nm0085: so this [0.4] can people see this all right [0.5] despi-, [0.2] cou-, cou-, [0.2] well i know you can't you can't see it 'cause of the pillar can you [0.6] tough [laugh] [0.3] those who [0.9] w-, for whom it's in their line of vision can you read it [0.2] [laughter] [0.3] yeah okay [0.3] er [0.5] i'd i wanted to get a better picture of Carr [0.4] but that's the one on the front of a recent biography of him [0.9] er if i move it up you'll see that the [0.2] crucial thing about it is that Cambridge dons [0.2] live on tea [0.7] er [1.7] but [0.4] that gives some idea of who this guy [1.0] who i hope you've all been reading [0.9] is [0.6] er [0.3] the dates are there [0.3] you should all have a handout as well with some quotes [0.3] i hope you've all got that have you [1. 0] yeah [0.6] right [1.3] and since i watched the tape of namex's lecture [0.8] i don't know if any of you remember one of you in the room must [0.4] er i'm supposed to take my glasses on and off [laughter] all the time [0.5] right [0.9] i've not i noticed after you told namex that that he i don't think he put his glasses on once [laughter] [0.3] i'll try and keep mine on but i can't guarantee it [0.6] er [0.5] right who was E H Carr [0.5] a middle class boy from north London [1.2] a student at Cambridge [0.4] er during the First World War escaped conscription on health grounds [0.5] and he had these four distinct careers [1.2] er [0.5] first [0.4] at the end of the First World War through the nineteen-twenties he's a Foreign Office official [0.6] working on er [0.2] north European and Russian affairs [0.3] er at the Versailles conference [0.7] er [0.4] posted to the British Legation in Riga in Latvia to work on Russian questions [0.3] during the nineteen-twenties [0.6] and [0.3] during the early thirties when the League of Nations was falling apart [0.3] he was part of the British diplomatic team in Geneva [0.7] watching that int-, international institution fall apart [2.4] in nineteen-thirty-five he quit [0.3] the Foreign Office [0.6] er [0.2] and [0.6] became Professor of International Relations at Aberystwyth [0.8] er [1.0] where he [0.5] er sat down and wrote [0.4] er [0.3] a book [0.2] er [0.2] er called The Thirty Years' Crisis which i'll say more about later [0.4] but it's basically [0.6] the foundational text or a foundational tax-, [0.2] text of the realist science of international relations [0.2] i'll er er expand on that later [0.6] er [1.1] very well worth reading published in er the end in nineteen-thirty-nine [2.4] during the Second World War and immediately afterwards he's a leader writer [0. 5] er on the Times [0.9] and he's a key figure among the [0.2] middle of the road [0.2] intellectuals [0.8] who are shifting the whole political census in Britain to the left [0.4] and preparing a way for the Labour victory in nineteen-forty-five [0.6] er [0.3] Winston Churchill [0.4] used to call the Times [0.2] er the threepenny edition of the Daily Worker the Communist paper [0.4] er because of the way the Times was no longer [0.3] er voicing the er conventional views of er the Conservative establishment [2.4] when the Cold War [0.6] set in [0.9] this basically turned Carr [0.2] from being a reformist intellectual at the hub [0.4] of the way things were going [0.5] in nineteen-forties Britain [0.5] into [0.8] an academic outsider [0.6] because he stuck to the view that good relations with the Soviet Union were crucial for British foreign policy [0.5] er [0.3] very much an outsider [0.4] er [0.2] definitely found it difficult to get an academic job at the height of the Cold War he ended up [0.4] er in a Cambridge college [0.3] where he spent the rest of his life [0.4] er [0.4] as a historian [0.2] of the Soviet Union [1.0] and that's his main claim to fame as a historian [0.5] er [0.2] he started that fourth career when he was fifty-four [0.8] he published fourteen volumes on the history of the Soviet Union between [0.5] er the revolution [0.5] and he got to nineteen-twenty-nine [0.4] by the time he was er [0.4] what was he eighty-three he published the last volume in nineteen-seventy-seven [1.2] so the a fourteen volume massive [0.4] work [0.3] on [0.3] basically the emergence of a planned economy in the sov-, from the revolution to nineteen-twenty-nine [1.5] and in nineteen-sixty-one [0.7] er he gave a series of lectures to history students in Cambridge [0.3] called What is History which is the book that i hope [0.2] you're reading [1.2] er i wish i could say i was there [0.7] ac-, i arrived in Cambridge actually the that autumn [0.5] just missed them [0.4] but i did buy the book and when i f-, when when we put this course on i got it back off my shelves and reread it [0. 6] and it's full of my er infantile [0.3] notes at the time [0.3] bought in December nineteen-sixty-one so i was in at the beginning of this [0.5] er [0.4] i completely misunderstood much of it at the time [0.3] but of course you won't because you'll be guided by this lecture and by the wonderful discussions you're going to have in seminars [0.8] er [1.8] since nineteen-sixty-one this book er has been [0.8] it must be the most widely read [0.4] er text on the nature of the historical discipline [0.7] er in this country [1.4] now [1.7] before er [1.6] i discuss [6.7] Carr [0.5] i want to say a few words about the chief object of his attack [0.4] which you could label naive empiricism [3.6] i namex did a show of hands didn't he last week about how many people had heard of [0.3] Ranke [0.5] and it wasn't very many which is very good because Ranke's a n-, [0.2] er a very long time ago and everything's moved on [0.4] but as he said [1.0] we have to engage with Ranke and it's actually he's g-, actually going to be very interesting [0.6] the most quoted phrase of all that you'll find in this course [0.3] i suspect [0.5] is Ranke's [0.3] notion [0.7] which was foundational for the nineteenth century emergence of history [0.5] as [0.4] an organized [0.4] academic discipline [0.9] that the purpose the what the historian did [0.5] was [0.8] discovered [0.4] how it really was [0.5] what actually happened in the past [0.8] now [0.3] as you'll [0.3] gather when you read about Ranke and in the next lecture in this course [0.6] there was nothing at all simple-minded about Ranke's own take on historical method he certainly was not a naive [0.3] empiricist [0.8] but much of the profession [0.3] that he was [1.1] responsible in some ways [0.3] for inventing [0.7] has been [0.9] extremely simple-minded [0.2] about the sources of its own knowledge [0.7] and hasn't really thought much about the sources of its own knowledge [0. 7] Patrick Burke's book History and Social Theory which is on the er [0.3] er reading list [0.5] er [1.1] traces [1.3] he starts the book by tracing the nineteenth century divorce [0.3] between history [0.7] and [0.6] the other social sciences from the later nineteenth century [0.4] as history became professionalized [0.2] into an academic discipline [1.2] and it became professionalized [0.3] around [0.3] an antitheory [0.4] ethos [1.7] especially in this country where of course empiricism [0.6] and a culture of no nonsense common sense is something of a [0.2] national fixation [3.4] now for the antitheory cast of mind which [2.0] certainly anybody who has been socialized in [0.3] British culture [0.8] part of their mind is certainly [0.2] belongs [0. 3] however hard they struggle against it [laugh] [0.3] to this antitheory cast of mind [0.5] er [1.0] doing history is just applied common sense [0.4] the way to produce objective [0.3] positive knowledge about the past [0.6] is to go through the sources without preconceptions [0.4] with an open mind [0.5] to rid yourself as best you can of any preconceptions [0.7] and of [0.9] present minded questions questions arising out of [0.7] present issues [1.0] and study the past for its own sake [1.5] for its own sake [0.4] not in order to grind axes [0.2] in arguments going on in the present [1.2] except of course arguments among historians [1.4] the most eloquent proponent of the antitheory view [0.5] is another Cambridge historian [0.2] Geoffrey Elton [1.0] who er [0.6] most famous for his er [0.9] discussion of [0.9] sixteenth century statecraft [0.6] er [0.3] the Tudor revolutionary government who published [0.5] a counterblast to Carr [0.4] in nineteen-sixty-seven called The Practice of History [2.4] er Elton [0.2] argues in that book [0.7] that er historians have got their own methods they're rooted in practical common sense [0.9] and these give you a real [0.5] if always of course provisional [0.8] knowledge about the past [2.0] practical common sense [2.1] the problem of course about common sense [0.7] is that one person's common sense is another person's nonsense [1.2] common sense [0.5] describes untheorized [0.3] prejudice [0.8] what just comes to your mind through the ether as it were without too much enquiry about where it comes from [2.3] unless one engages seriously with theory we're never going to realize our own unconscious prejudicises [0.8] and [0.5] those prejudices are going to prefigure our reading of the sources in a way that [1.3] we ourselves are not aware of [2.5] and that [0.7] in many ways is is kind of the key question for this whole course i think [0.7] er the evolution of the historical discipline since Ranke [0.8] in dialogue with other disciplines [0.5] in the social sciences particularly but also [0.3] literature [0.6] er [0.6] has created a whole storehouse of strategies [0.5] for how historians can handle that difficult relationship between [0.4] the historian's mind [1.3] and [0.5] the sources [0. 9] out of which we construct historical [0.6] narratives explanations and so on [3.8] and i think by the end of the course you will have been through a whole menu of different ways of approaching that problem and be able to locate yourself and your own preferred solutions [1.7] but Carr's a good starting point for all this [0.9] because he lays out very clearly some of the difficulties [0.2] and the very incoherence of Carr's book and as i'll try to show [0.5] it is i think fundamentally incoherent [0.6] but the very incoherence [0.7] takes one as it were to to to to [0.3] to the issue [0.9] that [1.0] subtler minds than Carr's [0.2] er [0.3] er that you will encounter as the course goes along [0.4] er also worry away at [3.2] the key to [0.5] approaching that book is to understand its rhetorical strategy [1.7] in chapter one [0.9] Carr gives you a radical [0.4] a radically scepta-, sceptical view [0.4] of [0.3] empiricism [0. 6] and of the antitheory claims of traditional empirical history [2.6] he's acutely aware of the difficulty of constructing objective accounts [0.3] of the past [0.5] rather than just using the past as a screen on which you project [0. 9] your own prejudices make up [0.2] any stories you please [2.9] but having laid that subjectivist trap he proceeds to [0.2] argue his way out of it [2.5] he believed that subjectivism [2.3] simply [0.4] er er the [0.3] er er a view in which [0.4] the state of his- , of historical knowledge is no greater than the state of th-, the its status [0.3] as objective truth about the past doesn't exist [0.3] it's simply [0.2] a projection of one's own prejudices [0.8] he believes that subjectivism could be avoided [0.3] to the extent that [0.5] one deconstructed outdated assumptions [0.9] and grasped realistically how the world was changing around you [2.2] the most objective historian he ends up by saying is the one who understands the trend of history [2.0] Carr essentially clings to er [0.2] an enlightenment faith in reason and progress [0.2] ultimately it's progress he argues [0.8] that makes history intelligible [2.2] now [1.4] i'll talk about all this i'm just laying out the agenda as it were [0.3] Carr's [0.2] certainty about progress and what it looks like [0.3] may now seem very dated [1.5] but at the end of the lecture i'm going to suggest that maybe [0.7] he has a point [1.7] about the inextricability of the idea of progress [0.5] and the practice of history [9.1] now what i want to do is to look in turn at Carr's analysis of [0.3] what i've called the subjectivist trap [0.5] and then at how he seeks to mobilize the idea of progress to spring that trap [2.7] the main burden of chapter one [0.9] is that there is no hard core of historical facts [0.2] existing independently of the historian [3.1] interpretive frameworks are at work [0.6] right from the start of the process [0.7] of constructing [0.3] knowledge about the past [1.1] as Carr puts it an element of interpretation enters into every fact of history [1.9] or it's an interpretation here and fact there [0.7] they're inextricably [0.8] mixed up [2.0] i think it's important to understand what Carr is saying and what he isn't saying here [1.2] he doesn't make it easy 'cause his terminology is rather confusing [0.4] and i'm going to suggest [0.4] substituting [0.2] a terminology that makes it easier [2.1] he's not in fact denying that information about the past exists independently of the insh-, [0. 2] of the historian [1.7] what he's trying to do is to make a distinction between two kinds of facts about the past [1.4] and he does this if you've read that chapter using rather strangely [0.4] upper class male metaphor about clubs [1.1] and you'll remember his er [0. 4] there are run of the mill [0.2] plebeian facts [0.3] which no one pays any attention to [0.9] and then there are important facts which have been nominated for membership of this [0.4] club [0.2] of professional historians [0.7] er [2. 7] those are facts mobilized as evidence [0.6] for some argument or another about the past [0.8] and once they're mobilized by a [0.2] properly [0.2] accredited professional historian to support some argument he's making [0.3] they become [0.9] properly historical facts [1.8] now this is very confusing 'cause he's using the word fact [0.3] to apply to two quite different kinds of thing [0.7] or concepts [1.1] Keith Jenkins [0.8] in his little book on rethinking history [0.8] er which er [1.7] i think we're all going to be talking about to some extent in the first seminar of this course [0.3] er v-, [0.2] very much [0.3] providing a [0.8] er er er a simple guide to post-modernist ideas about [0.3] er [0.2] er [0.2] about history [2.9] whatever one one may think of Keith Jenkins' approach overall i think he provides an extremely useful [0.3] er way of sorting out this fact fact problem [0.5] in [0.2] Carr [0.9] the key distinction he points out is between the past [0.3] and history [1.5] the past [0.3] was real [1.4] no doubt about that [0.5] it all happened [0.5] whatever it was that happened [0.2] but it doesn't exist any longer [1.1] it was real but it no longer exists [0.7] history [0.2] is what we write about the past [0.2] okay straightforward [1.6] the reason we can write about the past is 'cause it left traces behind [1.2] and that's a crucial word [0.3] traces [0.6] it left traces behind [0.4] buildings field systems [0. 7] but mainly [1.1] for historians written documents [1.7] those traces of course do [0.4] exist [0.2] in the present [1.2] most of these documents sitting in archives here and there [1.8] and we can consult the traces of the past [0.5] in search of evidence about the past [1.9] so for Carr's two kinds of facts about the past [0.4] non-historical facts inert ones that nobody pays any attention to on the one hand [0.2] and properly historical facts [0.8] facts which historians have picked up and run with as it were [0.7] one can substitute the much clearer terms i think [0.8] the traces from the past unworked on possibly as yet undiscovered documents [0.5] but these are the traces of the past or what the archaeologist find as he digs [0.2] these are the traces of the past [0.6] on the one hand [0.2] an evidence [0.7] information [0.4] about what actually happened distilled [0.2] from the traces by the labour of historians [1.3] the traces [0.2] have a purely objective existence they're there [0.8] you can't argue with it [0.3] yeah [0.9] the evidence of course is thoroughly mixed up [0.2] with questions of interpretation [2.8] the complications i think begin [0.4] when you contemplate the process of how you win [0.9] Carr's historical facts or what i'm calling evidence [0.4] from these inert [0.2] traces of the past [0.4] for the more empiricist historians like [0.4] Geoffrey Elton [1.4] that process is very skilled [0.8] you need a PhD to do it properly [0.7] mm [0.7] but [0.3] it's essentially value free [1.4] the trained historian checks the authenticity [1.3] of any particular [1.0] piece any particular trace of the past make sure it really is a trace of the past not something planted there [0.3] by a forger [1.0] er [1.8] he compares different accounts [0.2] in the sources [0.6] did it happen as this document says it did is the document likely to be [0.8] misinformation [0.7] produced at the time to misinform someone else [0.9] er [1.5] did the event leave traces in several documents independently produced so you can compare them with one another and therefore get a bit more than objective view of what went on [1.0] and at the end of such a process [0.2] one has objective knowledge about past events for Elton [0.2] about what actually happened [0.5] one has [0.5] a hard core of historical facts existing independently of any particular historian [0.6] checked out authenticated [0.6] but that's what happened in the past [1.7] now this is what Carr's concerned to deny [1.9] and perhaps the most convincing [0. 4] er criticism [0.2] of this idea of a hard core [1.3] of facts [0.5] is the selection problem [0.8] as i call it [1.6] the past leaves far more traces [0.2] than we can handle [2.5] and the recent past [0.2] all the more [1.1] all the historical work involves selection [0.2] and selection of course involves having an agenda an interpretive framework [0. 6] even before historians start checking out the authenticity of the sources [1. 5] the reliability of the evidence inferred from the traces [0.3] they have to decide what sources to look at [0.6] what kind of evidence [0.2] to try to infer [3.1] the evidence doesn't exist independently of the historian's agenda [0.9] it's inferred from the traces of the past [0.3] in order to answer some predetermined set of questions [1.4] which is why evidence is a more helpful term [0.3] for what Carr means than facts [0.7] facts you know are the kind of empiricist building block they're [0.2] hard [0.2] nuggets of things which have sharp and well defined edges [0.7] and you can [0.3] pile them up [0.5] into your [0.8] b-, [0.5] building bricks to make your tower of historical narrative [0.6] evidence on the other hand [0.4] only exists in relation to a case being made it's what's called in evidence [0.4] in relation to a particular argument [1.1] and that's what Carr means when he says that the facts of history can't be purely objective [0.4] since they become facts of history [0.3] only in virtue of the significance attached to them by the historian [2.0] he quotes approvingly a description of er the historian at work as [0.2] rummaging in the ragbag [1.1] er for traces of the past [0.2] in order to select [0.7] piece and pattern [0.3] evidence related to the interpretation he's seeking to construct [0.4] so rummaging in this [0.2] almost limitless ragbag [0.5] of traces [0.9] to look for the [1.1] bits of information that will help you construct what it is that you're trying to construct [2.2] is Carr right [1.5] to dismiss the idea that there's any hard core of facts out there [0.8] should we dismiss the claims of empiricist historians to produce [0.2] objective facts about the past [1.8] i'm not going to [1.1] even begin to try to offer you any kind of definitive answer to that question because er [0.7] what from one direction or another we'll come back to it again and again [1.2] er but i just want to suggest you give it some thought and to help you think about it let's just take one [0.3] very well attested historical fact the Second World War [1.2] right [1.4] we can all agree [0.2] it occurred [1.7] can we [0.7] whatever differences we might have are going to be about matters of interpretation [0.2] causes [0.2] effects [0. 2] and so on [0.8] well at first sight yes obviously you know the [0.2] the the tanks move the bombs drop the ships were sunk [0.5] and millions of people got killed [3.0] but [0.4] think again about it the Second World War [0.8] if it's such an indisputable fact when did it begin [1.5] mm [0.2] did it begin in nineteen-thirty-nine [0.6] or did it begin in nineteen-forty-one [0.6] or did it begin in nineteen-thirty-one when the Japanese attacked Manchuria [1.9] was it the Second World War [1.5] or was it just a continuation of the first [0.3] in a hundred years' time will historians talk about The Thirty Years' War of the early twentieth century [3.4] i'm sure there will be great debates [0.5] among historians as to whether such a concept [0.4] is more useful [0.4] than talking about a first and a second [0.8] or you can revise it the other way around [0.5] as the uncertainty over the date suggests is it one war [2.5] or is that [0.2] the historian imposing a single narrative [0.2] on a series of events [0.6] which make more sense [0.8] er looked at discretely [0.3] a series of discrete squabbles hundreds of local wars and civil wars [1.6] telling the story [0.3] as that of and it is telling the story constructing a narrative [0.2] of a second world war [0.3] perhaps privileges [0.6] you know Churchill Roosevelt Stalin you can see them sitting there in the [0.2] photograph directing [0.2] the course of history [0.7] but perhaps that's not how history [0.2] was made [0.4] in that period perhaps it's made much more [0.3] by a whole series of interlocked and interrelating processes [0.3] which are not grasped by the concept of a single second world war [0.6] in the longer perspective that particular narrative device and that's what it is [0.2] the Second World War [0.6] might be abandoned in favour of a more bottom-up approach that privileges local and regional dynamics [1.0] in understanding that period of a of global upheaval [2.1] perhaps there are some facts so er i ask you just to think about that and you i'm sure you could all come up with similar examples [0.5] of you know commonplace [0.3] historical events [0.3] which [0.2] as soon as you start to think of them are actually constructed narratives which could be constructed quite differently [0.8] er [0.5] perhaps there are some facts which exist independently [0.3] of interpretive frameworks [0.3] they're probably very trivial ones [1.1] most events [0.4] are themselves already interpretations mental constructions by historians [0.2] particular ways of telling a story [0. 3] to give it a particular kind of a meaning [3.7] now [0.5] those who don't get beyond the first chapter of Carr [1.3] er sometimes see Carr himself [0.2] as embracing a sceptical view that basically you can get any interpretive framework you make [0.4] you know there there there's no way out of this trap [0.3] that [0.3] you project onto the past whatever narrative you want [1.3] though even in chapter one he makes no secret of his contempt for such a view [0.9] as he puts it the past is not a child's box of letters [0.3] with which we can spell any word we please [1.9] and in fact [0.3] as i said at the beginning the rhetorical strategy of the book [0.2] is to set that sceptical trap [0.9] only in order to spring it [1.5] but before turning to the way he springs it [0.2] ah [0.8] the glasses came off put them back on again quick [0.4] [laughter] but before turning to the way he springs it [0.5] er [0.8] let me probe a bit deeper [0.2] into the sources of Carr's thinking [1.9] which brings me to a section [1.8] called er [2.7] the sociology of knowledge [6.2] now Carr is a middle class boy from a business family in north London he grows up with er [0. 9] a conventional Gladstonian belief [0.9] in that great truth of nineteenth century Britain [0.5] that the universal interests of humanity [0.2] are the same thing [0.3] as free trade [0.6] especially free trade dominated by the British [1.0] er [2.0] First World War [0.8] his experience as a Foreign Office official [0.3] blows all that apart and in the book i mentioned before The Twenty Years' Crisis [0.2] published in nineteen-thirty-nine which is a [0.4] basically a history of international relations between nineteen-eighteen [0.8] and nineteen-thirty- nine [3.0] well [0.7] no it's not basically that it's the the that's its its ostensible subject matter [0.8] er [0.5] Carr performs a quite brilliant deconstruction of the role of ideology [1.8] in masking [0.2] power [1.1] in masking [0.4] raison d'état [1.7] in international politics [0.5] he shows how the apparently utopian ideals of peaceful international relations [0.5] built around free trade Adam Smith Richard Cobden [0.2] and then the Americans Woodrow Wilson [0.3] and the idea of the League of Nations [0.4] the ut-, whole utopian strand [0.2] of er er thinking [0.4] er built around the idea that free trade free commercial intercourse among nations will bring peace [0.2] and prosperity to the world [0.4] that all this in fact [0.3] served to promote the interests of the most powerful [0.3] economies [0.7] high-minded free trade pacifism [0.3] didn't express any genuine harmony of interests it expressed [0.2] the interest [0.3] of [0.4] whoever was the current economic superpower the British in the nineteenth century the Americans [0.3] in the twentieth century [2.2] free trade was a weapon designed to subordinate weaker economies [1.7] wisdom [0.2] Carr concludes in foreign affairs [0.6] comes not out of the pursuit of er [0.5] utopian moral goals in foreign policy [1.1] but in adapting to the realities of power [0.2] as he saw them [1.0] for example [0. 3] er it's er central to that book on the Thirty Years' Crisis [0.3] the er [0. 2] in Eastern Europe [0.9] er [1.0] there could only be one of two dominant powers it either had to be Germany or Russia [1.3] and it was daft to think that you could construct any kind of society in Eastern Europe that wasn't dominated by one of these great powers or the other [0.3] and therefore Carr was an appeaser [0.2] in the nineteen-thirties [1.0] and [0.5] an opponent of the Cold War [0.2] after nineteen-forty-five [1.0] before the war it was Germany's area after the war it was Russia's area [0.2] and it was simply stupid [0.4] to try to [0.2] er resist this [2.2] the argument he mobilizes in The Twenty Years' Crisis is foundational as i [0.3] said earlier for the realist school in international relations Carr is really founding another academic discipline [0. 3] or playing an important part in it [0.4] er the the social scientific discipline of international relations [0.4] and he's doing [1.3] to pitch him at a high claim he's doing for international politics [0.2] what Machiavelli [0. 3] had done for domestic politics [0.6] getting behind [0.5] the moralizing [0. 2] er rhetoric [0.3] to [0.5] the [0.8] understanding that unless the Prince er for Machiavelli or the [0.2] Kissinger [0.2] for Carr [0.4] who [0.2] would be one outcome of this kind of thinking i suppose [0.3] er [0.4] and and and unless they can get behind er the i suppose its moral goals of foreign policy and understand the realities of power [0.2] they'll make a mess of things [1.7] now in formulating his ideas about the relationship [0.8] between [0.5] ideology [0.4] and power [0.2] in international relations he draws heavily on the ideas [0.2] of a Hungarian sociologist [0.7] who came to live in Britain in the mid-thirties er [0.3] at [0.2] at er L-S-E and s-, had a job at London School of Economics [0.4] Karl Mannheim [1.2] and Mannheim's most distinctive [0.7] contribution [1.0] that Carr picked up [0.2] was this idea of a sociology of knowledge [2.0] the key idea there was that all values [0.5] all truths in quotation mark [0.4] are rooted in a specific time and place [1.0] and the key to understanding the universalizing claims [0.8] that particular groups make the claim that their [0. 8] er er their ideas [0.3] represent the universal human interest [0.7] er the key to understanding these is to unmask them [0.2] to unmask the social basis of ideas [1.9] to do a sociology of knowledge [1.1] you always ask whose purposes are served by this political doctrine [0.3] that religion [0.6] this utopian project [1.3] the job of the social scientist or the historian [0.4] is to unmask [0.4] the unacknowledged function [2.0] of assertions of universal values [0.3] in sustaining or advancing particular [0.5] interests [1.9] but of course if knowledge production has a sociology [0.4] then this is true of the production of historical knowledge [1.5] as well [0.8] and in that spirit Carr attacks attempts to erect any [0.5] as he puts it suprahistorical standard by which to judge historical events [1.3] and you should all have a sheet with quotations on it [0.9] er [1.7] on the first of which is er or the second of which is that the serious historian is the one who recognizes the historically conditioned character [0.9] of all values [0.2] not the one who claims for his own values an objectivity beyond history [4.1] but if there are no values which have objectivity beyond history [1.3] where can you find objectivity [2.3] which brings me to er [0.8] the final section [0.3] of the lecture [0.4] er [0. 5] Carr and the idea of progress [3.0] he tries to mobilize the idea of [0.3] progress to spring the subjectivist trap [3.5] the key proposition is really very simple [1.3] and almost commonsensical [1.1] the test [0.2] of the objectivity of any particular historical interpretation [0.5] lies in its ability to predict the future [3.9] the most objective historian that's to say [0.7] is the one who has the deepest grasp of the tide of history [1.9] the most as Carr puts it profound and lasting vision [0.5] of the future [2.1] you know the quotes on your sheet [0. 5] only the future can provide the key to the interpretation of the past [0.6] it's only in this sense that we can speak of an ultimate objectivity in history [1.0] that doesn't mean of course that you can ever quite reach it because you don't actually know what's going to happen in the future [1.3] but [1.1] those historians who have understood the trend of history [0.4] are going to be the ones who last [0.4] Carr's saying and time will tell [0.5] which they are [2.3] now for Carr the tide of the twentieth cent-, er [1.8] sorry [0.8] Carr has this very firm conviction that there are tides in history that history has a direction [1.0] that these tides are knowable [1.2] though never of course [0. 2] absolutely [0.4] time tells [1.9] who [0.3] had understood better [0.4] the objectivity of any particular informing vision [1.4] for Carr the tide of the twentieth century was above all towards and a key word in all Carr's thinking [0.4] planning [3.7] the First World War [0.4] seemed to demonstrate pretty clearly that liberal capitalism [0.2] was over [0.9] the future lay with the planned economy [0.9] the First World War had shown how to do it particularly in the German war economy [1.1] but also to some degree in the British war economy [1.9] the stark contrast between [0.2] capitalist crisis nineteen- twenty-nine [0.7] and Soviet five year planning [1.4] was an inescapable [0.3] demonstration it seemed [0.8] er of er where the future lay [0.7] as Carr himself wrote in nineteen-thirty-one [0.4] the new religion of the kilowatt and the machine [0.6] may well prove to be the creed for which modern civilization is waiting [1.0] this new religion is growing up on the fringes of a Europe that's lost faith in her-, in herself [0.4] contemporary Europe is aimlessly drifting [1.2] and that view of things was of course triumphantly vindicated it seemed [0.5] by [0.4] the stupendous achievements of the Red Army in the Second World War [1.1] Hitler being defeated [0.8] by in Carr's view [0.4] the [0.2] triumphs of Soviet planning [0.4] essentially [2.5] none of that means that Carr was a Stalinist [0.7] or believed that Soviet style planning [0.3] was appropriate for Western societies [1.7] but this mids-, ni-, twentieth century belief in planning was more or less universal among reformist intellectuals [1.1] it was rooted in the experience [0.2] as i indicated of Western war economies [0.9] and [0.3] er thinking about what on earth do we do about the slump [0.5] as much as it was [0.2] anything to do with the U-S-S-R [0.7] and [0.2] whole notions of planning in the mid-twist twentieth century are responding as much to the needs of [0.4] big capital [0.2] big business [0.4] as they are [0.3] to any aspirations of socialists [0.9] but planning [0.6] becomes a point of convergence if you like [0.4] between the revolutionary drama in the Soviet Union on the one hand [0.7] and Western social democratic reformism [0.5] which Carr [0.2] the Times leader writer [0.4] is a central figure in in Britain [0.5] on the other [4.9] now Carr no less than Geoffrey entlo-, Elton [laugh] er there there it goes again [0.3] Carr no less than Geoffrey Elton [0. 4] er opposed [0.4] er [0.3] present mindedness [0.9] but in the name not of the study of the past for its own sake [0.9] but [0.2] in the name of as he put it a long term vision of a past and future [1.2] so if you like he's substituting [0.3] future mindedness for present mindedness [0.7] and he cites his own approach to the history of the Soviet Union as an example [1.5] Western views of the Soviet Union he says in a preface to some of the later volumes of er [0.5] the the the history of Russia [0.5] er [1.1] Western views have fluctuated drastically as international relations shifted from the kind of pro- Soviet ethos of the wartime years [0.3] to the Cold War years [0.9] Carr [0.2] says he stands aloof from the transient fluctuations of opinion [0.4] to document a deeper story which he [0.2] summarizes [0.5] late on in writing this history as [0.3] the determination the dedication the organization the sheer hard work [0.3] which in the last sixty years [0.2] have transformed Russia into a major industrial country [0.2] and one of the superpowers [1.3] for those who accused him of being an apologist for Stalin's crimes lacking the proper perspectives [0.4] he said after all with a sideswipe at Geoffrey Elton [0.4] nobody er [0.4] er an English historian can praise the achievements of Henry the Eighth [0.3] without [0.2] being a supporter of er [0.4] b-, being supposed to condone the beheading of wives [2.6] now Carr was confident that in the long historical perspective the achievements of Soviet [1.0] industrialization [0.6] would outweigh [0.4] would appear to be of greater historical significance [0.3] than the brutalities of the Stalinist terror [2. 0] whatever the peculiarities of his vision [0.2] and i'll come back to those [0.9] it was built on the fundamental proposition that human history embodies [0.4] the expansion of reason [1.4] widening application of the power of reason to [0.2] place human beings in control [0.2] of the natural environment and of social relations [1.5] seemed to Carr to be at the core of the twentieth century revolution [1.9] the transition from laissez-faire [0.6] to planning [0.7] from the unconscious to the conscious [0.6] from a belief in objective economic law somehow operating r-, remotely from human control [0.4] to a belief that man can [0.4] master his own [0.5] action [0.9] that man can be the master of his own destiny [1.4] man can plan his society [2.6] now [1.1] it's difficult not to conclude that Carr's contradicting himself [0.3] how on earth can you combine a statement of faith in the expansion of human reason [1.0] with his earlier insistence that there's no absolute values [0.4] outside history [0.3] that no serious historian can claim objectivity for his values beyond history [0.3] Carr's values are very clearly the values of the Enlightenment [0.4] and of the expansion of human reason [3.0] and he admits as much actually in an essay he wrote on Mannheim i won't read it out the quote's there [0.3] er o-, [0.2] er [0.4] er er this is er quite late in his life [0.4] er [0.4] he says that after all at the end of it all [0.3] you have to admit there is a supratemporal reason lurking somewhere [2.0] and he says you know i'm really just an old Victorian i can't get out of my head this notion of progress [0.8] er [1.5] i don't think you should judge Carr harshly for admitting to self-contradiction on this crucial and central issue [0.4] when it comes to the really big philosophical questions [0.4] my suspicion is you have to be slightly lunatic not to contradict yourself [1.5] er [0.4] perhaps some of you can find ways out of this that don't involve a measure of self-contradiction i don't know [0.3] but this isn't a philosophy course and we don't have to solve these big philosophical questions [0.2] though we should note them [2.0] but there are some particular aspects of Carr's idea of progress [0.5] which are more troubling [0.7] at the centre of [0.8] his historical imagination planning [0.5] the capacity of twentieth century man to move beyond the [0.3] anarchy of the marketplace [1.9] beyond that kind of nineteenth century condition of life which as Carr sees it is much the same as the primitive savage in the jungle who doesn't understand anything and that language of primitive sava-, savages in jungles [0.2] is very much part of Carr's rhetoric [2.2] er [0.3] you move from that into the sunlit uplands of the conscious control over our social and economic destiny [0.3] that planning gives you [1.5] sometimes Carr's presented as a Marxist and thought of as a Marxist and his thinking certainly owes something to Marxism [1.4] but he's more accurately located among that group of non-Marxist European intellectuals [0.5] who concluded from the early from the events of the early twentieth century [1.0] that some kind of socialism was inevitable [0.9] they might not want it [0.4] whether they liked it or not [1.3] so the sensible thing [1.2] was not to resist the tide of history [0.8] they knew what the tide was that's h-, where it was going [0.6] planning was the future [1.0] but to cooperate [0. 4] with the tide of history with a view to controlling it [0.3] freedom [0.6] in Hegel's famous phrase [0.2] was the recognition of necessity [1.6] you ride the tides of history [1.1] if sociali-, was socialism was inevitable [0.4] then the point was to make sure that rational educated people like themselves control it [0.5] not to leave it to the dangerous whims of the oppressed [3.3] the case against that kind of reasoning was made very forcibly by another Cambridge intellectual with whom Carr [0.2] jousts in What is History Isaiah Berlin [1.1] and i've given you quite a long quote from Isaiah Berlin in nineteen-fifty [0.7] er [2.3] which [0.9] in view of the time i won't read out but you've got it there to look at let's just pick out a couple of bits of it though [0.3] Carr is deeply affected by the contempt for liberalism made fashionable in the last century by Hegel [0.7] history is a procession of events ruled by inexorable laws [0.9] and it's childish to resist them [2.2] now [1.1] Carr [1.9] er [0.5] arguably is much too ready to identify progress and the expansion of reason [0.4] with the wielding of unprecedented power [0.6] by intellectuals and bureaucrats in control of massive state apparatuses [1.7] the history of Soviet planning which he wrote privileges the point of view of the planners privileges the [0.5] view debated within the Bolshevik project of the nineteen-twenties of how do you turn a society round [0.3] by a powerful state machine from the top [0.4] how do you transform a society from above [1.9] he's not very interested [0.7] in focusing on the costs of progress or in looking at history from below as Isaac Deutscher [0.4] there are his dates the biographer of Trotsky among others [0.2] and one of Carr's few [0.2] academic friends actually but if this is what your friends said imagine what your enemies said [0.4] er was w-, as Deutscher said of Carr [0.5] er [0.3] his passion is for statecraft [0.3] not for subversive ideas [0. 9] Deutscher was rather more interested in subversive ideas at least some of the time [1.9] some of Carr's [0.2] formulations show a surprinding [0.2] blindness to the dangers [0.2] to human freedom [0.6] involved in this project [0.5] of conscious control [1.6] you may have felt i don't know there was some disproportion [0.2] in his [0.6] quip at Elton [0.4] comparing [0.8] Henry the Eighth's [0.6] treatment of his wives with Stalin's treatment of er large sections of the Russian population [1.3] more fundamentally [0.7] there's an impatient dismissal of the concerns of nineteenth century liberalism as [0.3] nothing other than the selfish ideology of the bourgeoisie [0.9] the sociology of knowledge tells you this [0.8] huh [0.3] there's a rather facile dismission er dismissal in the second chapter of Carr of [0.3] the tension between individual liberty [0.3] and the pursuit of social equality [1.0] which is perhaps an abiding problem [0.3] of liberalism [1.3] and there's a bland assertion by Carr that [0.2] the modern preoccupation with social and economic ends [0.4] represents a broader and more advanced stage of human development [0. 3] tides of history again [0.5] than the nineteenth century liberal preoccupation with political and constitutional ends [0.2] we've moved on [1.3] political questions constitutional questions [0.3] anxieties about freedom that's behind us we're on to economic and social planning [1.2] now Carr's history of reason [1.1] triumphantly manifesting itself in the planning state [0.3] is worlds away [0.9] from [0.3] those path breaking historians [0.4] who [1.0] from the nineteen-sixties were launching a new social history as a history from below [0. 7] a history concerned with losers [0.6] as well as with winners [0.7] a history concerned with the costs of progress [0.9] a history concerned with [0. 2] recovering the mental world of the oppressed [1.1] as well as with reconstructing the reasoning of the rulers [1.1] already by the nineteen- sixties there are plenty of historians challenging Carr's rather outrageous [0. 3] and deeply Hegelian [0.6] dismissal [0.4] of [1.1] er did i put the quote here as of the history of the medieval poor [0.4] as not existing [0.3] the medieval poor have no history they had no rational life of their own he writes [0.3] the mass of the people belonged [0.3] like prehistoric peoples [0.2] to nature [0.4] rather than to history again they were savages in the jungle [1.2] you didn't have to share [0.4] Isaiah Berlin's liberal standpoint which makes the same point [0.8] to find remarks like that deeply offensive [1.0] er indeed as we'll see when we get to E P Thompson in this course [0.3] the most effective [0.8] rescue of the history of the defeated was mounted precisely by Marxist historians [0.7] of a very different [0.3] er [0.2] tenor than Carr's [0.3] Marxist historians for whom subversive ideas [0.4] rather than statecraft [0.2] was at the centre of their vision [1. 4] so [2.8] let's er try and [0.5] draw this together [0.3] er [2.6] i think reading Carr now the particular idea of progress that er [0.7] Carr places at the centre of his strategy for rescuing history from subjectivism [0.4] i [0.3] th-, [0.3] the his idea his particular idea of what the trend of history is [1. 0] er seems very dated [1.0] neither the Soviet Union of course [0.3] nor planning more generally [0.3] look [0.2] like the future [1.1] though a cautionary note i think [0.3] you know one should never forget every historian should have inscribed on their hearts really the er [0.6] the famous saying of Mao Tse Tung's when asked [0.3] er [0.6] what were the effects of the French Revolution [1.1] it's too early to tell [0.8] mm [0.5] er [0.2] well perhaps that's not true about seventeen-eighty-nine er [1.0] but it's certainly true about nineteen-eighty-nine [0.8] er that's only ten years [0.2] [laughter] [0. 5] er [2.9] but can the link between [0.2] historical objectivity and progress survive Carr's particular formulation of it [1.2] and these are really the questions i want to send you away [0.6] thinking about hopefully [0.7] how convincing is his argument that some idea of progress [0.9] of the advance of human reason of that kind of widening sphere of understanding and therefore [0. 2] conscious control of one's destiny [1.8] er [0.9] how convincing is the argument this is really a precondition for any kind of historical thinking [3. 0] can one distinguish between Carr's particular conception of progress and any conception of progress [2.1] Carr himself may not have understood the trend of the twentieth century [0.2] though [0.2] it may be too early to tell [0.8] er [0.5] but does this mean it has no trend [1.7] and might Carr have been right in thinking that the search for a trend for some meaningful narrative some [0.3] in in [0.3] some [0.5] something unfolding the unfolding of reason in Hegel's [0.3] term [1.7] was fundamental to the practice of history [0.3] i think one of the more appealing passages in in in in Carr's book i put on [0.2] here [0.5] er has Carr writing in [0.2] rather more modest vein than he sometimes does [0.5] modern man he says is to an unprecedented degree self-conscious [0.5] and therefore conscious of history [0.5] he peers eagerly back into the twilight out of which he's come [0.3] in the hope [0.2] that its faint beams will illuminate the obscurity into which he's going [0.8] and conversely [0.2] his aspirations and anxieties about the path that lies ahead [0.3] quicken his insight [0.2] into what lies behind [1.9] unsatisfactory though peering is [0.4] can we do history without it [0.6] er is Carr for all his inadequacies [1.0] right in linking the very idea of history [0.6] to [0.3] some kind of enlightenment belief in progress [1.9] and if history is not in some way a record of the expansion of human reason [0.5] does it have any meaning purpose or function [1.2] my own hunch [0.5] is that if the answer to that question is is negative that it isn't in any sense [0.2] a record of the expansion of human reason [0.4] i think we'll disappear from the culture myself historical study i i think it belongs [0.2] to the idea of progress [0.5] and that if you get rid in some level of the idea of progress [0.3] what you'll you history [0.2] simply becomes fiction [0.3] and why not have fiction novelists do it much better [0.8] mm [1.2] much more readable [0.3] [laugh] [0.5] er [0. 8] shall i just leave you with that er extremely er [0.2] un-, [0.7] er worked out [0.3] thought [1.5] okay