nm0088: the subject of today's lecture is [0.2] Karl Marx's text Eighteenth Brumaire [0.3] er [0.5] next week namex will talk about Marxism after Marx look at what s-, w-, what happened to the Marxist legacy [0.3] er after the eighteen- eighties [0.4] er what i want to do today largely is concentrate [0.3] er on the text itself which is [0.3] a very complicated text and i think not a from slightly difficult text [0.7] well i'll just begin by a a slight sort of er [0. 3] introduction when i arrived at namex er what seems like a lifetime ago but was only thirty-one years ago in nineteen-sixty-eight [0.7] er i would think probably about forty per cent of the members of staff [0.5] were [0.3] Marxists E P Thompson of course was the the doyen of the er [0.2] of Marxist British Marxist historians and was was here in the social history centre [0.8] and a straw poll conducted amongst er first year basic one students in a lecture in nineteen-sixty-nine [0.6] revealed that something like forty per cent of the students er saw themselves as either Marxist or sympathetic to Marxism [0.8] er [0.9] times have obviously changed and n-, [0.2] er now when Marx is brought up as a topic er i'm wheeled out as one of the [0.2] surviving dinosaurs as it were in the department [0.3] er most of the remaining Marxists either being dead or long departed or have become Liberal Democrats [laughter] or whatever [0.7] er i conducted a similar sort of poll er last year [0.3] in this this sort of er session [0.3] and found that unsurprisingly nought per cent of historiography students [0.2] er identified themselves as Marxists [0.5] er i tried one with a postgraduate er [0.2] historiography group the same year and found one out of thirty [0.3] but he didn't count 'cause he was an Italian [0.4] er er [0.3] but er [0.2] i could perhaps begin this lecture therefore with a sort of McCarthyite question are you now or have you ever been [0.2] [laughter] a Marxist and the camera will pick you out [laugh] [0.3] and er sort of [laughter] s-, sort of send your name straight to M-I-five [0.5] [laughter] er [0.8] clearly the world of the nineteen-seventies and eighties has been [0.6] eighties and nineties has been [0.3] singularly unkind [0.4] both to [0.5] Marxists linked social and political movements [0.4] and also to Marxist modes of analysis the collapse of the Soviet system [0.5] the sharp decline of socialist and trade union movements in the industrial West [0.4] the apparent disintegration [0.4] of the industrial heartlands of the er organized working class in Western Europe [0.4] the apparent disintegration of any clear sense of class identity as being the sort of basic building block [0.3] of one's [0.3] er personality as it were [0. 3] the apparent triumph of [0.3] free market globalized international capitalism [0.4] has all clearly [0.5] changed the world [0.2] drastically [0. 8] but before writing the final obituary of Marxism one should perhaps ponder [0.4] certain ironies noted by John Gray in a recent er Times Literary Supplement review [0.3] of a series of [0.6] er writings on the hundred-and- fiftieth anniversary of the Communist Manifesto which came last year [0.9] John Gray is no Marxist he he was a Thatcherite for a while in the eighties he's now sort of [0.4] New Labour i think [0.4] but Gray insists that [1.0] Marx clearly got all sorts of things wrong he's sub-, subsequent si-, [0.2] subsequent experiences have clearly questioned the viability of large-scale planned economies as being more rational and efficient than market economies [1.0] Marx was clearly blind to a whole series of ecological consequences of industrialization which have [0. 2] marked our own perceptions of the world in the last few years [0.8] but Gray insists that one striking central paradox [0.4] is that [1.0] some of Marx's central predictions [0.4] were in actua-, were have in fact been in a sense delayed [0.4] b-, [0.2] in their implementation [0.3] by the [0.4] intervening rise of Marxist and social democratic movements in the late nineteenth early twentieth century [0.9] and Gray goes on to argue that now [0.3] that Marxism and social democracy are clearly in d-, in retreat [0.8] the global capitalism which Marx predicted [0.3] is now at last in a sense coming into being [0.4] the world described by Marx in the Communist Manifesto [0.5] is Gray says recognizably the world we live in [0.2] a hundred-and-fifty years later [0.5] to take just one quote from the Communist Manifesto [0.8] all old established national industries [0.2] have been destroyed [0.3] or daily are being destroyed [0.3] they are being dislodged by new industries [0.3] whose introduction becomes a life and death question [0.3] for all civilized nations [0.4] by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw materials [0.3] but raw material drawn from the remotest zones [0.4] industries whose products are consumed [0.2] not only at home [0.7] er but in every quarter of the globe [0.2] in place of old wants satisfied by productions of the country [0.3] we find new wants requiring for their satisfaction [0.3] the products of distant lands and climes [0.3] in place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency [0.3] we have intercourse in every direction [0.3] universal interdependence of nations [1.1] moreover [0.4] the long term impact [0.3] of this as Marx predicted [0.5] may well be in the twenty-first century [0.4] not only the dominance of the world economy by a handful of capitalist multinational firms [0.5] but a predatory capitalism read in tooth and claw from which the [0.2] inhibitions of socialism and Marxist movements and trade unions and welfare states [0.3] have been removed [0.6] a polarization on a global scale between the affluent minority [0.4] and the destitute majority of the world's population [0.5] endless uncontrollable change and uncertainty and flux [0.4] in technologies [0.5] which makes the hopes for certainty and security futile [0.9] even [0.2] increasingly perhaps among broad strata [0.3] of the middle class [0.7] to quote the Communist Manifesto again [0.7] constant revolutionizing of production uninterrupted disturbances of all social conditions everlasting uncertainty [0.3] and agitation [0.3] distinguish the bourgeois epoch [0.2] from all earlier ones [0.5] all fixed fast frozen relations with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions [0.3] are swept away [0.5] all new formed ones become antiquated because before they can ossify [0.4] all that sol-, is solid melts into air [0.4] all that is holy [0.2] is profaned [0.5] and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses [0.2] his real condition of life [0. 3] and his relations with his kind [1.1] in nineteen-forty-eight in the the centenary of the Communist Manifesto [0.5] Joseph Schumpeter [0.2] again no Marxist but a leading sort of economic theorist [0.6] claimed that capitalism [0.3] left to itself and left unchecked [0.3] would make [0.2] intact civilization as Schumpeter called it [0.4] impossible [1.0] many conservatives in our own society believe in the need to restore family values traditional values [0.5] but at the same time they espouse free markets [0.6] this Gray insists is actually impossible combination it's quixotic to try and combine the two [0.4] for global free markets [0.4] are in the process of undermining [0.8] not only families but local cultures car-, c-, whole career structures [0.4] who today [0.3] in the face of constant downsizing delayering technological change [0.3] conte-, contemplate a stable career for life [0.5] and very soon university lecturers will be replaced by [laugh] videos as it were of past lectures or [0.2] interactive [0. 4] courses on on on on the web and so on and so forth u-, the university lecturer [0.3] will be a thing of the past [0.8] i'm too old to bother but those of you who are aspiring to be university lecturers er in the future [0.3] er might have some cause for s-, concern [0.7] there is in short [0.7] Gray argues an acute contradiction between capitalism's promise [0.2] of a liberal society and a good life [0.5] and the actual realities lived in a globalized market society [0.6] Gray's argument is that Marx's achievement [0.4] despite all the errors that he made and there are there are countless Gray says [0.3] his achievement was to identify the contradictions [0.2] at the heart of liberal civilization [0.4] to which no solution [0.4] has yet been found nm0088: what i want to do now is to look [0.2] er [0.3] at [0.2] Marx's the the wer-, [0.2] the emergence of Marxism [0.3] the relationship between Marxism and other paradigms of historical explanation which we look at this term [0.4] and then look at the text itself [1.5] this term in a sense we're dealing [0.2] above all with perhaps three major historiographical paradigms which emerged in nineteenth century Europe [0.4] we've done one of them s-, already [0.3] the Rankean paradigm [0.4] Ranke is clearly significant [0.5] er [0.3] for his insistence on professional standards his use of archives his scrutiny of evidence [0.4] his insistence that historians should [0.2] tr-, er try as far as possible to eliminate [0.3] their own prejudices [0.4] for claiming that the historian should seek to empathize with people who lived in the past verstehen to understand er what was going on inside their heads [1.3] er in emphasizing the individual event and the individual [0.3] historical actor great man great person [0.4] that one should not [0.7] move from the [0.2] general to the particular but one should perhaps tentatively try to move from the particular to the general [0.7] he rejected much of the Enlightenment emphasis on progress to a world of reason and peace [0.5] arguing that wars between powers had always occurred and would always occur [0.5] and the best one could hope for was a balance of power [0.7] and b-, and he insisted that great states each represented in a sense an idea er America represents democracy and freedom the United st-, the U-S-S-R represented [0.3] Soviet totalitarianism et cetera et cetera [0.6] and he insisted that a strong state was necessary as a prerequisite for internal order and the freedom of man to worship [0.4] now clearly ran-, the Rankean paradigm is still enormously powerful it's [0.5] clearly informs the writings of people like Geoffrey Elton in Britain [0.4] er [0.8] er there's a whole school of neo-Rankean historians [0.2] er in still in in in West in what was West Germany [1.2] the second paradigm [0.2] is [0.7] a French school of [0.3] positivist structuralist historians [0.4] er we used to have a lecture at this stage in the course on either Comte or Durkheim both of these have [0.2] been cast into the rubbish bin of history [0. 3] but you will fairly soon be doing the Annales who are in a sense the twentieth century heirs of this [0.2] French positivist tradition [1.2] and the key figure [0.3] in the nineteenth century in this who is virtually a contemporary [0.3] er of Ranke [0.4] is a man called Auguste Comte the founder of the discip-, of the word and the discipline of sociology [0.9] Ranke as you [0.2] found out was a Prussian a Lutheran a monarchist a conservative hostile to the Enlightenment [0.7] Comte [0.4] is in a sense a reverse of Ranke he's a claddic classic product of the [0.2] world of the French Revolution [0.3] educated in the grande école set up by [0.2] Napoleon after the French Revolution [0.2] to train the post-revolutionary elite [0.4] in France [0.6] Comte viewed the Enlightenment [0.3] as a stage on the path of humanity [0.3] from the age of religion [0.4] through the age of philosophy [0.4] finally to the age of science the age of positivism [0.3] er which he saw as emerging in the nineteenth century [1.0] he therefore shared the Enlightenment French Revolution emphasis on progress which Ranke rejected [0.5] but he was worried that the French Revolution [0.4] er [0.3] because of the [0.3] social un-, er upheaval which was created [0.3] would create instability therefore [0.2] what the post-revolution world needed [0.3] was [0. 4] Comte said a science of mankind [0.2] I-E sociology in-, he in-, invented the term [0.6] which would [0.2] diagnose social problems [0.2] and su-, suggest solutions [0.7] Comte saw society [0.4] as an entity it was a reality it was a thing [0.5] and society could be studied [0.2] using the methodology of natural sciences [0.2] something which Ranke rejected [0.5] and one could [1. 1] discern its laws there were laws of motion as it were of society which could be [0.3] er [0.2] worked out [0.8] and Comte envisaged a world where [0.3] experts [1.0] economists sociologists demographers scientists technologists and so forth [0.3] would [0.8] uncover these social laws [0.4] and utilize their knowledge of society to run society in a more efficient productive [0.4] er way for for as it were a more productive [0.3] er [0.3] more prosperous future [0.4] and the masses would not really understand this science but they would be taught to accept [0.2] and welcome the rule of this technocratic elite [1.9] now Marx is the figure clearly of a a third paradigm [0.4] Marxism differs from Comtean positivism because [0.5] positivists' approach [0.6] emphasized understanding deep structures and the laws of motion in society [0. 4] in order [0.4] that modern a sort of modern technocratic elite [0.3] could manage and stabilize society and achieve social integration and harmony [0.7] the positivists in sort er in short sought to control and eliminate social conflict [0.9] Marxism was clearly [0.6] more revolutionary in it it saw previous [0.2] m-, mar-, Marx famously said that previous philosophers [0.4] had sought to interpret the world [0.3] that his task [0.2] was to change it [0. 6] and he saw revolution as a sort of locomotive of history class conflict [0. 3] as what drove history forward [1.0] subsequent Marxists er have often criticized the positivists ce-, Comte and his disciples [0.2] for their [0.2] overemphasis on social structures and laws [0. 5] saying this this was too deterministic [0.3] er it undermined man's capacity to have an agency as it were i-, an input [0.2] into how history moved [1.1] but what it i think is important here to register is that for [0.3] much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century [0.5] Marxism [0.2] certainly shared or ki-, appeared to share many of the features [0.3] of this positivist sociological approach [0.8] indeed Karl Popper in another book that we used to do in historiography which has again been cast into the dustbin of history [0. 2] a book called the Poverty of Historicism [1.1] er [0.4] argued that [0.3] er [1.5] both Comte and Marx should be lumped together [0.4] as believers in deterministic laws of history they both in a sense shared [0.3] many features in common he asked [1.1] and why was this confusion possible well first of all because Marxists and positivists [0.2] both [0.4] unlike Ranke [0.4] appeared to share a common interest in [0.2] society they weren't so concerned with [0.2] individuals getting inside the heads of individual great people [0.6] but they were concerned with society social structures econ-, economics [0.7] er [1.3] secondly Marx was clearly influenced [0.5] if less directly by Comte himself [0.3] certainly by Comte's great [0.4] er [0.2] teacher was a who's a [0.2] rather eccentric French [0.3] er aristocrat who actually espoused the the re-, French Revolution a man called Saint-Simon [0.6] Saint-Simon was [0.8] an eccentric genius he dreamed he in he in his m-, [0.2] multitude of writings round about the turn of the century in the early eighteen er early early eighteen-hundreds [0.4] he dreamed of for example the Panama and Suez canals it was actually one of his disciples de Lesseps who built the Suez Canal [0.3] sixty years later but [0.3] er [0.3] er Saint-Simon dreamed of a single global market in order to have one one needed [0.2] er these canals to link the oceans of the world [0.2] he dreamed of the [0.5] he said [0.2] it was l-, logical that Europe should form a single [laugh] [0.5] European market [laugh] [0.2] and should have a single currency and all the [0. 3] er for those of you who are Europhobes and don't want want us to get out of Europe [0.2] can blame Saint-Simon as being well as it were well the founder of the [0.3] of the European idea [0.8] and Saint-Simon divided history into economic stages from him Marx derived the idea of a sort of teleology [0.4] of history progressing from slavery to feudalism to capitalism and so forth [0.8] and also Saint-Simon was responsible in a sense for the [0.4] er [0.6] notion which is [0.3] kind of central to sort of [0.3] er subsequent labour movements of the distinction as it were between productive [0.3] and parasitic [0.3] er social groups [0.2] there's a famous parable [0.3] er by Saint-Simon in which he says [0.3] imagine [0.4] er [0.2] a Europe in which [0.2] all the crowned heads [0.3] all the princes and princesses and bishops and so forth and aristocrats [0.3] are s-, are called to a [0.3] a wedding in Lisbon of a of a royal princess [0.3] and they happen to be walking across a bridge one day [0. 3] er to go to the cathedral and the bridge collapses and they're all [0.2] thrown into the river and drown [0.4] what is the impact on Europe [0.3] answer [1.4] zilch [0.3] er these people are totally useless they're unproductive they're parasitic [0.3] if that bridge however contained [1.1] scientists doctors er [0.4] technologists managers [0.3] er useful people [laugh] [0.4] then it would indeed be serious those are in a sense the productive classes [0.3] and it was [0.2] Saint-Simon's er students in the grandes écoles who took part in the [0.2] eighteen-thirty revolution in Paris which overthrew the [0.3] returned Bourbons [0.3] and some [0.2] radical Saint-Simonians actually spread their ideas among the workers in Paris in the early eighteen-thirties [0.3] and some French workers got the [0.4] er idea that actually they were the productive classes it was actually the workers [laugh] not the managers and the [0.3] and the and the industrialists who were the the true who actually er as it were the tr-, were the truly productive class [0. 3] so much of Marx's er [0.3] structure of thinking as it were [0.3] er comes from the-, these sorts of Saint-Simonian influences [0.9] moreover Marx was drawn into the [0.6] what [0.2] some have seen as a trap [0.4] of seeking the laws of historical development [0.4] in Das Kapital written in nine-, eighteen- sixty-seven [0.9] Marx said that he was seeking [0.3] the economic laws of motion [0.4] of modern society [0.6] and this led him certainly on occasions to [0.2] appear to write as if [0.5] society has moved inevitably inexorably [0.2] from feudalism to capitalism [0.3] and that capitalism too was inexorably doomed by [0.2] certain internal contradictions [0.7] and there were [0.2] clearly problems with this many of Marx's liberal critics [0.3] er Karl Popper for example [0.4] er a leading philosopher of science er [0.5] er argued in The Poverty of Historicism that Marx was [0.8] wedded to what had become an outmoded nineteenth century notion of science a concept of scientific laws [0. 5] er whereas twentieth century science after er ei-, [0.2] Einstein and relativity and so forth was much more [0.3] operating on the grounds of provisional hypotheses as it were which could be tested and falsified [0.7] and Isaiah Berlin who E H Carr [0.2] er refers to occasionally in his pamphlet histor-, [0.2] Historical Inevitability [0.4] argued that Marx's deterministic model [0.4] is a denial ultimately of human free will [0.3] and human agency [0.6] but certainly for a century or so after eighteen-fifty [0.5] Marxist historiography one could argue i think [0.3] was held back in some ways by this sort of positivist overlay [0. 8] and this was in part because Marx himself clearly wasn't in a technical sense a historian [0.4] and wrote relatively little [0.4] history [0.8] he was known for much of the late nineteenth early twentieth century for two major [0. 4] writings as it were first the [0.3] brief polemical [0.4] Communist Manifesto written on the eve of the European revolutions of eighteen-forty- eight [0.2] predicting them [0.3] and setting out a strategy for them [0.6] and secondly for Das Kapital written [0.2] nearly twenty years later [0.4] a huge attempt er er one of our great prime ministers Harold Wilson said he [0.2] he gave up on page two [0.4] er but er he b-, he b-, he'd done an economics degree at Oxford but [0.4] a huge attempt to construct a model [0.3] of the capitalist system [0.4] conceived almost like a machine with a sort of central [0.3] er sort of floor at er at its heart as it were [0.3] E P Thompson's [0.3] er book The Poverty of Theory which you'll look at next term in in conjunction with [0.2] Thompson's other writing [0.5] argues that er [0.7] that there is something unsatisfactory about this rather mechanistic [0.3] er version [0.3] er [0.2] of history which which which Marx gets drawn into he was trying to as it were refute [0.4] the capitalist economi-, [0.2] econ-, economists on their own ground [0.3] er and there's something rather unsatisfactory about this particular [0.3] er approach [1.8] the result of this concentration on the Communist Manifesto on the one hand and kas-, Das Kapital on the other was that many of the insights available in Marx's other writings in other texts [0.4] er where he does write some contemporary history and he does so in ways which are more suggestive [0.4] of a less deterministic [0.3] a-, approach [0.5] er where he allows some room for agency for class consciousness for beliefs ideologies cultures and so forth [0.4] er [0.7] these texts were relatively neglected [0.2] and it was only the rediscovery of such texts in the twentieth century [0.4] er a-, as together with the works of the so-called young Marx in the eighteen f-, early eighteen-forties [0.4] which inspired the [0.3] new Marxist new left of of the eighteen nineteen-sixties of which E P Thompson in a sense wa-, was a part [0.9] until then [0.3] Marxist historiography often reflected a rather crude [0.4] vulgar positivistic Marxism [0.4] and it's i think also [0.2] important to recognize that [0.6] it's only very late as it were in the nineteen-sixties [0.3] that Marxist historians get a s-, any sort of [0.7] toehold on most European university systems [0.3] er there is the odd maverick like Georges Lefebvre one of the c-, [0.2] classic historians of the French Revolution who has a post at the Sorbonne [0.3] in the nineteen-thirties [0.4] but in Germany clearly of in in the era of i-, Wilhelmine Germany or Nazi Germany [0.2] or even post-nineteen-forty-five [0.3] west West Germany [0.3] er [0.3] Marxists were largely excluded from the entire university system [0.3] Gramsci perhaps the greatest Marxist theorist of this century who namex will talk about next week [0.5] died of course in one of Mussolini's prisons in the nineteen-thirties [0.5] er British Marxists were very marginal George Rude one of the great British Marxist historians of the French Revolution [0.2] never er suc-, succeeded in getting a job in a British university and had to go to [0.3] Australia or some godforsaken place to [laugh] [0.2] and actually r-, wrote a book about the the Tolpuddle martyrs and [0.2] people being deported to Australia as it were [0.4] er in order to find a job [0.3] er [0.2] e-, even E P Thompson of course had only [0.3] about four or five years here [0.3] in his entire career he he was a sort of lecturer in a sort of worker's education in [0.2] in the West Riding of Yorkshire for most of his career [0.4] he had three or four years here [0.3] fell out with the Vice Chancellor wrote a famous book called Warwick University Limited [laugh] [0.3] which i recommend you to read [0.3] er it's all about how business interests control the the University of Warwick er [0.2] an implausible thesis but [0.4] er [0.3] er [0.2] and er [0.9] and then of course left and and there's i-, i-, there wa-, there was therefore not very much space as it were for Marxist historiography to develop [0.3] within the univer-, the university systems of Europe until [0.4] till the nineteen-sixties [1.3] but this vulgar Marxism as it were which was dominant was nevertheless [0. 2] in a sense quite powerful in that it argued [0.9] Hobsbawn er suggests five major things [0.9] in the last instan-, first of all in the last instance [0.2] that economic factors were determining [0.3] that [0.6] hypothetically [0.2] our world of the nineteen-nineties is being shaped by the globalization [0.2] [laugh] of the world economy [0.3] er and the spread of new technologies of [0.4] to take one example as it were [0.6] secondly a model of base and superstructure that the economic base of society the mode of production [0.7] er [0.2] determines in some sort of ways in the last instance [0.3] the superstructure of [0.4] politics ideas culture laws [0.2] and so forth that these are in some some ways [0.3] reflect [0.4] er what is going on er as it were underneath [1.1] thirdly a notion [0.2] that class is central that each as it were mode of production develops a distinctive set of classes and class relations [0.4] and that history's motor as it were is the [0.2] relationship and conflict between [0.3] these classes which is again as i say related to [0.2] to the m-, the modes of production [0.9] fourthly and i mentioned this already that there are in a sense certain historical laws [0.4] which [0.4] er [0.3] e-, [0.7] ensure that or which should suggest that his-, history [0.4] er moves societies from stages from slavery to feudalism to capitalism and so forth [0.7] and finally and this is quite [0.2] significant for the Eighteenth Brumaire which is partly about this [0.3] that the state [0. 5] is [0.2] in some ways either directly or indirectly [0.3] the instrument of the [0.4] dominant economic class at a given moment in the Ancien Régime [0.3] you had a feudal society with the [0.2] feudal aristocracy as the dominant [0. 7] class in a capitalist society it's the capitalist bourgeoisie which are [0. 2] hegemonic [0.6] er [0.2] and y-, [0.2] not only are they sort of were in control of the economics but also their ideas [0.2] er are the ones that circulate most freely and are [0.3] dominant within a given society [1.8] in other words the state is not as Ranke seemed to think of it er necessarily good [0.6] necessary needed to achieve s-, internal stability to fight wars [0.4] nor is it [0.2] the state as Comte and the positivists suggested [0.4] an instrument w-, whereby disinterested experts and technocrats maximize efficiency and produc-, productivity [0.3] and the public [0.2] well-being [0. 3] the state for Marx is the instrument ultimately [0.2] of the dominant class er at a given moment [1.6] now even this rather crude vulgar Marxism as it's sometimes known [0.4] had an explosive impact on Rankean [0.6] Rankeanism as it were wa-, was the dominant paradigm [0. 6] er eri-, Eric Hobsbawn in one of his essays in the nineteen-sixties said [0. 8] this even this sort of vulgar Marxism was a concentrated charge of intellectual dynamite which demolished the fortifications of traditional Rankean history this perhaps [0.3] overstating it because Rankean history [0.4] er is still with us as it were but er [0.2] as it were there is a a certain element of truth in it [1.0] many of the neo-Marxists of the twentieth century argued that the [0.2] the real Marx as it were the fully [0.3] fully sort of rounded Marx [0.4] was actually more nuanced more subtle [0.4] er if if more difficult to get at as it were that he was found only in brief texts such as The Eighteenth Brumaire [0.5] er dealing with [0.2] short specific periods [0. 4] that er many of the ideas from the as it were alternative Marx had to be teased out of incomplete texts [0.4] er [0.6] and there was an need therefore in the twentieth century for [0.3] Marxists to read and reread these different sort of fragmented writings of Marx to [0.2] to tease out [0.3] as it were the the authentic [0.3] voice of Marx [0.5] and cle-, clearly a what a lot of the historiography of the s-, nineteen-sixties and seventies was about was [0.6] Marxist historians [0.4] attempting to find an alternative [0.3] both t-, on the one hand to sort of the Rankean model [0.4] of great men or the positivist model of determinism [0.6] stressing [0.4] er a world [0.8] suggested in Marx's [0.2] shorter texts [0.2] where men make their own history [0.3] but do so [0.5] only under circumstances given and transmitted from the past [1.7] but to turn to the text itself [1.0] the Communist Manifesto [0.3] was written on the eve of eighteen-forty-eight on the eve of the revolutions of eighteen-forty-eight [0.6] and in it Marx appeared to claim that [0.7] two or three main th-, main things first of all that developments [0.3] within European capitalism [0.5] were already [0.2] in well advanced in the process [0.4] of polarizing society into [0.3] a dominant capitalist bourgeoisie [0.5] and [0.2] a growing working class [1.1] that the existing ruling elite therefore was increasingly capitalist [0.3] and that therefore the coming revolutions which he predicted and which occurred within weeks almost of the [0.3] publication of of the Communist Manifesto [0.2] that the coming revolution [0.2] which would sweep Europe [0.4] would be dominated [0.3] above all by [0.2] a central conflict between capitalists and workers [1.4] The Eighteenth Brumaire is written [0.4] nearly four years later [0.9] and it's written in a sense in defeat [0.5] and it's written to explain [0.8] why the revolutions did occur [0. 4] but also from unfortunately from a Marxist point of view why [0.5] the workers had been defeated [0.3] why the victor in France had been [0.4] a new sort of authoritarian centralized Bonapartist state er er a sort of [0.2] a second empire [0.4] a sort of r-, r-, some some ways sort of repeating the the pattern of [0.3] of er of Napoleon the First [0.3] and what this new state signified in in class terms [0.8] and to enquire whether his theories in the of the Communist Manifesto were [0.4] completely wrong or whether one could [0.2] as it were nuance them modify them [0.3] use them to explain as it were what had happened [1.3] the history of the text i think is significant it was written as i say [0.2] in [0.4] eighteen- fifty-two [0.3] it wasn't actually f-, [0.2] published until eighteen-sixty- nine [0.5] and it was largely ignored for fifty years or so after that you might wish it had been ignored for [laugh] [0.3] sort of [0.2] a hundred-and- thirty years after that but [0.2] it wasn't [0.3] er [0.2] it was taken up by [0.7] Marxists in the nineteen-twenties and thirties [0.2] as they grappled [0. 2] with [0.3] fresh defeats [0.5] at the hands of not Bonapartism this time but fascism [0.4] why did the Italian working class go down to feat [0.3] defeat at the hands of Mussolini [0.2] why did the German working class [0.5] with a huge sort of communist party a huge socialist party a hu-, [0.5] tens of m-, millions of of o-, unionized workers [0.2] why had these movements gone down de- , [0.2] defeat [0.2] at the hands of of fascism [0.6] and [0.3] there's a quite interesting book on [0.3] th-, theories of fascism by [0.2] a man called Kitchen published in the nineteen-seventies [0.2] very short book and the [0.3] one of the very short chapters in this very short ch-, book [0.2] is [0.3] Fascism as a Bonapartism and what [0.3] Kitchen does is use [0.4] The [0.2] Eighteenth Brumaire [0.3] as a way of reflecting on [0.3] th-, the nature of fascism [0.4] er [0.7] and the text certainly influenced [0.3] the new er Gramsci in his sitting in Mussolini's jail reflecting on why the Italian left had been defeated by Mussolini [0.5] er [0.9] took an interest in in the sort of ideas that that Marx had put forward in this text [0.7] now how does The Eighteenth Brumaire modify [0.2] the Communist Manifesto well it does so in a number of ways first of all [0.5] it argues that capitalism [1.1] is actually only developing slowly gradually unevenly in the Europe of of mid-nineteenth century [0.5] that older modes of production [0.2] both in industry and with artisan producers [0.2] and in the countryside with peasant farming [0.3] are still there therefore [0.5] one does have industrialists and one does have industrial workers but there is a much more [0.3] diverse economy [0.4] er with er m-, many more sort of different sort of s-, u-, subordinate social groups [1.2] there is a class war that goes on in Paris and Lyon and Berlin and Cologne and so forth in Europe in eighteen- forty-eight between [0.3] capitalists and workers [0.3] but there are lots of other conflicts going on in Europe as well between other sort of [0.3] social s- , social groups [0.8] and because the co-, there is a very complex [0.4] class structure and an unevenly developed economy [0.9] er the [0.5] social and political divisions of Europe [0.4] in eighteen-forty-eight are much more complicated than Marx suggested in the Communist Manifesto [0.7] at the level of elite politics it's difficult to form a single coherent [0.4] conservative party because [0.7] on the one hand one still has remnants of the old aristocracy er who still survive and are still yearning for some sort of return to the Ancien Régime [0.6] still imperfectly assimilated into the new [0.4] bourgeois world [0.6] and the bourgeoisie itself Marx says is fragmented on all sorts of grounds between [0.5] finance industry trade land [0.3] er [0.4] th-, th-, the professions [0.2] politically between royalists Bonapartists republicans [0.2] culturally between Catholics Jews Protestants [0.3] Freemasons and [0.2] Voltaireans and so forth [0.4] in other words the [0.3] the world of the elites is much more fragmented on all sorts in all sorts of grounds [0.3] than Marx suggested in this notion of a sort of single capitalist ruling class [1.3] and these intraclass divisions divisions as i say are within the leading classes [0.4] make it difficult for the elites to achieve a united front [0.4] even in the face of the threat of workers and peasants in the revolutions of eighteen-forty-eight [0.7] and Marx concludes in the end [0.3] these fragmented social elites in the er in the end need Bonapartism some sort of strong authoritarian military backed regime [0.4] to come in to [0.3] sort out their difficulties for them [0.4] er to or as it were [0.3] counteract the their own fragmentation [0.2] just er er as later Marx has said [0.3] as the [0. 2] German bourgeoisie which was squabbling [0.2] over all sorts of things needed the Nazis [laugh] [0.2] to come and save them from communism and the depression [0.3] er in the early nineteen-thirties [1.2] the title The Eighteenth Brumaire derives from Marx's [0.2] ironic view of eighteen-forty- eight [0.5] a tragicomic replay of the heroic revolution of seventeen-eighty- nine and the seventeen-nineties history repeating itself as farce [0.6] er in place of as it were the great Napoleon one has Napoleon the Little er his his nephew [0.4] er in place of a [0.2] a heroic and successful bourgeois revolution [0.3] in the seventeen-nineties [0.2] one has [0.2] a stuttering and ultimately failed [0.2] working class revolution [0.2] in eighteen-forty-eight [0.6] and this revolution fails Marx argues because [0.3] the working class is still too small [0.4] er [0.3] er that er it's forced to ally with er [0.3] other social groups artisans and peasants and petits bourgeois [1.6] the style of the text i think is significant er Marx is in a sense a [0.7] a one of the many things that makes him interesting to read but also often difficult to read is he is that he [0.4] he [0.2] i-, is enormously learned in world literature from Greece and Rome and nineteenth century literature and Cervantes and [0.3] and everything else [0.3] er and er he [0.2] scatters the the text with all sorts of literary references to all sorts of different [0.4] periods [0.5] and i think when you read the text that perhaps it's useful to concentrate on [0.2] the first third [0.3] and perhaps the last fifteen pages or so i think there's the meat of the argument i-, is is there and the middle sec-, [0.2] sections are rather [0.6] complex overcomplex perhaps [0.3] account of the [0.6] int-, in-, internal squabblings of the various elites [0.3] which may be fascinating if you're interested in right wing elite politics in France but probably [0.3] fairly bewildering [laughter] [0.2] er if you're not [0.4] er [0.3] and [0.5] but much of the middle section has the the various actors er the various sort of aristocrats and different sections of the bourgeoisie and various sorts of bourgeois and aristocratic parties [0.7] er [0.2] he has them sort of dressing up they're endlessly putting on masks and [laugh] putting on costumes and [laugh] [0.2] as it were d-, adopting er different sort of historical guises [0. 3] er adopting the roles and the postures of of previous historical epochs [0. 5] and the irony the savage irony the of the text derives from Marx's [0.5] dialectical mode of argument his [0.2] sense that his conviction that [0.4] objective historical processes are in fact occurring [0.4] in a sense despite [0.2] not because of the actions of individuals parties classes [0.6] unlike Ranke who says [0.3] you understand history by getting inside the heads of people [0.3] and [0.2] finding out what they thought they were doing [0.4] Marx says that's only part of the process because [0.3] lots of times people do things which they think are going to have one sort of impact [0.2] and in fact they have [0.2] completely the opposite [0.2] er er impact [0.4] for example Marx says the newly enfranchised peasantry who've got the vote for the first time [0.2] in eighteen-forty-eight [0.4] in the midst o-, middle of a revolution in the middle of a huge agrarian crisis of indebtedness and [0.4] and and so on and so forth [0.5] er they feel threatened from all sides they feel worried about urban socialism [0.4] er they're f-, worried about the ha-, hanging on to their small farms they're in debt the crops have failed [0.5] cash prices are falling whatever [0.5] they vote Louis napol-, er Marx says er in December eighteen-forty-eight for Louis Napoleon as somebody as a sort of [0.2] charismatic saviour who will come and rescue them from their [0.3] their [0.3] problems [0.4] but Marx says and this is the the irony [0.7] if you actually get a Bonapartist regime [0.3] which stabilizes French capitalism [0.7] the development of capitalism inexorably will in the long term [0.2] destroy small-scale peasant agriculture [laugh] [0.2] in other words the peasants vote for [0.2] somebody who they think will save them [0.5] but [0. 4] in the long term [laugh] [0.3] the type of regime that Bonaparte er [0.2] ism-, introduces by [0.3] spreading agrarian capitalism will actually [0.2] undermine small peasant agriculture [0.4] er [0.8] and er this sort of [0.2] the the the certain sort of similar sort of arguments you make about the German petit bourgeoisie and Hitler [0.4] or or indeed some-, some-, someone suggested to m-, Mrs Thatcher and small grocers in the er [0.3] in the nineteen-eighties and nineteen-nineties the the sort of sign which i [0.3] usually mention in my seminars which was [0.2] painted on a bridge in namex in namex where i live [0. 3] in the early nineteen-eighties at the height of Thatcherism [0.3] er you know [0.2] Mrs Thatcher helps small businesses get smaller and smaller and the actual [0.3] er sign was started off in very large letters [laugh] [0.2] itself got smaller as [0.3] er towards the end of the [0.3] the sentence [0.5] er [0.7] now clearly one could say that in the long term [0.3] the French peasantry have [0.2] largely disappeared or well there are still some of them around blockading channel ports [laugh] [0.2] yesterday if you've read your Daily Mail and your Sun you might [0.2] might have noticed this [0.4] er but that's this is the remem-, remnants of a er a once much larger [0.3] class the the the peasantry has has steadily been eroded [0.2] in Europe over the last hundred-and-fifty years [0. 7] but mar-, what Marx is is [0.3] concentrating on is the contradiction between [0.7] what men [0.4] actually are and who they think they are what they [0.4] are doing and what they think they're doing or what the im-, impact of what they're doing is [0.2] mor-, er [0.3] what they think that it's going to be and what what it actually is [0.5] er for example [0.9] er the aristocracy in the post- [0.3] seventeen-eighty-nine world Marx says [0.4] still see themselves as [0.4] heirs of a long sort of aristocratic pedigree going back to the Middle Ages [0.3] enemies therefore of the revolution and the and the bourgeoisie [0.9] and yet Marx says really if you look at these people in eighteen-forty-eight [0.4] they no longer have [0.2] seigneurial privileges they no longer have aristocratic tax exemptions [0.3] they've lost most of the things which actually distinguish them as a [0.4] as a er class [0.2] in the Ancien Régime [0.5] they're still quite rich but their ri-, their income comes from land it comes from [0.2] railway investments [laugh] shares in coal mines and so forth [0.2] in all sorts of [0.4] ways they are objectively [0.2] p-, part of the part of the bourgeoisie their their income actually comes from [0. 2] the same sort of sources [0.3] as that of the upper middle class [0.4] they're really de facto part of the bourgeoisie [0.7] and therefore they should in a sense share a common interest to defend property against socialism [0.6] but subjectively Marx says some of them are still locked in the past subjectively s-, they're still locked in this sort of world of of [0.2] hereditary privilege and and [0.3] and and family heritage and so on and so forth [0.5] and Marx sees them therefore as a sense schizophrenic [0. 4] er endlessly [0.6] putting on and taking off costumes and masks posing one moment as [0.2] sort of feudal seigneurs and the next moment as [0.4] defenders of property against against working class socialism [0.6] and er one recent criti-, er sort of [0.4] er er [0.2] sort of of study of The Eighteenth Brumaire by [0.2] by chris-, Christopher Norris in the context of post- modernism which is something you'll come to next term [0.4] suggested that eighteenth cent-, The Eighteenth Brumaire is in a sense the first [0.4] as it were protopostmodernist text because one has these characters as it were endlessly [0.2] changing identity changing costumes [0.2] choosing identities [2.9] one of the things that clearly distinguishes Marx's approach from from that of Ranke is his treatment as it were of great [0.4] men [0.4] er Marx has clearly no time at all for the notion that [0.9] well then Ranke as as it were [0.2] p-, p-, largely attributed the German Reformation to to Luther that Luther was the this great man who came along and thought [0.3] in a different way about the [0.2] about the church about er theology and so on and so forth the [0.2] the [0.2] in a sense the Reformation and indeed [0.4] subsequent German national identity was conceived in the mind [0.3] of this of this great man in in in the early sixteenth century [0.6] Marx rejects the sort of Rankean emphasis on which whi-, whi-, [0.3] w-, would it be possible as it were to write a Rankean account [0. 3] of the period that Marx is writing about [0.2] in terms of Louis Napoleon as a great man who comes along and [0.2] saves the state against chaos in and and and revolution and so forth and [0.3] revives France's economic and political power in the eighteen-fifties [0.4] after the crisis [0.7] er [0.8] but although Marx refuses to take that line he also says that the [0.4] some of the lines taken by l-, [0.2] Louis Napoleon's Republican critics people like the novelist Victor Hugo who wrote a pamphlet called Napoleon le Petit Napoleon the Little [0.4] er which he sort of ridiculed Louis Napoleon as a complete [0.3] idiot a nincompoop a sort of pale shadow of his uncle and so on and so forth [1.0] Marx said that's not good enough either because if this man is such an idiot [0.3] [laugh] er [0.3] so incompetent and so forth how come he's managed just to seize power in one of the most powerful states [laugh] [0.2] in Western Europe [0.7] er [1.2] Marx's answer to this if it is an answer and there are things wrong with it undoubtedly is that [0.3] the significant [0.6] reading of why Louis Napoleon and Bonapartism came to power [0.3] in France in eighteen-fifty-one [0.5] is [0. 5] in terms of the a sort of [0.7] paralysis in the class war as it were the [0. 2] the French elites [0.3] are too [0.2] divided as i've tried to describe [0. 2] to rule themselves [0.7] the masses workers and peasants [0.3] are too mobilized too angry too radicalized to allow the elites to rule [0.4] but the masses are also soo-, too [0.4] immature too unorganized [0.3] er to actually seize power effectively themselves [0.2] and it's in this sort of [0.5] stalemate in a class war as it were [0.2] which allows this [0.2] er figure as it were w-, [0.2] with various sorts of backers and various sorts of er thing [0.2] to to to come to power [1.5] what Marx is trying to do here is to [0.9] constantly in a sense decode [0.5] French politics [0.7] in class terms he says you've got a variety of parties you've got Republicans Radicals [0.3] Montaignards [0.3] er Legitimist Royalists or Lyonist Royalists Bonapartists and so on and so forth [0.3] these are the were the political labels [0.4] who [0.7] in class terms do these various parties represent [0.9] and the bourgeois elites he says are fragmented [0.4] er there is in a sense a ruling block rather than a single capitalist ruling class [0.5] er [1.0] er many of the as it were financiers and so forth have backed [0.2] the Orleanist regime till eighteen-forty-eight [0.5] the conservative wing of the er nobility are still yearning for the return of the Bourbons who've been displaced in eighteen-thirty [0.7] er and there are all sorts of [0.2] er divisions as it were within the the the the ruling elites [0.2] er [0.8] and er as i i tried to describe the er [0.2] er the the aristocracy are sort of [0.3] s-, schizophrenic about their identity [0.6] er [0.8] on the one hand they the aristocracy are [0.6] as it were [0.2] er [1.9] objectively in terms of their income part of the bourgeoisie but nevertheless [0.2] they're still swayed by family traditions dynastic loyalties [0.4] family memories [0.3] er they still obstinately feel themselves to be distinct from the bourgeoisie [0.6] er and Marx goes on to say distinction is made in private life [0.4] between what a man thinks and says of himself [0.3] and what he really is and does [0.4] in historical struggles [0.3] one must [0.2] make a still sharper distinction [0. 4] between th-, [0.7] er between the [0.2] phrases [0.2] and fantasies of the parties involved [0.2] and their real interests between their conceptions [0.2] of themselves [0.2] and what they really are [1.5] and similarly [0.3] er looking at the [0.4] the f-, the left in France in eighteen-forty-eight which is trying to make a more popular egalitarian revolution of in the interests of the [1.4] workers peasants artisans the lower classes of society [1.3] Marx attributes their [0.2] er [0.3] you see he basically says that they are a sort of composite group they're an uneasy alliance of a certain number of sort of bourgeois radical leaders you know lawyers and doctors and journalists [0.5] together with sections of the lower middle class sections of the skilled artisans [0.2] sections of the peasantry [0.4] and the new emerging working class [0.6] er and Marx argues that it's precisely this preponderance within this [0.2] popular coalition [0.4] of [0.4] petit producers you know small artisans small peasant [0.2] proprietors [0.4] which makes [0.4] their ultimate strategy their ultimate ideology [0.2] slow confused and ultimately Marx argues such a failure [0.5] because what Marx argues and this is part of Marx's sort of [0.5] historical ruthlessness [0.2] is that [0.5] much of this popular alliance actually represents people like small independent craftsmen [0.2] and small peasants [0.2] who are doomed [0.2] to [0.5] to disruption the capitalist process [0.2] is too powerful [0.2] to allow these sorts of [0.2] intermediary groups [0.2] to survive much longer [0.3] their modes of production are archaic [1.3] and one could argue and p-, certain historians have argued [0.3] that Marx is here allowing his in a sense his teleological conviction [0.3] of the long term cap-, you know in the long term these people are going to be defeated [laughter] therefore [0.2] in a sense their struggles are doomed and therefore in a sense they're futile [0.3] one could nevertheless argue that in the real world of the France of eighteen-forty-eight [0.3] since there are millions of peasants and [0.2] hundreds of thousands of small artisans and you know these people actually exist [0.3] they're not actually factory workers [0.3] er [0.4] nevertheless they they will actually try to construct a world where where y-, wh-, based on you know cooperative credit and mutual aid societies and [0.3] various sorts of mutua-, er er sort of er [0.3] er [0.3] institutions of this sort cooperative production [0.3] which would actually try and prolong their existence [0.4] and indeed Bernard Moss in quite an interesting article in the Socialist Register nineteen-ninety- eight which should be on the reading list and isn't [0.4] er has argued that [0. 4] Marx himself [0.3] a year or two earlier in eighteen-forty-eight forty-nine had actually urged [0.3] in both France and Germany [0.2] a sort of broad populist coalition in worker [0.2] which workers allied with peasants and artisans [0.3] and the petit bourgeoisie [0.3] it's only [0.4] when he comes to The Eighteenth Brumaire when [0.2] when they when they've actually been defeated that he says well it's inevitable they would be defeated because they [0.2] represent as it were the the forces of backwardness and the forces of the past nm0088: what i want to do finally if i've got time is to look [0.4] briefly at [0.4] the relationship between class and politics i-, in in in in in to summarize it as it were [0.4] and then if i have time and if i don't have time then you've got it written down on the on the sheet i've give-, given you [0.2] look a bit about the [0.2] the role of the state [0.5] first of all to summarize in a sense what i think Marx is trying to say er about [0.2] the relationship between class and politics [1.0] he's arguing i think that class doesn't in itself represent [0.3] a category of absolute political unity [0.4] there are endless [0.3] squabbles within classes ideological cultural political and so forth [0.2] if one thinks of our own [0. 4] period of the nineteen-eighties and nineties the [0.2] the English bourgeoisie is divided between some who believe in a sort of libertarian [0.3] [laugh] er moral code and some who believe in Christian family values [0.4] er some believe you know bankers and financiers and people in the city in the London like [0.3] interest rates to go up because they make their money through [0.2] lending money [0.3] on high rates of interests which are harmful to northern and midland industrialists [0.4] er there are [0.2] sections of the Tory Party that are in favour of [0.5] the single European currency and the common market and there are sections of the Tory Party that are [0.2] against it [0.2] sections of British business which are [0.3] take different lines [0.3] the in other words the [0.2] the bourgeoisie is is fragmented on all sorts of of lines [0.4] but mar-, what is Marx is arguing is that [0.4] ultimately class dictates a certain line of material interest beyond which [0.3] no political fraction [0.3] of the bourgeoisie will actually cross [0.4] the bourg-, no bourgeois party will in the last instance [0.6] attack private property or call call for the wholesale nationalization of the the banks or the city of London [laugh] [0.2] or [0.3] or the renationalization of the railway system or or whatever [0.4] er but until that line is reached [0.4] class fractions will f-, actually fight [0.2] quite bitterly amongst themselves [0.8] such squabbles might well be about religion if you one [0.3] one looks at the British bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century [0.3] the most bitter conflicts were often between [0.2] the Church of England and non-conformists [0.2] these were very real [0.4] through a cultural and often politic-, you know the [0.2] non-conformists tended to be Liberals [0.4] er [0.3] er Church of England [0.2] tended to be Tories these are very real conflicts [0.3] such ideas [0.5] such conflicts actually exist in a certain plane [0.2] er in in the superstructure as it were [0.6] er but may be explained in the sense [0.4] in that plane you don't need to constantly return to the [0.4] mode of production or the underlying economic base [0.4] to necessarily explain all these [0.2] er [0.3] er [0.3] conflicts or some of them might be [0.3] might be done that way [0.5] the line of class therefore in a s-, in a sense establishes a ring [0.5] around possible activities what goes on inside the ring [0.5] can have non-material causes can be conflicts about religion or whether or not one supports a [0.2] particular dynasty or whatever [0.7] and conflicts over such issues may be subjectively deeply felt [0.4] er as deeply felt even more deeply felt than class divisions [0.6] but such conflicts rarely in the last instance cross the line [0.3] of certain common material interests [1.0] Marx later insisted that it is not the consciousness of men which determines their s- , social existence [0.4] but on the contrary [0.3] their social existence which determines their consciousness [1.0] and one [0.5] of the [0.3] complicated lessons i think of The Eighteenth Brumaire [0.5] is that [0.3] in the [0.2] complicated transitional society of France of eighteen-forty-eight a world [0. 2] moving towards capitalism but in which [0.4] peasants artisans petits bourgeois aristocrats all sorts of [0.3] older social groups are still present [0.6] then [0.6] social existence is determined [0.5] by in a sense a coexistence of the new capitalist mode of production [0.2] but also with older modes of production [0.8] and hence the superstructure of ideas ideologies consciousness [0.4] reflects in the France of eighteen-forty-eight [0.3] not [0. 2] a single dominant capitalist mode of production [0.3] but also various [0.4] subsidiary perhaps declining but still very powerful [0.3] er [0.2] as it were [0.2] al-, alternative modes of production [2.1] the idea moreover the study of the aristocracy suggests the ideas and attitudes generated by an earlier feudal society [0.3] may in a sense have an afterlife the feudal system may have gone by seventeen-eighty-nine [0. 4] er [0.2] but [0.3] it still lives on in a sense in the consciousness [0.3] of aristocratic families and may outlast might outla-, outlast the mode of production [0.3] which gave rise to it nm0088: i'll just summarize the last bit very bries-, briefly [0.7] Marx [0.3] er Marx's final er focus was on the [0.3] Bonapartist state [0.8] er [0.7] in a superb often quoted [0.4] and i i'll link this with the analysis of the peasantry because he sees the peasantry as in some way the [0.3] the mass base [0.3] of the Bonapartist state [0.8] in a superb and often quoted passage at the end towards the end about ten pages from the end [0.4] Marx portrays the French peasantry as [1.1] objectively a class there are millions of these smallholders and and sort of small tenant farmers and share croppers [0.4] living in provincial rural France each of them farming a few acres [0.3] er [0.2] distinct clearly from other classes they are in a sense [0.2] er you know clearly a c-, a a a a c-, they have a class with certain things in common [0.8] but subjectively Marx says their level of class consciousness [0.8] is very low [0.4] they are not fully a class for itself as it were [0.4] because they were geographically dispersed they have low lates of rates of literacy [0.4] they [0. 2] don't meet each other very often in market centres they are [0.3] too fragmented in all sorts of ways to [0.2] act together [0.4] as a class [0.8] and therefore Marx argues they are unable to generate a level of class class organization [0.4] er achieved by say even by urba-, urban workers or by urban bourgeois [0.8] they are therefore unable Marx says to defend their own class interests in this crisis of eighteen-forty-eight [0.3] and turn to a Bonapartist messiah [0.4] er who will [0.4] as Marx says [0.2] send the rain to s-, and the sunshine from above in other words they turn to a charismatic figure [0.2] to save them because they are [0.2] too [0.4] er [0.3] unorganized to save themselves Marx says [0.3] and this is a phrase which Edward Said uses in in the beginning of Orientalism which you'll be studying next term [0.4] they cannot represent themselves [0.3] they must be represented [1.2] now Marx i think is [0.5] actually aware that er the the peasantry of France in in in the [0.6] eighteen-forty-eight er to eighteen-fifty-one is actually quite mobilized quite radicalized in some some areas [0.4] er some of the peasants vote for Louis Napoleon in ei-, [0.2] in December eighteen-forty-eight shouting [0.3] aristocrats and usurers to the guillotine which is not the [laugh] the normal sort of conservative [0.4] er sort of response er [0.3] er that one might im-, imagine [0.3] and he notes the the way that some peasants are actually attracted by the left er in in in in as the second republic [0.4] er progresses [0.8] but Marx is also almost wilfully myopic about er about the possibilities of peasant consciousness and peasant organization [0.5] he talks elsewhere in his writings about the idiocy of rural life [0.6] he sees peasants as almost irredeemably backward and ignorant [0.3] doomed ultimately by the growth of agrarian capitalism [0.3] it's only the workers [0.3] gathered together in factories and cities [0.2] who are capable of organizing as a potential radical revolutionary class [0.7] er and i think he therefore largely ignores what was actually quite substantial peasant resistance to the Bonapartist coup d'état in December eighteen-fifty-one he talks about France being [0.3] delivered [0.2] unresisting into captivity [0.6] and if one looks at [0.2] if one looks at this more broadly [0.3] er [0.9] it's i think an interesting question to pose Marx says the history of [0.3] societies is the history of class and class conflicts [0.7] while the history of most er most people in Europe over [0.4] a thousand years and more have actually been peasants [0.3] well if peasants have such a low level of class consciousness [0.3] what role i mean if you look at the [0.3] German peasant revolt of fifteen-twenty-five or the [0.3] French peasant revolt of seventeen-eighty-nine or the Russian peasant revolt of nineteen- [0.3] five or nineteen-seventeen or the Chinese peasants [0.2] are are peasants irredeemably backward [0.2] incapable of of political [0.4] consciousness and action this is a [0.3] a question that [0.2] that Marx er in a sense er [0.7] poses [0.2] and perhaps doesn't provide an entirely satisfactory answer to [2.1] what i think Marx i-, is arguing is that [0.4] all societies are divided into classes but the level of class consciousness [0.4] varies widely [0.3] and so does the capacity for effective class action [1.1] the later [0.3] Marxist theorist the [0.2] er Hungarian Georg Lukacs [0.4] argued that Marxists should be aware [0.6] of three levels of class [0.2] one is the objective class position as it were one's actual place in the social structure [1.2] the second is the actual level of subjective class consciousness which Marx claims for the French peasants is fairly low [0.9] and thirdly [0.2] what Lukacs arg-, argues that Marxist historians should be [0.6] aware of what he called ascribed class consciousness I-E what a class [0.3] would think if it could perceive its interests more clearly [0.3] er perhaps it's something a bit like Rousseau's general will as it were [0.4] and he [0.2] Lukacs argued that Marxists should be aware of this third [0.5] er er as it were sort of [0.2] category [0.2] because the contrast between [0.4] people's actual and their rational behaviour [0.3] affects the historical effectiveness of their actions nm0088: Marx sees the peasant electors [0.9] as a sort of mass [0.2] passive base [0.2] of the Bonapartist state the [0.3] Bonapartism is strong in part because it's able to attract the support [0.3] of at least a sizable proportion [0.3] of France's [0.4] mass rural er peasant electorate [0.9] but Marx argues there's no necessary correlation between [0.3] the interests of the peasantry and the longer term interests of the Bonapartist regime [0.4] just as there's no necessary correlation [0.5] later Marxists will argue between the interests of the German petit bourgeoisie who voted for the Nazis [0.4] and the actual [0.4] er sort of [1.0] programmes and policies of the Nazi regime [0.2] in power which are often more favourable to [0.3] to I G Farben and German big business [1.2] Marx sees the bourgeois elites in France as turning to Bonapartism again [0.6] later Marxists would say like the bourgeoisie in Italy in the nineteen-twenties or the bourgeoisie in Germany in the nineteen-thirties [0.6] because they grow impatient of the divisions and squabbles [0.3] within their own political class [0.3] because in the face of economic depression and p-, possible [0.5] working class socialism or revolution [0.4] er the bourgeoisie bourgeois politicians are squabbling among themselves [0.3] the bourgeoisie say to hell with that lot [laugh] [0.3] we're fed up with parliamentary government we're fed up with elections it's all too [0.3] messy it's all too dangerous [0.2] what we need is a strong man [laugh] [0.2] who can restore law and order and and so forth [0.3] and er [0.8] and in a sense er therefore the the the the there are certain parallels i think er between er [0.4] between Bonapartism fascism there [0.5] and then there is the question that is the resultant state the Bonapartist state the fascist state [0.4] a capitalist bourgeois state [0.6] well yes and no and yes it's not because it is not [0.4] directly run by the capitalists it's not actually [0.4] financiers and [0.2] industrialists and so forth who [0.2] run the state machine in the in France in the eighteen-fifties [0.2] or in Germany in the nineteen-thirties [0.5] and to some degree the bourgeoisie relies on protection from the police and the bureaucracy and the army [0.5] er er to in order to [0.2] to to to preserve it its its wealth and its power and its investments [0.8] but Marx argues that [0.4] yes it is a you know capitalist bourgeois state it's not a state he says [0.2] not a state suspended in a void [0.6] because by suppressing the left [0.6] by dismantling the workers' movement after eighteen-fifty-one [0.2] just as the Nazis dismantled the communists and the trade unions [0.2] after nineteen- thirty-three [0.6] er one [0.2] allowed the capitalist [0.3] regime to survive [0.3] and to expand to make profits for the b-, for the bourgeoisie [0.3] and that the state machine itself [0.3] recruits from the elites the bureaucracy is actually recruited from the [0.2] educated sons of the propertied elites [0.2] and lives in a sense off the surplus value [0.3] created by [0.2] capitalism and by [0.2] the taxation system [0.6] and therefore [1.2] what Marx is postulating is an idea of a state which is both [0.5] on the one hand [0.3] semi-autonomous is [0.2] it's not directly controlled by [0.2] the capitalists they've in sense abandoned that [0.5] but yet it's functioning [0.3] in the long term to protect their their interests [0.3] and as i say [0.2] in that sense the analysis of fascism [0.3] er [0.2] er in nineteen-twenties and thirties [0.3] relied heavily on Marx's analysis of Bonapartism [0.3] er in The Eighteenth Brumaire [0.4] thank you very much