nm0089: well good morning everybody [0.2] er [1.4] last year i volunteered or was volunteered to give this lecture because somebody was on leave that somebody's come back and apparently i'm still giving the lecture i don't know how that happened but [0.5] here i am [0.6] and what i'm going to talk about is Marxism [0.2] er and Marxist historiography since Marx [0.6] linking up with what namex said last week [0.7] and [0.2] i think one of the points that [0.6] er is very important about Marx is that Marx's ideas and i i think namex mentioned this last week [0.8] are a sort of unique fusion of [0.3] two separate categories of thinking [0.6] first of all [0.2] there is a strongly philosophical element to Marx [0.5] Marx's ideas [0.2] developed er [0.3] as philosophical ideas in the first place [0.8] and [0.3] it was [0.5] once he'd kind of developed a er a philosophical view of the world based on Hegel and other er thinkers of early nineteenth century Germany [0.6] he then [0.3] er [0. 4] began to observe the realities of capitalist society around him and this led to the second layer of his thought [0.4] the kind of empirical [0.3] practical [0.3] pragmatic [0.2] understanding of the society in which he lived [0.8] now any aspect of Marxist thought has got these two things [0.4] closely infused together [0.8] and [0.2] this makes it rather exceptional [0.7] if you go back before Marx [0.5] you had philosophers i mentioned Hegel Kant and others who were not social analysts [0.6] and you had people who were social analysts Montesquieu [0.3] er Adam Smith [0.5] who were not in the true sense philosophers i'm not saying they didn't have ideas but they didn't have this fusion [0.6] and many people have argued that [0.2] er Marx came to his conclusions philosophically [0.4] and then used the world around him to justify them [0.5] and there's a very er the linkage between them i think is brought out by this perhaps the most famous quotation of from Marx from eighteen-forty- eight from his thesis on Feuerbach [0.8] where he argues that philosophers have only interpreted the world [0.4] the point is to change it [1.2] so [0.2] for Marx [0.6] er understanding was simply [0.3] a preliminary step [0.5] to action and to changing things [0.7] and [0.3] it follows from this that for a Marxist history is as i've said at the bottom [0. 4] it's about analysing the present as well as the past [0.5] with a view [0.5] er [0.2] to changing the future not necessarily foretelling the future [0.4] but changing the future [1.0] now [0.2] it's with this background in mind that i want to talk particularly [0.4] about [0.2] two aspects really following from this [0.4] the way that Marxist ideas developed [0.5] and to jump in from time to time to talk about the way [0.4] that development of Marxist philosophy [0. 4] began [0.2] to affect the way they looked at history because that's our main concern here is the historiography of all this [1.4] now [0.8] the [2.2] question [0.4] which arose [0.3] almost [0.3] p-, er [0.5] permanently [0.7] in people's minds after Marx [0.7] was the question of [0.3] why [0.2] was it [1. 0] that the revolution that he'd predicted [0.4] had not come about [2.8] and [0.5] in many ways the philosophical responses and the other responses to Marx [0.4] er [0.6] in the late nineteenth century are answers to this question and stro-, and on into the [0.3] twentieth century as well [1.1] and [0.5] the first stage in this process really [0.5] was one which began [0.6] with [0.2] not Marx himself so much but Engels [0.7] and the person who became the leading figure [0.5] in Marxist philosophy after [0.7] er after Marx [0.3] Karl Kautsky the leader of the s-, German Social Democratic Party [1.0] it's famous [0.2] famously [0.2] er [0.2] quoted everywhere that Marx said [0.7] in the latter part of his life as for me [0.5] i am not a Marxist [0.7] er and if that phrase meant anything it meant that the kind of [0.5] processes which were going on with Marx's ideas towards the end of his life [0.5] and certainly after his death in eighteen-eighty-one [0.4] were ones which er [0.2] w-, which [1.0] er [0.6] were [1.3] not [0.4] er in his view [0.2] following up [0.2] the main i-, the main er essence of his ideas in particular [0.7] there were attempts to turn his ideas into systems into rules into laws [0.4] they were becoming in the context of the time much more positivistic [0.5] er and they turned into what some people have called [0. 2] vulgar Marxism [0.4] er a very crude form of historical materialism [0.5] and Kautsky [0.2] very much er [0.3] f-, pushes forward this [0.4] er concept of vulgar Marxism and of scientific Marxism [0.8] if we look at some of the major features [0.3] of that sort [0.3] er of vulgar Marxism or s-, or or or [0.6] er [1.0] this attempt to turn into a set of dogmas essentially [1.0] the [0.5] starting point for most versions of it was the economic er interpretation of history [0.6] economics is the fundamental [0.3] aspect of history [0.5] everything arises [0. 2] er or can be explained in terms of economic conjunctures economic development [0.5] er and and economic base [0.8] er and that [0.2] there is [0. 2] er in this interpretation i'll come on to that in a moment [0.5] er [0.3] er a model of base and superstructure but the economic interpretation argued the fundamental factor on which all other fac-, social factors depended [0.4] was [0.3] er [0.4] economy particularly the means of production [0.5] er [0.3] and ownership of it the means of production in different societies being land [0.6] in feudal society machines and industrial society [0.4] capital and labour [0. 4] er capital in capitalist society labour in in a number of other societies as well [0.4] and the way in which those means of production were organized and particularly who owned them hence the basis [0.3] of class because classes were divided into those people who owned these means of production [0.5] and those people who were employed to work these means of production [0.4] er in Marx's terminology in in a capitalist society [0.4] er the bourgeoisie and the proletariat [1.0] so [0.2] vulgar [0.2] er [0.2] Marxists [0.5] argued very strongly for the economic [0.3] er determination of society and this led [0.6] er [0.3] some and many of the tendencies continued in the twentieth century in fact in some ways Stalin is one of the [0.5] er [0.3] leading exponents of this particular version and crude [0.4] Marxism as it was developed in the Soviet Union in the nineteen late twenties and thirties [0.6] that [0.4] society has a kind of basis and a superstructure [0.6] the economy is the basis [0.3] the superstructure is everything that's built on it social forms [0.4] but not just social forms [0.3] also ideas cultural phenomena [0.5] er law [0.4] er religion [0.5] er [0.3] what we're doing today [0.2] er higher education whatever it happens to be [0.3] all these things arise in this very crude interpretation [0.4] from economic er economic er [0.3] economic er origins [0.7] and associated with this [0.5] er [0.3] is [0.2] a stress [0.2] on [0.5] the on [0.2] class interest [0.2] and class struggle [3.3] and the idea of historical laws and historical inevitability [0.5] er in other words er [0.3] the [0.2] version of Marxism which is most often criticized by people who don't know much about Marx himself [0.4] is often this particular version of Marxism this [0.4] er [0.2] version of Marxism which possibly Marx had in mind when he said he wasn't himself a Marxist [0.4] but the first stage of development of Marxist ideas [0. 5] brings it into this rather [0.2] er schematic [0.4] positivist influenced [0. 4] er [0.2] rule based idea of [0.2] controlling history [0.3] history working directly through laws [0.3] and those laws being readily [0.3] perceptible [0. 2] er and readily er understandable [1.0] now [0.6] er [0.8] that [0.9] interpretation [0.8] doesn't satisfy everybody on a number of grounds [0.7] and as i've said the key question in people's minds was why had there not been [0. 3] a revolution of the Marxist kind [0.6] and the first [0.3] bold effort [0.3] to try to [0.4] answer this question er was put was was one [0.3] associated with [0.2] er the name Eduard Bernstein [0.4] in late [0.3] er nineteenth er he developed these ideas in late nineteenth er [0.4] early twentieth century [0.4] er Britain actually although he was German h-, er er his British experiences [0.4] meant a great deal to him [0.5] and he began to argue that there were some fundamental flaws he didn't actually challenge the [0.2] positivistic element so much he challenged [0.4] the working out of some of those rules that we were looking at [0.4] and he argued that [0.2] in actual fact the the laws as they were understood by Kautsky and orthodox Marxists [0. 5] the laws of capitalist development [0.3] were mistaken [0.9] hence his ideas are often referred to as revisionism [0.6] instead he argued [0.5] that [0.7] first of all [0.3] the class [0.4] idea that Marx had and i think that [0.6] er [0.2] that [0.2] er [1.0] namex emphasized last week let me just take that it's probably easier if i just take that completely off there [0.7] er [0.3] that [0. 3] all that [0.3] classes will polarize [0.4] the middle class will disappear the proletariat will sink into penury [0.3] the peasantry will th-, will disappear the petit bourgeoisie will disappear under capitalism [0.3] and everything will move out into [0.3] a wide range of of of polarized classes [0.3] according to Bernstein this was not happening [0.5] and he argued that the middle class doesn't disappear in fact the middle class is the s-, is the class which is expanding most rapidly [0.5] in Britain in the late n-, nineteenth and early twentieth century [0.3] so far from polarizing and disappearing into a a class struggle [0.3] between the impoverished [0.2] and the super rich which is the crude interpretation of Marx [0.5] er the [0.6] development of capitalism [0.2] was moving in a different direction [0.4] and er the er [0.6] lower classes were not disappearing [0.4] and the reason for this was that ownership of capital ownership of the means of production was not as Marx thought polarizing [0.4] through competition driving [0.3] poor er er sec-, er [0.6] er failed producers out of the market [0.4] and creating a smaller and smaller number of big [0.2] er [0.2] successful producers [0.6] er whether it be in agriculture or in industry [0.9] so instead [0.5] er Bernstein argued the middle class was getting broader [0.6] the working class was actually getting richer [0.7] its wages were improving [0.3] it was owning more [0.4] the petit bourgeoisie [0.4] small land owners in particular market gardeners that kind of person were becoming more rather than less numerous [0.4] and even shareholding was becoming dispersed through society [0.6] so that [0.4] from Bernstein's point of view [0.5] er capitalism itself was beginning to evolve [0.5] er a kind [0.2] o-, [0.3] would hopefully evolve into a kind of socialism [0.4] which could be developed through [0.3] pursuit of reformism [0.3] through [0.2] pursuing democracy [0.4] through pursuing [0.3] er [0.5] the [0.2] er current paths of capitalist development without revolution [0.7] in other words he saw in an optimistic way that capitalism itself was dispersing ownership through society and once the ownership was dispersed through society was effectively [0. 4] almost a socialist society [0.6] and that's i think behind that other rather mysterious quotation there [0.3] the ultimate goal of socialism is nothing to me [0.2] the movement is everything in other words [0.4] for him [0.2] the idea of [0.3] future communism or whatever er i-, utopian society you had [0.3] was not the crucial thing [0.2] the crucial thing was the movement towards it [0.4] er and the ideas that er [0.7] the the the [0.6] the the workers movement for reform for change bringing people together [0.3] er things like trade unions eventually the Labour Party these were all things which were developing [0.3] in a big way in the eighteen- nineties and around nineteen-hundred in the in Britain [0.2] and he saw that as the way forward for the labour movement [0.8] of course you'll realize that that is exactly the split which has occurred in [0.2] the socialist movement in the twentieth century [0.8] between those who follow the revolutionary path [0. 4] and those who follow this reformist path [0.3] if you like Bernstein is the founder of New Labour [0.5] maybe they don't even talk about socialism but the [0.3] ultimate goal is nothing to me could certainly be said by er Tony Blair [0.5] er [0.3] but the movement is everything er [0.4] and the idea that that er th-, i mean the the problem that arises from this that socialism is split [0.4] of course has helped [0.2] er [0. 8] to maintain [0.3] socialism as a as as as a [0.7] er an unsuccessful movement in most respects in the twentieth century in terms of er [0.2] er in terms of what was expected in the late nineteenth century [0.6] however not all Marxists were as pessimistic about the future although [0.4] Bernstein i wouldn't say is pessimistic [0.5] but they were they were less pessimistic than he was about the potential for [0.4] er revolution [0.7] and [0.8] the revolutionary side of Marxism [0.5] was given [0.7] a [0.2] new lease of life naturally by the Russian Revolution [0.6] er but also by [1.5] some ideas which preceded it [0.6] and [0.3] the [0.4] er person [0.4] er who [0.2] engendered a number of these ideas [0.5] is [0.2] er Rudolf Hilferding [0.2] a an Austrian economist and socialist [0.6] er who himself ended up more of a Bernsteinian than a revolutionary [0.8] but [0.9] Hilferding [0.2] as i've said like many others was interested in the question why hasn't there been a proletarian revolution [0.9] and he argued that in fact what was happening under capitalism [0.6] was a massive development [0.2] of [0.7] er what he called finance capital that capitalism itself was beginning to change [0.7] there were i mean today [0.2] we see a capitalism of giant corporations bestriding the globe larger than nation states holding nation states to ransom [0.8] hence er the need or the drive to do things like put [0.2] er [0.6] er the European Union together to try to combat this by uniting nation states to try to control some of these big corporations [0.7] er [0.4] but [0.2] he [0.3] er argued that what had happened was that er [0.5] capitalism had changed its nature in that in Marx's day [0.5] the owners of capital were usually the direct investors of capital [0.5] you invested your own money in what seemed to be profitable [0.2] potential businesses [0.7] by the end of the century according to Hilferding [0.3] capitalism was now based not on individuals but on banks [0.5] and other financial institutions which became gigantic pools [0. 3] lakes [0.5] of anonymous capital [0.7] er as they are today [0.8] er you put your [0.2] er [0.6] you put your money into the bank or i suppose [0.3] probably your overdraft in most cases [0. 4] but your money goes into the bank [0.5] and [0.2] er what happens to it where does it go [0.9] the bank lends people money whose money is it lending nobody knows it's a great anonymous pool of capital [0.5] which is not controlled by individuals you don't control where that money goes still less if you [0.5] have pension funds or [0.4] er [0.3] er other [0.3] er [0.2] financial [0.2] er services and so on and so forth [0.6] and that money is [0. 5] is allocated by professionals who don't own the money [0.9] er by [0.4] professional financial advisers fina-, financial managers for these institutions investment managers and so on and so forth [0.7] and he argued that this growth of monopoly capitalism was changing the nature of capitalism that it wasn't this was one of the reasons why there were super profits being made [0.5] er and so on and so forth [0.5] but this was taken up by some of the revolutionaries because he also argued [0.4] perhaps here [0.6] echoing a bit of Bernstein that capitalis-, this meant capitalism itself was becoming more organized this was a second concept he had organized capitalism [0.7] for Marx capitalism was based on the anarchy of the market the in the inpr-, unpredictability of the market [0.5] the market was a kind of [0.2] er tempestuous ocean [0.4] on which capitalist enterprises had to sink [0.2] or swim [0.8] er [0.7] in order to protect themselves from this tempestuous sea [0. 4] capitalism is becoming more and more organized er [0.2] finance capitalism is one way it's becoming more organized because this meant that there were links [0.5] between big companies [0.3] er and banks and heavy investors [0.6] but also [0.2] companies themselves were coming together into monopolies and cartels and and doing deals with each other to control the market [0.7] the idea that capitalists like markets is laughable capitalists hate markets they like to control markets or don't like free markets they like to control markets [0.7] and he was pointing to this as a way in which big capital had survived [0. 3] the predictions of Marx that it was changing its nature [0.3] it was turning into what we think of as monopoly capitalism [0.5] now the points from the revolutionary's poi-, er view [0.4] is that certain revolutionaries Lenin in the forefront [0.3] seized on Hilferding's ideas [0.5] as a justification for the potential for revolution [0.3] in the face of Bernstein's criticism [0. 4] er and Bernstein's revisionism because [0.5] the conclusion which [0.3] Lenin drew from Hilferding's ideas [0.4] of organ-, organized capitalism was that here was capitalism [0.4] itself developing institutions [0.4] which [0.2] could be taken over [0.7] by a future revolutionary state [0.7] because instead of having a whole inchoate class of capital owners [0.4] running the capitalist economy [0.6] you now had these key [0.3] financial managers [0.4] who were working for banks for salaries [0.6] if you decapitated capitalism [0.6] er and that in a se-, er in in Lenin's view meant nationalizing the banks [0.6] you'd be able to control capitalist society this was the this was Lenin's assumption at the turn of the century from these ideas [0.5] so by nationalizing the banks [0.3] you could then control [0.4] er you could then control [0.9] er [1.0] the evolution of capitalism control where investment went and you could control [0.3] where [0.4] er [0.3] the priorities for society were [0.5] and the fundamental problems of exploitation hopefully could be avoided by the state intervening and controlling this process and moving towards socialism so Lenin [0.4] saw this as as a-, a-, as er monopoly capitalism as a step towards [0.3] potential socialism because sen-, socialism is supposed to be a rational controlled organized society [0.9] er one which was er in which [0.6] human beings [0.2] er called the tune and [0.2] organized society the way they wanted it [0.4] not one in which society called the tune [0.3] and organized human beings in whatever was appropriate to the given [0.3] economic er [0.2] conditions of the day [1.6] secondarily Lenin also looked at another phenomenon of the late nineteenth century as did Rosa Luxemburg and Nikolai Bukharin [0.6] to argue that one of the reasons for the growth of these big monopolies and the expansion of capitalism was imperialism [0.9] that [0.3] er where Marx might have thought that capitalist ec-, capitalist er [0.6] er r-, [0.2] profit rates would fall because ca-, if capitalism was a kind of enclosed system once it became a global system the massive opportunities for [0.4] what Lenin called super profits to be made [0.3] by investing overseas and international trade and the monopoly companies were in the forefront of this [0.7] and he argued that the [0.4] most advanced workers of western Europe the wor-, the er [0.5] er [0.4] skilled workers of Germany and France and Britain [0.4] were actually doing quite well out of capitalism as it was this is of course what Bernstein had also said [0.3] because they were able to be paid by the super profits of imperialism [0.6] so this was buying them off so to speak from their revolutionary potential [0.8] er [0.3] and Lenin also came to the conclusion [0. 4] that since imperialism is a global system you could have a revolution at any one point of it Bernstein er er Bukharin [0.7] er [0.3] was the first person to coin the phrase that capitalism could break at its weakest link [0.6] er and Lenin's conception of capitalism was of of a global system with Russia as one of its weakest links [0.4] so while Russia was not a capitalist society at the time of the Russian Revolution [0.4] Lenin thought he was breaking [0.2] the world system of capitalism [0.3] by er attacking it at this [0.2] at this weak link [0.3] and from there it would spread to where it should take place [0.3] in Germany [0.3] er in France in Britain in western Europe [0.4] and eventually who knows even in North America [1.0] er [0.6] s-, but Lenin [0.3] er and these thinkers were still [0.4] fairly much [0.2] in the tradition of the semi-positivistic er [0.3] interpretation of Marx [0.6] since the Russian Revolution particularly since many people [0.5] er [0.5] on the left criticized the Russian Revolution and the way it was developing from very early on inclusing including Rosa Luxemburg who was [0.5] very worried about the dictatorial and anti-democractic tendencies of Lenin and the Russian Revolution in nineteen-seventeen and nineteen-eighteen very early on [0.8] er [0.2] many [0.2] er [0.2] thinkers began to look in different directions [0.4] for [0.2] er [0.5] new inspiration about Marxist ideas and these are ones which begin to feed in to [0.4] er [0.8] which begin to feed in to [0.3] a new [0.3] er way of looking at society [0.4] er and these are ones which become particularly influential [0.3] for twentieth century [0.3] er Marxist hi-, and other historiography [0.7] in particular [1.2] a group of thinkers [0.4] er [4. 8] began [0.2] to move away from this er traditional [0.5] as it were almost rule based [0.2] er version [0.2] of [1.3] Marxism [0.8] to drawing attention to quite different aspects of it [0.8] to argue [0.2] that [0.8] the revolution had not occurred [0.5] for [0.2] amongst other things what we might think of in some way as cultural reasons [0.6] that [0.3] they turned our attention towards the issue of consciousness [0.6] the political awareness of a given individual or a d-, given group of individuals [0.5] er what role does this play in history [0.4] we can't say that the economic base simply determines what everybody thinks [0.4] what they think and the struggle [0.4] for them to develop their own ideas [0.4] and for them to [0.2] er [0.4] become er part of a larger movement focused around particular ideas [0.3] and to become aware of their situation in society [0.4] is one of the reas-, is one of the factors [0.3] er why or or or the fact this hasn't happened is one of the reasons why [0.3] society [0.4] er [0.3] why the revolution that Marx expected had not taken place [0.4] and in do- , in in pursuing this area they began to open up a whole [0.3] er [0.5] whole range of issues [0.4] er for social and historical exploration [1.0] er [1.3] in a sense the earliest of these although he's often forgotten [0.4] is Antonio Labriola who was [0.2] perhaps the first person to begin to break [0.5] with [0. 3] er [0.6] the more [1.3] er [1.8] positivistic interpretation of Marxism [0. 8] and [0.3] he [0.9] pointed to the fact that [1.9] what materialist theory represented for him [0.6] was [0.2] the first attempt to create [0.5] a sort of [0.2] er [0.5] general science general social science [0.4] unifying different historical processes [0.7] er the materialist theory is the culminating point of this process [0.6] what he meant was that [0.2] in looking at history and the way it develops [0.6] er [0.2] materialism and the materialist theory is the first to break away from the compartmentalization of history into [0.5] religious history history of politics [0.4] er history of the law constitutional history [0.3] and so on and so forth [0.4] and begin to look [0.3] at human society as a whole and of course this has been [0.5] er a massive [0.2] er [0.3] development [0.2] in er twentieth century historical studies and twentieth century historical understanding [0.5] that there is nothing these days [0.3] which is [0.2] separate from history [0.5] and in particular [0.3] er it's this [0.2] er sort of holistic sense of history [0.6] but Labriola's ideas er gave way to others which became [0.3] er i think much more [0.2] e-, effective [0.9] in particular [0.3] er [0.2] i [0.2] Georg Lukacs the Hungarian Marxist [0.8] er [2.3] and i've taken a couple of key [0. 4] er s-, er a couple of key [0.2] er [0.4] concepts from him [0.8] er he developed the idea or [0.3] this is present in Marx although er it's a technical point here that [0.5] Marx's [0.2] er [0.6] philosophical ideas of the early [0.5] er writings were not known [0.6] er until the nineteen-thirties and the nineteen-forties because some of his key works had never been published [0.5] until that time so in many ways Lukacs was [0.5] er [0.6] er er was was predicting er the er ideas of Marx which had not yet been er published and revealed [0.8] and he emphasized the question o-, the issues of alienation and reification and i include reification [0.6] particularly because many people have seen this as being crucially relevant to modern consumer society [0.8] alienation [0.3] is a concept which is present in Marx and er particularly in those early writings [0.6] er [0.5] s-, as i say only a few of which had actually been published at the time Lukacs was writing [0.6] by which Marx argued that human beings could create things [0.5] which they didn't recognize as their creations and kind of bowed down to them as though they were what controlled human beings [0.7] in other words human beings had a had a a tendency to create [0.3] their own masters [0.2] in various ways [0.6] and by looking at er a number of these things as social conventions rather than as ruling forces [0.4] you could then take a step towards [0.2] er overcoming this alienation and controlling them [0.6] there were a number of important [0.2] er [0.8] er examples of this [0.6] let's take er [0.3] a very philosophical example a lo-, er Marx's view on this arose from some [0.4] theological interpretations by Feuerbach whom i mentioned earlier [0.6] about the idea of God [0.6] Feuerbach argued that it wasn't God that created man it was man that created God [0.6] because God was a human conception and a human construction so to speak [0.5] and having created this [0.5] er [0.3] construction [0.4] human beings then [0. 2] took it as a literal reality and began to obey [0.4] er this er God which they themselves had created [0.6] it seems a strange [0.3] sort of theology i suppose to most of you but it has been quite influential amongst religious thinkers as well because [0.5] it does point to the fact that [0.2] knowledge of God as we or [0.5] conceptions of God [0.2] as we understand them are human creations there's no two ways about that [0.4] er although that doesn't necessarily follow that God is a human creation in this sense [0.3] but certainly the conceptions of God are [0.7] and secondarily [0.2] in more social terms [0.6] er one could point to [0.4] phenomena like [0.2] er [0.2] we have in foremost in our mind i suppose the market [1.0] don't buck the market [0.2] why not buck the market we made it it's our market it's supposed to be there to do what we want [0.6] that is what er er Lukacs would argue these are human creations there's nothing s-, nothing sacred about the market the market is a human convention [0.6] money is a human convention [0.7] all these things are created by people so why do we bow down and worship them as though they were ruling over us [1.1] er so [0.2] many Marxists began to argue that the first step towards revolutionary action was to un-, with this level of understanding this level of combating [0.3] of what appeared to be the fundamental rules of society around us [0.9] and a special form of alienation was this one er [0.3] which er w-, this one [0.7] usually referred to as reification [0.6] which is er defined roughly speaking [0.4] er [0.2] as transforming human properties into properties of man-made things [0.6] er this of course has opened up a lot of discourse about the nature of modern consumer society and advertising and things like that [0.7] when you buy a commodity these days it's often associated with things which are way beyond that particular commodity [0.5] er you're buying fun you're buying happiness you're buying goodness knows what if you buy the right product [0.6] if you can associate thirst with a can of Coca-cola you're winning aren't you [0.6] er persuade people that they don't want a drink they want a Coke [0.5] er you are moving towards er [0.3] towards controlling or or or developing [0.4] your own commercial interests over people [0.4] and in a mass scale this idea that you can actually [0.2] er er you you can actually influence people by [0.4] er turning [0.4] these human properties into commodities [0.5] is o-, is referred to also as commodity fetishism i suppose we live in an age of commodity fetishism [0.5] er as you're only too well aware i'm sure [0.4] designer this designer that label this label that the right thing here the right thing there why are you buying those things [0.5] er [0.5] to be seen to be you to be to be with to to to to be buying the right things whatever it happens to be [0.4] this is a form of reification it's not because you want them or y-, because you need them or because there's any particular [0.4] er [0.2] necessity to have a [0.4] a pair of Calvin Klein underpants or whatever it happens to be [0.4] er [0.3] but you made but you still go out and people still go out and buy them [0.5] er [0.4] and er [0. 4] this is er what Lukacs would think of as reification [1.6] now associated with that also moving into the cultural area [0.5] is another one of those that group of thinkers [0.4] er Antonio Gramsci [1.3] er [0.6] and Gramsci [0.7] er [0.3] developed a number of ideas [0.6] but he's most [0.2] well known for [0. 3] the [0.2] concept of hegemony [1.1] Gramsci spent most of his life in [0.2] er or a large part of his life in [0.2] Mussolini's prison system [0.6] er and he had a great deal of time to reflect on these issues [0.4] and perhaps not the greatest access to information but [0.4] he argued [0.2] that [0.2] er [0. 6] the issue of consciousness was crucial [0.6] because [0.5] er [1.0] the [0. 7] socie-, [0.2] the [0.3] crucial element in society or a crucial element in society which Marx had not really er [0.3] allowed for in this particular way [0.4] was the cultural domination of a particular class [0.3] the ideas and beliefs which [0.4] are shared by a wide proportion of a society the assumptions of that particular society [0.6] the web of beliefs as it says here the institutional [0.3] and social relations [0.4] of a given society [0.4] and through this through establishing a certain set of beliefs let's take [0.2] the one one of those that i [0.4] mentioned before [0.5] if everybody believes in the market the people in whose interest the market operates of course [0.4] er [0.3] have succeeded in establishing that particular [0.2] set of er concepts and beliefs [0.3] in society [0.3] and if people accept it that's fine for them maybe not quite so fine for the people who [0.5] er do not er [0.2] benefit so er [0.2] thoroughly from the market [0.8] and [0.2] er this intellectual hegemony this cultural hegemony [0.3] was the work [0.3] of [0.3] intellectuals now [1.3] er [1.3] for Gramsci everybody is in part an intellectual intellectuals are not entirely a separate class [0.5] every form of labour [0.2] has a certain intellectual content to it according to him [0.8] er it's a question of the proportionality [0.5] but he divided [0.2] intellectuals into two classes [0.3] organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals [0.4] roughly speaking i suppose in as far as he was concerned goodies and baddies [0.4] traditional intellectuals those who established [0.5] the hegemonic ideas of the time [0.5] and organic intellectuals [0.4] people who were associated with [0.3] particular groups and classes in society [0.5] and [0.2] e-, and [0.2] enunciated and and developed [0.2] the ideas characteristic of those particular classes [0.5] so different classes would have their own organic intellectuals [0.5] er the working class would have its intellectuals the middle class would have its intellectuals [0. 4] the aristocracy would have their intellectuals intellectuals were part of every other class [0.3] and int-, intellectualism was a part of almost every human being's [0.4] er [0.8] er [0.3] part of every human being's [0.4] er outlook on life although he obviously hadn't seen Do You Want to be a Millionaire [0.7] [laughter] er [0.6] er [0.3] but [0.2] the [0.4] sphere in which this [0.2] e-, [0.2] evolves and which this battle takes place [0.4] is another key concept which is talked about a great deal civil society [0.7] because [0.2] er [0.4] one of the [0.2] long term phenomena since the Middle Ages was the growth of [0.4] er o-, of society and of important er changes and important forces in society [0.3] outside the state [0.7] and civil society was the area in which intellectuals [0.3] battled out their different conceptions [0.5] and in fact would conduct a kind of intellectual class struggle [0.3] through the media [0.3] the press television [0.4] er and all the rest of it and and that [0.4] er this was an area of political activity major political activity [0.4] moving away from the kind of traditional Marxist emphasis on workers' movements trade unions [0.4] er [0.2] strikes and that kind of thing which were still important [0.5] but for Gramsci the the additional element which was required was to move [0.2] into a ch-, challenge [0.4] the ruling hegemonic ideas [0.3] of a given er period and a given generation [0.7] now [0.3] er [0.3] what has all this got to do with [0.2] er historiography [0.7] a lot of these ideas had important implications [0.7] and i think i've got [0.4] er [1.7] two or three [0.2] er [0. 3] two or three er [0.9] er [0.3] concepts here i think we've got time to do this [0.9] er [0.2] what is how how [0.3] is are these ideas beginning to affect [0.4] how [0.2] history is understood [0.9] er [1.9] first of all [0.2] it i-, [0.2] it's implicit [0.4] that [0.9] er [0.8] according to a number of these ideas [0.8] and i s-, [0.3] er and i suppose [0. 6] both the [0.2] consciousness ideas to some extent [0.5] but even more the vulgar Marxist ideas [0.5] the idea i mean most Marxists would argue [0.3] that history was structural [0.8] that the role of individual [0.2] er [0.3] men and women [0.5] was not crucial in history [0.8] er [1.6] human beings would be the object of history not its subject [0.4] the whole point of revolution was to change this relationship to turn them into the subjective history so they controlled their own history [0.9] but [0.2] er [0.6] historical explanation moves away from the idea of great individuals [0.4] and moves more towards the idea of groups [0.3] of classes [0.3] of structural problems [0.3] er and so on and so forth [2.0] secondarily [0.5] i suppose [0.2] er [0.6] from the mid- nineteenth century [0.2] we tend to talk these days about historical change [0. 4] rather than about historical progress [0.6] er historical progress is something [0.3] which er people are [0.4] much more sceptical about today and we use the much more neutral word change to [0.4] describe how the different conflicting forces we're talking about [0.4] er impact on each other [0.3] and create er a new situation [0.7] it's also [0.4] er and i've mentioned this already [0.5] er has moved towards [0.4] er history becoming more holistic [0.5] so the history is not divided up into separate domains [0. 4] er it becomes [0.2] er the object of the historian is to try to give [0.3] much broader explanations [0.3] touching on all aspects of of life [0.5] er the the traditional fields in British historiography break up after the First World War [0.5] er i've given a few examples down there [0.5] and in the words of Gareth Stedman Jones before [0.3] this happened [0.2] no attempt was made to fuse this aggregate of specialist routines [0.3] into a meaningful [0.2] historical totality [0.6] so [0.3] er that is partly er the way in which [0.2] er [0.8] which historiography [0.5] er began to evolve under the pressure of these kind of ideas which have come from other quarters as well but [0.4] this was a major challenging area [0.6] er [0.2] going beyond that [4.7] er [1.6] i haven't [0.9] talked in any great detail about the subject of dialectics because er [0.5] it's a complex issue in itself [0.7] but [0.3] er [0.2] having said that progress has given way to historical change [0.7] er Marxist historians in particular [0.5] tend to put stress on dialectical iss-, on on on diale-, the dialectical nature of historical struggles [0.6] I-E that there are always conflicting forces [0. 4] that force A conflicts with B [0.4] and very often this produces a synthesis of both those forces C which is different from either A or B [0.7] and history moves co-, constantly dialectically because C then gives rise to its opposing idea D [0.4] which produces E [0.4] and h-, and this leads to an interpretation of history which is based on the constancy of change [0.9] that there is no stability in history [0.4] er nothing stays the same [0.5] er [0.5] that change is the normal condition of life rather than stability [0.6] er we would probably [0.3] not have [0.2] a big problem [0.2] er understanding that but conservatism [0.5] with a small C is based on the opposite point of view that stability is normal and change is abnormal [0.6] er and that er this er dialectical view of history [0.5] shows that change is the fundamental bedrock of history [0.3] er rather than er any form of stability or stasis [1.9] secondly [0.3] er [0.8] the [0.6] particularly the the Western Marxists [0.5] raised as i've said the problem of consciousness [0.5] er and added to the more [0.2] positivist structuralist interpretations [0.5] the whole issue [0.5] of it being far too crude to simply say that complex [0.5] er cultural [0.3] phenomena like law and religion [0.4] can simply be crudely related to the economic base of a given society [0.5] these are much more complex and they need much more detailed examination they need to be looked at [0.3] much more carefully and much more closely [0.5] er you can't simply say Jane Austen is a f-, [0.2] is a mouthpiece [0.4] of the British upper classes [0.2] that sort of thing although many [0.5] er [0.2] crude Marxist literary historians have attempted to do things like that [0.5] er Lenin himself said that Tolstoy was just [0.5] er largely a mouthpiece of the Russian landowning gentry which seems the most inadequate description of Tolstoy [0.4] imaginable to anybody who's read him [1.1] thirdly [0.3] er these people [0.2] drew attention to [0.3] a whole new areas of historical subject matter [0.7] obviously implicit in what i've been saying the development of capitalism itself [0.6] er Marx analysed the capitalism of his day [0.5] er the analysis of contemporary society and its evolution over the previous decades and centuries [0.3] was absolutely crucial to this level of historical understanding [0.6] er [0.5] industrialization came into the picture [0.4] er [0.6] the [0.2] er agitations of the oppressed classes [1.0] er the ideas [0.4] of peasants workers [0.3] peasants and workers were almost entirely absent from historiography [0.4] except as occasional intruders in peasant revolts or [0.4] er [0.5] er un-, er untidy uprisings of various kinds in the past [0.3] there was very little interest [0.2] in these groupings [0.5] er and there was very little interest in in in er in revolutions [0.3] it was thought rather crudely [0.5] that it wasn't going to be possible [0.3] to write the history of ordinary people because they didn't leave any traces behind [0.5] but essentially this is the kind of argument which has been levelled [0.4] at any er at many of the new phases of [0.2] er historical interpretation [0.6] it's not my job to bring this up to date but i can remember when gender history began to evolve [0.6] er conservative historians again with a small C argued [0. 4] well there can't be any gender history we can't write the history of women because there can't be any evidence for it because if there had been we would have done it [0.7] this idea that history is evidentially based and emerges [0. 3] er full blown out of the archives [0.4] er [0.6] in fact of course once people started asking questions about the history of women they went and found there was a whole new way of looking [0.3] at e-, at at at at archives which already existed or material which already existed [0.3] and whole [0.2] swathes of material which had never been looked at the same had been done for peasants the same had been done for workers [0.5] classes who had been [0.4] er in the phrase hidden from history [0.4] er it's a ques-, and and this points to the to the to to the [0.9] er [0.9] er [0.5] this points to the er fact that [0.9] historians no longer [0.2] saw themselves as the subjects of historical enquiry [0.5] er as or as outside it [0.4] it led to the whole [0.2] question of the role of the historian themself [0.8] er [0.3] i- , if in the nineteenth century traditional idea [0.3] the historian was above history [0.5] er and simply [1.3] related what had happened [0.9] er [0.7] these ideas led to historians becoming part [0.5] of the hi-, of the social process [0.5] historians themselves [0.2] are [0.4] organic or traditional intellectuals [0.4] they are part of the intellectual struggle [0.4] they are part of hegemony [0.8] if conservative or dominant ideas suggest that [0.3] er [0.4] women should not be emancipated historians over the past hadn't even noticed that they were [0.6] unemancipated [0.4] and then suddenly when the r-, issue of women's emancipation arises [0.3] historians begin to turn towards it as a new question a new hish-, issue [0.6] similarly in the nineteenth century [0.4] national historians turn towards the history of their own nationalities [0.7] historians in other words [0.2] increasingly become part of the intellectual struggle [0.5] er and see themselves as part of the intellectual struggle [0.4] and in fact come to the conclusion that they cannot separate themselves [0.2] from the society in which they exist [0.5] this has led to [0.2] er and again it's a territory that i don't want to jump into at this particular moment [0.5] the sort of post-modernist extremes of this that [0.4] er [0.2] you go to so far that the histor-, that history [0.4] at the end of the day doesn't tell you anything about the past because it's a construction of the historian [0.7] er herself or himself [0.6] er [0.4] and [0.2] er [0.4] while most [0.3] Marxist historians wouldn't go as far as that [0.4] the the objectivity of history [0.3] was undermined by this and the subjectivity of history [0.4] was stressed [0.5] that doesn't mean to s-, that doesn't mean to say one can necessarily conclude [0.4] that one will need that that w-, one can go as far [0.9] er as the post-modernists in saying that there's no such thing [0.4] as [0.3] history or we cannot know anything worth knowing about the past [0.4] most historians would tend to disagree with that [0.7] so [0.3] if just to summarize at the end [0.5] er if we look at [0.2] er [0.3] a [1.6] number of points made by the Italian historian Momigliano [0.7] quoted by Hobsbawm [0.6] er [0. 3] arguing what had happened to history in the hundred years after Ranke [0.7] er [0.2] he stressed in particular two or three of the points that we've been looking at here [0.6] a decline in political and religious history [0.7] er national histories begin to look old-fashioned according to this [0.5] er and instead of [0.3] national and religious history history of the state [0.5] er there's a major turn towards social and economic history [0.6] er and the twentieth century has seen of course massive development in the late twentieth century massive development of social [0.4] and economic history [0.6] er [0.9] it's no longer easy [0.8] to use ideas as an explanation of history [0.9] although ideas as i've been stressing have a role in history [0.5] the concept that everything in history arises from [0.4] ideas which had been prevalent [0. 5] er [0.2] in certain schools of nineteenth century historiography [0.4] er is much more difficult to sustain these days [0.5] that ideas [0.2] themselves are seen as [0.2] socially [0.9] i don't know whether to say conditioned or determined perhaps the best word is to say socially shaped [0.6] er they don't arise full-blown unobjectively [0.4] er in people's heads they are themselves partly constructed socially [0.6] er and ideas themselves are related to the society in which they evolve [1.0] er [0.7] and [4.4] although we can then [0.5] er move on from that [0.5] and say that one can look at explanations in term of social forces [0.5] it still doesn't necessarily solve that thorny issue [0.3] of the precise relationship [0.5] between [0.2] er the explanation of historical events [0.3] and the explanation of individual actions [0.9] what is the relationship between these two this is something which constantly puzzles historians and constantly puzzles [0.4] philosophers of history [0.8] can we go totally structural and say individual actions mean nothing [1.2] probably not [0.6] because at certain stages individual actions can weigh very heavily [1.1] if Stalin had not been Stalin there may not have been a terror [0.4] if Lenin had not been Lenin there might not have been a Russian revolution if Napoleon had not been Napoleon er the French Revolution might have turned out differently [0.4] individual actions individuals may un-, certain under certain conditions be very effective [0.8] but we can't go to the other extreme and say history is nothing but [0.6] the accumulation of the action of individuals [0.2] or dominated by the action of individuals [0.6] because those individuals work in contradictory and sometimes complementary ways and it's what they do it's a resultant of what they all do together [0.9] which in a sense changes history rather than what they do as individuals it's the [0.3] resultant of of of of the collective actions of individuals very often which [0.4] er which leads to social pri-, er issues so it hasn't actually solved this problem [0.8] and finally as i've already mentioned it had become very much more difficult [0.3] to speak of progress [0.3] or of the meaningful development of events in a certain direction [0.5] what is poshly known as a teleological view of history the idea that [0.4] things are always moving towards some sort of goal [0.6] er usually for the better [0.5] er progress in the liberal historiography in the mid-nineteenth century [0.5] future socialist society and perhaps communism [0.4] in the Marxist interpretation of history [0.4] er Marxism is seen [0.3] as a kind of teleological history i-, itself is a kind of teleological history [0.5] because it does see [0.2] society rising through different stages [0.4] towards [0.3] er some sort of [0.4] ideal [0.2] er utopian [0.3] er future [0.4] er [0.4] and [0.4] this er vision [0.2] er is is one which is shares er i-, well not the same vision but the er notion of that kind of progress is something which [0.5] Marx shared with er many of his contemporaries who were liberals [0.5] and one which is much more sceptically er looked upon today [1.0] okay i want to stop there [0.2] and er [0.6] you should have a copy of a few items of bibliography which has been circulated [0. 5] er to add to what you've already got because [0.3] these are quite interesting articles focused specifically on the issues i've been talking about [0.5] Marxist interpretation of history [0.4] and er Marxist interpretation of society [0.5] okay