nm0078: when you're invited to give a guest lecture it's always important to think about who your audience will be [0.9] they should be kept in mind when you're choosing your topic [0.3] and deciding the best way to present it [0.8] your audience will also want to know something about you [0.9] who and what you are [0.2] helps to explain why you've chosen a particular subject [0.5] and what you make of it [1.0] i'm a historian [0.8] i spend my time studying the past [0.8] the period of the past that i study most intensively [0.5] is the nineteenth and twentieth centuries [0.5] and the particular area of the world [0.3] has been Africa [0.4] and in particular the European impact on Africa [0. 4] during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries nm0078: many of you here today are not [0.2] from Africa [0.7] but you are many of you from parts of the world that have been affected by one of the great global [0.5] forces at work [0.5] in world history [0.4] what we loosely call imperialism [0.5] and that is why [0.3] i thought what i should [0.3] try to [0. 5] talk to you about today [0.3] is this phenomenon [0.3] of imperialism [0.6] not just in terms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries [0.6] and as you will see [0. 3] not just in terms of the impact of Europe [0.7] on the non-European world [0. 8] because what we are grappling with [0.5] in the phenomenon of imperialism [0. 7] is a phenomenon that in various forms [0.6] is as old as the formation of state systems [0.4] by human beings [0.5] so i'm going to er at considerable [0. 3] risk [0.3] er to myself [0.3] try to set this phenomenon in a much wider [0. 5] er more global [0.2] perspective [0.5] i hope that might be of interest to many of you [0.4] who have either been [0.3] subjected to what you consider imperialism [0.4] or indeed have been part of states and societies that have themselves [0.4] been imperialistic [0.4] or are still being so [0.8] because whatever one says about [0.5] the phase of European domination on a global scale [0.6] which was such a feature [0.5] of the [0.2] late nineteenth [0.3] and the [0.3] first part of the twentieth century [0.6] European colonial empires [0.3] may come and go [0.4] but the phenomenon [0.2] of imperialism [0. 5] goes on [0.5] and it goes on [0.3] in different forms and in different places [0.4] all the time [0.9] so what i'm going to try to talk to you about is [0.5] this subject of what is imperialism [0.6] and what can we say [0.4] about some of its [0.3] actual [0.2] er record [0.6] in the past [0.5] and the recent past nm0078: i think [0.2] we have to begin [1.3] by [0.4] facing up to the fact that today [0.5] we live in an age of anti-imperialism [1.3] all over the world there is a reaction [0.5] against the things which we associate [0.4] with the [0.2] phenomenon of imperialism [1.1] the domination [0.6] of weak countries [0. 5] or societies [0.7] by the strong [1.5] the economic exploitation [0.4] of the natural resources [0.4] of often poorer countries [0.7] er in the world [0. 5] by the rich [0.2] industrialized [0.3] parts of the world [1.4] the gross [0. 5] and in many parts of the world [0.6] the widening gap [0.6] in terms of the political [0.6] military [0.4] and economic power [0.5] and standards of living [0.9] between the rich [0.5] and the poor countries [1.9] the belief [0.6] i-, [0.3] in one society [0.8] of the absolute superiority [0.3] of its culture [0. 7] its values [0.5] and its beliefs [0.9] and the attempt to impose these [0.3] upon the people of other cultures [0.6] and often of different races [1.3] today in Europe and America [0.8] in the countries of the [0.3] ex-Soviet Union [0.7] and in Asia [0.7] as well as in [0.4] all those areas of the what used to be called [0.4] the Third World [0.7] which were until so recently [0.5] under European influence [0.4] or indeed [0.3] colonial rule [1.0] imperialism is regarded as a bad thing [1.4] to call someone an imperialist [0.7] is a term of abuse [0.9] like calling them a racist [0.9] or a fascist [1.6] the very word imperialism i think you'll agree [0.4] is loaded with emotional and ideological overtones [1.6] if i [0.2] say for instance that [0.2] recently i have been studying and contributing to a new Oxford history of the British empire [0.6] which i have [1.1] that is a clear [0.4] concrete and perfectly respectable [0.2] historical subject [0.5] to study [0.5] it was indeed [0.4] the most powerful and extensive empire [0.4] in world history [1. 3] but if i say i'm studying and writing [0.5] about the history of British imperialism [0.8] that's already [0.4] a somewhat different thing [1.7] the kind of books that are written about it [0.4] are different too [1.4] the point i'm making is well illustrated [0.4] if one looks up the word for one aspect of imperialism [0.7] colonialism [0.8] in two [0.3] different [0.2] dictionaries [1.5] in Webster's American Dictionary [0.8] colonialism [0.5] is simply defined as [1.1] the system in which [0.2] a country maintains foreign colonies [2.1] but if you take the [0.4] dictionary produced in the Soviet Union of foreign s-, words and look up the word [0.4] kolonizatsiya [1.0] you find it defined as [0.7] the seizure of a country or region by imperialists [0.3] accompanied by the subjection [0.3] brutal exploitation [0.3] and sometimes the annihilation [0.3] of the local population [1.6] you see what i mean about the ideological [0.4] and emotional overtones that almost inevitably [0.4] creep into discussions [0. 4] about the phenomenon [0.3] we are addressing nm0078: now as a historian i believe that if history teaches us anything [0.8] it should teach us to take the long term view [0.9] of what happens [0.8] and has happened [0.6] in the past [0.4] seeing ourselves in the long [0.4] perspective of time [1.0] and not just [0.4] in terms of the present [0.7] and its very particular attitudes [0.4] values [0.3] and preoccupations [0.6] that i'd say is [0.2] one of the [0.2] key [0.3] things that the study of history [0.6] can give us [1.5] and in any long view [0.7] empires [0.5] and what today we mean by imperialism [1.4] are a perennial feature [0.4] of history [1.4] indeed until very recently [1.2] until [0.5] almost the twentieth century in fact [0.9] that impulse to expansion [0.2] by powerful states [0.6] usually at the expense of the weak [0.7] has been regarded not only as a part of the natural order of things [0.9] but also as a force for good [1.5] a movement which was bound up with the progress [0.3] of the world [0.4] as a whole [1.1] and certainly [0.4] of its more backward [0.2] regions [1.5] it's in this context that i think [0.2] probably the history of the British empire will eventually in the long run [0.5] come to be set [0.5] in perspective [1.1] after all [0.5] that is certainly what has happened [0.3] to the history of the ancient Roman empire [1.1] it was the conquest [0.4] colonization [0.5] and incorporation into the Roman empire [0.5] of the backward areas [0.2] like the British Isles [0.4] and France [1.1] which first drew these areas into the mainstream of European history [1.5] certainly [0.6] in Europe as a whole [0.2] it's a fact [0.4] that after the collapse of the Roman empire [0.5] in the fifth century [0.4] A-D [1.0] the memory of that empire [0.2] haunted and encouraged [0.4] the attempts of later generations [0. 4] to recreate it [1.3] Charlemagne [0.7] the Hohenstaufen kings of Germany [0. 6] the Habsburgs [0.5] and the long history of the Holy Roman Empire [0.2] as it was called [0.4] right down to [0.2] its disappearance in eighteen-o-six [0. 7] all these [0.4] in one way or another [0.6] drew some of their inspiration [0.9] from the dignity [0.7] glory [0.6] grandeur and [0.2] power [0.7] associated with Rome [1.6] the very term imperialism [1.5] deriving as it does from the Latin word [0.2] imperator [0.9] has clearly [0.3] Roman associations [1.9] and if we look outside Europe [0.5] as i think one should encourage [0.2] everybody [0.2] to do [0.4] in terms of this term [1.2] to the world at large [0.7] then again we find that in the world at large empires [0.3] and imperial systems [0.4] are a perennial feature of history [1.7] the Ming [0.4] and Manchu empires in China [0.9] from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries [1.3] the Ottoman empire [0.4] in the Middle East [1.3] the Mogul empire [0.2] in India [1.4] the Aztec and Inca empires [0.2] in Central and South America [1.3] the Egyptian [0.6] and Fulani [0.5] and Zulu empires [0.3] in Africa [1.3] the Japanese empire [0.8] in Korea [0.6] Manchuria [0.7] and China [1.5] wherever we look [0.5] it would seem [0. 2] that empires [0.8] and what we today would regard as imperial situations [0. 6] are as old [0.4] and continuous [0.4] as the formation of state systems [0. 4] by humankind nm0078: the term [0.2] imperialism is [0.3] as i've said such a loose and loaded word [0.3] today [0.8] that in any discussion it's necessary to define [0.2] what you mean [1.8] and [0.2] in this [1.0] terms [0.5] by what one means quite carefully [0.8] because one of the reasons [0.4] why [0.3] so many of the books about imperialism are so unsatisfactory [0.8] is that different writers use the term [0.3] to mean quite different things [1.3] now since i'm painting with a very broad indeed a global brush [0.4] this morning [0.6] and i [0.2] still stand by the point that the question of definitions is always important [0.7] er let me suggest that there are broadly speaking two different meanings [0.4] of the term imperialism [1.6] firstly [0.3] there is the meaning [0.2] as i've already been using [0.4] the term [0.4] that is [0.7] to mean any effective [0.5] dominalation or [0.3] relationship of control [1.1] by one society [0.4] over another [1.4] that control [0.5] need not be direct [0.3] and [0.2] political [1.1] or involve military conquest or rule [1.1] that control can be indirect [0.6] or informal [0.8] between two independent countries [1.0] and take any of the forms [0.4] of economic [0.5] military [0. 5] social [0.5] or cultural [0.4] domination [0.7] rather than [0.2] outright [0.2] political rule [2.0] now defined like that [0.5] it's clear that imperialism is a perennial feature of history [0.7] and is to be found in all periods [0.3] and in very different parts [0.4] of the world [1.4] it's not making [0.8] imperialism [0.2] something peculiar [0.4] to Europeans [0.3] or Americans [0.4] in the nineteenth [0.3] and twentieth centuries nm0078: secondly [1.0] there is the loosely Marxist definition [0.6] given [0. 3] not by Karl Marx himself [0.4] he never uses the term [0.4] imperialism [0.9] but by Lenin [0.7] in his highly influential booklet [0.5] Imperialism [0.4] the Highest State of Capitalism [0.4] published [0.3] when Lenin seemed to be a no hope [0.4] revolutionary in exile [0.4] in nineteen- sixteen [1.5] there Lenin defined imperialism in terms of a particular stage [0. 7] what he called [0.4] the highest stage [0.4] in the development of capitalism [1.8] this is a much narrower definition [0.3] of imperialism [0.5] than my first one [1.1] but it has been extraordinarily influential [1.4] i find amongst [0.3] African students in African universities [0.4] what mine one might loosely call the Leninist definition of imperialism is simply taken [0.4] for granted [2.5] defined in Leninist terms [0.2] imperialism becomes a function [0.9] an inevitable result in his view [0.9] of the economic history [0.2] of certain [0.9] mainly western [0.6] societies [1.3] in terms of this definition imperialism didn't appear anywhere in the world [0.6] until the late nineteenth century [0.9] and in the twentieth century its main focus [0.3] has moved [0.2] from Europe [0.5] to the United States [0.5] but also to include Japan nm0078: the trouble with this definition of imperialism [0.3] is that even within the narrow restrictions [0.3] of nineteenth of twentieth century history [0.7] it raises very awkward questions [1.7] i can only [0.3] pause to [0.7] raise a few of these awkward questions here but you can perhaps [0.3] think about [0.2] some others yourself [1.2] firstly [0.4] if you've got er er a definition of imperialism that equates it as a certain stage [0.4] an inevitable stage in Lenin's view [0.4] in the development of capitalism [0.7] can [0.2] supposedly non-capitalist economies [0.4] and societies [0.4] be imperialistic [1.4] how else would we describe [0.5] the [0.3] activities of the ex-Soviet Union [0.7] or [0.4] some would say [0.2] to this day [0.5] of China [1.9] but how else would we describe [0.3] many other societies which have [0.2] ex-, [0.2] exhibited [0.5] that tendency to [0.3] expansionism [0.6] and domination of weaker [0.5] smaller [0.4] societies or states [0.3] that i've mentioned [1.2] if [0.2] one can think of cases of American [0.3] imperialism which fit that bill [0.8] what about the relationship [0.4] of [0. 5] the er of [0.3] the Soviet Union [0.4] with the [0.2] states of eastern Europe [0.4] in the [0.2] half-century or so [0.3] after the Second World War [0.7] or about the relationship to be provocative [0.5] between China and Tibet [0.4] to this day [1.8] so there's that first objection can so-called non- capitalist societies be imperialistic [0.6] the answer seems to be yes [1.6] secondly why is it that only some capitalist societies [0.3] become imperialistic [0.9] Portugal for instance [0.5] one of the [0.2] least developed [0.3] capitalist [0.3] societies [0.3] in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had a large [0.2] colonial empire and was one of the last [0.5] er European [0.3] colonial powers to decolonize [1.7] Switzerland [0.6] far more developed capitalist society [1.4] Belgium [0.4] with its huge colony [0.4] in the Congo [1.3] but not Denmark [0.6] again [0.2] a small but [0.4] highly developed highly capitalist [0.3] society [1.5] so er [0.8] if [0.5] imperialism is a stage an inevitable stage in the development of capitalism why is it that only certain states [0.4] seem to [0.3] er become imperialistic or [0.2] more so than others and why is it that many states which are [0.3] or societies which are not capitalistic [0.3] in their organization [0.3] w-, can become amongst the most expansionist [0.3] and imperialist [0.2] in modern history [1.4] the straight [0.5] Marxist-Leninist particularly Leninist definition of imperialism of proves so obviously unsatisfactory [0.4] that very few historians today [0. 4] in fact adopt it [1.2] but many [0.2] more [0.3] have [0.4] utilized and worked with what might be called a looser [0.6] er Marxist definition [1.5] and i would say that some of the aspects [0.3] of the Marxist definition of [0.3] er imperialism have been by far the most [0.2] influential and are nearly always brought in [0.7] if as we've time for some questions and discussion afterwards i'm sure some of you will bring in this crucial if you like [0.3] economic [0.2] dimension [0.8] to [0.3] imperialism at least [0.3] in the world [0.4] in modern centuries nm0078: much of the literature [0.8] about [0.2] imperialism [0.4] is not only ideologically charged as i said earlier [0.5] but it's often been rather heavily theoretical [0.4] and full of grand assertions and a bit light [0.4] on concrete examples [0.7] many of which are taken very selectively [1.3] now you can [0.3] see at once how if you've got a grand general theory [0.4] about a phenomenon like imperialism [0.6] it's got to be able to stand up against the test [0.2] of all sorts of empirical [0.2] actual [0.4] examples in history [0.5] if it fails that test [0.4] er against [0.2] the the actual empirical evidence from the past [0.2] of a whole number [0.4] of cases then that undermines [0.3] the validity [0.4] of [0.2] the general theory [1.1] and i suppose where we are today is that some of the Marxist- Leninist [0.2] dimensions [0.4] of what goes into the making of imperialism [0. 5] has become [0.2] what G N Sanderson has called a background [0.3] theory [0. 8] er the trouble with [0.2] background theories is they do remain in the background and they often become rather ineffective [0.4] for actually [0.2] explaining why particular societies at particular times [0.4] became as expansionist [0.4] as they did nm0078: just a further word about the danger of selectivity i said general theories about anything [0.4] have to stand up [0.5] against the test of a wide range of empirical examples [0.6] to take the African continent for example [0.7] it's no good selecting South Africa [0.6] the only [0.5] major industrialized country [0.2] in Africa [0.4] and a key world producer of gold [0.3] and a whole series of other [0.2] strategic minerals [0.4] and ignoring all the other [0.4] African examples [0. 4] which don't have minerals and which don't fit [0.2] the theory [0.3] you see what i mean about the danger of using [0.2] selective [0.3] examples simply to support a theory [0.3] which you've decided beforehand [0.3] er explains the phenomenon you're doing good historians [0.3] are more sceptical than that [0. 5] the theory has to be [0.4] stand the test [0.3] across a very wide range [0. 3] of examples if it's to stand up [0.5] as a general theory nm0078: now i'm using the term imperialism in this lecture [0.3] in accordance with really the first definition i gave [0.9] i would simply define imperialism as the tendency of a state [0.7] to expand within the confines set [0.8] by its economic [0.5] and political strength [1.0] and military and naval power [0.4] let me repeat that [0.2] i can see you all scribbling it down [1.6] [laughter] imperialism as the tendency of a state [0. 7] to expand within the confines set [0.6] by its economic [0.3] and political strength [0.7] and military [0.4] and naval [0.4] power [0.7] of course i include [0.3] air power in that [0.5] and nuclear power [0.4] in the [0.2] twentieth century [1.0] this seems to me as useful [0.5] a definition [0.2] for studying the phenomenon of imperialism [0.5] as in [0.5] the present age as in past ages [1.6] but [0.5] i'd like first to emphasize er f-, three very important contributions [0.4] to the debate about what imperialism is [0.5] that i think Marxist writing or loosely Marxist writing has made [0.5] because of course [0.3] er it remains true you don't have to be a [0.2] a Marxist or a Leninist [0.3] to [0.2] take on board some of the valid points [0.3] that both writers have made [0.4] about the phenomenon of imperialism [0.4] in the modern world nm0078: first there is the point i made just a minute or two ago [0.3] that following the general Marxist approach to history [0.5] the theory of imperialism in Marxist terms is after all [0.4] part of a materialist [0.2] explanation of history generally [1.1] the subject of imperialism [0.4] has [0.7] got to bring in i think a discussion about the importance of [0.4] economic [0.2] factors [0.6] in imperialistic relationships [0.5] not [0.3] purely [0.4] political factors [0.2] of course economics and politics can [0.3] become [0.2] closely together [0.5] but you can't leave out [0.4] examining the economic dimension [0.4] to imperialistic relationships now [1.1] i think [0.7] as often is true [0.5] the [0.3] perhaps exaggerated [0.2] emphasis indeed making ec-, the economic dimension the be all and end all [0.4] of imperialism in the sort of narrower [0.5] Leninist view of imperialism [0.4] has actually been beneficial [0.3] to non-Leninist non-Marxist historians [0.3] in making them [0.2] ask th-, questions about the economic dimension of imperialism wherever that [0.5] phenomenon [0.6] is studied nm0078: secondly [0.4] i think the whole debate about what is imperialism [0.4] from [0.2] a [0.3] Marxist-Leninist perspective [0.7] has stressed that [0.2] informal [0.3] empire [0.7] as opposed to formal empire [0.3] formal empire being the empire formal political rule [0.5] areas [0.2] that the British liked to think of as painted red on the map [0.6] in the [0.3] British empire case [0.5] as opposed to areas you simply traded with [0.3] but didn't rule over directly [0.2] had informal relationships [0.3] with [0.7] i think there's been a great er usefulness [0.2] in pointing to [0.5] informal relationships between states [0.3] which can be very imperialistic [0.3] even where there isn't outright military conquest [0.3] or political rule [0.5] or suggestio-, [0.2] or or subjection [1.9] in the case of the United States in the twentieth century [0. 6] this [0.2] informal [0.7] imperial rule [0.8] or role [0.6] is what a large part of the discussion [0.5] about the imperialistic nature [0.4] of the United States is actually [0.4] er about [0.6] the formal part [0.4] of an American empire [0.3] which at the very end of the [0.2] nineteenth century included areas like Cuba [0.5] and er the Philippines [0.3] it was of course but the tip of the iceberg [0.3] had a far far larger [0.5] informal [0.4] American [0.4] er influence [0.7] not just economic but with strong economic aspects to it [1. 2] so [0.4] that [0.2] difference between [0.3] informal imperialism as opposed to formal imperialism is i think again something we all [0.3] at the end of the twentieth century [0.4] er take for granted as part of the debate it certainly is a [0.3] large [0.2] part of it nm0078: thirdly [0.3] the focus of many [0.2] Marxist writers [0.5] was on the central dynamic role of the industrial revolution [0.9] and the continually [0. 4] transforming effects [0.5] of industrialization [0.6] and the what this has brought about [0.5] in not just in terms of the economic development [0.3] of individual [0.2] countries [0.6] but in terms of the establishment of a world economy [1.0] the bringing [0.4] into being [0.6] of an international [0.4] world [0.5] trading economy [1.2] run [0.5] on [0.3] basically capitalist principles [0.6] to which different parts of the world [0.4] became increasingly [0.2] linked [0.4] or tied in [0.6] often as a direct result [0.4] of [0.4] being colonized [0.3] and of a period of colonial rule [0.6] in other words [0.3] colonialism [0.2] one form of imperialism [0.5] acted as a means by which all sorts of [0.4] previously often rather undeveloped rather isolated parts of the world [0.4] became tied in linked in [0.4] to a worldwide trading system [0.5] which really has only come into being [0.3] in the course of the last century [0.3] in its full [0.4] respect [0.5] now we at the end of the twentieth century are acutely aware [0.5] of the truth of this [0.4] in terms of [0.2] globalization [0.7] er in the buzz phrase [0.4] of the [0.2] current er [0.5] time [0.5] the way in which more and more parts of the world are not [0.3] autonomous [0.3] not [0.2] self-sufficient [0.2] are inevitably irretrievably and [0.5] in many cases [0.3] for [0.3] in their own interests [0.3] er actually tied in to a worldwide [0.3] er trading [0.3] system [1.1] now this again i think [0.4] er the development of this worldwide trading system [0.3] has again b-, [0.3] been a large [0.4] element that writing [0.4] on [0.6] the left is one can call it that [0.4] has focused as one of the [0.6] legacies [0.2] if you like [0.4] of the era of high imperialism or the new imperialism [0.4] in which the West played such a strong and im-, [0.4] dominant role [0.4] from the late nineteenth century on into the mid [0.4] er twentieth century [2.1] thus in all sorts of [0.3] fundamental ways [0.5] er many of which i [0.2] haven't time to go into here but you're very free to ask questions about it at the end [1.0] but [0.4] in all sorts of ways in the questions that this second Marxist-Leninist definition of imperialism has raised [0.5] it seems to me that it's actually been beneficial [0.7] to historians of all [0.3] kinds [0.9] er [1.2] by and large in other words [0.7] it's been fr-, most fruitful i would say [0.4] when this [0.3] these dimensions have been taken out of the ideological straitjacket [0.5] of Marxism or Leninism [0.2] per se [0.6] and been applied specifically [0.3] and empirically [0.4] in all sorts of [0.3] situations [0.4] er in [0.2] the modern world nm0078: so [0.6] to conclude the first part of my lecture [1.1] on about this question what is imperialism [0.2] definitions of it [1.1] i regard imperialism as a perennial phenomenon [0.2] in history [1.1] taking all sorts of different forms [0.9] in all [0.2] parts of the world [0.6] in different places [0.4] at different times [0.3] the forms may change [0.5] but the phenomenon [0.5] of imperialism [0.5] goes on [1.4] and i would say that is just as true [0.4] in the [0.3] post- [0.2] decolonization of the European colonial empires [0.3] era [0.2] in which we are now living [0.5] as in [0.2] eras before [0.3] that great expansion of the European colonial empires [0.4] at the end of the nineteenth century [0.6] in other words imperialism [0.4] goes on but its forms change [0.3] and the focus [0.2] of where it's going on most intensively [0.3] changes from time to time as well [1.3] and it is to do with that [0.2] tendency of [0.2] strong states [0.2] or societies to expand [0.4] beyond their quote national boundaries [0.7] and to dominate militarily politically [0.5] economically [0.4] or culturally [1.2] weaker states [0.5] or societies [0.8] which may be even adjacent to them [0.6] in the same [0.3] part of the world [0.7] or situated overseas [0.3] imperialism is by no means [0.4] necessarily [0.3] an overseas [0.3] er phenomenon nm0078: i want in the second part of my talk to turn to [0.6] the consideration of this phenomenon in imperialism [0.2] in the twentieth century [0.3] since that is probably [0.3] er what most er [0.6] interests [0.4] er many of you [2. 2] i actually specialize in the nineteenth century but i also study [0.5] the er [0.4] er [0.3] phenomenon of colonial empires [0.4] in the [0.2] twentieth century and their dissolution [0.5] in the second half of the twentieth century [0.4] which itself raises very interesting questions about our times [0.6] the second half of the twentieth century has been very [0.5] bad for empires of all kinds [0.3] not just the European colonial empires [0.4] but more recently the dissolution [0.4] of the Soviet [0. 3] empire [0.3] one of the last and [0.2] largest [0.3] empires [0.4] of the [0. 2] twentieth century [0.6] so what i began by saying that we live in an era of anti-imperialism [0.8] i'm [0.2] concluding this section by saying [0.4] means that the phenomenon of imperialism [0.2] and the driver wheels which drive it [0.2] have certainly not disappeared [0.4] from the world [0.4] as we all know [0.6] but the actual forms [0.3] that it takes [0.3] and the actual areas of the world [0.4] er [0.2] change [0.2] and are changing [0.6] where colonialism ends [0.2] neo-colonialism and other forms of imperialism [0.4] begin [0.4] if you like nm0078: the classical phase [0.2] of nineteenth century imperialism [0.4] one might say began to be brought to an end [0.4] by the First World War [1.0] although it's true [0.4] that the [0.3] greatest of the nineteenth century colonial empires the British [0.5] only reached its greatest territorial extent after the First World worl-, [0.2] War [0.8] with the redistribution [0.4] of the ex- German and ex-Ottoman [0.4] er territories [1.4] this [0.4] British empire which [0.4] er [0.4] Oxford University Press is producing [0.5] in the next [0. 2] two years f-, [0.2] five volumes [0.3] over its sort of four-hundred year history the British empire [0.8] brought a total of something like six-hundred- million people [0.6] under British rule [0.8] about a quarter [0.5] of the world's population [1.2] er so it's no wonder that er [0.4] some British historians like myself are interested in it how did it come into being how was it sustained why did it come to an end [0.4] these questions are very live [0. 4] in historical debates today [2.4] nonetheless [0.2] i would say [0.2] that [0.5] already in the nineteen-twenties and thirties [0.5] the British empire like all the other European colonial empires some of them of very recent creation [0.6] was already weakening [1.0] by the end of the Second World War [0.6] it was in a state of disintegration [1.0] today [0.6] it has gone [0.6] and many would f-, [0.3] put the sort of full stop [0.6] on [0.2] the British [0.3] empire [0.6] in terms of its exercises in decolonization [0.4] with er the [0. 5] er [0.5] the [0.3] er end of British rule in Hong Kong [0.5] in [0.2] er nineteen-ninety-seven [1.2] yet we know [0.8] imperialism is alive and well [0. 4] and living [0.4] in almost all parts of the world [0.4] today nm0078: but whereas in the past [0.4] imperialism was usually seen in terms of an imbalance of power [0.6] in the political and military relationship [0.5] between states [1.0] in the twentieth century and partly as a result of that [0. 3] Marxist influence [0.3] that i emphasized earlier [0.4] there's been increasing emphasis upon [0.3] the [0.2] informal relationships [0.4] of [0.3] an imperialistic nature [0.4] and the economic dimensions [0.3] to those relationships [0.6] on the economic motives and means [0.4] at work [0.4] in the relationship [0.4] between two states [0.4] and of course crucially at the great imbalance [0.3] in economic [0.2] power [0.5] between [0.4] er [0.3] trading partners [0.4] investing partners [0.3] those exporting raw materials [0.3] those acquiring [0.4] those raw materials [0.3] themselves a crucial part [0.3] of the continuing process [0.2] of industrialization [0.4] which i mentioned earlier nm0078: colonialism [0.6] certainly colonialism in the sense of the European colonial [0.4] empires [0.3] in Africa [0.5] and Asia [0.8] we can now see was only one form [0.6] of imperialism [1.0] which can be replaced by other forms of dominance [0.4] influence [0.3] or control [1.8] colonial empires may have disappeared [0.9] but imperialistic relationships [0.4] continue [1.4] as Kwame Nkrumah [0.4] the first [0.3] er leader of an independent [0.3] Ghana [1.2] said [0.9] where colonialism ends [0.5] neo-colonialism begins [0.7] the essence of neo-colonialism he said [0.5] is that the state which is subject to it [0.4] is in theory independent [0.5] and has all the outward trappings [0.2] of international sovereignty [0.8] but in reality [0.5] its economic system [0. 4] and thus its internal policy [0.5] is directed [0.4] from outside [1.8] now this emphasis on the economic aspect is typical [0.3] of a great deal of writing [0.4] on twentieth century [0.5] imperialism [1.4] Michael Barrett Brown actually defines imperialism in the late twentieth century as [0.5] a complex of economic political and military relations by which the less economically developed lands [0.4] are subjected to the more economically developed [0.4] imperialism remains the best word [0.3] for the general system of [0.2] unequal [0.3] world [0.3] economic [0.4] relations [1.9] so [1.0] this emphasis on the economic aspect of imperialism is a very striking feature [0.6] at the debate about what imperialism is [0.4] at the end of the twentieth century nm0078: but whereas earlier imperialism tended to be considered in terms of relationships between governments [0.7] and between states [1.0] modern imperialism is also seen in terms of informal relations [0.5] between societies [0.4] and of all sorts of groups of people [0.4] and institutions [0.3] within and beyond those individual [0.3] states or societies [0.3] in a world made up [0.3] of sovereign nation states [0.5] er [0.4] under the United Nations [0.9] businessmen [0.7] banks [0.6] missionaries [0.5] United Nations organizations [0.4] and multinational corporations [0.4] are now seen as the new arenas [0.2] if you like [0.3] in which imperialism can be exhibited [1.4] above all at the end of the twentieth century there is perhaps an awareness of the framework set by the international economy [0.6] that has come into being [0.6] the terms of trade [1.2] for instance especially between primary producing countries [0.5] and industrialized countries [0.5] which in so many respects seem disadvantageous [0.4] to the poor [0.3] and weak [0.6] and to the advantage [0.4] of the rich [0.5] and strong [2.2] so that's a second [0.4] er feature of imperialism in the [0.4] present age nm0078: thirdly [1.2] the instruments of imperialism in the twentieth century have also changed [0.3] and diversified [0.7] where in the past [0.3] what was called gunboat diplomacy [1.4] and a fairly crude use [0.3] of political [0.2] naval or military power [0.5] often sufficed [0.9] today [0.5] the instruments of imperialism are more likely to be the granting or withholding of economic aid [0.8] loans [0.3] or other forms [0.2] of technical or economic assistance [0.4] which [0.4] there should be no doubt about it [0.3] can amount to the difference between whether a political regime in some fairly fragile [0.7] ex-Third World state [0.5] falls [0.4] or stays in power [1.5] and a system [0.2] of what was [0.8] rightly called client states [0.4] has developed [0.5] in which many such regimes are kept in place [0.3] as clients of some larger [0.2] great [0.3] power [0.4] in the world [0.5] and you if you think that's purely an American phenomenon [0.4] you're wrong [0.4] other states in the twentieth century have proved very adept [0.3] at the system of clientage [0.4] if one could call it that [0.3] er as well nm0078: the aims behind all this [0.4] remain largely what they always have been [1.4] they may be in economic [0.8] the pursuit of markets [0.8] the search for [0.3] raw materials [0.7] or oil [0.7] or energy supplies [1.3] or they may be strategic [1.0] the defence [0.2] of [0.5] territory or of [0.4] interests [0.5] including economic interests elsewhere [0.3] in other words one area becomes important for its strategic importance [0.3] in relation to somewhere else [0.3] not for anything [0.3] particularly valuable economically [0.4] in itself [1.4] the pursuit of political power [1.1] and an influential [0.7] international role [2.1] it can also be to do with ideology [1.3] er [0. 2] the twentieth century is a highly ideologically charged era [1.6] saving a small country from domination by communism [0.4] was a hardy perennial [0.6] in the ideological vocabulary of the West [0.8] and it had its [0.2] er [0.8] equivalent [0.6] in the East [0.4] in the years [0.4] of the Cold War [0.5] which we have all [0.2] just [0.4] emerged from or are emerging from nm0078: quite clearly i would argue [0.2] imperialism in the twentieth century has not been limited [0.6] to societies with capitalistic [0.4] economic systems [0.9] nor has it been limited [0.4] to relations with countries [0.2] far away overseas [1.2] both the United States [0.5] and the Soviet Union [0.8] spent most of the nineteenth century expanding into adjacent land areas on a huge scale [0.8] in the [0.4] er [0.9] er Soviet case [0.3] it was er a Russian [0.2] expansionism right across to the [0.2] Pacific [0.4] at Vladivostok and down [0.3] to the Middle East to the Caucasus [0.8] in the case of the United States it was right across from the Atlantic [0.4] to [0.2] the Pacific [0.7] though one should not antedate [0.4] the [0.8] period before which [0.3] the United States emerged as a world power this was only [0.5] in [0.2] the twentieth century [1.1] so in other words expanding into adjacent areas [0.4] can be [0.3] er seen to have been a major feature of the [0.6] two of the great [0.2] powers of the twentieth century [0.9] Russian expansion into eastern Europe [0.4] during and after the Second World War [0.8] took the form of indirect [0.4] rather than direct political rule [0.9] but it was a system of what i call clientage [0.2] client states [0.4] as the military interventions in East Germany [0.4] in Hungary nineteen-fifty-six in Czechoslovakia [0.4] in nineteen-sixty-eight [0. 3] and the threat of intervention in Poland in nineteen-eighty-one [0.5] all demonstrate [1.2] Russian [0.2] dominance [0.8] in all these areas [0.4] of [0. 2] er eastern Europe therefore remain imperialistic [0.6] and [0.2] as effective in many ways [0.5] for being indirect [0.3] er probably more effective than for being direct [0.7] and certainly it could and was backed up by military power [0.5] er when necessary [1.5] er [0.2] the Brezhnev doctrine as it was called in the years of the Cold War [0.5] whereby [0.3] the destabilization of any part [0.4] of the Soviet [0.2] bloc [0.3] was regarded as a threat to the whole [0.5] was in some ways [0.3] a corresponding [0.4] er equivalent [0. 5] to the American Monroe doctrine [0.4] which goes right back to the first [0. 2] third of the nineteenth century [1.0] but the United States also [0.4] has adopted a system in the twentieth century of what i call [0.7] client states [0. 3] in the Caribbean [0.4] and Central and South America [0.6] and the United States on occasion has not hesitated to send in the Marines [0.4] to Caribbean countries [0.4] within the American sphere of interest [0.4] whenever necessary [0.9] Santo Domingo in nineteen-sixty-five and Grenada [0.4] in the early nineteen-eighties [0.3] are just two very [0.3] obvious examples in a fairly long series [0.4] of United States interventions [0.3] in that area [0.7] usually justified [0.3] ideologically [0.4] in terms of preserving law and order [0.4] or democracy [0.5] or a capitalist [0.4] free trading [0.5] system nm0078: in other words the fact is that the Cold War era the second half of the twentieth century was the heyday [0.4] of a [0.3] superpower [0.5] er forms of imperialism [0.4] in which both of the blocs [0.3] Soviet [0.2] and [0.4] er that [0.2] under the United States the West [0.5] managed [0.3] client states [0.4] and what they called spheres of interest [0.5] what in the nineteenth century have been called spheres of influence [0.7] in which [0.6] we can only [0.5] er [0.7] say that the relationships were imperialistic [1.7] in this activity there were losses as well as gains [0.6] Iran for instance after nineteen-seventy-nine [0.4] was a loss [0.3] to the United States it became a [0.4] not only an important [0.3] oil producer but it ceased to be a client state [0.4] in the way it had been [0.4] and the [0.3] last years of the shah [1.0] and one might say that Afghanistan if ever it was a very effective [0.4] client state [0.2] ceased to be so [0.3] after the withdrawal [0.3] of the Soviet Union [0.5] from Afghanistan [0.5] and the sorry state [0.2] of civil war and collapse [0.3] which Afghanistan has been in [0.4] er since [1.1] certain [0.3] countries have been remarkably effective [0.5] in the [0.4] height [0.2] of the Cold War years the nineteen-fifties [0.4] at playing off [0. 4] one [0.4] bloc [0.3] against the other [0.4] i think particularly of Egypt [0.2] for instance [0.4] under [0.3] General Abdul [0.3] Nasser [0.5] very effective at in a way seeking to get [0.2] er gain [0.3] something [0.3] from relations with both blocs without being totally subservient [0.4] to either one of them nm0078: all this [0.4] leads me on to suggest that modern imperialism [0.7] tends to operate informally [0.3] through a wide range [0.5] of economic [0.3] and political forms of influence and pressure [1.1] rather than [0.3] as in the [0.7] old days of imperialism [0.6] through outright territorial annexation [0. 5] military conquest [0.4] or formal [0.3] colonial [0.3] rule [1.7] investment [0.6] or not investing [0.9] trade [0.9] arms sales [0.4] loans [0.6] raw materials [0.4] aid programmes [0.4] the export of modern technology [0.6] these are the new means [0.3] by which influence [0.4] is exerted [1.1] but aircraft carrier diplomacy [0.6] and outright military invasion [0.8] can be resorted to [0.4] on occasion [0.7] and still are [3.1] the basic accusation [0. 4] against imperialism in the modern age [0.3] is that it is by definition exploitative [1.4] and what one means by exploitation [0.8] is that the terms of the relationship between the two parties or two countries [0.9] are grossly unequal [1.0] with most of the gains [0.3] going to the richer [0.5] or stronger [0.6] partner [3.1] there is i think no doubt [0. 5] that trade [0.6] and investment [0.6] and purchase of raw materials and all those other things are important [0.7] er to certain developed industrialized [0.3] countries [1.1] and that without these economic connections [0.4] and leverage [0.4] the profits of some industries would be lower [0.8] the costs higher [0.7] the goods scarcer [0.8] and more expensive [1.2] but we need to look a f-, at a few [0.6] of the basic underlying [0.5] er [0.3] truths facts [0.6] er i think before we [0.6] easily fall back on er the assumption that all imperialistic relations [0.5] are exploitative nm0078: first [0.3] exports [1.8] if we take the most powerful country in the world today the United States [1.2] we have to face the fact [0.2] that the markets [0.4] of the poorer countries of the world [0.6] are relatively unimportant [1.2] little more than about one per cent [0.5] of the gross national product [1.6] as markets for all the richer countries [0.7] the poorer countries of the world [0.5] have been declining [0.5] in relative importance [0.3] during the last thirty [0.4] or forty years [1.2] poorer countries [0.7] amounted to about thirty per cent of world trade [0.4] in the nineteen-fifties [0.8] twenty per cent [0.3] in the nineteen-sixties [0. 4] and the gap in the nineteen-seventies and eighties as we all know [0.3] between the rich and the poor [0.3] has increased [1.0] meanwhile [0.5] the markets [0.3] for manufactured goods and so on [0.3] of the richer countries have been growing much m-, faster [0.7] than those of the poorer countries [1. 0] because that [0.4] the richer countries is where the purchasing power [0.5] is [1.2] as in the nineteenth century [0.3] so in the twentieth century [0.5] trade follows demand [0.9] and trade between the richer countries [0.5] that is trade between [0.2] richer countries [0.4] within what has come [0.4] by some economists to be called a metropolitan centre [0.5] of the world trading system [0.5] is increasingly as we all know [0.2] the real source of growth [0.4] in the capitalist economies [0.6] it's not the trade [0.3] between the rich [0.4] and the poor [0.8] the rich at the centre [0.2] the poor countries at the periphery [1.6] so in terms of this first category exports [1.1] the rich countries [0.2] carry out the most important part of their trade [0.4] with each other [0.4] overwhelmingly so [1.4] for the economic growth of the centre [1.0] trade with the periphery [0.6] it's therefore [0.3] peripheral [1.0] and much less important [0.5] than the trade of the richer countries [0.7] with each other [0. 9] that's one hard [0.6] fact nm0078: second [0.6] investment [1.8] as sources for investment [0.5] the poor countries are also declining in importance [1.2] large scale capital investment [0.7] goes to areas under a capitalist international [0.5] economy [0.7] with the most profitable [0.5] and rapidly growing [0.3] markets [1.2] not the poor countries [1.3] more than two-thirds of all United States foreign investment [0. 5] is with mature [0.3] developed [0.2] countries [0.9] in Europe [0.5] Canada [0.4] and elsewhere [1.3] in other words also under the heading investment [0. 8] the [0.3] rich countries [0.6] therefore [0.2] need each other [1.0] much more [0.5] than they need the poor countries [0.6] there are certain [0.4] exceptions [0.2] oil rich [0.4] Arab countries in the Middle East [0.3] are one obvious one which i shall come to in just a minute [1.3] but this point about the rich economies needing each other more far far more [0.5] than they need the poor countries is the terrible truth we live with [0.5] at the end of the twentieth century [0.8] it's a very grim conclusion [0.7] with grim implications for the poorer countries [0.5] in the coming [0.3] twenty-first century [1.1] Gunnar Myrdal [0.2] one of the great historians of Asia and of Europe's [0.4] er interaction with Asia [0.6] put the point [0.2] quite a long time ago unforgettably [0.5] in one of his books [0.7] when he said that the entire Indian subcontinent could sink beneath the waves of the Indian Ocean [0.6] without this causing so much as a ripple [0.6] on the economies [0.3] of the developed countries of the world nm0078: after [0.2] trade [0.5] and investment [0.5] thirdly [0.3] raw materials [1.4] this clearly [0.5] is the area where poor countries [0.3] surely possess [0.2] their chief importance [0.3] in relation to the rich countries [0.7] most industrialized countries are very dependent [0.4] on imports of minerals [0.3] fuels [0.3] raw materials and other [0.2] primary products [0.2] from less [0.3] developed [0.4] countries [0. 8] and some of those [0.2] producers of these [0.2] crucial [0.3] er [0.4] commodities [0.5] are on occasion [0.2] able to combine [0.3] to extract a better deal [0.4] from the rich countries [0.3] whose trade they are dependent on i'm thinking of [0.3] the temporary cartel of the OPEC [0.3] producers for instance [0.2] which caused such an oil price rise [0.3] in the nineteen- seventies [1.3] but [0.7] too often [0.7] the question of price [0.7] and the question of alternatives [0.4] to these imports [0.4] are forgotten [1.1] but both of these questions price [0.4] and are there alternatives are crucial [1. 2] so long as a raw material or so long as many raw materials this isn't true of all [0.4] oil is [0.3] an exception in various ways [0.6] but so long as a raw material can be extracted [1.1] plentifully [0.7] and imported [0.5] relatively [0.2] cheaply [0.6] it will be imported [1.2] but if difficulties occur [0.4] in relation to extraction [0.6] or the price [0.2] is dramatically increased [0.5] this stimulates [0.2] a search for alternatives [0.9] one only has to look [0.3] at the way in which the development of synthetics [0.5] in the last half-century [0.4] has replaced [0.4] what were previously [0.4] er goods manufactured with raw materials like rubber [0.4] for instance to see the [0.3] truth of what i'm saying [0.8] in other words where a particular primary product [0.3] becomes very expensive or difficult to obtain in sufficient quantities [0.4] this stimulates [0.2] a search out for a development [0.4] er of a synthetic replacement [0.4] and the huge growth of plastics and synthetics of all kinds there's a very interesting [0.4] case [0. 3] in the twentieth century of precisely that [1.2] the same [0.4] can be seen in certain regional areas i haven't time to go into that [0.4] in terms of er certain [0.2] topics like er fuel [0.4] as well [0.8] er coal for instance the rise and fall [0.3] and sometimes revival [0.4] of coal as a f-, [0.2] a fossil fuel resource over and against [0.3] that of alternatives [0.3] is again crucially affected by price [0.3] as well as [0.3] readily and [0.2] near-, nearby [0.4] er availability [2.6] i've watched this myself in southern Africa [0.2] where mineral extraction has been absolutely crucial [0.5] to the relatively successful [0.3] er development [0.4] of one or [0.2] two of the other positive cases in the African continent Botswana [0.4] for instance a [0.2] poor very poor country [0.4] in terms of rainfall [0.4] and er natural resources apart from [0.3] its minerals [0.6] or South Africa itself [0.3] with its astonishing [0.4] er ly-, rich endowment not just of gold [0.5] but of other minerals [0.6] the development [0.3] of gold mining has been absolutely crucial [0.3] of course to the take-off [0.3] of the [0.2] southern African economies [0.3] into industrialized developed [0.3] form [0.8] but er the actual [0.2] price of gold [0.4] er became highly destabilized [0.3] i can just remember in the nineteen early nineteen-eighties [0.4] er [0.2] no late seventies actually early eighties [0.4] when the price of gold rocketed up to eight-hundred dollars an ounce [0.4] this led to all sorts of mining tips [0.3] in southern Africa [0.3] it becoming viable to reprocess them to extract the remaining gold in them [0. 4] because the price of gold [0.3] made this viable whereas in a [0.2] earlier period where the price of gold had been lower [0.3] it simply wasn't economically viable [0.5] to do it so these things can change [2.3] and er many other er [0.4] subjects i could show about how [0.4] things can change [0.4] if the actual er price changes the extractability [0.4] changes [0.3] the demand for it changes [1.4] so the actual er [0.2] situation [0.5] vis-à-vis [0.3] these [0.2] er [0.2] questions [0.5] er [1.3] changes nm0078: i also er [1.3] think we should take in one other aspect of imperialism having spent some time on the economic side of it [0.9] and that is cultural [0. 3] imperialism [1.1] because we are far more sensitive at the end of the twentieth century [0.6] than many people in many parts of the world were at the beginning of this century [0.5] about the whole cultural a-, dimension [0.5] to imperialism [0.6] in the way that rich countries export their tastes [0.5] their preferences [0.6] their salary structures [0.5] and their values [0.3] to poorer countries [0.3] through a process [0.3] that the economists often like to call trickle-down marketing [1.9] poor countries [0.5] of the peripheral [0. 2] parts of the world [0.6] are thereby robbed of their chance to develop tastes [0.3] and lifestyles autonomously [0.8] instead [0.4] they become imitative [0.6] artificially stimulated [0.4] in their tastes [0.4] values [0.4] aspirations [0.3] by outside models [0.6] and processes [0.8] this is a process [0.2] nicely known as Coca-cola imperialism [0.8] [laughter] but it could easily be taken to er imply that from MacDonalds [0.3] or any of the other [0.3] er huge and very er [0.3] pervasive [0.3] er forms [0.3] of if you like in this case [0.2] western or American [1.0] er culture [1.9] now it's quite true that in many parts of Africa Asia Latin America [0.9] the new elites do tend to imitate [0.3] the tastes [0.2] and lifestyles of those in foreign [0.4] rich [0.2] countries [0. 8] the need of what is often a poor developing country [0.6] to save and live modestly [0.5] to [0.4] er [0.7] aid [0.3] its national [0.2] progress [0.2] and development [0.5] instead gets diverted [0.8] into conspicuous consumption [0.5] by the elite [0.3] often with the accompaniment of what's now called [0.4] in [0.4] the light of the Russian case crony capitalism [0.6] and elsewhere is [0.4] rife with [0.3] corruption [0.4] of various kinds [1.2] i remember [0.5] when i was about your age spending some time in Tanzania [0.6] where Julius Nyerere the [0.3] leader of independent Tanzania [0.4] gave a notable lead against this trend in a series of speeches in his doctrine of Ujamaa [0.9] er [0.2] the poorer people [0.4] he er well knew in Tanzania had a word to describe [0.5] any of the elite in their country [0.4] who started driving around in large cars