of sense 
which is more akin to a sort of [0.8] er a visual presentation [0.3] or [1.0] 
something which is kind of dependent on the object [0.5] so [0.2] i think it's 
on your handouts a bit later actually we'll see Evans has got a nice quote 
about [0.6] just because you say that there's a way of giving an object if i 
give you a present there's a way in which i give you the present [1.3] but 
that's not to say that the giving of the present is kind of indirect [0.4] or 
that [0.2] the way of giving it is something independent of the giving of the 
present [0.6] or the 
present itself [1.0] so he's going to want to have senses which are what he 
calls object-dependent [1.1] they're going to be [0.6] modes of presentation of 
an object which can't be separated from the object [0.6] er that they [0.4] as 
a sense of [0.5] good sentence [0.7] er [2.4] but you're right to think [0.4] 
that we might understand a sense as a definite description [0.7] er and if we 
do then we'll see that Frege's position [0.4] is going to be what's called 
being a descriptivist about names [1.2] so we'll come on to that [1.1] any 
other questions so far 
sm0113: er 
nf0098: namex [0.5] 
sm0113: er [0.3] does the is the problem [0.2] if you see it from a use theory 
because then you only have pragmatic [0.3] like so if you went back to the [0.
5] assignment of 
nf0098: mm 
sm0113: then it it seems a bit more [0.7] plausible doesn't it 
nf0098: if you're not coming from a formal perspective 
sm0113: mm 
nf0098: yeah i think that's probably right [0.2] er [3.5] yeah i m-, this whole 
sort of problem is probably premised more on having a kind of referentialist 
semantics going on definitely [0.2] so yeah think that's right [5.7] 
okay [1.0] er so there's a quote on the handout [0.6] er [1.1] i've told you 
that [1.8] the object referred to [0.3] there's two elements to the meaning of 
name both the object referred to [0.3] and the sense [0.4] sense being the way 
in which the name selects the object [1.4] and Frege tells us in Sinn und 
Bedeutung that [0.4] it is plausible to connect with a sign [0.5] a name a word 
combination an expression [0.5] not only the designated object which may also 
be called the reference of the sign [0.5] but also [0.2] the sense [0.5] and he 
puts in brackets connotation meaning [0.5] of 
the sign [0.5] in which is contained the manner [0.2] and context of 
presentation [1.6] so for those guys who were paying attention when we were 
doing Mill [0.4] last week [0.4] you'll see that really what Frege's doing here 
is extending [0.7] the notion of meaning [0.2] that Mill gave us for all [0.2] 
words for objects [1.2] bar proper names [0.3] Frege is extending that picture 
[0.2] to proper names [0.5] he thinks that Mill's idea [0.3] that we could have 
names having denotation but no connotation [0.3] is just wrong [1.6] names have 
to have both sense and reference they have to have both denotation and 
connotation [4.1] okay then [0.2] well before we go on perhaps we should take a 
break [1.0] any other questions before we go on about [0.3] Frege's argument [2.
7] okay let's take [0.3] five minutes then